What is diagnosis? Some critical reflections

It is argued that the common definition of diagnosis as ‘the determination of the nature of a disease’ is misleading. Many diagnoses are not the names of disease entities. This finding reflects the integral relation of the diagnostic task to the rest of clinical reasoning. Diagnosis has no separate goal of its own, in particular it does not have the goal of determining the nature of a disease. Instead, diagnosis contributes to the general goals of clinical medicine. Any attempt to model diagnostic reasoning abstracted from the rest of clinical reasoning will yield an inadequate representation of diagnosis. Such a distortion of medical reasoning will blind us to whatever implications an adequate epistemology of medicine may have for an understanding of the relation between theoretical and practical knowledge in other contexts.     

Are there critical bands in kinesthesia?

The effect of changing the bandwidth of noise on the ability of human subjects to detect a 10-Hz sinusoidal movement signal was measured in two experiments. The objective of these studies was to investigate whether critical bands exist for the kinesthetic system, as has been demonstrated for the auditory and tactile systems. It was found that subjects' ability to detect a 10-Hz sinusoidal movement stimulus embedded in noise was not influenced by the bandwidth of the noise over a range of 4-10 Hz. These findings suggest that, if a critical filter does exist for this system, it would have to be greater than 10 Hz.     

Mental causation via neuroprosthetics? A critical analysis

Some recent arguments defending the genuine causal efficacy of the mental have been relying on empirical research on neuroprosthetics. This essay presents a critical analysis of these arguments. The problem of mental causation, and the basic idea and results of neuroprosthetics are reviewed. It is shown how appealing to the research on neuroprosthetics can be interpreted to give support to the idea of mental causation. However, it does so only in a rather deflationary sense: by holding the mental identical with the neural. So contrary to what the arguments have been assuming, neuroprosthetics cannot be used to argue for nonreductive physicalism. It can rather be taken to illustrate just the opposite: how the mental and the physical are identical.     

Does religious belief promote prosociality? A critical examination

Numerous authors have suggested that religious belief has a positive association, possibly causal, with prosocial behavior. This article critiques evidence regarding this "religious prosociality" hypothesis from several areas of the literature. The extant literature on religious prosociality is reviewed including domains of charity, volunteering, morality, personality, and well-being. The experimental and quasi-experimental literature regarding controlled prosocial interactions (e.g., sharing and generosity) is reviewed and contrasted with results from naturalistic studies. Conceptual problems in the interpretation of this literature include separating the effects of stereotypes and ingroup biases from impression formation as well as controlling for self-report biases in the measurement of religious prosociality. Many effects attributed to religious processes can be explained in terms of general nonreligious psychological effects. Methodological problems that limit the interpretation of religious prosociality studies include the use of inappropriate comparison groups and the presence of criterion contamination in measures yielding misleading conclusions. Specifically, it is common practice to compare high levels of religiosity with "low religiosity" (e.g., the absence of denominational membership, lack of church attendance, or the low importance of religion), which conflates indifferent or uncommitted believers with the completely nonreligious. Finally, aspects of religious stereotype endorsement and ingroup bias can contribute to nonprosocial effects. These factors necessitate a revision of the religious prosociality hypothesis and suggest that future research should incorporate more stringent controls in order to reach less ambiguous conclusions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

A critical assessment of Pereboom’s Frankfurt-style example

In this paper, I assess Derk Pereboom’s argument for the thesis that moral responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise. I argue that the Frankfurt-style example Pereboom develops presupposes a prior act or omission which the agent was able to avoid. This undermines his argument. I propose a way for Pereboom to revise his example and thereby undercut this objection. Along the way, I also argue that Pereboom should supplement his account of what counts as a robust alternative—an alternative of the sort that should matter to those who argue for an ability-to-do-otherwise condition on moral responsibility.     

The three-systems-model of fear and emotion—A critical examination

The ‘Three-Systems-Model’ of fear and emotion (Lang, 1968; Rachman. 1978b) is reviewed and discussed. The paper is centered on four topics relevant to such a view of fear; The definitional focus; Measurement and quantification of components; Implications for etiology; Implications for treatment of phobias. Definitional problems with the radical operationalist view implied by the Tree-Systems-Model are identified and discussed. In addition problems with measurement and quantification of the various components are discussed. Implications for etiology of phobic fears are noted. Finally, it is suggested that treatment methods be individually tailored to the particular component response-profile displayed by each patient, and that the identification of such a profile is included in standard behavioral diagnosis procedures when fear is clinically assessed.     

How effective are our marriage ministries? A critical survey

Since the introduction of marriage and family counseling into some seminary curricula thirty years ago, the majority of clergy have developed premarital counseling as a part of their marriage ministries, and educational committees have established marriage and family courses in church school programs. Two questionnaires, used in three clergy conferences, provide data for a critical survey of representative clergy involved in ministry to marriage. Analysis of the data and interviews with a continuing education director and a marriage counseling trainer provide reasons why clergy may not be fully qualified and, therefore, may be only partially effective as marriage counselors. The kinds of educational experience necessary for ministers to become more effective in marriage ministry are examined. Finally, the minister's role in marriage in a secular society is interpreted as undergoing a shift for which many clergy are unprepared.     

