Imprecise Epistemic Values and Imprecise Credences

A number of recent arguments purport to show that imprecise credences are incompatible with accuracy-first epistemology. If correct, this conclusion suggests a conflict between evidential and alethic epistemic norms. In the first part of the paper, I claim that these arguments fail if we understand imprecise credences as indeterminate credences. In the second part, I explore why agents with entirely alethic epistemic values can end up in an indeterminate credal state. Following William James, I argue that there are many distinct alethic values that a rational agent can have. Furthermore, such an agent is rationally permitted not to have settled on one fully precise value function. This indeterminacy in value will sometimes result in indeterminacy in epistemic behaviour—that is, because the agent’s values aren’t settled, what she believes might not be.     

Logical recoding of S-R rules can reverse the effects of spatial S-R correspondence

Two experiments investigated competing explanations for the reversal of spatial stimulus—response (S—R) correspondence effects (i.e., Simon effects) with an incompatible S—R mapping on the relevant, nonspatial dimension. Competing explanations were based on generalized S—R rules (logical-recoding account) or referred to display—control arrangement correspondence or to S—S congruity. In Experiment 1, compatible responses to finger—name stimuli presented at left/right locations produced normal Simon effects, whereas incompatible responses to finger—name stimuli produced an inverted Simon effect. This finding supports the logical-recoding account. In Experiment 2, spatial S—R correspondence and color S—R correspondence were varied independently, and main effects of these variables were observed. The lack of an interaction between these variables, however, disconfirms a prediction of the display—control arrangement correspondence account. Together, the results provide converging evidence for the logical-recoding account. This account claims that participants derive generalized response selection rules (e.g., the identity or reversal rule) from specific S—R rules and inadvertently apply the generalized rules to the irrelevant (spatial) S—R dimension when selecting their response.     

A graded semantics for counterfactuals

This article presents an extension of Lewis’ analysis of counterfactuals to a graded framework. Unlike standard graded approaches, which use the probabilistic framework, we employ that of many-valued logics. Our principal goal is to provide an adequate analysis of the main background notion of Lewis’ approach—the one of the similarity of possible worlds. We discuss the requirements imposed on the analysis of counterfactuals by the imprecise character of similarity and concentrate in particular on robustness, i.e., the requirement that small changes in the similarity relation should not significantly change the truth value of the counterfactual in question. Our second motivation is related to the logical analysis of natural language: analyzing counterfactuals in the framework of many-valued logics allows us to extend the analysis to counterfactuals that include vague statements. Unlike previous proposals of this kind in the literature, our approach makes it possible to apply gradedness at various levels of the analysis and hence provide a more detailed account of the phenomenon of vagueness in the context of counterfactuals. Finally, our framework admits a novel way of avoiding the Limit Assumption, keeping the core of Lewis’ truth condition for counterfactuals unchanged.

     

A normative account of epistemic luck

This paper develops a normative account of epistemic luck, according to which the luckiness of epistemic luck is analyzed in terms of the expectations a subject is entitled to have when she satisfies the standards of epistemic justification. This account enables us to distinguish three types of epistemic luck—bad, good, and sheer—and to model the roles they play e.g. in Gettierization. One controversial aspect of the proposed account is that it is non‐reductive. While other approaches analyze epistemic luck in non‐epistemic terms—either in modal terms (lack of safety) or in agential terms (lack of creditworthiness)—I argue that the non‐reductive nature of the normative account is actually a selling‐point relative to its competitors.     

Global Constraints on Imprecise Credences: Solving Reflection Violations,Belief Inertia,and Other Puzzles

The move to imprecise credence models leaves many formal norms of rationality surprisingly intact, as rational constraints on precise credences are often reinterpreted as constraints on individual elements of a rational agent’s representor. However, constraints on imprecise credences needn’t take this form. Whether an imprecise agent is rational might just as easily depend on global features of her representor. This paper is an extended investigation of global rules of rationality. I begin by distinguishing and defining multiple notions of globalness. Then I use these notions to solve several problems faced by fans of imprecise credences. On behalf of fans of imprecise credences, I respond to the problem of belief inertia, according to which certain imprecise agents are unable to engage in inductive learning. In addition, I answer the objection that that imprecise agents are doomed to violate the rational principle of Reflection.     

