Young infants’ reasoning about physical events involving inert and self-propelled objects

The present research examined whether 5- to 6.5-month-old infants would hold different expectations about various physical events involving a box after receiving evidence that it was either inert or self-propelled. Infants were surprised if the inert but not the self-propelled box: reversed direction spontaneously (Experiment 1); remained stationary when hit or pulled (Experiments 3 and 3A); remained stable when released in midair or with inadequate support from a platform (Experiment 4); or disappeared when briefly hidden by one of two adjacent screens (the second screen provided the self-propelled box with an alternative hiding place; Experiment 5). On the other hand, infants were surprised if the inert or the self-propelled box appeared to pass through an obstacle (Experiment 2) or disappeared when briefly hidden by a single screen (Experiment 5). The present results indicate that infants as young as 5 months of age distinguish between inert and self-propelled objects and hold different expectations for physical events involving these objects, even when incidental differences between the objects are controlled. These findings are consistent with the proposal by Gelman, R. (1990). First principles organize attention to and learning about relevant data: Number and the animate–inanimate distinction as examples. Cognitive Science, 14, 79–106, Leslie, A. M. (1994). ToMM, ToBY, and Agency: Core architecture and domain specificity. In L. A. Hirschfeld & S. A. Gelman (Eds.), Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture (pp. 119–148). New York: Cambridge University Press, and others that infants endow self-propelled objects with an internal source of energy. Possible links between infants’ concepts of self-propelled object, agent, and animal are also discussed.     

Why do young infants fail to search for hidden objects?

Recent evidence indicates that infants as young as 3.5 months of age understand that objects continue to exist when hidden (Baillargeon, 1987a; Baillargeon & DeVos, 1990). Why, then, do infants fail to search for hidden objects until 7 to 8 months of age? The present experiments tested whether 5.5-month-old infants could distinguish between correct and incorrect search actions performed by an experimenter. In Experiment 1, a toy was placed in front of (possible event) or under (impossible event) a clear cover. Next, a screen was slid in front of the objects, hiding them from view. A hand then reached behind the screen and reappeared holding the toy. The infants looked reliably longer at the impossible than at the possible event, suggesting that they understood that the hand's direct reaching action was sufficient to retrieve the toy when it stood in front of but not under the clear cover. The same results were obtained in a second condition in which a toy was placed in front of (possible event) or behind (impossible event) a barrier. In Experiment 2, a toy was placed under the right (possible event) or the left (impossible event) of two covers. After a screen hid the objects, a hand reached behind the screen's right edge and reappeared first with the right cover and then with the toy. The infants looked reliably longer at the impossible than at the possible event, suggesting that they realized that the hand's sequence of action was sufficient to retrieve the toy when it stood under the right but not the left cover. A control condition supported this interpretation. Together, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that by 5.5 months of age, infants not only represent hidden objects, but are able to identify the actions necessary to retrieve these objects. The implications of these findings for a problem solving explanation of young infants' failure to retrieve hidden objects are considered.     

Attributions and depression: why is the literature so inconsistent?

A large body of literature examining the relations between depression and causal attributions has produced inconsistent findings. Many studies have clearly had inadequate statistical power, however, so that negative findings cannot be readily interpreted. In this review, statistical power was computed for all published analyses relating depression to attributions to any of the following: internal, stable, or global causes, or their composite, ability/character, effort/behavior, luck, or task difficulty. On average, the power of these analyses was very poor. For example, only 8 of the 87 analyses had a probability of .80 or better of detecting a small-medium true population effect (e.g., r = .20). Separating studies by levels of power helped to clarify the inconsistencies in the literature. Whereas across all published studies depression was fairly consistently related only to the composite of internal, stable, and global attributions, those few studies with fairly high power all reported significant relations of depression to stable and global attributions as well as to the composite. It is suggested that increased attention be paid to the power of statistical analyses in planning studies and in drawing conclusions from completed studies.     

