共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Greg Janzen 《Philosophia》2008,36(3):355-366
According to reductive intentionalism, the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is constituted by the experience's
intentional (or representational) content. In this article I attempt to show that a phenomenon in visual perception called
change blindness poses a problem for this doctrine. Specifically, I argue that phenomenal character is not sensitive, as it
should be if reductive intentionalism is correct, to fine-grained variations in content. The standard anti-intentionalist
strategy is to adduce putative cases in which phenomenal character varies despite sameness of content. This paper explores
an alternative antiintentionalist tack, arguing, by way of a specific example involving change blindness, that content can
vary despite sameness of phenomenal character.
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Greg JanzenEmail: |
2.
Shaun Gallagher 《Continental Philosophy Review》2008,41(2):163-178
The embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended approaches to cognition explicate many important details for a phenomenology
of perception, and are consistent with some of the traditional phenomenological analyses. Theorists working in these areas,
however, often fail to provide an account of how intersubjectivity might relate to perception. This paper suggests some ways
in which intersubjectivity is important for an adequate account of perception.
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Shaun GallagherEmail: |
3.
Shannon Vallor 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(1):1-15
Dennett’s recent defense in this journal of the heterophenomenological method and its supposed advantages over Husserlian
phenomenology is premised on his problematic account of the epistemological and ontological status of phenomenological states.
By employing Husserl’s philosophy of science to clarify the relationship between phenomenology and evidence and the implications
of this relationship for the empirical identification of ‘real’ conscious states, I argue that the naturalistic account of
consciousness Dennett hopes for could be authoritative as a science only by virtue of the very phenomenological evidences
Dennett’s method consigns to the realm of fiction. Thus heterophenomenology, qua scientific method, is incoherent.
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Shannon VallorEmail: |
4.
Bill Brewer 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(1):87-97
Early modern empiricists thought that the nature of perceptual experience is given by citing the object presented to the mind
in that experience. Hallucination and illusion suggest that this requires untenable mind-dependent objects. Current orthodoxy
replaces the appeal to direct objects with the claim that perceptual experience is characterized instead by its representational
content. This paper argues that the move to content is problematic, and reclaims the early modern empiricist insight as perfectly
consistent, even in cases of illusion, with the realist contention that these direct objects of perception are the persisting
mind-independent physical objects we all know and love.
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Bill BrewerEmail: |
5.
Michael V. Antony 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(2):239-263
Intuitively it has seemed to many that our concepts conscious state and conscious creature are sharp rather than vague, that they can have no borderline cases. On the other hand, many who take conscious states to
be identical to, or realized by, complex physical states are committed to the vagueness of those concepts. In the paper I
argue that conscious state and conscious creature are sharp by presenting four necessary conditions for conceiving borderline cases in general, and showing that some of those
conditions cannot be met with conscious state. I conclude that conscious state is sharp, and the conclusion is then extended to conscious creature. The paper ends with a brief discussion of some implications.
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Michael V. AntonyEmail: |
6.
Kantian non-conceptualism 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Robert Hanna 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):41-64
There are perceptual states whose representational content cannot even in principle be conceptual. If that claim is true,
then at least some perceptual states have content whose semantic structure and psychological function are essentially distinct
from the structure and function of conceptual content. Furthermore the intrinsically “orientable” spatial character of essentially
non-conceptual content entails not only that all perceptual states contain non-conceptual content in this essentially distinct sense, but also that consciousness goes all the way down into so-called unconscious or subpersonal mental states. Both my argument for the existence of essentially non-conceptual
content and my theory of its structure and function have a Kantian provenance.
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Robert HannaEmail: |
7.
8.
Nancy E. Snow 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2006,9(5):545-561
Dual process theorists in psychology maintain that the mind’s workings can be explained in terms of conscious or controlled processes and automatic processes. Automatic processes are largely nonconscious, that is, triggered by environmental stimuli without the agent’s conscious awareness or deliberation. Automaticity researchers contend that even higher level habitual social behaviors can be nonconsciously primed. This article brings work on automaticity to bear on our understanding of habitual virtuous actions. After examining a recent intuitive account of habitual actions and habitual virtuous actions, the author offers her own explanation in terms of goal-dependent automaticity. This form of automaticity provides an account of habitual virtuous actions that explains the sense in which these actions are rational, that is, done for reasons. Habitual virtuous actions are rational in the sense of being purposive or goal-directed and are essentially linked with the agent’s psychological states. Unlike deliberative virtuous actions, the agent’s reasons for habitual virtuous actions are not present to her conscious awareness at the time of acting.
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Nancy E. SnowEmail: Phone: +1-414-9061084Fax: +1-414-2883010 |
9.
John Dilworth 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2007,6(3):369-387
Representationalists currently cannot explain counter-examples that involve indeterminate perceptual content, but a double content (DC) view is more promising. Four related cases of perceptual imprecision are used to outline the DC view, which also applies
to imprecise photographic content. Next, inadequacies in the more standard single content (SC) view are demonstrated. The
results are then generalized so as to apply to the content of any kinds of non-conventional representation. The paper continues
with evidence that a DC account provides a moderate rather than extreme realist account of perception, and it concludes with
an initial analysis of the failure of nomic covariance accounts of information in indeterminacy cases.
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John DilworthEmail: |
10.
