Is the Appeal of the Doctrine of Double Effect Illusory?

Scanlon (2008) has argued that his theory of permissibility (STP) has more explanatory power than the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE). I believe this claim is wrong. Borrowing Michael Walzer’s method of inquiry, I will evaluate the explanatory virtue of these accounts by their understanding of actual moral intuitions originated in historical cases. Practically, I will evaluate these accounts as they explain cases of hostage crises. The main question in this context is: is it permissible that nation-states act with military force in order to liberate hostages, even if those actions put the lives of the hostages at risk? The first part of this paper has an operative reconstruction of the relevant theories. In the second section, two cases of hostage crises will be considered: the Moscow theater hostage crisis of 2002, and the Jaque Operation, which occurred in Colombia in 2008. Additionally, it will be shown that DDE explains these cases better than STP. Finally, this paper offers a critical analysis of Scanlon’s account of the explanatory power of both STP and DDE.     

Communicative functions of directional verbal probabilities: Speaker’s choice,listener’s inference,and reference points

Verbal probabilities have directional communicative functions, and most can be categorized as positive (e.g., “it is likely”) or negative (e.g., “it is doubtful”). We examined the communicative functions of verbal probabilities based on the reference point hypothesis According to this hypothesis, listeners are sensitive to and can infer a speaker’s reference points based on the speaker’s selected directionality. In four experiments (two of which examined speakers’ choice of directionality and two of which examined listeners’ inferences about a speaker’s reference point), we found that listeners could make inferences about speakers’ reference points based on the stated directionality of verbal probability. Thus, the directionality of verbal probabilities serves the communicative function of conveying information about a speaker’s reference point.     

Chunking or not chunking? How do we find words in artificial language learning?

What is the nature of the representations acquired in implicit statistical learning? Recent results in the field of language learning have shown that adults and infants are able to find the words of an artificial language when exposed to a continuous auditory sequence consisting in a random ordering of these words. Such performance can only be based on processing the transitional probabilities between sequence elements. Two different kinds of mechanisms may account for these data: Participants may either parse the sequence into smaller chunks corresponding to the words of the artificial language, or they may become progressively sensitive to the actual values of the transitional probabilities between syllables. The two accounts are difficult to differentiate because they make similar predictions in comparable experimental settings. In this study, we present two experiments that aimed at contrasting these two theories. In these experiments, participants had to learn 2 sets of pseudo-linguistic regularities: Language 1 (L1) and Language 2 (L2) presented in the context of a serial reaction time task. L1 and L2 were either unrelated (none of the syllabic transitions of L1 were present in L2), or partly related (some of the intra-words transitions of L1 were used as inter-words transitions of L2). The two accounts make opposite predictions in these two settings. Our results indicate that the nature of the representations depends on the learning condition. When cues were presented to facilitate parsing of the sequence, participants learned the words of the artificial language. However, when no cues were provided, performance was strongly influenced by the employed transitional probabilities.     

基于属性掌握概率的认知诊断计算机化自适应测验选题策略

在认知诊断计算机化自适应测验(CD-CAT)中, 被试对每个属性的掌握概率更直接地反映了被试能力的当前估计值。因此, 基于被试的属性掌握概率来构建选题策略, 选择最能改变被试属性掌握概率的题目作为下一个测验项目, 这应该是一个值得尝试的方案。本文借鉴已有相关研究的数据生成模式进行探索, 模拟实验结果表明：假设属性间相互独立,在定长(长度为16)、变长(长度为16或后验属性掌握模式概率达到0.8)以及短测验(长度分别为4、6、8、10)的情况下, 基于属性掌握概率的选题策略PPWKL和PHKL有较好的分类准确率, 在题目曝光率, 题库使用均匀性等方面也有较好的表现; 与研究较多的PWKL、HKL等策略相比, 也略有优势; 当属性间存在不同程度的相关时, 在定长、变长以及较短的测验条件下, 基于PHKL和MI的测验对知识状态估计精度较好, 基于PPWKL和PHKL的测验综合表现占优。     

Eliciting Subjective Probabilities through Pair‐wise Comparisons

We propose and test a novel approach for eliciting subjective joint probabilities. In the proposed approach, judges compare pairs of possible outcomes and identify which of the two is more likely and by how much. These pair‐wise comparative judgments create a matrix of ratio judgments from which the target probabilities are extracted using the rows' (or columns') geometric means. In Study 1, subjects provided direct assessments of the likelihood of joint events (e.g., sunny days and stock market gains) and also made pair‐wise comparisons of the same joint events. Subjects in Study 2 learnt the distribution of hypothetical events pairs and provided direct and ratio estimates. In both studies, the ratio estimates were significantly more accurate than the direct estimates. The results suggest that it is possible to elicit probabilistic estimates without explictly asking for probabilities and that the pair‐wise approach is a candidate for complementing or replacing traditional elicitation approaches. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Nonmonotonic conditionals that behave like conditional probabilities above a threshold