Towards a new method for bridging the gap between “smart” infants and “dumb” preschoolers

Based on violation-of-expectation (VoE) paradigms, amazing cognitive competencies have been demonstrated in young infants, which could not be shown in toddlers or even preschoolers. This divergence might as much be caused by different research methods as by discontinuities in development. As looking-time measures are not readily applicable to older children, we suggest a new method that is suitable for children from two years of age onwards. In an empirical examination of this method, 26 children aged 2–7 years learned by trial and error to always find a target picture among a pair of pictures. Each target picture was an impossible version of the non-target picture. After reaching a learning criterion, children had to generalize the learned concept to pictures belonging to a different category. Results showed that even the youngest participants reached the learning criterion and were able to apply what they had learned to another category.     

Reconstruction of things past: Why do some memories feel so close and others so far away?

The vast majority of work in construal level theory focuses prospectively on the future. Through a series of studies controlling for knowledge about an event, we look retrospectively at the past and demonstrate that construal mindsets can materially influence how a past event is reconstructed in memory. Specifically, an event recalled in a more concrete mindset feels subjectively closer than when recalled in an abstract mindset (Studies 1-3). We present evidence suggesting this is because a concrete mindset actually makes people feel as though they know more, even if they were initially exposed to the same set of information—perceived information accessibility mediates the effect of construal level on temporal distance (Study 2). The effect of construal level on memory reconstruction extends to judgments of blame, where judgments of greater temporal distance drive a greater propensity to blame parties for negative events and temporal distance mediates these judgments (Study 3). Together, these studies are the first to demonstrate that the mindset employed when recalling an event shapes its remembrance.     

What do infants remember when they forget? Location and identity in 6-month-olds' memory for objects

What does an infant remember about a forgotten object? Although at age 6 months, infants can keep track of up to three hidden objects, they can remember the featural identity of only one. When infants forget the identity of an object, do they forget the object entirely, or do they retain an inkling of it? In a looking-time study, we familiarized 6-month-olds with a disk and a triangle placed on opposite sides of a stage. During test trials, we hid the objects one at a time behind different screens, and after hiding the second object, we removed the screen where the first object had been hidden. Infants then saw the expected object, the unexpected other object, or the empty stage. Bayes factor analysis showed that although the infants did not notice when the object changed shape, they were surprised when it vanished. This finding indicates that infants can represent an object without its features.     

Consistency-based compliance: when and why do children become vulnerable?

This study examines the nature and development of behavioral consistency pressures in children. Specifically, we examined the effectiveness of the foot-in-the-door procedure in producing consistent prosocial behavior and self-attributions in kindergartners and second and fifth graders. Children were either induced to comply with a request to share prize coupons or were not given this initial prosocial experience. Those who complied either were labeled as helpful by an adult or were not. Later, children were given the opportunity to help under public or private circumstances. Moreover. children's understanding of trait stability, their internal preference for consistent behavior, and their belief that adults prefer behavioral consistency were assessed. Consistent responding began to occur within the foot-in-the-door procedure in the second grade, and this developmental shift was paralleled by a shift in children's understanding of trait stability. Furthermore, once the foot-in-the-door effect appeared among the second and fifth graders, its strength was significantly affected by the children's internal preference for consistency.     

Embodied perception of reachable space: how do we manage threatening objects?

This study aimed at determining whether the size of reachable space is affected by the level of danger of some everyday manipulable objects. Two possibilities are examined: Dangerous objects affect the size of reachable space because of long-term semantic knowledge of their potential hurtful value or the on-line relation between objects’ dangerous attributes and the body. The experimental paradigm combined the danger value (dangerous/not dangerous) and the orientation of objects (e.g. pointing away from/towards the perceiver). Reachability judgments measured the size of peripersonal space, and perception of objects’ danger was estimated through questionnaires. Results revealed that, whatever the estimated level of objects’ danger, the extent of peripersonal space was reduced when the threatening part of dangerous objects was oriented towards participants, not when oriented away. This suggests that the characteristics of the here and now body-objects interaction are crucial in affecting the boundary of peripersonal space.     

