Précis of "Lifelines: biology, freedom, determinism"

There are many ways of describing and explaining the properties of living systems; causal, functional, and reductive accounts are necessary but no one account has primacy. The history of biology as a discipline has given excessive authority to reductionism, which collapses higher level accounts, such as social or behavioural ones, into molecular ones. Such reductionism becomes crudely ideological when applied to the human condition, with its claims for genes "for" everything from sexual orientation to compulsive shopping. The current enthusiasm for genetics and ultra-Darwinist accounts, with their selfish-gene metaphors for living processes, misunderstand both the phenomena of development and the interactive role that DNA and the fluid genome play in the cellular orchestra. DNA is not a blueprint, and the four dimensions of life (three of space, one of time) cannot be read off from its one-dimensional strand. Both developmental and evolutionary processes are more than merely instructive or selective; the organism constructs itself, a process known as autopoiesis, through a lifeline trajectory. Because organisms are thermodynamically open systems, living processes are homeodynamic, not homeostatic. The self-organising membrane-bound and energy-utilising metabolic web of the cell must have evolved prior to socalled naked replicators. Evolution is constrained by physics, chemistry, and structure; not all change is powered by natural selection, and not all phenotypes are adaptive. Finally, therefore, living processes are radically indeterminate; like all other living organisms, but to an even greater degree, we make our own future, though in circumstances not of our own choosing.     

A Conceptual Construction of Complexity Levels Theory in Spacetime Categorical Ontology: Non-Abelian Algebraic Topology, Many-Valued Logics and Dynamic Systems

A novel conceptual framework is introduced for the Complexity Levels Theory in a Categorical Ontology of Space and Time. This conceptual and formal construction is intended for ontological studies of Emergent Biosystems, Super-complex Dynamics, Evolution and Human Consciousness. A claim is defended concerning the universal representation of an item’s essence in categorical terms. As an essential example, relational structures of living organisms are well represented by applying the important categorical concept of natural transformations to biomolecular reactions and relational structures that emerge from the latter in living systems. Thus, several relational theories of living systems can be represented by natural transformations of organismic, relational structures. The ascent of man and other living organisms through adaptation, is viewed in novel categorical terms, such as variable biogroupoid representations of evolving species. Such precise but flexible evolutionary concepts will allow the further development of the unifying theme of local-to-global approaches to highly complex systems in order to represent novel patterns of relations that emerge in super- and ultra-complex systems in terms of compositions of local procedures. Solutions to such local-to-global problems in highly complex systems with ‘broken symmetry’ might be possible to be reached with the help of higher homotopy theorems in algebraic topology such as the generalized van Kampen theorems (HHvKT). Categories of many-valued, ?ukasiewicz-Moisil (LM) logic algebras provide useful concepts for representing the intrinsic dynamic ‘asymmetry’ of genetic networks in organismic development and evolution, as well as to derive novel results for (non-commutative) Quantum Logics. Furthermore, as recently pointed out by Baianu and Poli (Theory and applications of ontology, vol 1. Springer, Berlin, in press), LM-logic algebras may also provide the appropriate framework for future developments of the ontological theory of levels with its complex/entangled/intertwined ramifications in psychology, sociology and ecology. As shown in the preceding two papers in this issue, a paradigm shift towards non-commutative, or non-Abelian, theories of highly complex dynamics—which is presently unfolding in physics, mathematics, life and cognitive sciences—may be implemented through realizations of higher dimensional algebras in neurosciences and psychology, as well as in human genomics, bioinformatics and interactomics.     

From the Critique of judgment to the hermeneutics of nature: Sketching the fate of philosophy of nature after Kant

This paper proposes an interpretative framework for some developments of the philosophy of nature after Kant. I emphasize the critique of the economy of nature in the Critique of judgement. I argue that it resulted in a split of a previous structure of knowledge; such a structure articulated natural theology and natural philosophy on the basis of the consideration of the order displayed by living beings, both in their internal organisation and their ecological distribution. The possibility of a philosophical discourse on nature that is neither mathematical nor theological stemmed from this shift. I call “hermeneutics of nature” such a program, since it aims at unpacking an immanent meaning in nature that is not explicated by the sciences of nature, which are dealing with the laws of nature. The Naturphilosophie, undertaken by Schelling, as well as the philosophies of nature of Hegel and Schopenhauer, are several realizations of this program. I highlight the structural traits that they share, such as a pregnant sense of conflicts in nature, an emphasis on the riddles of gender, and above all a prominent status given to organisms as a clue to the meaning of nature. Finally, I try to sketch the ramifications of this hermeneutics of nature in contemporary philosophy, especially phenomenology, and argue that the coming philosophy of nature, as shown by the attempts of syntheses between phenomenology and ecology, seems to depart from this hermeneutical program.     

