Similarity and causality in the use of social analogies

The present paper examines whether causal relations are necessary for the use of social analogies. Although causal relations increase the use of social analogies, it is not known whether they are necessary. Establishing this is important for understanding both analogical reasoning and learning in novel situations where people lack knowledge of the causal relations. Study 1 demonstrated that, in the absence of an explicit causal relation, as the similarity between a target individual and a previously encountered individual (the base) increased, people thought the target was increasingly likely to perform the same behavior as the base. Thus, a causal relation is not necessary. Two additional studies used asymmetries in similarity judgments to provide additional evidence that when reasoning analogically people relied on similarity. Manipulating whether subjects focused primarily on the target or the base completely reversed asymmetries both in judgments of how similar the target was to the base and in predictions of how likely the target was to perform the same behavior as the base. The asymmetries for similarity and prediction were completely parallel. Thus, in the absence of an explicit causal relation, use of the analogy was based on judgments of global similarity. The implications of these asymmetries in similarity judgments and predictions for other judgments, such as stereotyping, are also discussed.     

Cause and covariate: Development of two related concepts

This study used a rule-analytic technique to investigate the role of event covariation in causal judgment. Junior high school and college subjects were shown information about the co-occurrences of two potentially related events and were asked to make either causal or covariation judgments about the two events. Subjects often failed to identify covariates as causes or identified as causes events which were either unrelated or related in the opposite direction to the event to be explained. Rule analyses indicated that use of mathematically flawed strategies resulted in erroneous covariation and causal judgments. Comparisons between the junior high and college samples showed parallel improvement with increasing age for the two judgments. Strategy analyses of the covariation and causal judgments showed that males defined causes and covariates by similar rules, but that females used different rules to make the two judgments.     

The rule learning behavior of reading disabled and normal children as a function of task characteristics and instruction

The purpose of this research was to investigate rule learning in reading disabled (RD) and normal children (chronological age and reading age (RA) match) when required to (a) abstract rules independently, and (b) use rules after instruction. Study 1 required the children to solve problems using shapes and letters. Although there was no difference between groups in the rate of problem solving when children were asked to abstract rules independently, the pattern of errors was different. The RD children made a greater proportion of errors on the negative instance for the more complex problems. In particular, this occurred on the letter task which involved psycholinguistic categorization. After instruction, the RA controls made more errors than the other groups. Study 2 was an analogous pseudoword reading task. Even with statistical adjustment for differences in prior grapheme-phoneme (g-p) rule knowledge, the RD children performed less accurately than the RA controls when they had to abstract rules, although this was restricted to the most difficult rule (rule of e). There was no difference after instruction in rule application, although the pattern of errors and post-test results indicated that the RD children continued to experience decoding difficulty. These results suggest a phonologically based productive deficit which interferes with the learning of g-p rules. This may be part of a more general language deficit which includes psycholinguistic categorization. Despite the severity of this handicap, RD children seem responsive to instruction.     

Retrospective and prospective metacognitive judgments in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta)

A growing body of research suggests that some non-human animals are capable of making accurate metacognitive judgments. In previous studies, non-human animals have made either retrospective or prospective judgments (about how they did on a test or how they will do on a test, respectively). These two types of judgments are dissociable in humans. The current study tested the abilities of two rhesus macaque monkeys to make both retrospective and prospective judgments about their performance on the same memory task. Both monkeys had been trained previously to make retrospective confidence judgments. Both monkeys successfully demonstrated transfer of retrospective metacognitive judgments to the new memory task. Furthermore, both monkeys transferred their retrospective judgments to the prospective task (one, immediately, and one, following the elimination of a response bias). This study is the first to demonstrate both retrospective and prospective monitoring abilities in the same monkeys and on the same task, suggesting a greater level of flexibility in animals’ metacognitive monitoring abilities than has been reported previously.     

