Michel Foucault and the “care of the self” approach to the Buddhist dharma

In line with a particular form of analysis as developed by Michel Foucault, this article proposes to elucidate a particular way of understanding Buddhist monastic culture as detailed in the rules concerning behaviour (the Vinaya), which may be called the “care of the self approach”. To develop this argument, the article first describes the nature of the Vinaya as a “training scheme” rather than a system of prohibitions or rules. Second, it examines the nature of confession or what is called “truth telling”. Third, it examines the nature of transgression of the Vinaya rules. Fourth, I examine the Vinaya and the role of ethics. Lastly, it is shown how these approaches to monastic Buddhism deal with the nature of the transformation of desire to construct what may be seen as a form of “ethical technology” or alternatively as a “transgressive technology”.     

Jñānagarbha and the “God's‐eye view”

In trying to define the difference between conventional and ultimate truth, the Mādhyamika Buddhist author Jñānagarbha ends up in paradoxical formulations. Putnam's discussion of Nietzsche's remark that “as the circle of science grows larger it touches paradox at more places” is presented as an illustration for Jñānagarbha's case. No comparison of Putnam and Jñānagarbha is intended as regards the contents of their presentations, the focus being only on the logical form of their argumentation. The paradoxical nature of Jñānagarbha's doctrinal system is explained to derive from the logical incompleteness of formal systems. The paradox is also explained to work as a direction arrow pointing to what can only be realised in a mystical experience.     

Computational models of the “active self” and its disturbances in schizophrenia

The notion that self-disorders are at the root of the emergence of schizophrenia rather than a symptom of the disease, is getting more traction in the cognitive sciences. This is in line with philosophical approaches that consider an enactive self, constituted through action and interaction with the environment. We thereby analyze different definitions of the self and evaluate various computational theories lending to these ideas. Bayesian and predictive processing are promising approaches for computational modeling of the “active self”. We evaluate their implementation and challenges in computational psychiatry and cognitive developmental robotics. We describe how and why embodied robotic systems provide a valuable tool in psychiatry to assess, validate, and simulate mechanisms of self-disorders. Specifically, mechanisms involving sensorimotor learning, prediction, and self-other distinction, can be assessed with artificial agents. This link can provide essential insights to the formation of the self and new avenues in the treatment of psychiatric disorders.     

Functioning of cognitive codes in autobiographical memory and the self—Is the self visual?

The main goal was to test the relationship between types of cognitive codes (perceptual–imaginative and verbal–propositional) and autobiographical memory. The purpose of this research was to evaluate whether there are independent processes serving the self, depending on separate cognitive codes. Sixty adult participants completed the NEO-FFI inventory using two kinds of procedure: perceptual–imaginative code or verbal–propositional code. Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used for analysis. The study has shown the dynamic of the self, depending on two cognitive perspectives. The results indicate that the reflection of the self in autobiographical memory brings different knowledge about the self and its motives.     

Is a multiple self healthy or pathological?

In a sample of 144 undergraduate students, scores on Sackeim and Gur's measure of self-deception were associated with neuroticism scores (r = .50) on the Big Five Inventory, while scores on Altrocchi's measure of having a plural self were associated with neuroticism and openness scores (rs = .35 and .18, respectively). A multiple self, therefore, appears to have positive and negative features.     

A syndrome of errant sexuality – and the self

Abstract

Sexual activity can be viewed as a service for the self. Addictive, perverse and aversive devices mostly build an aggregate. I will present self-psychological and other views for understanding such an aggregation of errant sexuality. In the course of the development of culture, sexuality has developed a variety of functions. Self-psychology views sexual activity as a device for establishing and/or repairing coherence and vitality of the self. In the present paper, I will posit perverse action as being part of a conglomerate – consisting of addictive, perverse and aversive features as different but interdependent appearances of sexual life. Fundamental to developing and sustaining deviant sexuality, as perverse activity, is sexualisation. A vertical split is often described. The individual psychodynamic may be featured by addictive and aversive attributes. Addictive, perverse and aversive behaviours are viewed as part of narcissistic behaviour disorders. Self-psychologically informed features of treatment concentrate on the anxieties of being empty and destructive, and thus being unable to engage in an intimate relationship. The healing process consists of helping the client to establish a stronger self, able to build up and maintain relationships with sufficiently sustaining self-object qualities.

