Cognitive disorders in endogenous psychoses

Cognitive disorders of schizophrenics as well as subjects with affective psychosis were studied with the aid of 10 tests. Differences between schizophrenics and patients with affective psychosis could hardly be detected. Subgroup differences within the two broad diagnostic categories are pointing to the importance of the severity of illness. However, some differences between two small samples (N = 9) carefully matched with regard to several relevant aspects - especially concerning the severity of disorder - show that the diagnostic category is not wholly unimportant. Judged on the basis of these differences, there are probably no deficits of a fundamentally different nature; the assumption of divergent cognitive styles or defence mechanisms considering comparable basic deficits seems more plausible.     

Prostaglandins and endogenous psychoses

The authors refer to the biochemical investigation of the occurrence and metabolism of essential fatty acids in the CNS and to significant differences in results between those obtained in animal experiments and those involving human beings, taking into account hypotheses that have not yet met with general acceptance. Discussed is the possible connection between eicosanic acid and schizophrenia, notably Horrobin's hypothesis of PGE1 deficiency in schizophrenic patients. The probability of a pathogenetic connection between changes in the metabolism of fatty acids and the occurrence of endogenous psychoses is assumed.     

Visually controlled space orientation in endogenous psychoses

The visual controlled behaviour in space is measured in 30 psychotic patients. In a room with a row of 8 equal chairs we measured the right-left-choice and the choice of distance. The neglect of the left chairs in patient with "distrust" and "delusion" let us suppose a right hemispherical dysfunction. There is no correlation between psychosis and choice of distance, but a good correlation between disturbed parental home and near distance.     

Differential diagnosis of endogenous psychoses in relation to a symptom catalog

The paper introduces a catalog of symptoms to promote in the field of endogenous psychoses differentiated diagnosis, at the same time constituting a prognosis. Symptoms should be more minutely differentiated than is customary in psychiatric questionnaires. Manic-depressive disorders and purely phasal psychoses are distinguished solely in the clinical evaluation. Thus benign cycloid psychoses can be distinguished from malignant unsystematic schizophrenia.     

Memory and consciousness: trace distinctiveness in memory retrievals

The aim of this article was to provide experimental evidence that classical dissociation between levels of consciousness associated with memory retrieval (i.e., implicit or explicit) can be explained in terms of task dependency and distinctiveness of traces. In our study phase, we manipulated the level of isolation (partial vs. global) of the memory trace by means of an isolation paradigm (isolated words among non-isolated words). We then tested these two types of isolation in a series of tasks of increasing complexity: a lexical decision task, a recognition task, and a free recall task. The main result of this study was that distinctiveness effects were observed as a function of the type of isolation (level of isolation) and the nature of the task. We concluded that trace distinctiveness improves subsequent access to the trace, while the level of trace distinctiveness also appears to determine the possibility of conscious or explicit retrieval.     

Missing piece of the puzzle in the science of consciousness: Resting state and endogenous correlates of consciousness

Consciousness still stands as one of the most interesting and the most elusive problems of neuroscience. Finding its correlates is the first step toward its satisfactory explanation. Several theories have proposed its correlates but none of them seem to be generally accepted even though most of them share some very similar elements. These elements are the activity of the thalamus, which is considered by some as the central region for consciousness, and gamma synchronization, which should be the general principal for the emergence of conscious experience. However, all of these proposed theories share one characteristic and that is that they do not take into consideration the recently discovered endogenous activity of the brain, which is generally associated with the default mode network. Although the activity of this large scale brain network is in correlation with various levels of consciousness it is still missing in discussions of consciousness. This review recognizes the importance of endogenous activity and points out the important discoveries of endogenous activity that could be an important step toward a satisfactory explanation of consciousness.     

