Is ontological revisionism uncharitable?

Some philosophers (‘nihilists’) deny the existence of composite material objects. Other philosophers (‘universalists’) hold that whenever there are some things, they compose something. The purpose of this paper is to scrutinize an objection to these revisionary views: the objection that nihilism and universalism are both unacceptably uncharitable because each of them implies that a great deal of what we ordinarily believe is false. Our main business is to show how nihilism and universalism can be defended against the objection. A secondary point is that universalism is harder to defend than nihilism.     

The ontological reappropriation of phronēsis

Ontology has been traditionally guided by sophia, a form of knowledge directed toward that which is eternal, permanent, necessary. This tradition finds an important early expression in the philosophical ontology of Aristotle. Yet in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle's intense concern to do justice to the world of finite contingency leads him to develop a mode of knowledge, phronsis, that implicitly challenges the hegemony of sophia and the economy of values on which it depends. Following in the tradition of the early Heidegger's recognition of the ontological significance of Aristotle's Ethics and of Gadamer's appropriation of phronsis for hermeneutics, this article argues that an ontology guided by phronsis is preferable to one governed by sophia. Specifically, it suggests that by taking sophia as its paradigm, traditional philosophical ontology has historically been determined by a kind of knowledge that is incapable of critically considering the concrete historico-ethico-political conditions of its own deployment. This critique of sophia is accomplished by uncovering the economy of values that led Aristotle to privilege sophia over phronsis. It is intended to open up the possibility of developing an ontology of finite contingency based on phronsis. Such an ontology, because it is guided by and must remain responsible to the concrete individual with which it is engaged, would be ethical at its very core.     

What ontological arguments don’t show

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - Daniel Dombrowski contends that: (1) a number of versions of the ontological argument [OA] are sound; (2) the deity whose existence is most well...     

On the motivations for Merleau-Ponty’s ontological research

This paper attempts to clarify Merleau-Ponty’s later work by tracing a hitherto overlooked set of concerns that were of key consequence for the formulation of his ontological research. I argue that his ontology can be understood as a response to a set of problems originating in reflections on the intersubjective use of language in dialogue, undertaken in the early 1950s. His study of dialogue disclosed a structure of meaning-formation and pointed towards a theory of truth (both recurring ontological topics) that post-Phenomenology premises could not account for. A study of dialogue shows that speakers’ positions are interchangeable, that speaking subjects are active and passive in varying degrees, and that the intentional roles of subjects and objects are liable to shift or ‘transgress’ themselves. These observations anticipate the concepts of ‘reversibility’ and ‘narcissism’, his later view of activity and passivity, and his later view of intentionality, and sharpened the need to adopt an intersubjective focus in ontological research.     

Mechanized analysis of Anselm’s modal ontological argument

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - We use a mechanized verification system, PVS, to examine the argument from Anselm’s Proslogion Chapter III, the so-called “Modal...     

Loving without understanding: Raimon Panikkar’s ontological pluralism

Raimon Panikkar is one of the most sophisticated and most profound among contemporary pluralists of religion. His pluralism is radical because it is rooted in the very nature of things, in the pluralism of being itself, beyond all perspectivalism and indeed beyond truth and falsity taken as intellectual categories. I discuss several issues regarding his position. Is he indeed a pluralist or a monist in disguise? Does he do justice to the uniqueness of each religion? Is he not prematurely introducing the eschatological ideal of the harmony of opposites into the historical world where opposites often produce bloody conflicts?     

Heidegger in Mexico: Emilio Uranga’s ontological hermeneutics

“Exiled” Spanish philosopher José Gaos was the first to translate, in its entirety, Martin Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit. Emilio Uranga, a student of Gaos in Mexico City (exiled since 1938), appropriates Heidegger’s ontological hermeneutics in an effort to expose the historico-existential structures making up “lo mexicano,” or Mexicanness. Uranga’s Análisis del ser del mexicano (1952) freely and creatively employs the methods of existential analysis, suggesting that the being-there of the Mexican being is ontologically “insufficient” and “accidental”—modes of being reflected in existential expressions of sentimentality, indifference, and angst particular to this form of life. As a work indebted to Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit, Analysis of the Being of the Mexican fails to be faithful to this method. This, however, is the source of its value. The purpose of this paper is two-fold: one, to introduce the Anglo–American philosophical readership to Uranga’s existential phenomenology; and, two, to disentangle the lines of thought that make up Uranga’s Análisis and in the process defend Uranga from the possible charge that he ignorantly misappropriates Heidegger’s method.