Nietzsche Contra Darwin

Nietzsche attributes 'will power' to all living things, but this seems in sharp conflict with other positions important to him-and implausible besides. The doctrine smacks of both metaphysics and anthropomorphizing, which he elsewhere derides. Will to power seems to be an intentional end-directedness, involving cognitive or representational powers he is rightly loath to attribute to all organisms, and tends to downplay even in persons. This paper argues that we find a stronger reading of will to power-both more plausible and more consistent with Nietzsche's other views-by developing his affinities with Darwinism. By seeing will to power as an 'internal revision'to Darwinism, opposing the latter's stress (as Nietzsche thinks) on 'survival', but assenting to its uses of natural selection, we can ground or naturalize that notion, congenially to Nietzsche and to us.     

The pathology of cellular anti-stress mechanisms: a new frontier

Exposure to stressors is an omnipresent variable for all living organisms, which have evolved anti-stress mechanisms to deal with the consequences of stress. The chaperoning systems are among these mechanisms, and their central components are the molecular chaperones that play important roles in protein biogenesis. Recent data suggest that failure of the chaperoning systems due to defective chaperones, for example, leads to pathology. Consequently, medical researchers and practitioners must now also consider the chaperoning systems, both as potentially major players in pathogenesis and as diagnostic-prognostic indicators.     

Self-organisation in dynamical systems: a limiting result

There is presently considerable interest in the phenomenon of “self-organisation” in dynamical systems. The rough idea of self-organisation is that a structure appears “by itself” in a dynamical system, with reasonably high probability, in a reasonably short time, with no help from a special initial state, or interaction with an external system. What is often missed, however, is that the standard evolutionary account of the origin of multi-cellular life fits this definition, so that higher living organisms are also products of self-organisation. Very few kinds of object can self-organise, and the question of what such objects are like is a suitable mathematical problem. Extending the familiar notion of algorithmic complexity into the context of dynamical systems, we obtain a notion of “dynamical complexity”. A simple theorem then shows that only objects of very low dynamical complexity can self organise, so that living organisms must be of low dynamical complexity. On the other hand, symmetry considerations suggest that living organisms are highly complex, relative to the dynamical laws, due to their large size and high degree of irregularity. In particular, it is shown that since dynamical laws operate locally, and do not vary across space and time, they cannot produce any specific large and irregular structure with high probability in a short time. These arguments suggest that standard evolutionary theories of the origin of higher organisms are incomplete.     

对热休克反应的哲学思考

生物细胞在受到各种有害因素刺激后,会发生一种应激反应,其间细胞内的正常蛋白质合成受抑,而合成一些新的蛋白质,这种现象及所合成的蛋白质被称之为热休克反应和热休克蛋白。研究发现,热休克反应是生物细胞对环境因素的适应性反应,并广泛存在于从原核到真核生物的生物体内。对人类而言,其功能是多样的,利弊共存,形成了相互联系相互转化的对立统一关系     

THE EXPLORATION OF ECOSPACE: EXTENDING OR SUPPLEMENTING THE NEO‐DARWINIAN PARADIGM?

The neo‐Darwinian paradigm, focusing on natural selection of genes responsible for differential adaption, provides the foundation for explaining evolutionary processes. The modern synthesis is broader, however, focusing on organisms rather than on gene transmissions per se. Yet, strands of current biology argue for further supplementation of Darwinian theory, pointing to nonbiotic drivers of evolutionary development, for example, self‐organization of physical structures, and the interaction between individual organisms, groups of organisms, and their nonbiotic environments. According to niche construction theory, when organisms and groups develop, they not only adapt to their environments but modify their environments, creating new habitats for later generations. Insofar as ecological niches persist beyond the lifecycle of individual organisms, an ecological inheritance system exists alongside genetic inheritance. Such ecological structures may even facilitate the development of a cultural inheritance system, as we see in humans. The article discusses theological perspectives of such new developments within holistic biology.     