Thinking across species—a critical bioethics approach to enhancement

Drawing upon a concept of ‘critical bioethics’ [7] this paper takes a species-broad approach to the social and ethical aspects of enhancement. Critical Bioethics aims to foreground interdisciplinarity, socio-political dimensions, as well as reflexivity to what becomes bioethical subject matter. This paper focuses upon the latter component and uses the example of animal enhancement as a way to think about both enhancement generally, and bioethics. It constructs several arguments for including animal enhancement as a part of enhancement debates, and considers some connections between human and animal enhancement. The paper concludes in a plea for an ‘enhancement’ to our critical abilities to examine some of the underlying social, moral and ethical assumptions bound up in varied anticipated ‘enhanced’ futures.

Why be critical? Introducing a symposium on Capitalizing Religion

This article introduces a review symposium on Craig Martin’s Capitalizing Religion: Ideology and the Opiate of the Bourgeoisie (2014). It provides a brief summary and situates Capitalizing Religion in relation to recent debates about what it means to engage in the ‘critical’ study of religion\s. The symposium consists of four commentaries: by Véronique Altglas (Queen’s University Belfast); Finbarr Curtis (Georgia Southern University); Sean McCloud (University of North Carolina at Charlotte); and Jörg Rüpke (Universität Erfurt).     

Transparent emotions? A critical analysis of Moran's transparency claim

I critically analyze Richard Moran's account of knowing one's own emotions, which depends on the Transparency Claim (TC) for self-knowledge. Applied to knowing one's own beliefs, TC states that when one is asked “Do you believe P?”, one can answer by referencing reasons for believing P. TC works for belief because one is justified in believing that one believes P if one can give reasons for why P is true. Emotions, however, are also conceptually related to concerns; they involve a response to something one cares about. As a consequence, acquiring self-knowledge of one's emotions requires knowledge of other mental attitudes, which falls outside the scope of TC. Hence, TC cannot be applied to emotions.     

Deviance‐construction in Stalinist societies: A critical analysis

This study is concerned with the definition of deviance and the processes of constructing deviance in Stalinist societies. Deviances created by the state in these societies are analyzed, especially from functionalist and phenomenologist aspects and by applying Foucault's approach. Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago is used as a starting point for the analysis. In his work, Solzhenitsyn dwells at length on the “deviances” and the process of deviance construction in Stalinist Soviet Union. It is suggested that, in these societies, “total state deviance” fits in a desacralized, demodernized world view. Finally some consequences of this deviance image still at work are discussed.     

Safety–critical events in everyday cycling – Interviews with bicyclists and video annotation of safety–critical events in a naturalistic cycling study

Research in cycling safety seeks to better understand bicycle-related crashes and injuries. The present naturalistic cycling study contributes to this research by collecting data about bicyclists’ behavior and impressions of safety–critical situations, information unavailable in traditional data sources (e.g., accident databases, observational studies). Naturalistic data were collected from 16 bicyclists (8 female; M = 39.1 years, SD = 11.4 years) who rode instrumented bicycles for two weeks. Bicyclists were instructed to report all episodes in which they felt uncomfortable while riding (subjective risk perception), even if they didn’t fall. After data collection, the bicyclists were interviewed in detail regarding their self-reported safety–critical events. Environmental conditions were also recorded via video (e.g., road surface, weather). In total, 63 safety–critical events (56 non-crashes, 7 crashes) were reported by the bicyclists, mainly due to interactions with other road users – but also due to poorly maintained infrastructure. In low-visibility conditions, vehicle-bicycle and bicycle-bicycle events were the most uncomfortable for the bicyclists. Self-reported pedestrian–bicycle events primarily consisted of pedestrians starting to cross the bicycle path without looking. With one exception, all crashes found in the study belonged to poorly maintained road and infrastructure. In particular, construction work or obstacles in the bicycle path were reported as uncomfortable and annoying by the bicyclists. This study shows how naturalistic data and bicyclists’ interviews together can provide a more informative picture of safety–critical situations experienced by the bicyclist than traditional data sources can.     

Is burnout solely job‐related? A critical comment

Within the field‐dominating, multidimensional theory of burnout, burnout is viewed as a work‐specific condition. As a consequence, the burnout syndrome cannot be investigated outside of the occupational domain. In the present paper, this restrictive view of burnout's scope is criticized and a rationale to decide between a work‐specific and a generic approach to burnout is presented. First, the idea that a multidimensional conception of burnout implies a work‐restricted scope is deconstructed. Second, it is shown that the burnout phenomenon cannot be confined to work because chronic, unresolvable stress – the putative cause of burnout – is not limited to work. In support of an integrative view of health, it is concluded that the field‐dominating, multidimensional theory of burnout should abandon as groundless the idea that burnout is a specifically job‐related phenomenon and define burnout as a multi‐domain syndrome. The shift from a work‐specific to a generic approach would allow both finer analysis and wider synthesis in research on chronic stress and burnout.     