I'll describe a range of systems for nonmonotonic conditionals that behave like conditional probabilities above a threshold. The rules that govern each system are probabilistically sound in that each rule holds when the conditionals are interpreted as conditional probabilities above a threshold level specific to that system. The well-known preferential and rational consequence relations turn out to be special cases in which the threshold level is 1. I'll describe systems that employ weaker rules appropriate to thresholds lower than 1, and compare them to these two standard systems.     

Carnap's inductive probabilities as a contribution to decision theory

Common probability theories only allow the deduction of probabilities by using previously known or presupposed probabilities. They do not, however, allow the derivation of probabilities from observed data alone. The question thus arises as to how probabilities in the empirical sciences, especially in medicine, may be arrived at. Carnap hoped to be able to answer this question byhis theory of inductive probabilities. In the first four sections of the present paper the above mentioned problem is discussed in general. After a short presentation of Carnap's theory it is then shown that this theory cannot claim validity for arbitrary random processes. It is suggested that the theory be only applied to binomial and multinomial experiments. By application of de Finetti's theorem Carnap's inductive probabilities are interpreted as consecutive probabilities of the Bayesian kind. Through the introduction of a new axiom the decision parameter λ can be determined even if no a priori knowledge is given. Finally, it is demonstrated that the fundamental problem of Wald's decision theory, i.e., the determination of a plausible criterion where no a priori knowledge is available, can be solved for the cases of binomial and multinomial experiments.     

Predicting the directionality of probability words from their membership functions

Teigen and Brun have suggested that distinct from their numerical implications, most probability phrases are either positive or negative, in that they encourage one to think of reasons why the target event will or will not occur. We report two experiments testing our hypotheses that (a) the direction of a phrase can be predicted from properties of its membership function, and (b) this relation is invariant across contexts, and (c) —originally formulated by Teigen and Brun (1999)—that strong modifiers intensify phrase directionality. For each phrase, participants encoded membership functions by judging the degree to which it described the numerical probabilities 0.0, 0.1, …, 1.0, and also completed sentences including the target phrase. The types of reasons given in the sentence completion task were used to determine the phrase's directionality. The results support our hypotheses (a) and (b) regarding the relation between directionality and the membership functions, but we found only limited support for hypothesis (c) regarding the effects of modifiers on directionality. A secondary goal, to validate an efficient method of encoding membership functions, was also achieved. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Naive Probability: Model‐Based Estimates of Unique Events

We describe a dual‐process theory of how individuals estimate the probabilities of unique events, such as Hillary Clinton becoming U.S. President. It postulates that uncertainty is a guide to improbability. In its computer implementation, an intuitive system 1 simulates evidence in mental models and forms analog non‐numerical representations of the magnitude of degrees of belief. This system has minimal computational power and combines evidence using a small repertoire of primitive operations. It resolves the uncertainty of divergent evidence for single events, for conjunctions of events, and for inclusive disjunctions of events, by taking a primitive average of non‐numerical probabilities. It computes conditional probabilities in a tractable way, treating the given event as evidence that may be relevant to the probability of the dependent event. A deliberative system 2 maps the resulting representations into numerical probabilities. With access to working memory, it carries out arithmetical operations in combining numerical estimates. Experiments corroborated the theory's predictions. Participants concurred in estimates of real possibilities. They violated the complete joint probability distribution in the predicted ways, when they made estimates about conjunctions: P(A), P(B), P(A and B), disjunctions: P(A), P(B), P(A or B or both), and conditional probabilities P(A), P(B), P(B|A). They were faster to estimate the probabilities of compound propositions when they had already estimated the probabilities of each of their components. We discuss the implications of these results for theories of probabilistic reasoning.     

Taurek, Numbers and Probabilities

In his paper, “Should the Numbers Count?" John Taurek imagines that we are in a position such that we can either save a group of five people, or we can save one individual, David. We cannot save David and the five. This is because they each require a life-saving drug. However, David needs all of the drug if he is to survive, while the other five need only a fifth each. Typically, people have argued as if there was a choice to be made: either numbers matter, in which case we should save the greater number, or numbers don't matter, but rather there is moral value in giving each person an equal chance of survival, and therefore we should toss a coin. My claim is that we do not have to make a choice in this way. Rather, numbers do matter, but it doesn't follow that we should always save the greater number. And likewise, there is moral value in giving each person an equal chance of survival, but it doesn't follow that we should always toss a coin. In addition, I argue that a similar approach can be applied to situations in which we can save one person or another, but the chances of success are different.     