The evolution of asphyxial defense

From the time animals became dependent upon molecular oxygen as an integral part of their energy-producing processes, they have remained in the shadow of acute asphyxial threat—the blocking of respiratory exchange resulting in the intracellular triad of hypoxia, hypercapnia and acidosis. The most commonly occurring precipitant of acute asphyxia has always been the transfer between air and water environments. Over the last one hundred years studies on a wide range of living organisms, from single cells to complex multicellular organisms like mammals, have demonstrated the presence of well-defined metabolic and cardiovascular-respiratory mechanisms for protecting living things against acute asphyxia. Single-celled animals depend upon anaerobiosis and secondarily hypometabolism. In addition to these processes, animals with gills or lungs utilize “passive” protection such as increased oxygen storage and the “dynamic” cardiovascular adjustments of bradycardia and selective ischemia. These latter changes decrease overall oxygen consumption and hence utilize the oxygen stores in the most economical way to protect the cardiac and cerebral tissue, which are most sensitive to hypoxia and vital to continued survival of the organism. In this article an attempt is made to place these processes into an evolutionary context. As through a glass darkly we glimpse asphyxial defense running like a paleophysiological thread through hundreds of millions of years, being accentuated here and muted there, depending upon the particular needs of individual species.     

RELIGION AND SCIENCE IN DIALOGUE: AN ASIAN CHRISTIAN VIEW

We may understand natural science as part of the attempt by human beings to understand themselves and their place in the world in which they find themselves. In this sense, as Karl Rahner has suggested, natural science flows naturally into anthropology. Consciously or unconsciously, science is always part of the drive to self‐understanding. In an age of religious pluralism like ours, Christian faith in Asia is also brought face to face with the living reality of other religions, and that, too, cannot but affect how we understand our shared humanity.     

Stranger in a strange land: an optimal-environments account of evolutionary mismatch

Synthese - In evolutionary medicine, researchers characterize some outcomes as evolutionary mismatch. Mismatch problems arise as the result of organisms living in environments to which they are...     

Pine ridge places—Feral,liminal, sacred

Animal dreams can bring us into deeper relationship with our own instinctual nature. They seem to communicate something from the ancient vestiges of our functioning on earth—all the head knowledge in the world cannot match the sheer vibrancy and power of our own animal. In an age characterized by alienation from the rhythms of natural life, animal dreams can remind us that we still retain access to the deepest layers of instinctual wisdom. This is particularly relevant for women, as they tend to suffer the consequences of an overly technological society most keenly. Women's lives are anchored in natural rhythms, and the impact of living in a culture that ignores and denigrates nature is therefore especially wounding. This essay explores the ways in which dreams of animals can help guide women back toward a relationship with their embodied nature. The author researches and explores several examples of animals in women's dreams and the ways in which these dreams can support a return to what is most vital and “natural” in their lives.     

Children's understanding of death as the cessation of agency: a test using sleep versus death

An important problem faced by children is discriminating between entities capable of goal-directed action, i.e. intentional agents, and non-agents. In the case of discriminating between living and dead animals, including humans, this problem is particularly difficult, because of the large number of perceptual cues that living and dead animals share. However, there are potential costs of failing to discriminate between living and dead animals, including unnecessary vigilance and lost opportunities from failing to realize that an animal, such as an animal killed for food, is dead. This might have led to the evolution of mechanisms specifically for distinguishing between living and dead animals in terms of their ability to act. Here we test this hypothesis by examining patterns of inferences about sleeping and dead organisms by Shuar and German children between 3 and 5-years old. The results show that by age 4, causal cues to death block agency attributions to animals and people, whereas cues to sleep do not. The developmental trajectory of this pattern of inferences is identical across cultures, consistent with the hypothesis of a living/dead discrimination mechanism as a reliably developing part of core cognitive architecture.     

Thinking through enactive agency: sense-making,bio-semiosis and the ontologies of organismic worlds

According to enactivism all living systems, from single cell organisms to human beings, are ontologically endowed with some form of teleological and sense-making agency. Furthermore, enactivists maintain that: (i) there is no fixed pregiven world and as a consequence (ii) all organisms “bring forth” their own unique “worlds” through processes of sense-making. The first half of the paper takes these two ontological claims as its central focus and aims to clarify and make explicit the arguments and motivations underlying them. Our analysis here highlights three distinct but connected problems for enactivism: (i) these arguments do not and cannot guarantee that there is no pregiven world, instead, they (ii) end up generating a contradiction whereby a pregiven world seems to in fact be tacitly presupposed by virtue of (iii) a reliance on a tacit epistemic perspectivalism which is also inherently representationalist and as a consequence makes it difficult to satisfactorily account for the ontological plurality of worlds. Taking these considerations on board, the second half of the paper then aims to develop a more robust ontologically grounded enactivism. Drawing from biosemiotic enactivism, science and technology studies and anthropology, the paper aims to present an account which both rejects a pregiven world and coherently accounts for how organisms bring forth ontologically multiple worlds.     

Emergence,Naturally!