Journal review: Including the critical‐social function into psychology

PsychCritique: The International Journal of Critical Psychology and Psychoanalysis, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1985. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corp.     

Reimagining gender in psychology: What can critical psychology offer?

In this article, I argue that gender is a complex sociocultural construct, yet how gender is accounted for in psychological research is limited. Specifically, psychologists conflate sex with gender, rely on quantifying gender differences and, by implication, conceptualise gender as merely a participant characteristic. To illustrate, I apply this viewpoint to the topic of gender differences in tobacco use/cessation using on a feminist quality appraisal tool. I show how these three issues promote the narrow study of sex/gender differences, despite problems surrounding this inquiry, and reduce insights into the intersection of gender and behaviour. To offer a way forward for psychology, I describe how a critical psychology perspective attends to the complexities of gender and its influence on behaviour. I showcase diverse ways of attending to gender as a sociocultural construct, inviting psychologists to engage with, and reflect on, their gender analyses.     

Queuing or sharing? A critical evaluation of the single-bottleneck notion

The model of a single central bottleneck for human information processing is critically examined. Most evidence cited in support of the model has been observed within the overlapping tasks paradigm. It is shown here that most findings obtained within that paradigm and that were used to support the model are also consistent with a simple resource model. The most prominent findings are the millisecond-for-millisecond slope at the left of the RT2-SOA curve, the high RT1-RT2 correlation, the additivity of the effects on RT2 of SOA and of the difficulty of selecting R2, and the washout of the effect of S2 discriminability on RT2 in a dual-task condition. In addition, the asymmetry of the effects of the dual-task requirement on RT1 and RT2 can be accounted for by the resource model provided that it assumes uneven allocation of resources, which is quite reasonable in view of the task asymmetry inherent in the demand characteristics of the paradigm. The same is true for two other findings that appear to support the single-bottleneck model-that in the dual-task condition, the demand of the first task affects equally RT1 and RT2 and that its effect on RT1 is the same as the corresponding effect in the single-task condition. Furthermore, the single-bottleneck model is hard to reconcile with a negative slope at the left of the RT1-SOA curve or a positive slope at the left of the IRI-SOA curve, unless augmented by ancillary assumptions that are yet to be substantiated. Representative data were fit by each of the models using its optimal set of parameters. Both models achieved quite good degrees of fit. It is further argued that since the overlapping tasks paradigm is heavily biased in favor of a speedy reaction to the stimulus that appears first, it is nonoptimal for testing the central bottleneck model. Finally, the bottleneck model is examined in terms of other scientific criteria.     

Born to kill? A critical evaluation of homicide adaptation theory

Given the enormous harm that results from the intentional killing of humans by other humans, the development of etiological theories of homicide is an important task. Homicide Adaptation Theory (HAT) is one such attempt to explain why homicide occurs. In short, the proponents of HAT propose that humans possess a number of specific, evolved adaptations for killing that have been selected for because they managed to successfully solve recurrent adaptive problems in our ancestral past. In this paper it is argued that, although evolutionary approaches can potentially advance our understanding of homicide in important ways, the available evidence does not support the existence of specific adaptations for killing in humans. Specifically, I argue that the proponents of HAT have not provided: (a) a thorough analysis of the evolutionary costs and benefits of killing; (b) evidence for ‘special design’ features of homicide; or (c) a systematic comparative appraisal of killing among different species. Given this lack of evidence, HAT suffers in terms of its explanatory worth, relative to alternative evolutionary hypotheses, such as the idea that homicide is a by-product of other evolved adaptations.     

Does violence beget violence? A critical examination of the literature

Critically examines the "violence breeds violence" hypothesis broadly defined. Organized into seven sections, the literature review includes (a) the abuse breeds abuse hypothesis; (b) reports of small numbers of violent/homicidal offenders; (c) studies examining the relationship of abuse and neglect to delinquency, (d) to violent behavior, and (e) to aggressive behavior in infants and young children; (f) abuse, withdrawal, and self-destructive behavior; and (g) studies of the impact of witnessing or observing violent behavior. A detailed discussion of methodological considerations and shortcomings precedes the review. The author concludes that existing knowledge of the long-term consequences of abusive home environments is limited and suggests that conclusions about the strength of the cycle of violence be tempered by the dearth of convincing empirical evidence. Recommendations are made for further research.     

The critical distance of interaction in the Zöllner illusion

Two experiments attempted to de termine the distance (as visual angle) over which the Zöllner distortion of a straight line could be produced by a background field. Experiment 1 showed that the background lines did not need to intersect the test line in order to distort it but could exert this effect up to a distance of 1 deg visual angle from it. Experiment 2 indicated that when the background lines do intersect the test line portions of these formed beyond an angle of 1 deg do not contribute to the distortion. These values may indicate the size of the cortical receptive fields interacting to produce the illusion.