Paul J. Silvia Ann G. Phillips Miriam K. Baumgaertner Emily L. Maschauer 《Motivation and emotion》2006,30(3):225-231
Many experiments have found that emotional experience affects self-focused attention. Several approaches to cognition and
emotion predict that conscious emotional experience may be unnecessary for this effect. To test this hypothesis, two experiments
primed emotion concepts without affecting emotional experience. In Experiment 1, subliminal exposure to sad faces (relative
to happy faces and neutral faces) increased self-focused attention but not subjectively experienced affect. In Experiment
2, a scrambled-sentences task that primed happy and sad emotion concepts increased self-focused attention relative to a neutral
task. Thus, simply activating knowledge about emotions was sufficient to increase self-focused attention. The discussion considers
implications for research on how emotional states affect self-awareness.
相似文献
Paul J. SilviaEmail: |
11.
Thomas Spitzley 《Erkenntnis》2009,71(1):73-88
The topic of this article is the dependency or, maybe, the interdependency of rationality and self-knowledge. Here two questions
may be distinguished, viz. (1) whether being rational is a necessary condition for a creature to have self-knowledge, and
(2) whether having self-knowledge is a necessary condition for a creature to be rational. After a brief explication of what
I mean by self-knowledge, I deal with the first question. There I defend the Davidsonian position, according to which rationality
is, indeed, a necessary condition for self-knowledge. In addition, I distinguish two aspects of rationality which I call basic
and local rationality. After that I concentrate on the second question for the remaining larger part of this article. Here
I proceed in two stages: first I examine whether self-knowledge is necessary for basic rationality, and then whether it is
necessary for local rationality.
相似文献
Thomas SpitzleyEmail: |
12.
13.
Uriah Kriegel 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(3):357-381
To a first approximation, self-representationalism is the view that a mental state M is phenomenally conscious just in case
M represents itself in the appropriate way. Proponents of self-representationalism seem to think that the phenomenology of
ordinary conscious experience is on their side, but opponents seem to think the opposite. In this paper, I consider the phenomenological
merits and demerits of self-representationalism. I argue that there is phenomenological evidence in favor of self-representationalism, and rather more confidently, that there is no phenomenological evidence against self-representationalism.
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Uriah KriegelEmail: |
14.
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16.
Phenomenology of the body and the third generation of cognitive science, both of which attribute a central role in human cognition
to the body rather than to the Cartesian notion of representation, face the criticism that higher-level cognition cannot be
fully grasped by those studies. The problem here is how explicit representations, consciousness, and thoughts issue from perception
and the body, and how they cooperate in human cognition. In order to address this problem, we propose a research program,
a cognitive phenomenology of the body, which is basically motivated by the perspective of Merleau-Ponty. We find a substantial clue in developmental psychological
studies on the body and language.
相似文献
Shoji Nagataki (Corresponding author)Email: |
Satoru HiroseEmail: |
17.
It is generally agreed upon that Grice’s causal theory of perception describes a necessary condition for perception. It does
not describe sufficient conditions, however, since there are entities in causal chains that we do not perceive and not all
causal chains yield perceptions. One strategy for overcoming these problems is that of strengthening the notion of causality
(as done by David Lewis). Another is that of specifying the criteria according to which perceptual experiences should match
the way the world is (Frank Jackson and Michael Tye). Finally, one can also try to provide sufficient conditions by elaborating
on the content of perceptual experiences (Alva N?e). These different strategies are considered in this paper, with the conclusion
that none of them is successful. However, a careful examination of their problems points towards the general solution that
we outline at the end.
相似文献
Valtteri Arstila (Corresponding author)Email: |
Kalle PihlainenEmail: |
18.
Hannes Leitgeb 《Topoi》2007,26(1):115-132
On the basis of impossibility results on probability, belief revision, and conditionals, it is argued that conditional beliefs
differ from beliefs in conditionals qua mental states. Once this is established, it will be pointed out in what sense conditional beliefs are still conditional,
even though they may lack conditional contents, and why it is permissible to still regard them as beliefs, although they are
not beliefs in conditionals. Along the way, the main logical, dispositional, representational, and normative properties of
conditional beliefs are studied, and it is explained how the failure of not distinguishing conditional beliefs from beliefs
in conditionals can lead philosophical and empirical theories astray.
相似文献
Hannes LeitgebEmail: |
19.
This paper presents an new epistemicist account of vagueness, one that avoids standard arbitrariness worries by exploiting
a plenitudinous metaphysic.
相似文献
Andrew McGonigalEmail: |
20.
Rocco J. Gennaro 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(1):39-56
It is often said that some kind of peripheral (or inattentional) conscious awareness accompanies our focal (attentional) consciousness.
I agree that this is often the case, but clarity is needed on several fronts. In this paper, I lay out four distinct theses
on peripheral awareness and show that three of them are true. However, I then argue that a fourth thesis, commonly associated
with the so-called "self-representational approach to consciousness," is false. The claim here is that we have outer focal
consciousness accompanied often (or even always) by inner peripheral (self-)awareness. My criticisms stem from both methodological
and phenomenological considerations. In doing so, I offer a diagnosis as to why the fourth thesis has seemed true to so many
and also show how the so-called "transparency of experience," frequently invoked by representationalists, is importantly relevant
to my diagnosis. Finally, I respond to several objections and to further attempts to show that thesis four is true. What emerges
is that if one wishes to hold that some form of self-awareness accompanies all outer-directed conscious states, one is better
off holding that such self-awareness is itself unconscious, as is held for example by standard higher-order theories of consciousness.
相似文献
Rocco J. GennaroEmail: |