The prevailing common assumptions about how nature behaves have their origins in the early Enlightenment. The notion of emergence does not sit comfortably within this framework. Emergence appears virtually impossible within a world determined by ineluctable and unwavering natural laws. But the variety and combinations inherent in living systems render physical laws indeterminate. The study of ecological dynamics suggests that processes rather than laws are what accounts for most order seen in the living realm. As a consequence, there are aspects of ecological dynamics that violate each of the Newtonian postulates. The dynamics of ecosystems suggest a smaller set of rational assumptions through which to view nature—an “ecological metaphysic.” Emergence appears as a rare but wholly natural phenomenon within the new rational platform. In addition, several apparent conflicts between science and theism that arose under the Newtonian framework simply vanish under the new perspective.     

Natural death and Christian fasting

The Christian has a unique resource for responding to the problem of how competent adults can exercise responsibly the right to control the last stages of their living/dying. Recent natural death legislation offers only a partial solution, because it does not specify what counts as life-sustaining procedures which may be discontinued if the individual fills out a directive to the physician. One of the most troublesome questions continues to be whether the withholding or withdrawal of artificial feeding, or indeed natural feeding, is ever justifiable. An adaptation of principles included in the Christian idea of fasting seems to provide adequate criteria for determining when forgoing nourishment by the terminally ill adult is morally justifiable.     

Did Darwin initially develop a theory of evolution in the biological sense of the word?

Abstract

Darwin’s physicalist orientation reacts to a long-standing vitalistic mode of thought of idealistic morphology and should be assessed by taking other 19th and 20th centuries biological schools of thought into account - trends that each emphasised different modes of explanation, such as mechanicism, physicalism, holism, neo-vitalism, organismic biology and pan-psychism.

Darwin’s acceptance of “universal laws of nature” is consonant with Leyll’s view of invariant natural laws (uniformitarianism), but at the same time, owing to their tendency towards change, living entities are considered to be without constant structures - an outcome of Darwin’s nominalist understanding of living entities. Nominalism provides a starting point both for modem historicism (with its emphasis on change) and for Darwin’s adherence to a nominalistic view of living entities. In the light of the fossil record, the issue of constancy and change is discussed with a focus on Gould’s claim that the basic theory of natural selection offers no statement about general progress and therefore does not supply a mechanism in terms of which an overall advance might be expected.

Darwin’s physicalistic orientation in 1859 made it problematic for him to claim that he has accounted for evolution in the truly biological sense of the word.     

Teleological Essentialism: Generalized

Natural/social kind essentialism is the view that natural kind categories, both living and non-living natural kinds, as well as social kinds (e.g., race, gender), are essentialized. On this view, artifactual kinds are not essentialized. Our view—teleological essentialism—is that a broad range of categories are essentialized in terms of teleology, including artifacts. Utilizing the same kinds of experiments typically used to provide evidence of essentialist thinking—involving superficial change (study 1), transformation of insides (study 2), and inferences about offspring (study 3)—we find support for the view that a broad range of categories—living natural kinds, non-living natural kinds, and artifactual kinds—are essentialized in terms of teleology. Study 4 tests a unique prediction of teleological essentialism and also provides evidence that people make inferences about purposes which in turn guide categorization judgments.     

Design and its discontents

The design argument was rebutted by David Hume. He argued that the world and its contents (such as organisms) were not analogous to human artifacts. Hume further suggested that there were equally plausible alternatives to design to explain the organized complexity of the cosmos, such as random processes in multiple universes, or that matter could have inherent properties to self-organize, absent any external crafting. William Paley, writing after Hume, argued that the functional complexity of living beings, however, defied naturalistic explanations. In effect he dared anyone to come up with an alternative to his inference to design, and hence a designer, outside of nature. Charles Darwin explained the apparent design of functional complexity by his theory of natural selection. Asa Gray, however, in essays as well as in correspondence with Darwin argued that natural selection allowed for a type of ‘evolutionary teleology’ in which design at most could be considered the result of universal principles. F.E. Hicks updated Hume by specifically objecting to the use of design arguments by Paley. Hicks argued that the apparent design seen in nature reflected order at a deep level in nature. The design argument was briefly revived by Lawrence Henderson early in the twentieth century but he ultimately concluded that design and teleology were not necessarily mutually entailing and he retracted his design argument in favor of one that he termed ‘natural teleology’. The current claims of ‘intelligent design’ have the same logical problems that have beset previous design arguments. If design is divorced from teleology and its discontents put behind us, then there is a possibility that the latter can have a place in the development of theories to explain the phenomena of emergent complexity.