Triebel A.

Sexualität kann als Aktivität im Dienste des Selbst angesehen werden. Süchtige, perverse und aversive Verrichtungen bilden meistens ein Aggregat. Ich will selbstpschologische und andere Gesichtspunkte darstellen, um eine solche Ansammlung umherirrender Sexualität zu verstehen. Im Verlauf der Entwicklung der Kultur hat Sexualität eine Vielzahl von Funktionen entwickelt. Selbstpschologie sieht sexuelle Aktivität als eine Maßnahme, um die Kohärenz und Vitalität des Selbst zu etablieren und/oder wieder herzustellen. In der vorliegenden Arbeit will ich perverse Handlung als Teil eines Konglomerats darstellen – bestehend aus süchtigen, perversen und aversiven Zügen als verschiedenartige aber interdependente Erscheinungen sexuellen Lebens. Grundlegend für die Entwicklung und Aufrechterhaltung devianter Sexualität, wie perverser Aktivität, ist die Sexualisierung. Oft wird eine vertikale Spaltung beschrieben. Die individuelle Psychodynamik kann durch süchtige und aversive Attribute gekennzeichnet sein. Süchtige, perverse und aversive Verhaltensweisen werden als Teil von narzißtischen Verahltensstörungen angesehen. Selbstpsychologisch informierte Merkmale der Behandlung konzentrieren sich auf Ängste, leer und destruktiv zu sein und somit unfähig, sich in einer intimen Beziehung zu engagieren. Der Heilungsprozeß besteht in der Hilfe, ein stärkeres Selbst zu etablieren und die Fähigkeit, Beziehungen mit genügend tragenden Selbst-Objekt Qualitäten aufzubauen und zu erhalten.

Tribel A. Un síndrome de Sexualidad Errante-y del Self

La actividad sexual puede ser vista como al servicio del self. Adicciones, perversiones y mecanismos aversivos la mayoría de la veces conforman un agregado. Presentaré el punto de vista de la psicología del Self y otros para la comprensión de la incorporación de la sexualidad errante. En el curso de desarrollo de cultura sexual se han desarrollado una variedad de funciones. La psicología del Self contempla la actividad sexual como un mecanismo para el establecimiento de la coherencia y/ o la reparación y vitalidad del Self. En este trabajo propondré la acción perversa como una parte de un conglomerado, consistente en un futuro adictivo, perverso y aversivo, como partes diferentes pero interdependientes apariencias de la vida sexual. Fundamentalmente para el desarrollo y sostenimiento de la desviación sexual. A menudo se describe una escisión vertical. La psicodinamia individual puede ser representada por atributos adictivos y aversivos. Comportamientos adictivos, perversos y aversivos son vistos como parte de trastornos de comportamiento narcisista. La psicología del self informa sobre tratamientos concentrados en las ansiedades de sentirse vacíos y destructivos y por tanto incapaz de unirse en una relación intima. El proceso de cura consiste en ayudar a establecer un self más fuerte, capaz de construir y mantener relaciones con sostenimiento suficiente de las cualidades del Self-objeto.     

An alternative view of the “Gibson normalization effect”

Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics - Two experiments are reported which show that (1) a curve tends to be perceived as more curved than its physical dimensions warrant, (2) after a period...     

Personhood and neuroscience: naturalizing or nihilating?

Personhood is a foundational concept in ethics, yet defining criteria have been elusive. In this article we summarize attempts to define personhood in psychological and neurological terms and conclude that none manage to be both specific and non-arbitrary. We propose that this is because the concept does not correspond to any real category of objects in the world. Rather, it is the product of an evolved brain system that develops innately and projects itself automatically and irrepressibly onto the world whenever triggered by stimulus features such as a human-like face, body, or contingent patterns of behavior. We review the evidence for the existence of an autonomous person network in the brain and discuss its implications for the field of ethics and for the implicit morality of everyday behavior.     