The Effect of a Computerized Decision Aid on the Development of Knowledge

This study provides evidence on how the use of a computerized decision aid affects knowledge acquisition. While the intent of such computer-based decision aids is to improve and support unaided human judgments, it is unclear whether the use of the aids actually facilitate knowledge transfer. Seventy-six subjects completed a hypothetical decision task where one of two types of decision aids was used: an expert system or traditional textual materials. Results suggest that those using a computer-based decision aid acquired and encoded in memory less declarative knowledge than those using textual reference materials. Implications of the findings are discussed.     

Representational Consequences of Two Modes of Learning

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that a non-strategic mode of rule learning results in atomic representations. In each case subjects were taught concepts under two different conditions, designed to favour either non-strategic or strategic learning. Following training, subjects demonstrated an equivalent ability to discriminate exemplars from non-exemplars of the concepts acquired under each of these two learning conditions. However, performance on a decompositional inference task, which required access to critical constituent elements within the rule representations, was disproportionately poor for a concept acquired under the training condition that favoured non-strategic learning. These findings lend support to the view that rule acquisition can be mediated by either of two modes of learning, and that the format of knowledge representations is not equivalent across these two learning modes.     

Egocentric spatial framework effects from single and multiple points of view

In three experiments, we tested the one-place, one-perspective rule formulated by Franklin, Tversky, and Coon (1992). This rule proposes that subjects take a neutral, external perspective when they must use multiple viewpoints to make decisions about the locations of objects in memorized scenes. We compared responding from a single viewpoint with responding from two viewpoints. In Experiments 1 and 2, we used a sentence verification procedure, and in Experiment 3, we compared a true-false verification procedure with a six-alternative forced-choice procedure. Under these various conditions, we observed egocentric spatial framework effects in that above-below judgments were faster than front-back judgments and front-back judgments were faster than right-left judgments. When responding from two points of view in a single place, our subjects took multiple intrinsic perspectives rather than one neutral external perspective as proposed by the one-place, one-perspective rule.     

Development of relational learning: Effects of instruction and delay of transfer

Preschool children were trained on a color relevant oddity problem by one of three methods: increased salience of the oddity relationship, instruction on the solution rule, or a combination of increased salience and rule instruction. The youngest Ss solved the training problem when the solution rule was provided but not under the salience procedure. The two older groups solved in all conditions and errors decreased with age. The generality of the solution was determined by performance on a form relevant transfer task. The youngest Ss made fewer errors on the transfer problem following rule instruction training than following training in the combined procedure. The intermediate age group made fewer errors when the transfer task was administered one week after training than one minute after training. The transfer problem was easily solved by the oldest Ss and performance was independent of training procedure and amount of delay. These results were interpreted as reflecting developmental differences in relational concept learning.     

Learning artificial grammars: No evidence for the acquisition of rules

Two experiments investigated whether there is evidence for acquisition of rules in implicit artificial grammar learning (AGL). Two different methods were used in meeting this goal, multiple regression analysis and analysis of receiver-operating characteristics (ROCs). By means of multiple regression analysis, several types of knowledge were identified that were used in judgments of grammaticality, for example, about single letters and about larger stimulus fragments. There was no evidence for the contribution of rule knowledge. The ROCs were in accord with a similarity-based account of AGL and thus did not support the notion that rule knowledge is acquired in AGL either. Simulations with a connectionist model corroborated the conclusion that the results were in accord with a similarity-based, associative account.     

Generalization of action knowledge following observational learning

Both observational and physical practices support the acquisition of motor skill knowledge in the form of spatiotemporal coordination patterns. The current experiment examined the extent that observation and physical practice can support the transfer of spatiotemporal knowledge and amplitude knowledge associated with motor skills. Evidence from a multijoint limb task revealed that knowledge about spatiotemporal patterns (relative phase) acquired by observers and models can be generalized exceptionally well within the trained arm (right) and across to the untrained arm (left). Transfer of relative phase occurred even when untrained combinations of joint amplitudes were required. This indicates that observation and physical practice both lead to the development of an effector-independent representation of the spatiotemporal knowledge in this task. Both observers and models showed some transfer of the relative amplitude knowledge, with observers demonstrating superior transfer for both a trained and untrained-arm transfer test, while the models were limited to positive transfer on an untrained-arm transfer test. The representation of movement amplitude knowledge is effector-independent in this task, but the use of that knowledge is constrained by the specific practice context and the linkage between the elbow and wrist.     

