Continuity in social cognition from infancy to childhood

Research examining the development of social cognition has largely been divided into two areas: infant perception of intentional agents, and preschoolers’ understanding of others’ mental states and beliefs (theory of mind). Many researchers have suggested that there is continuity in social cognitive development such that the abilities observed in infancy are related to later preschool ability, yet little empirical evidence exists for this claim. Here, we present preliminary evidence that capacities specific to the social domain contribute to performance in social cognition tasks both during infancy and in early childhood. Specifically, looking time patterns in an infant social cognition task correlated with preschool theory of mind; however, no such relationship was found for infants in a nonsocial cognition task.     

New evidence for the prediction of intelligence from infancy

An assumption is made that tests of the infant's ability to recognize a previously seen target tap early cognitive processes similar to those processes employed to solve later tests of intelligence. The recognition memory abilities of normal infants have been found to be superior to those of infants considered to be at risk for later intellectual deficit. Evidence for the predictive validity of infant recognition memory tests emerges from longitudinal studies in which the relationship between the extent of infants' visual preferences for novel targets and later performance on standard tests of intelligence has been examined. Various theoretical and practical consequences flow from these initial discoveries of continuity in intelligent functioning from infancy to childhood.     

Relation of infant motor development with nonverbal intelligence,language comprehension and neuropsychological functioning in childhood: a population‐based study

Within a population‐based study of 3356 children, we investigated whether infant neuromotor development was associated with cognition in early childhood. Neuromotor development was examined with an adapted version of Touwen's Neurodevelopmental Examination between 9 and 20 weeks. Parents rated their children's executive functioning at 4 years. At age 6 years, children performed intelligence and language comprehension tests, using Dutch test batteries. At age 6–9 years, neuropsychological functioning was assessed in 486 children using the validated NEPSY‐II–NL test battery. We showed that less optimal neurodevelopment in infancy may predict poor mental rotation, immediate memory, shifting, and planning; but not nonverbal intelligence or language comprehension.     

The reciprocal relation between sleep and memory in infancy: Memory‐dependent adjustment of sleep spindles and spindle‐dependent improvement of memories

Sleep spindle activity in infants supports their formation of generalized memories during sleep, indicating that specific sleep processes affect the consolidation of memories early in life. Characteristics of sleep spindles depend on the infant's developmental state and are known to be associated with trait‐like factors such as intelligence. It is, however, largely unknown which state‐like factors affect sleep spindles in infancy. By varying infants’ wake experience in a within‐subject design, here we provide evidence for a learning‐ and memory‐dependent modulation of infant spindle activity. In a lexical‐semantic learning session before a nap, 14‐ to 16‐month‐old infants were exposed to unknown words as labels for exemplars of unknown object categories. In a memory test on the next day, generalization to novel category exemplars was tested. In a nonlearning control session preceding a nap on another day, the same infants heard known words as labels for exemplars of already known categories. Central–parietal fast sleep spindles increased after the encoding of unknown object–word pairings compared to known pairings, evidencing that an infant's spindle activity varies depending on its prior knowledge for newly encoded information. Correlations suggest that enhanced spindle activity was particularly triggered, when similar unknown pairings were not generalized immediately during encoding. The spindle increase triggered by previously not generalized object–word pairings, moreover, boosted the formation of generalized memories for these pairings. Overall, the results provide first evidence for a fine‐tuned regulation of infant sleep quality according to current consolidation requirements, which improves the infant long‐term memory for new experiences.     

Risk in infancy. Origins and implications

This article focuses on biological risks that can adversely influence development during infancy and later. In the first part of the article, the origins of risks and their potential consequences are discussed relative to prepregnancy, prenatal, perinatal, and postnatal periods. Epidemiological data are presented. The second part of the article addresses issues pertaining to assessment of infant development and interventions provided for infants whose development may be in jeopardy. Finally, goals for prevention are highlighted and the need for a nationally derived data base on risk and outcomes is emphasized.     