Neurological disorders and the structure of human consciousness

Recent studies that identify distinct neural correlates of perceptual awareness offer a promising step towards improved understanding of the neurological underpinnings of conscious experience. Such studies indicate that perceptual awareness is modular in nature, with neural correlates of awareness consisting of the specialized structures involved in perceptual processing. However, the integrative, multimodal nature of conscious experience appears to require a functional architecture that overcomes this modular segregation of function. We propose a model in which experience emerges from the dynamic interactions of specialized component processes via a distributed neural network. Such a model offers a mechanism to explain several empirical observations of the neural correlates of perceptual awareness, cognitive function, and symptoms of neurological damage.     

Autobiographical memory, autonoetic consciousness, and self-perspective in aging

In this study, the authors examined the effects of aging on autobiographical memory in 180 participants by means of a new method designed to assess across 5 lifetime periods the nature of memories-that is, specificity and spontaneity--and the phenomenal experience of remembering--that is, self-perspective and autonoetic consciousness--via the field/observer and remember/know paradigms respectively. Age-related differences were found for the specificity and spontaneity of memories and the phenomenal experience of remembering. There was an increase in observer and know responses with age, but a decrease in field and remember responses and in the ability to justify them by recalling sensory-perceptive, affective, or spatiotemporal specific details. This pattern confirms the existence of a semantic-episodic dissociation in autobiographical memory in aging. Moreover, the data support the view that older participants can subjectively "travel back in time" to relive personal events in the most distant past better than those in the recent past.     

Aspects of the unity of consciousness and everyday memory failures

We argue that analyzing everyday memory failures in terms of the "unity of consciousness" can elucidate the bases of such failures. A perfect unity amongst one's mental states is rare. In extreme cases the unity of consciousness can breakdown in dramatic fashion (e.g., in Dissociative Identity Disorder), but such breakdowns also occur in less dramatic ways that affect us in everyday life. For example, disruptions in the unity of consciousness can result in everyday memory failures, such as forgetting to put on a tie for an important formal meeting. After providing some philosophical background into the notions of "unity of consciousness" and "functionalism," we offer preliminary analyses of three examples of everyday memory failure. We then introduce and develop what we call the "unity model" of memory failure and show how it explains the examples. We also describe different ways that unity can break down which, in turn, can lead to memory failure and inappropriate behavior. We then show how slips of action and other kinds of cognitive failures (e.g., memory blocks) differ from everyday memory failures. Finally, we examine alternative models (e.g., Absentmindedness and Multimodal) arguing that the unity model is preferable, and then show how our model is consistent with some experimental results.     

Explicit memory in anxiety disorders

Two experiments were conducted to study selective memory bias favoring anxiety-relevant materials in patients with anxiety disorders. In the 1st experiment, 32 patients with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), 30 with social phobia (speaking anxiety), and 31 control participants incidentally learned GAD-relevant words, speech anxiety-relevant words, strongly pleasant words, and words with a neutral valence. Participants did not show any explicit memory bias for threatening materials. Thirty patients suffering from panic disorder (PD) with agoraphobia and 30 controls took part in the 2nd experiment. The design was similar to the 1st experiment. This time a highly specific selective memory bias for threatening words was found. Words describing symptoms of anxiety were better recalled by PD patients. Results are consistent with previous findings but are inexplicable by existing theories.     

Dispensary treatment of endogenous psychoses from the viewpoint of the psychiatrist in ambulatory care

Reviewing the results of the observation of 72 patients suffering from endogenic psychoses during a period of 11 years the author tries to demonstrate the advantages of a basis-near, i.e. near to the places of living and employment, therapy for psychically sick persons. The necessity of long-term therapy is emphasized.     

Determination of similarity and dissimilarity of endogenous psychoses in monozygotic twins based on a differential diagnosis

The frequently published opinion that endogenous psychoses in monozygotic twins often show a marked lack of similarity could not be confirmed by the results of studies performed by the author and his associates. In general, differenting diagnosis allows the particular syndrome, on which the establishment of the respective diagnosis is based, to be nearly always observed in either partner. On the other hand, changes of mood, which are accessory symptoms, often show a different picture which may perhaps be regarded as being due to the fact that monozygotic twins often differ in their respective temperaments. The course and severity of the disease also usually show considerable differences which may in part be due to additional affections.