A normatively adequate credal reductivism

It is a prevalent, if not popular, thesis in the metaphysics of belief that facts about an agent’s beliefs depend entirely upon facts about that agent’s underlying credal state. Call this thesis ‘credal reductivism’ and any view that endorses this thesis a ‘credal reductivist view’. An adequate credal reductivist view will accurately predict both when belief occurs and which beliefs are held appropriately, on the basis of credal facts alone. Several well-known—and some lesser known—objections to credal reductivism turn on the inability of standard credal reductivist views to get the latter, normative, results right. This paper presents and defends a novel credal reductivist view according to which belief is a type of “imprecise credence” that escapes these objections by including an extreme credence of 1.     

Imprecise evidence without imprecise credences

Philosophical Studies - Does rationality require imprecise credences? Many hold that it does: imprecise evidence requires correspondingly imprecise credences. I argue that this is false. The...     

Inducing Maximal Versus Typical Learning Through the Provision of a Pretraining Goal Orientation

This study explores how account managers—employees who operate as entrepreneurial customer boundary spanners—obtain intrafirm knowledge (organizational and expertise knowledge) from diverse colleagues so as to develop tailor-made solutions for their customers. Access to intrafirm knowledge is obtained through two independent knowledge-based exchanges within internal knowledge markets: account managers invest in different activities in order to signal communal and deal-maker reputations. In exchange, colleagues share organizational and expertise knowledge that ultimately contribute to account managers' performance. The types of knowledge shared by colleagues depend on the reputations of account managers.     

Toward a Truly Social Epistemology: Babbage,the Division of Mental Labor,and the Possibility of Socially Distributed Warrant

In what follows, I appeal to Charles Babbage’s discussion of the division of mental labor to provide evidence that—at least with respect to the social acquisition, storage, retrieval, and transmission of knowledge—epistemologists have, for a broad range of phenomena of crucial importance to actual knowers in their epistemic practices in everyday life, failed adequately to appreciate the significance of socially distributed cognition. If the discussion here is successful, I will have demonstrated that a particular presumption widely held within the contemporary discussion of the epistemology of testimony—a presumption that I will term the personalist requirement—fails to account for those very practices of knowers that I detail here. I will then conclude by suggesting that an alternate account of testimonial warrant, one that has heretofore been underappreciated, ought to be given more serious consideration—in particular because it is well suited to account for those actual practices of knowers that the personalist requirement leaves unrecognized.     

Can Interventionists Be Neo-Russellians? Interventionism,the Open Systems Argument,and the Arrow of Entropy

Several proponents of the interventionist theory of causation have recently argued for a neo-Russellian account of causation. The article discusses two strategies for interventionists to be neo-Russellians. First, I argue that the open systems argument—the main argument for a neo-Russellian account advocated by interventionists—fails. Second, I explore and discuss an alternative for interventionists who wish to be neo-Russellians: the statistical–mechanical account. Although the latter account is an attractive alternative, it is argued that interventionists are not able to adopt it straightforwardly. Hence, to be neo-Russellians remains a challenge for interventionists.     

THE SIMPLE ARGUMENT FOR SUBCLASSICAL LOGIC

This paper presents a simple but, by my lights, effective argument for a subclassical account of logic—an account according to which logical consequence is (properly) weaker than the standard, so‐called classical account. Alas, the vast bulk of the paper is setup. Because of the many conflicting uses of ‘logic’ the paper begins, following a disclaimer on logic and inference, by fixing the sense of ‘logic’ in question, and then proceeds to rehearse both the target subclassical account of logic and its well‐known relative (viz., classical logic). With background in place the simple argument—which takes up less than five pages—is advanced. My hope is that the minimal presentation will help to get ‘the simple argument’ plainly on the table, and that subsequent debate can move us forward.     

