Disproportional mental causation

In this paper I do three things. First, I argue that Stephen Yablo’s influential account of mental causation is susceptible to counterexamples involving what I call disproportional mental causation. Second, I argue that similar counterexamples can be generated for any alternative account of mental causation that is like Yablo’s in that it takes mental states and their physical realizers to causally compete. Third, I show that there are alternative nonreductive approaches to mental causation which reject the idea of causal competition, and which thus are able to allow for disproportional mental causation. This, I argue, is a significant advantage for such noncompetitive accounts.     

Determination,realization and mental causation

How can mental properties bring about physical effects, as they seem to do, given that the physical realizers of the mental goings-on are already sufficient to cause these effects? This question gives rise to the problem of mental causation (MC) and its associated threats of causal overdetermination, mental causal exclusion, and mental causal irrelevance. Some (e.g., Cynthia and Graham Macdonald, and Stephen Yablo) have suggested that understanding mental-physical realization in terms of the determinable/determinate relation (henceforth, ‘determination’) provides the key to solving the problem of MC: if mental properties are determinables of their physical realizers, then (since determinables and determinates are distinct, yet don’t causally compete) all three threats may be avoided. Not everyone agrees that determination can do this good work, however. Some (e.g., Douglas Ehring, Eric Funkhauser, and Sven Walter) object that mental-physical realization can’t be determination, since such realization lacks one or other characteristic feature of determination. I argue that on a proper understanding of the features of determination key to solving the problem of MC these arguments can be resisted.     

Free will and mental disorder: Exploring the relationship

A link between mental disorder and freedom is clearly present in the introduction of the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV). It mentions “an important loss of freedom” as one of the possible defining features of mental disorder. Meanwhile, it remains unclear how “an important loss of freedom” should be understood. In order to get a clearer view on the relationship between mental disorder and (a loss of) freedom, in this article, I will explore the link between mental disorder and free will. I examine two domains in which a connection between mental disorder and free will is present: the philosophy of free will and forensic psychiatry. As it turns out, philosophers of free will frequently refer to mental disorders as conditions that compromise free will and reduce moral responsibility. In addition, in forensic psychiatry, the rationale for the assessment of criminal responsibility is often explained by referring to the fact that mental disorders can compromise free will. Yet, in both domains, it remains unclear in what way free will is compromised by mental disorders. Based on the philosophical debate, I discuss three senses of free will and explore their relevance to mental disorders. I conclude that in order to further clarify the relationship between free will and mental disorder, the accounts of people who have actually experienced the impact of a mental disorder should be included in future research.     

Intervening causation and the mitigation of responsibility for harm doing II. The role of limited mental capacities

The present study investigated (i) the conditions under which the proximal cause of an event affects judgments of a distal cause, (ii) the capacities persons need to be held responsible for their actions, and (iii) the relationship between judgments of causation, blame, and restitution. Subjects read about situations in which an initial act, in combination with a later behavior by a second person, produced harm. The age and mental state of the second person were varied. It was found that cause and blame assigned to the initial action was greater when the second person was a child or mentally disturbed, as compared to a sane adult. Causal and moral responsibility were related to the understanding, reasoning capacity, and ability to control behavior of the person judged. Finally, support was obtained for an entailment model of the relations between judgments of causation, blame, and restitution.     

Everyday magical powers: the role of apparent mental causation in the overestimation of personal influence

These studies examined whether having thoughts related to an event before it occurs leads people to infer that they caused the event--even when such causation might otherwise seem magical. In Study 1, people perceived that they had harmed another person via a voodoo hex. These perceptions were more likely among those who had first been induced to harbor evil thoughts about their victim. In Study 2, spectators of a peer's basketball-shooting performance were more likely to perceive that they had influenced his success if they had first generated positive visualizations consistent with that success. Observers privy to those spectators' visualizations made similar attributions about the spectators' influence. Finally, additional studies suggested that these results occur even when the thought-about outcome is viewed as unwanted by the thinker and even in field settings where the relevant outcome is occurring as part of a live athletic competition.     

Recall of mental sleep experience with or without prior verbalization.

We investigated whether verbalization of contents of mental sleep experience (MSE), just after awakening provoked during rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, facilitates subsequent recall in the morning. Twelve subjects were awakened four times in each of two experimental nights and alternately asked to recall, with or without concurrent verbalization, MSE contents preceding the awakening. In the morning, the subjects were asked to report MSEs both verbalized and nonverbalized during the night. If subjects were unable to provide a spontaneous morning report, they were prompted using a probe, which was the title given by the subjects to each MSE at the end of its verbalization or covert recall at night. Frequencies of spontaneous reports were high, regardless of whether MSEs had been previously verbalized or not. The proportions of spontaneous and probed reports were similar for verbalized and nonverbalized MSEs, but spontaneous morning reports were longer than probed ones, regardless of their previous verbalization. Spontaneous and probed morning reports corresponding to night reports shared similar linguistic structures (i.e., length of sentences and proportions of waking-related utterances, which are indicative of difficulty of retrieval for MSE contents) and had similar percentages of contents common to night and morning reports. These findings support the hypothesis that verbalization does not directly influence the further accessibility of MSE contents.     

Metaphysics of causation

Conclusion The world contains not only causes and effects, but also causal relations holding between causes and effects. Because causal relations enter into the structure of the world, their presence has various modal and probabilistic consequences. Causation and necessary and sufficient conditions do often go hand in hand. Causation, however, is a robust ingredient within the world itself, whereas modalities and probabilities supervene on the nature of the world as a whole, and on the resulting relations between one possible world and others. Some modalities, therefore, are essentially causal; but causation is not essentially modal.¹⁹     

Physics and the direction of causation

Two proposals for a physicalistic analysis of causation — the so-called transference model and an account given by J. L. Mackie — are examined and found wanting on the score of physical objectivity. This shortcoming can be remedied, but it is further argued that both proposals embody a too restricted conception of what a physicalistic analysis of causation should be. A more general program is proposed.     

Grounding in the image of causation

Grounding is often glossed as metaphysical causation, yet no current theory of grounding looks remotely like a plausible treatment of causation. I propose to take the analogy between grounding and causation seriously, by providing an account of grounding in the image of causation, on the template of structural equation models for causation.     

Mechanisms and the nature of causation

In this paper I offer an analysis of causation based upon a theory of mechanisms-complex systems whose internal parts interact to produce a system's external behavior. I argue that all but the fundamental laws of physics can be explained by reference to mechanisms. Mechanisms provide an epistemologically unproblematic way to explain the necessity which is often taken to distinguish laws from other generalizations. This account of necessity leads to a theory of causation according to which events are causally related when there is a mechanism that connects them. I present reasons why the lack of an account of fundamental physical causation does not undermine the mechanical account.     

Apparent contraction of edge angles.

The corner effect, the Münsterberg illusion, and the Café Wall illusion are explained by a model postulating that the corner effect is an orientation illusion specific to corner edges and that the perceived orientations of these edges are shifted toward angle contraction. It is also assumed that the effect is greatest when the corner edges show the same or similar edge contrast at the corner. This model yields three new types of illusions: the 'checkered illusion', the 'illusion of shifted gradations', and the 'illusion of striped cords'. Each of them gives many variations making a three-dimensional impression.