Context affects the interpretation of low but not high numerical probabilities: A hypothesis testing account of subjective probability

Low numerical probabilities tend to be directionally ambiguous, meaning they can be interpreted either positively, suggesting the occurrence of the target event, or negatively, suggesting its non-occurrence. High numerical probabilities, however, are typically interpreted positively. We argue that the greater directional ambiguity of low numerical probabilities may make them more susceptible than high probabilities to contextual influences. Results from five experiments supported this premise, with perceived base rate affecting the interpretation of an event’s numerical posterior probability more when it was low than high. The effect is consistent with a confirmatory hypothesis testing process, with the relevant perceived base rate suggesting the directional hypothesis which people then test in a confirmatory manner.     

Assigning and combining probabilities in single-case studies: A second study

The present study builds on a previous proposal for assigning probabilities to the outcomes computed using different primary indicators in single-case studies. These probabilities are obtained by comparing the outcome to previously tabulated reference values, and they reflect the likelihood of the results in the case that no intervention effect is present. In the present study, we explored how well different metrics are translated into p values in the context of simulation data. Furthermore, two published multiple-baseline data sets were used to illustrate how well the probabilities might reflect the intervention effectiveness, as assessed by the original authors. Finally, the importance of which primary indicator would be used in each data set to be integrated was explored; two ways of combining probabilities were used: a weighted average and a binomial test. The results indicated that the translation into p values worked well for the two nonoverlap procedures, with the results for the regression-based procedure diverging due to some undesirable features of its performance. These p values, when either taken individually or combined, were well aligned with effectiveness for the real-life data. These results suggest that assigning probabilities can be useful for translating the primary measure into the same metric, using these probabilities as additional evidence of the importance of behavioral change, complementing visual analysis and professionals’ judgments.     

On Holland's Dutch identity conjecture

The manifest probabilities of observed examinee response patterns resulting from marginalization with respect to the latent ability distribution produce the marginal likelihood function in item response theory. Under the conditions that the posterior distribution of examinee ability given some test response pattern is normal and the item logit functions are linear, Holland (1990a) gives a quadratic form for the log-manifest probabilities by using the Dutch Identity. Further, Holland conjectures that this special quadratic form is a limiting one for all smooth unidimensional item response models as test length tends to infinity. The purpose of this paper is to give three counterexamples to demonstrate that Holland's Dutch Identity conjecture does not hold in general. The counterexamples suggest that only under strong assumptions can it be true that the limits of log-manifest probabilities are quadratic. Three propositions giving sets of such strong conditions are given.     

特征概率影响多维和少维类别的分类学习和特征学习

探讨了特征概率对多维和少维类别的分类学习和特征学习的效果及策略的影响。结果表明高特征概率条件下,多维比少维类别的分类学习更容易,而且学到更多的特征知识,多维条件下人们更倾向于整体性加工策略,而少维条件下人们倾向于分析性加工策略。低特征概率条件下,多维比少维类别的分类学习和特征学习都困难,且两种条件下人们都倾向于采取分析性加工策略。     

The mental context for the description of odors: a semantic space

The experiments conducted in this research aimed to increase our understanding of olfactory properties and classify them hierarchically through entailment. The research objective was to build an odor classification based on internal knowledge (i.e. mental context). Twelve floral scents were described freely by 60 participants. First, three sensory judges undertook a semantic analysis of the 1145 olfactory terms gathered. Secondly, a study of the entailment between olfactory properties was conducted using 42 subjects working on four lists of terms describing the characteristics of floral perfumes. The results confirmed the hypothesis that olfactory properties show tree-like structure. This allowed us to propose a classification system composed of two superordinate categories: First, objects, being olfactory sources, constitute the first category and are considered as olfactory properties themselves (i.e. civilization, food and natural sources). Second non-objects properties are those applicable to a diversity of objects: (i.e. properties, such as objects' physical state: sensory, intensity, space, time) and those related to the subject (as personal feelings and value judgments). Based on these results, it appears that olfactory properties can be organized as a semantic network in line with the general theory of categorization.     

What is learned from experience in a probabilistic environment?