The role of frontal lobe functioning in the development of infant self-regulatory behavior.

In the last two decades, there has been tremendous growth in two fields of study related to human infant development: (1) the development of neural processes during the early postnatal years and (2) the development of self-regulatory behavior. In an attempt to stimulate research on the relation between early brain development and self-regulatory processes, several hypotheses pertaining to the role of frontal lobe functioning in the development of emotion regulation during infancy are proposed. The results of a study of the relation between frontal electroencephalographic (EEG) activity and emotional behavior of 21-month-old infants are reported. It was found that increases in frontal lobe activation were associated with increases in emotional arousal, while EEG activity recorded from the parietal region showed either a reciprocal pattern of activation or did not change as a function of level of emotional arousal. These results provide evidence for the specialized role of the frontal lobe in mediating emotional behavior during infancy.     

Is there a nonverbal period of development?

That the infant lives in a nonverbal sensorimotor world is widely believed. Yet this notion is being challenged by research, in a range of fields, that depicts the young infant as actively attuned to aural speech from birth and able to process and use its sounds and meanings well before the end of the first year. Following a selective review of the research on infant speech processing between birth and age twelve months, three questions are identified that highlight the theoretical and clinical implications of this research for psychoanalytic conceptualizations of infancy, the nature of language, and clinical process. The research, it is concluded, identifies the operation of linguistic and conceptual processes in early life, processes that may intersect with the experiential and emotional processes with which psychoanalysis is already concerned. Moreover, this research raises questions about the view that the nature of infancy is essentially nonverbal.     

Infant recognition memory and later intelligence

The present study asked if tests of visual recognition memory during infancy based on differential fixation to novel and previously seen targets are valid predictors of later intelligence for children scoring in the normal to superior range of intelligence. Statistically significant and moderate correlations of .37 and .57 were obtained between infant recognition memory scores obtained at four to seven months and later vocabulary tests of intelligence, for 54 children tested at four and for 39 children seen at seven years, respectively. The coefficients did not vary by sex, and were independent of differences in socio-economic status.     

Using deferred imitation to understand the process of change in infant memory development

In their commentaries, Carver, Richmond and DeBoer pose several challenging and insightful questions in response to our target article. Two key themes emerged from their commentaries, which are important in the field of infant memory research. The first concerns the use of deferred imitation as a paradigm, and its relationship to other methods of assessing infant cognition. The second concerns understanding the process of change observed in infant memory. How do maturation and experience interact to produce developmental change, and what theories can best account for changes in representational flexibility in early infancy? We will address each area and the implications these questions have for the direction of future research. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

智力开发的基本理念与实践

以高度分化的g因素研究为理论基础,智力开发活动形成了神经潜能开发、心理管理与反省经验开发、专家技能开发、多元智力开发、社会分布式认知开发、知识表征重组开发、环境重组开发等智力要素开发理念以及一些代表性的实践。随着对智力结构的整合研究的出现和不断深入,智力开发理念和模式将由分化的要素开发向整合开发转变,以智力与其他心理结构、智力与内部世界和外部世界系统关系为基础的智力开发将是理论和实践研究的重点内容     

The foundations of psychological understanding

In this paper, I review some recent submissions to Developmental Science that advance our understanding of psychological development. More and more submissions to the journal explore the origins of knowledge and, for psychological knowledge, such origins are multiple. Here I consider the contribution of mechanisms such as contingency detection, gaze following and gaze monitoring, social referencing and joint attention to emergent psychological understanding. I also consider infant understanding of goal-directed action, and the intimate connection between language acquisition and psychological development. The centrality of intention-reading skills to both language and social cognition is highlighted.     