Judging relationships between events: how do we do it?

A decade ago, Allan (1993) concluded that associative models provided the best account of data generated in tasks that require human observers to judge the relationship between binary events. In the intervening years, new data have been reported that provide evidence for higher-order processes. Some have argued that these new data pose a serious threat to the viability of the associative account. The purpose of the present paper is to review this evidence and to assess the severity of this threat.     

Embodied perception of reachable space: how do we manage threatening objects?

This study aimed at determining whether the size of reachable space is affected by the level of danger of some everyday manipulable objects. Two possibilities are examined: Dangerous objects affect the size of reachable space because of long-term semantic knowledge of their potential hurtful value or the on-line relation between objects' dangerous attributes and the body. The experimental paradigm combined the danger value (dangerous/not dangerous) and the orientation of objects (e.g. pointing away from/towards the perceiver). Reachability judgments measured the size of peripersonal space, and perception of objects' danger was estimated through questionnaires. Results revealed that, whatever the estimated level of objects' danger, the extent of peripersonal space was reduced when the threatening part of dangerous objects was oriented towards participants, not when oriented away. This suggests that the characteristics of the here and now body-objects interaction are crucial in affecting the boundary of peripersonal space.     

How and why do infants imitate? An ideomotor approach to social and imitative learning in infancy (and beyond)

It has been proposed that already in infancy, imitative learning plays a pivotal role in the acquisition of knowledge and abilities. Yet the cognitive mechanisms underlying the acquisition of novel action knowledge through social learning have remained unclear. The present contribution presents an ideomotor approach to imitative learning (IMAIL) in infancy (and beyond) that draws on the ideomotor theory of action control and on recent findings of perception–action matching. According to IMAIL, the central mechanism of imitative and social learning is the acquisition of cascading bidirectional action–effect associations through observation of own and others’ actions. First, the observation of the visual effect of own actions leads to the acquisition of first-order action–effect associations, linking motor codes to the action’s typical visual effects. Second, observing another person’s action leads to motor activation (i.e., motor resonance) due to the first-order associations. This activated motor code then becomes linked to the other salient effects produced by the observed action, leading to the acquisition of (second-order) action–effect associations. These novel action–effect associations enable later imitation of the observed actions. The article reviews recent behavioral and neurophysiological studies with infants and adults that provide empirical support for the model. Furthermore, it is discussed how the model relates to other approaches on social-cognitive development and how developmental changes in imitative abilities can be conceptualized.     

Can infants use video to update mental representations of absent objects?

Before their second birthday, infants can update their knowledge based on what someone tells them, but can they do so based on what a video shows them? The current study explored whether infants can update their representation of an absent object’s properties after seeing a video of something happening to it, following seminal work showing that they can update their representation after being told about something happening to it (Ganea et al., 2007). It thus adapted an existing paradigm for testing infants’ understanding of references to absent objects (using language) to investigate a different symbolic medium (video). Twenty-two-month-olds first played with a toy and later saw on video that the toy underwent a change in state while they were out of the room. Infants in the current study did not subsequently identify the toy based on this new information, whereas those in previous research did. Infants this age thus appear less likely to update their representation of an absent object’s properties using video than using language. This result is consistent with the possibility that infants may understand the representational function of symbolic objects later in development than they understand the representational function of language. It also aligns with evidence of the video deficit in which infants learn less effectively from video than from firsthand experience.     

Vision and touch: multiple or multisensory representations of objects?

The relationship between visually and haptically derived representations of objects is an important question in multisensory processing and, increasingly, in mental representation. We review evidence for the format and properties of these representations, and address possible theoretical models. We explore the relevance of visual imagery processes and highlight areas for further research, including the neglected question of asymmetric performance in the visuo-haptic cross-modal memory paradigm. We conclude that the weight of evidence suggests the existence of a multisensory representation, spatial in format, and flexibly accessible by both bottom-up and top-down inputs, although efficient comparison between modality-specific representations cannot entirely be ruled out.     