Three experiments explored what is learned from experience in a probabilistic environment. The task was a simulated medical decision‐making task with each patient having one of two test results and one of two diseases. The test result was highly predictive of the disease for all participants. The base rate of the test result was varied between participants to produce different inverse conditional probabilities of the test result given the disease across conditions. Participants trained using feedback to predict a patient's disease from a test result showed the classic confusion of the inverse error, substituting the forward conditional probability for the inverse conditional probability when tested on it. Additional training on the base rate of the test result did little to improve performance. Training on the joint probabilities, however, produced good performance on either conditional probability. The pattern of results demonstrated that experience with the environment is not always sufficient for good performance. That natural sampling leads to good performance was not supported. Further, because participants not trained on joint probabilities did, however, know them but still committed the confusion of the inverse error, the hypothesis that having joint probabilities would facilitate performance was not supported. The pattern of results supported the conclusion that people learn all the necessary information from experience in a probabilistic environment, but depending upon what the experience was, it may interfere with their ability to recall to memory the appropriate sample set necessary for estimating or using the inverse conditional probability. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Justice,instruction, and the good: The case for public education in Aristotle and Plato'sLaws

This paper develops an interpretation and analysis of the arguments for public education which open Book VIII of Aristotle'sPolitics, drawing on both the wider Aristotelian corpus and on examination of continuities with Plato'sLaws. Part III: Sections VIII-XI examine the two arguments which Aristotle adduces in support of the claim that education should be provided through a public system. The first of these arguments concerns the need to unify society through education for friendship and the sharing of a common end. Several versions of his second argument are considered, and the most promising of them is elaborated in connection with an examination of the links between instruction and legislation in theLaws. This yields what is probably the most compelling argument there is for the claim that public supervision of education is anecessary condition for a just society.     

A mechanism for elliptic-like bursting and synchronization of bursts in a map-based neuron network

A system consisting of two Rulkov map-based neurons coupled through reciprocal electrical synapses as a simple phenomenological example is discussed. When the electrical coupling is excitatory, the square-wave bursting can be well predicted by the bifurcation analysis of a comparatively simple low-dimensional subsystem embedded in the invariant manifold. While, when the synapses are inhibitory due to the artificial electrical coupling, a fast–slow analysis is carried out by treating the two slow variables as two different bifurcation parameters. The main result of this paper is to present a mechanism for the occurrence of a kind of special elliptic bursting. The mechanism for this kind of elliptic-like bursting is due to the interaction between two chaotic oscillations with different amplitudes. Moreover, the generation of antiphase synchronization of networks lies in the different switching orders between two pairs of different chaotic oscillations corresponding to the first neuron and the second neuron, respectively.     

Surprises: low probabilities or high contrasts?

Outcome expectations can be expressed prospectively in terms of probability estimates, and retrospectively in terms of surprise. Surprise ratings and probability estimates differ, however, in some important ways. Surprises are generally created by low-probability outcomes, yet, as shown by several experiments, not all low-probability outcomes are equally surprising. To account for surprise, we propose a contrast hypothesis according to which the level of surprise associated with an outcome is mainly determined by the extent to which it contrasts with the default, expected alternative. Three ways by which contrasts can be established are explored: contrasts due to relative probabilities, where the obtained outcome is less likely than a default alternative; contrasts formed by novelty and change, where a contrast exists between the obtained outcome and the individual's previous experience; and contrasts due to the perceptual or conceptual distance between the expected and the obtained. In all these cases, greater contrast was accompanied by higher ratings of surprise.     

Scepticism,defeasible evidence and entitlement

The paper starts by describing and clarifying what Williamson calls the consequence fallacy. I show two ways in which one might commit the fallacy. The first, which is rather trivial, involves overlooking background information; the second way, which is the more philosophically interesting, involves overlooking prior probabilities. In the following section, I describe a powerful form of sceptical argument, which is the main topic of the paper, elaborating on previous work by Huemer. The argument attempts to show the impossibility of defeasible justification, justification based on evidence which does not entail the (allegedly) justified proposition or belief. I then discuss the relation between the consequence fallacy, or some similar enough reasoning, and that form of argument. I argue that one can resist that form of sceptical argument if one gives up the idea that a belief cannot be justified unless it is supported by the totality of the evidence available to the subject—a principle entailed by many prominent epistemological views, most clearly by epistemological evidentialism. The justification, in the relevant cases, should instead derive solely from the prior probability of the proposition. A justification of this sort, that does not rely on evidence, would amount to a form of entitlement, in (something like) Crispin Wright’s sense. I conclude with some discussion of how to understand prior probabilities, and how to develop the notion of entitlement in an externalist epistemological framework.