Barriers and traps: great apes’ performance in two functionally equivalent tasks

Tool-using tasks that require subjects to overcome the obstacles to get a reward have been a major component of research investigating causal knowledge in primates. Much of the debate in this research has focused on whether subjects simply use certain stimulus features or instead use more functionally relevant information regarding the effect that certain features may have on a moving reward. Here, we presented two obstacle tasks, a trap platform and a barrier platform, to 22 great apes. Although perceptually similar, these two tasks contain two perceptually different but functionally equivalent obstacles: a trap and a barrier. In a pre-exposure phase, subjects either experienced an obstacle task or a task without any obstacle. In the transfer phase, all subjects were presented with an obstacle task, either the trap platform or the barrier platform. Our results show that those subjects who received an obstacle task prior to the second task performed better than those who first received a non-obstacle task. The type of obstacle task that subjects received first did not have any effect on their performance in the transfer phase. We suggest that apes possess some knowledge about the effects that obstacles have on slow-moving unsupported objects.     

Transfer of metacognitive skills and hint seeking in monkeys

Metacognition is knowledge that can be expressed as confidence judgments about what one knows (monitoring) and by strategies for learning what one does not know (control). Although there is a substantial literature on cognitive processes in animals, little is known about their metacognitive abilities. Here we show that rhesus macaques, trained previously to make retrospective confidence judgments about their performance on perceptual tasks, transferred that ability immediately to a new perceptual task and to a working memory task. We also show that monkeys can learn to request "hints" when they are given problems that they would otherwise have to solve by trial and error. This study demonstrates, for the first time, that nonhuman primates share with humans the ability to monitor and transfer their metacognitive ability both within and between different cognitive tasks, and to seek new knowledge on a need-to-know basis.     

Theory-based categorization under speeded conditions

It is widely accepted that similarity influences rapid categorization, whereas theories can influence only more leisurely category judgments. In contrast, we argue that it is not the type of knowledge used that determines categorization speed, but rather the complexity of the categorization processes. In two experiments, participants learned four categories of items, each consisting of three causally related features. Participants gave more weight to cause features than to effect features, even under speeded response conditions. Furthermore, the time required to make judgments was equivalent, regardless of whether participants were using causal knowledge or base-rate information. We argue that both causal knowledge and base-rate information, once precompiled during learning, can be used at roughly the same speeds during categorization, thus demonstrating an important parallel between these two types of knowledge.     

Race-specific perceptual discrimination improvement following short individuation training with faces

This study explores the effect of individuation training on the acquisition of race-specific expertise. First, we investigated whether practice individuating other-race faces yields improvement in perceptual discrimination for novel faces of that race. Second, we asked whether there was similar improvement for novel faces of a different race for which participants received equal practice, but in an orthogonal task that did not require individuation. Caucasian participants were trained to individuate faces of one race (African American or Hispanic) and to make difficult eye-luminance judgments on faces of the other race. By equating these tasks we are able to rule out raw experience, visual attention, or performance/success-induced positivity as the critical factors that produce race-specific improvements. These results indicate that individuation practice is one mechanism through which cognitive, perceptual, and/or social processes promote growth of the own-race face recognition advantage.     