AMPLE智力模型——PASS智力模型的扩展

本文根据实验事实,对PASS智力模型进行扩展,并提出一个简称AMPLE的智力模型。这个模型基于脑的四个功能系统学说,包括注意（attention）、操纵（manipulation）、计划（planning）、学习（learning）和评估（evaluation）等过程。它是一个囊括觉、知、情、意诸成分在内的全面的智力模型。     

Small and large number processing in infants and toddlers with Williams syndrome

Previous studies have suggested that typically developing 6‐month‐old infants are able to discriminate between small and large numerosities. However, discrimination between small numerosities in young infants is only possible when variables continuous with number (e.g. area or circumference) are confounded. In contrast, large number discrimination is successful even when variables continuous with number are systematically controlled for. These findings suggest the existence of different systems underlying small and large number processing in infancy. How do these develop in atypical syndromes? Williams syndrome (WS) is a rare neurocognitive developmental disorder in which numerical cognition has been found to be impaired in older children and adults. Do impairments of number processing have their origins in infancy? Here this question is investigated by testing the small and large number discrimination abilities of infants and toddlers with WS. While infants with WS were able to discriminate between 2 and 3 elements when total area was confounded with numerosity, the same infants did not discriminate between 8 and 16 elements, when number was not confounded with continuous variables. These findings suggest that a system for tracking the features of small numbers of object (object‐file representation) may be functional in WS, while large number discrimination is impaired from an early age onwards. Finally, we argue that individual differences in large number processing in infancy are more likely than small number processing to be predictive of later development of numerical cognition.     

An Expanded View of Intersubjectivity in Infancy and its Application to Psychoanalysis

We consider the relevance of forms of intersubjectivity in infancy to the nonverbal and implicit dimension of intersubjectivity in psychoanalysis. The term forms of intersubjectivity, within the adult explicit and implicit modes and the infant presymbolic implicit mode, is offered to clarify the multiple meanings of intersubjectivity. The ideas of infant intersubjectivity of Meltzoff, Trevarthen, and Stern that have particular relevance for psychoanalysis are highlighted: the dialogic origin of mind, the role of correspondences, and the idea that symbolic forms of intersubjectivity are built on presymbolic forms. We build on their work to define a fourth position: that the full range of patterns of interactive regulation provides the broadest definition of the presymbolic origins of intersubjectivity, with correspondence being only one of many critical patterns. We additionally address the place of interactive regulation, problems with the concept of matching, the role of self-regulation, the role of difference, and the “balance model” of self- and interactive regulation. We take the position that all forms of interactive regulation are relevant to the possibility of perceiving and aligning oneself with the moment-by-moment process of the other. A broadened understanding of intersubjectivity in infancy sets the stage for a more fruitful exchange between infant researchers and psychoanalysts.     

Novelty-seeking,novelty-finding,and the developmental continuity of intelligence

This article suggests that novelty-seeking and novelty-finding, as well as the ability to learn and reason with novel kinds of concepts, are critical aspects of intelligence at all ages from infancy, onward. The results of studies by Lewis and Brooks-Gunn and by Fagan and McGrath regarding intelligence in infancy are reviewed, and these results are found to be compatible with some of my own results regarding intelligence in adulthood. It is suggested that a major aspect of intelligence, attitude toward and performance with novel kinds of concepts, is continuous in nature throughout the life span, although by necessity, they must be measured in different ways at different times of life.     

Old mead in new bottles: the impersonal and the interpersonal in infant knowledge

Orthodox cognitive-developmental theory has tacitly assumed that knowledge is private and that it arises in the individual from asocial negotiation with physical objects. In contrast, a ‘neo-Meadian’ (social-constructivist) school holds that knowledge is interpersonal and arises from early social interaction. This paper argues that a more satisfactory alternative to the private (personal) account is not an interpersonal but an impersonal (public) account. Early knowledge would thus be seen as inherently accessible to observation. Such a position is indicated, it is argued, in Piaget's formulation of sensorimotor intelligence and in Bower's rule-following model. It is suggested that the neo-Meadian model of infancy is essentially conservative, in stressing communicative inferiority on the part of the infant. Further, it seriously distorts Mead's own cohesive account of development through infancy and childhood. It is noted finally that Mead's philosophical stance — a realist pragmatism — is in fact consistent with an impersonalist position. It is therefore suggested that Mead's realist version of social behaviourism be taken seriously.     