What about the babies? A critical review of infants’ and toddlers’ absence in homelessness scholarship

Rates of family homelessness continue to reach unprecedented levels. As many as two million young children experience family homelessness each year, with an estimated one in 10 younger than one year old. Yet, despite their high prevalence, a dearth of studies have specifically investigated infants’ and toddlers’ experiences of homelessness. Overall, the available literature suggests homeless infants and toddlers experience increased risk to physical health, development, and well-being at an individual- and family-level. This presents a severely limited understanding of homeless infants’ and toddlers’ experiences, with substantial gaps remaining. This review documents the scant existing literature on infant and toddler development within the context of homelessness at both the individual and family-system levels, and proposes next steps for research, practice, and policy.     

Moral philosophy and theology: why is there so little difference for Roman Catholics?

The cardinal question in Christian moral theory and bioethics is whether the knowledge that Christians have (1) by grace and (2) by revelation (e.g., regarding the character of human and cosmic history as reaching from creation through the Incarnation and the Redemption to the Second Coming and the restoration of all things) makes a crucial contribution to understanding morality, as for example issues such as the good death and the morality of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia. This article argues that such a contribution is made by grace and revelation. The reduction of Roman Catholic moral theology and bioethics to secular bioethics is explored, as well as the necessity of the unique knowledge possessed by Christians for adequate end-of-life decision-making.     

The sound of darkness: why do auditory cues aid infants' search for objects hidden by darkness but not by visible occluders?

In manual search tasks designed to assess infants' knowledge of the object concept, why does search for objects hidden by darkness precede search for objects hidden by visible occluders by several months? A graded representations account explains this décalage by proposing that the conflicting visual input from occluders directly competes with object representations, whereas darkness merely weakens representations. This study tests the prediction that representations of objects hidden by darkness are strong enough for infants to bind auditory cues to them and support search, whereas representations of objects hidden by occluders are not. Six-and-half-month-olds were presented with audible or silent objects that remained visible, became hidden by darkness, or became hidden by a visible occluder. Search required engaging in the same means-end action in all conditions. As predicted, auditory cues increased search when objects were hidden by darkness but not when they were hidden by a visible occluder. Results are discussed in the context of different facets of object concept development highlighted by graded representations perspectives and core knowledge perspectives and in relation to other work on multimodal object representations.     

When and why do retrieval attempts enhance subsequent encoding?

Unsuccessful retrieval attempts can enhance subsequent encoding and learning. In three experiments, subjects either attempted to retrieve word pairs prior to studying them (e.g., attempting to recall tide–? before studying tide–beach) or did not attempt retrieval and retention of the studied targets was assessed on a subsequent cued recall test. Experiment 1 showed that attempting retrieval enhanced subsequent encoding and recall relative to not attempting retrieval when the word pairs were semantically related, but not when the pairs were unrelated. In Experiment 2, studying a different word pair prior to the correct pair (e.g., studying tide–wave prior to tide–beach) did not produce the same effect as attempting retrieval prior to studying. Constraining retrieval to a particular candidate word prior to study (e.g., recalling tide–wa__ before studying tide–beach) produced a negative effect on subsequent recall. Experiment 3 showed that attempting retrieval did not enhance encoding when a brief delay occurred between the retrieval attempt and the subsequent study trial. The results support the idea that a search set of candidates related to the retrieval cue is activated during retrieval and that this retrieval-specific activation can enhance subsequent encoding of those candidates.     

What is conscience and why is respect for it so important?

The literature on conscience in medicine has paid little attention to what is meant by the word ‘conscience.’ This article distinguishes between retrospective and prospective conscience, distinguishes synderesis from conscience, and argues against intuitionist views of conscience. Conscience is defined as having two interrelated parts: (1) a commitment to morality itself; to acting and choosing morally according to the best of one’s ability, and (2) the activity of judging that an act one has done or about which one is deliberating would violate that commitment. Tolerance is defined as mutual respect for conscience. A set of boundary conditions for justifiable respect for conscientious objection in medicine is proposed.