Dubious objections from iterated conjunctions

The knowledge account of assertion (KAA)—roughly: one should not assert what one does not know—can explain a variety of Moorean conjunctions, a fact often cited as evidence in its favor. David Sosa has objected that the account does not generalize satisfactorily, since it cannot explain the infelicity of certain iterated conjunctions without appealing to the controversial “KK” principle. This essay responds by showing how the knowledge account can handle such conjunctions without use of the KK principle.     

Platonism and laws: A reply to Demetra Sfendoni‐Mentzou

This paper is a reply to Demetra Sfendoni‐Mentzou; it defends a realist—indeed a platonist—account of laws of nature.     

Symmetry and asymmetry in interpersonal relations--with implications for the concept of projection

This paper first reviews evidence for some proposals about interpersonal relations These relations tend to be “symmetrical” or “asymmetrical”—i.e, involve similar or dissimilar characteristics for the two parties—depending on what the characteristics are. Certain characteristics (eg., love-hate) are—and are perceived to be—symmetrical, and others (eg, dominance-submission) asymmetrical The implications are then illustrated for the concept of projection A process of attributing to others characteristics that “explain” one's own would account for symmetrical projection for certain characteristics and asymmetrical projection for others This reformulation can provide a simpler and more unified account for cases that are traditionally treated separately as “supplementary” and “complementary” projection     

Second best epistemology: fallibility and normativity

Philosophical Studies - The Fallibility Norm—the claim that we ought to take our fallibility into account when managing our beliefs—appears to conflict with several other compelling...     

Trogdon on Monism and Intrinsicality

Kelly Trogdon [2009] argues that priority monism—here, the view that only the world as a whole has fundamental properties—conflicts with the best extant accounts of intrinsicality. He then proposes an alternative account that is designed to be not only compatible with this view, but also independently plausible. But his account conflicts with priority monism as well, and incorrectly classifies various non-intrinsic properties.     

The dialectics of infinitism and coherentism: inferential justification versus holism and coherence

This paper formally explores the common ground between mild versions of epistemological coherentism and infinitism; it proposes—and argues for—a hybrid, coherentist–infinitist account of epistemic justification. First, the epistemological regress argument and its relation to the classical taxonomy regarding epistemic justification—of foundationalism, infinitism and coherentism—is reviewed. We then recall recent results proving that an influential argument against infinite regresses of justification, which alleges their incoherence on account of probabilistic inconsistency, cannot be maintained. Furthermore, we prove that the Principle of Inferential Justification has rather unwelcome consequences—formally resembling the Sorites paradox—as soon as it is iterated and combined with a natural Bayesian perspective on probabilistic inferences. We conclude that strong versions of foundationalism and infinitism should be abandoned. Positively, we provide a rough sketch for a graded formal coherence notion, according to which infinite regresses of epistemic justification will often have more than a minimal degree of coherence.     

The Effect of Temporal Distance on Attitudes toward Imprecise Probabilities and Imprecise Outcomes

Many personal, managerial, and societal decisions involve uncertain or ambiguous consequences that will occur in the future. Yet, previous empirical research on ambiguity preferences has focused mainly on decisions with immediate outcomes. To close this gap in the literature, this paper examines ambiguity attitudes toward future prospects, particularly how they may differ from the attitudes toward comparable prospects in the present. On the basis of a recent paradigm, we first distinguish between two types of ambiguity: imprecise probabilities and imprecise outcomes. Then, in accordance with construal level theory, which shows that temporal distance increases the relative importance of outcomes over probabilities in evaluating prospects, we conjecture that temporal distance would moderate attitudes toward imprecise probabilities but amplify attitudes toward imprecise outcomes. Through a series of experiments, we demonstrate that when the prospects are in the future, individuals are less averse toward imprecise probabilities and more seeking toward imprecise outcomes. However, the effect is most prominent for prospects where both the probability and outcome dimensions are concurrently imprecise. The paper ends with a discussion on how dimension salience may have contributed to this result. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Lange on essentialism,counterfactuals, and explanation

Marc Lange objects to scientific essentialists that they can give no better account of the counterfactual invariance of laws than Humeans. While conceding this point succeeds ad hominem against some essentialists, I show that it does not undermine essentialism in general. Moreover, Lange's alternative account of the relation between laws and counterfactuals is—with minor modification—compatible with essentialism.