Is schizotypy taxonic? Response to

Beauchaine, Lenzenweger, and Waller (2008) criticize our taxometric study of schizotypy (Rawlings, Williams, Haslam, & Claridge, in press) on a variety of methodological and philosophical grounds. We argue that their critique selectively applies more stringent standards to our work than to studies supporting their view that schizotypy is taxonic (i.e., categorical). Many of their criticisms apply at least equally to existing studies that offer support for a schizotypy taxon, and these studies are vulnerable to biases favouring taxonic conclusions that were controlled for in our study. Contrary to their criticisms, we did not claim to have disconfirmed previous taxonic findings about schizotypy, and our findings positively support dimensional models of schizotypy rather than merely being null results. Similarly, our findings are not artefacts of the sampling or measurement decisions that they question. Even well-replicated taxometric findings are not immune to empirical challenge, and evaluation of such challenges must be even-handed.     

Infinitism Redux? A Response to Klein

Foundationalist, Coherentist. Skeptic etc., have all been united in one respect—all accept epistemic justification cannot result from an unending, and non-repeating. chain of reasons. Peter Klein has recently challenged this minimal consensus with a defense of what he calls "Intinitism"—the position that justification can result from such a regress. Klein provides surprisingly convincing responses to most of the common objections to Infinitism, but I will argue that he fails to address a venerable metaphysical concern about a certain type of regress. My conclusion will be that until Klein answers these metaphysical worries he will not have restored Infinitism as a viable option in epistemology.     

Response to “Poison Cookies” Discussions

This is a response to the discussions of the case presented by this author. Responding to the discussions has allowed the author to pull together her own ideas about the case as well as about the work we do. The author sees Sheldon (Shelly) Bach's view of sadomasochism as a particular type of object relationship as informing her own point of view. Next comes a discussion centering on Steven (Steve) H. Knoblauch's emphasizing the importance of the internal symbolic world of the patient. The author makes the point that understanding the level of differentiation of the internal objects in the patient's representational world is important in thinking about the types and timing of interventions the analyst makes; for example, those which Mary-Joan Gerson describes in her comments. Finally, the author addresses Sue Grand's response, especially her emphasis on the importance of siblings in our patients’ histories and the resulting sibling transferences to the analyst.     

What Influences Audience Response to Figure Painting?

The Psychological Record - According to Mechner (2017), the aesthetic response is characterized by a “surprise-tinged” emotion that has no immediate function and tends to be...     

Response to Stuart Rennie's ‘Elegant variations’

Abstract

In Happiness, Tabensky equates the notion of happiness to Aristotelian eudaimonia. I shall claim that doing so amounts to equating two concepts that moderns cannot conceptually equate, namely, the good for a person and the good person or good life. In §2 I examine the way in which Tabensky deals with this issue and claim that his idea of happiness is as problematic for us moderns as is any translation of the notion of eudaimonia in terms of happiness. Naturally, if happiness understood as eudaimonia is ambiguous, so will be the notion of a desire for happiness, which we find at the core of Tabensky’s whole project. In §3 I shall be concerned with another aspect of the desire for happiness; namely, its alleged self-justifying nature. I will attempt to undermine the idea that this desire is self-justifying by undermining the criterion on which Tabensky takes self-justifiability to rest, i.e. its basicness, but also by shedding doubt on the idea that there is such a thing as an ultimate basic principle and, even if there were, that it is what Tabensky calls the eudaimon principle.     

Response to ‘Somatic Intentionality Bifurcated: A Sellarisan Response to Sachs’s Merleau-Pontyan Account of Intentionality’

ABSTRACT

This article advances a new analysis of stupidity as a distinctive form of cognitive failing. Section 1 outlines some problems in explicating this notion and suggests some desiderata. Section 2 sketches an existing model of stupidity, found in Kant and Flaubert, which serves as a foil for my own view. In Section 3, I introduce my theory: I analyse stupidity as form of conceptual self-hampering, characterised by a specific aetiology and with a range of deleterious effects. In Section 4, I show how this proposal meets the desiderata and I clarify how it diverges from existing accounts. My position is close to a ‘public health approach’, in contrast to the virtue/vice framework employed by Engel or Mulligan.     

Parental Emotional Response to Children’s Traumas

To better understand how parents react to their child’s trauma exposure and evaluate whether different reactions are related to different types of traumas, 120 parents (79.2% mothers, 18.3% fathers, 2.5% other caregivers) were asked about their emotional reactions related to their child’s self-reported worst trauma. Emotional reactions were assessed with the Parental Emotional Reactions Questionnaire (PERQ). Parents reported high levels of distress and guilt. Furthermore, there was a significant relationship between type of trauma and parents’ overall emotional reactions. Parental distress was equally endorsed among the different trauma groups. Parents of children who experienced intrafamilial violence and extrafamilial sexual abuse reported the highest levels of guilt, and child exposure to intrafamilial violence was associated with higher levels of parental shame.     

Response to ‘Containment lost’ by Andrew Briggs

This is a response to Andrew Briggs’ paper presented to the ACP Conference in June 2017. Briggs’ paper, sobering, pessimistic and challenging, looks at the emotional pressures on child psychotherapists in Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS) as a result of the imposition of the internal market in the NHS. He posits that this has caused the loss of organisational containment, not just for child psychotherapists, but for all those clinicians who work in CAMHS. Briggs writes that this loss of containment is evident in clinicians’ experience of meaninglessness in their work and that this meaninglessness may lead to the despair of the death instinct. For Briggs, this goes along with the loss of professional identity as a once favoured discipline. He compares this fall from grace to Satan’s as described in Milton’s Paradise Lost. If, as he suggests, there has been a strong sense of being the favoured discipline, then maybe a dependence had grown in the profession whereby this loss now feels like a terrible abandonment. The author of this response sees hope amidst the despondency being forced upon workers in the NHS and makes the case for us to engage and resist in a number of practical ways.     

A Response to Steve Bruce's "Praying Alone?"

This article argues that neither Steve Bruce's theory of secularisation nor Grace Davie's theory of voluntary organisations are needed to explain British attitudes to religious belief and practice.     

Response to Lynne Segal: Thatcher’s legacy

In response to Lynne Segal’s paper on the legacy of Margaret Thatcher, I briefly examine how Thatcher redefined the ‘social’ away from being an expression of care and mutuality. Playing on images of the dangers of infection and enfeeblement, she mobilised fears about dependency to create a discourse of strength and self-aggrandising invulnerability, a discourse that is destructive of sociality and an ethic of care.