Emergence and reduction in chemistry: ontological or epistemological concepts?

In this paper I argue that the ontological interpretation of the concepts of reduction and emergence is often misleading in the philosophy of science and should nearly always be eschewed in favor of an epistemological interpretation. As a paradigm case, an example is drawn from the philosophy of chemistry to illustrate the drawbacks of “ontological reduction” and “ontological emergence,” and the virtues of an epistemological interpretation of these concepts.     

The standard ontological framework of cognitive neuroscience: Some lessons from Broca’s area

Since cognitive neuroscience aims at giving an integrated account of mind and brain, its ontology should include both neural and cognitive entities and specify their relations. According to what we call the standard ontological framework of cognitive neuroscience (SOFCN), the aim of cognitive neuroscience should be to establish one-to-one mappings between neural and cognitive entities. Where such entities do not yet closely align, this can be achieved by reforming the cognitive ontology, the neural ontology, or both. In order to assess the limits and the possibilities of the SOFCN, we will examine a paradigmatic case study: the concept of Broca’s area, which indicates an alleged mapping between the left inferofrontal gyrus and the production of language. We review evidence showing that such a mapping does not hold, thus calling into question either the status of Broca’s area or the validity of the SOFCN. We then propose some strategies for addressing the issue and suggest that it may be solved within the SOFCN by adopting both of the following strategies: first, more accurately defining the relevant neural structures and second, switching the focus of neural ontology from structures to events, individuated by a where (neural structures) conjoint with a how (oscillatiory frequency).     

How is the question ‘Is Existence a Predicate?’ relevant to the ontological argument?

It is often said that the ontological argument fails because it wrongly treats existence as a first-level property or predicate. This has proved a controversial claim, and efforts to evaluate it are complicated by the fact that the words ‘existence is not a property/predicate’ have been used by philosophers to make at least three different negative claims: (a) one about a first-level phenomenon possessed by objects like horses, stones, you and me; (b) another about the logical form of assertions of existence; and (c) still another about a second-level phenomenon possessed by concepts when they are instantiated. I argue that only the last of these claims, originally voiced by Kant, is both plausible and relevant to the ontological argument. And I try to show that the relevance of the Kantian version comes from its providing the underlying justification for a different, and far less controversial, criticism of the ontological argument.     

Reliance on visual and verbal information across ontological kinds: What do children know about animals and machines?

In two experiments, we systematically examined the reliance on visual (external shape and features) and verbal (origins and internal structure) information in isolation, and together in the identification of animals and machines by 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds, and adults. Experiment 1 examined the use of visual and verbal information independently in a visual classification task, a verbal classification task, and an induction task. Experiment 2 examined the relative weighting of visual and verbal information in an induction task and a categorization task. The three most important findings from Experiment 1 were that (a) children and adults can use either visual or verbal information to distinguish animals from machines; (b) all age groups classified items with mixed visual information as machines, a tendency that increased with age; and (c) with age, children became increasingly able to induce non-obvious properties, especially the non-obvious properties of machines. The findings from Experiment 2 indicate that the youngest and oldest participants relied on both visual and verbal information in the identification of animals and machines in categorization and induction tasks. Five-year-olds, however, relied only on visual information. As in Experiment 1, we observed a tendency to judge items with contrasting information as machines, suggesting that individuals utilize a more strict definition (both visually and verbally) for the category of animals. We discuss the implication of these results with respect to developmental differences in the use of perceptual and conceptual information across the ontological distinction between artifacts and natural kinds.     

The person as an extended field: Querying the ontological binaries and dominant “container” metaphor at the core of psychology

The Western-centricity of psychology means it has inherited some of the key ontological categories and distinctions at the heart of Western cultures. This paper identifies four such distinctions that have been particularly influential in psychology: mind-body; subjective-objective; self-other; and inner-outer. Together, these have created a pervasive view that the mind – and the person more broadly – is metaphorically like a “container.” However, this paper proposes that a better conceptualization, or at least a complementary one, may be a “field,” whereby people's being extends outwards, beyond the apparent boundary of their skin, into the world. Such perspectives have been especially prominent in other cultures and traditions (like Buddhism), but have pedigree in the West too. The paper thus draws on various cultural sources, and numerous disciplines both within psychology and beyond, to make its case. It is hoped the discussion may help psychology reflect on and re-evaluate the ontological assumptions at its core, and to engage with field-based perspectives that may be provide a useful alternative or complement to the standard container metaphor.