Infant imitation and the self—A response to Welsh

Talia Welsh (2006 Welsh, T. 2006. Do neonates display innate self-awareness? Why neonatal imitation fails to provide sufficient grounds for innate self and other awareness. Philosophical Psychology, 19: 221–238. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) argues that Shaun Gallagher and Andrew Meltzoff's (1996) application of neonatal imitation research is insufficient grounds for their claim that neonates are born with a primitive body image and thus an innate self-awareness. Drawing upon an understanding of the self that is founded upon a “theory of mind,” Welsh challenges the notion that neonates have the capacity for self-awareness and charges the supposition with an essentialism which threatens to disrupt more social constructionist understandings of the self. In this paper, I initially defend Gallagher and Meltzoff's (1996) application of infant imitation to understandings of neonatal self-awareness by explaining how body image schemas can be understood as non-representational embodied cognitive phenomena that challenge “theory of mind” theory. I then further develop the claim that neonates are born self-aware with reference to my own work in fetal development. I conclude that Welsh's political concerns are unfounded by showing how the conclusion that a neonate is self-aware does not signal a return to an essentialist understanding of self-awareness, but rather introduces into philosophical and psychological discourse possible alternate understandings of an embodied sense of self that are embedded within intersubjective contexts.     

Creativity and the subliminal manipulation of projected self‐images

Abstract:

This is a report of two experiments on the relationship between creativity and the effects of manipulations of self‐image. Creativity was estimated with the Creative Functioning Test (CFT), an assessment of the tendency to bar the use of subjective interpretations when the support for a “correct” interpretation is being gradually eroded. Self‐image was manipulated in the Identification Test (IT). This involves a backwards masking design in which an ambiguous picture of a face is presented briefly on a viewing screen, preceded by either of two subliminal verbal messages. These were I SUPERIOR and I INFERIOR in a pilot study (n = 25) and I GOOD and I BAD in the main study (n = 33). In the latter, there was also an interview which served to further cross‐validate the CFT. In both studies, creative subjects alternated between reporting young faces and adult ones significantly more often than uncreative subjects. Their identity was not, then, fixedly adult. Creative and uncreative subjects also defended their projected self‐image in different ways against the subliminal manipulations. High and stable self‐confidence was typical of both highly creative and uncreative subjects, but not of subjects in the middle range. Still, the self‐confidence in the two extreme groups was only superficially similar.     

No‐self,real self,ignorance and self‐deception: Does self‐deception require a self?

In this paper I dispute Eliot Deutsch's claim [See Deutsch, Eliot (1996) Self‐deception: a comparative study, in: Roger T. Ames and Wimal Dissanayake (Eds) Self and Deception: a cross‐cultural enquiry (Albany, State University of New York Press), pp. 315–326] that examining self‐deception from the perspective of non‐Western traditions (i.e. how it is understood in those cultures) can help us to better understand the nature of the phenomenon in one's own culture. Although the claim appears to be uncontrover‐sial and perhaps even self‐evident, I shall argue that it is fundamentally mistaken. What is important about both the claim and my critical assessment of it is not what it tells us about self‐deception. I shall show that it tells us little about self‐deception; that Deutsch confuses ignorance with self‐deception; and that he straightforwardly equivocates on the concept. Instead, what is interesting is what Deutsch's treatment of self‐deception in comparative perspective can tell us about comparative philosophy. The significance of what follows in this paper is less about self‐deception than it is about comparative philosophy.     

Christian commitment and a “Docetic” view of human emotions

This paper encourages people in the church to discuss the danger of equating Christian commitment with a denial of one's humanity, thus developing a docetic view of human emotions. The paper focuses on biblical passages which are susceptible to three forms of docetic interpretation:denial of unpleasant feelings often in the name of Christian joy, with possible damaging emotional or physical consequences;denial of human development and the possible influence of the past on present emotional and religious experience; anddenial of human value through passive acceptance of what seems to be inevitable by saying, Thy will be done.This article is a revision of a paper presented at the National conference of the Association of Professors and Researchers in Religious Education in Providence, Rhode Island, October 22–24, 1982.     

Hegel and self‐actualization

Abstract

Hegel says that mind develops through three phases, which he calls soul, consciousness, and mind. By referring to these three phases as the Primary level, the Social level and the Realizing level, it makes it clearer that they link up with thoroughly familiar phenomena in the field of psychotherapy and with contemporary life generally. In fact, they give a new angle on the whole process of self‐actualization, which throws light on many topics in humanistic psychology.