Cognitive biases in human causal learning

The main aim of this work was to look for cognitive biases in human inference of causal relationships in order to emphasize the psychological processes that modulate causal learning. From the effect of the judgment frequency, this work presents subsequent research on cue competition (overshadowing, blocking, and super-conditioning effects) showing that the strength of prior beliefs and new evidence based upon covariation computation contributes additively to predict causal judgments, whereas the balance between the reliability of both, beliefs and covariation knowledge, modulates their relative weight. New findings also showed "inattentional blindness" for negative or preventative causal relationships but not for positive or generative ones, due to failure in codifying and retrieving the necessary information for its computation. Overall results unveil the need of three hierarchical levels of a whole architecture for human causal learning: the lower one, responsible for codifying the events during the task; the second one, computing the retrieved information; finally, the higher level, integrating this evidence with previous causal knowledge. In summary, whereas current theoretical frameworks on causal inference and decision-making usually focused either on causal beliefs or covariation information, the present work shows how both are required to be able to explain the complexity and flexibility involved in human causal learning.     

The development of equivalence rules for visual configurations

The use of discrete and relational aspects of visual configurations in making similarity judgments was compared in 3-, 4-, 5-, and 8-year-old children and adults. The subjects were asked to match line drawings, which were similar in color, form, or spatial arrangement of the components, in a forced-choice task. There was a shift, with age, toward increased use of spatial arrangement as the basis for the equivalence judgment and toward greater consistency of choice. An analysis of patterns of response suggested the operation of underlying equivalence rules, which change with age from a limited form rule to more extensive rules, which incorporate a form rule as well as a spatial arrangement rule. We proposed a model of rule development that is hierarchical and involves the subordination of earlier rules to later emerging rules.     

Typicality in logically defined categories: Exemplar-similarity versus rule instantiation

A rule-instantiation model and a similarity-to-exemplars model were contrasted in terms of their predictions of typicality judgments and speeded classifications for members of logically defined categories. In Experiment 1, subjects learned a unidimensional rule based on the size of objects. It was assumed that items that maximally instantiated the rule were those farthest from the category boundary that separated small and large stimuli. In Experiment 2, subjects learned a disjunctive rule of the form "x or y or both". It was assumed that items that maximally instantiated the rule were those with both positive values (x and y). In both experiments, the frequency with which different exemplars were presented during classification learning was manipulated across conditions. These frequency manipulations exerted a major impact on subjects' postacquisition goodness-of-example judgments, and they also influenced reaction times in a speeded classification task. The results could not be predicted solely on the basis of the degree to which the rules were instantiated. The goodness judgments were predicted fairly well by a mixed exemplar model involving both relative-similarity and absolute-similarity components. It was concluded that even for logically defined concepts, stored exemplars may form a major component of the category representation.     

Intersensory conflict between vision and touch: the response modality dominates when precise, attention-riveting judgments are required

In four experiments, reducing lenses were used to minify vision and generate intersensory size conflicts between vision and touch. Subjects made size judgments, using either visual matching or haptic matching. In visual matching, the subjects chose from a set of visible squares that progressively increased in size. In haptic matching, the subjects selected matches from an array of tangible wooden squares. In Experiment 1, it was found that neither sense dominated when subjects exposed to an intersensory discrepancy made their size estimates by using either visual matching or haptic matching. Size judgments were nearly indentical for conflict subjects making visual or haptic matches. Thus, matching modality did not matter in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, it was found that subjects were influenced by the sight of their hands, which led to increases in the magnitude of their size judgments. Sight of the hands produced more accurate judgments, with subjects being better able to compensate for the illusory effects of the reducing lens. In two additional experiments, it was found that when more precise judgments were required and subjects had to generate their own size estimates, the response modality dominated. Thus, vision dominated in Experiment 3, where size judgments derived from viewing a metric ruler, whereas touch dominated in Experiment 4, where subjects made size estimates with a pincers posture of their hands. It is suggested that matching procedures are inadequate for assessing intersensory dominance relations. These results qualify the position (Hershberger & Misceo, 1996) that the modality of size estimates influences the resolution of intersensory conflicts. Only when required to self-generate more precise judgments did subjects rely on one sense, either vision or touch. Thus, task and attentional requirements influence dominance relations, and vision does not invariably prevail over touch.