Comparative cognitive development

This paper aims to compare cognitive development in humans and chimpanzees to illuminate the evolutionary origins of human cognition. Comparison of morphological data and life history strongly highlights the common features of all primate species, including humans. The human mother-infant relationship is characterized by the physical separation of mother and infant, and the stable supine posture of infants, that enables vocal exchange, face-to-face communication, and manual gestures. The cognitive development of chimpanzees was studied using the participation observation method. It revealed that humans and chimpanzees show similar development until 3 months of age. However, chimpanzees have a unique type of social learning that lacks the social reference observed in human children. Moreover, chimpanzees have unique immediate short-term memory capabilities. Taken together, this paper presents a plausible evolutionary scenario for the uniquely human characteristics of cognition.     

Monolingual but not bilingual infants demonstrate racial bias in social cue use

Bilingualism exerts early and pervasive effects on cognition, observable in infancy. Thus far, investigations of infant bilingual cognition have focused on sensitivity to visual memory, executive function, and linguistic sensitivity. Much less research has focused on how bilingualism impacts processing of social cues. The present study sought to investigate whether bilingualism modulates the expression of one aspect of social processing: early racial bias. Using a gaze‐following paradigm, we investigated whether 18‐ to 20‐month‐old monolingual and bilingual infants favored their own race. Results demonstrated that monolingual infants favored their own race in following a model whose direction of gaze signaled an event. In contrast, bilingual infants demonstrated race‐neutral gaze‐following patterns, relying more heavily on the reliability of the behavior of the model over race. Findings suggest that bilingualism may have protective effects against the early emergence of racial bias.     

Parent-infant resemblance for general and specific cognitive abilities in the Colorado adoption project

Previous publications emanating from the Colorado Adoption Project have reported significant relationships between parental general cognitive ability (g) and infant Bayley MDI scores. The present study compared infant Bayley factor scores representing separable dimensions of infant cognition with parental general and specific cognitive abilities for 182 adoptive families and 164 nonadoptive families. Parent/offspring correlations between 12-month Bayley factors and parental cognitive abilities suggest only minimal relationships for both parental g and specific abilities. At 24 months, more parent/offspring resemblance was present; moreover, Bayley factors that were related to parental cognition tended to be related to parental g, not to specific abilities. The finding of significant parent/offspring relationships at 24 months between biological parents and their adopted-away infants, as well as between nonadoptive parents and their infants, suggests some genetic continuity from infancy to adulthood.     

Attentive tracking of objects versus substances

Recent research in vision science, infant cognition, and word learning suggests a special role for the processing of discrete objects. But what counts as an object? Answers to this question often depend on contrasting object-based processing with the processing of spatial areas or unbound visual features. In infant cognition and word learning, though, another salient contrast has been between rigid cohesive objects and nonsolid substances. Whereas objects may move from one location to another, a nonsolid substance must pour from one location to another. In the study reported here, we explored whether attentive tracking processes are sensitive to dynamic information of this type. Using a multiple-object tracking task, we found that subjects could easily track four items in a display of eight identical unpredictably moving entities that moved as discrete objects from one location to another, but could not track similar entities that noncohesively "poured" from one location to another-even when the items in both conditions followed the same trajectories at the same speeds. Other conditions revealed that this inability to track multiple "substances" stemmed not from violations of rigidity or cohesiveness per se, because subjects were able to track multiple noncohesive collections and multiple nonrigid deforming objects. Rather, the impairment was due to the dynamic extension and contraction during the substancelike motion, which rendered the location of the entity ambiguous. These results demonstrate a convergence between processes of midlevel adult vision and infant cognition, and in general help to clarify what can count as a persisting dynamic object of attention.