Are We Rarely Free? A Response to Restrictivism

Arguments for Restrictivism – the position that we are rarely free– have been proposed by incompatibilists Peter van Inwagen and David Vander Laan among others. This article is concerned much more with these arguments than with quantifying the frequency of free actions. There are two general ways to argue for restrictivism. First, one may take a Negative Strategy, arguing that the situations in which one is not free are common and predominant. Second, one may focus on situations in which one is apparently free, and argue directly that these situations are rare – the Inventory Strategy. I conclude that both types of arguments for restrictivism are unconvincing.     

Should We Be Kantians? A Defence of Empiricism (Part One)

In his book Mind and World (1994), John McDowell defends the Kantian position that the content of experience is conceptual. Without this Kantian assumption, he argues, it would be impossible to understand how experience may rationally constrain thought. But McDowell's Kantianism is either false or empty, and his view of the relation between mind and world cannot be stated without transcending the bounds of sense. McDowell's arguments supporting the Kantian thesis, which are very different from Kant's arguments, essentially involve a fallacy of ambiguity. In order to understand how thought may be rationally constrained by experience we should become empiricists.     

Should We Want God to Exist?

Whether God exists is a metaphysical question. But there is also a neglected evaluative question about God’s existence: Should we want God to exist? Very many, including many atheists and agnostics, appear to think we should. Theists claim that if God didn’t exist things would be far worse, and many atheists agree; they regret God’s inexistence. Some remarks by Thomas Nagel suggest an opposing view: that we should want God not to exist. I call this view anti‐theism. I explain how such view can be coherent, and why it might be correct. Anti‐theism must be distinguished from the argument from evil or the denial of God’s goodness; it is a claim about the goodness of God’s existence. Anti‐theists must claim that it’s a logical consequence of God’s existence that things are worse in certain respects. The problem is that God’s existence would also make things better in many ways. Given that God’s existence is likely to be impersonally better overall, anti‐theists face a challenge similar to that facing nonconsequentialists. I explore two ways of meeting this challenge.     

Should We Be Talking About Ethics or About Morals?

This article seeks to revisit the distinction between the words ethics and morals. First, we understand the word ethics to be focused on the way we seek to live our own life, and hence to connote a relativistic and essentially subjective perspective, whereas we understand the word morals to be focused on the way we should live our lives together, especially through sensitivity to viewpoints other than our own. Second, we perceive a usefulness in such a differentiation when the ethical values of those in a dilemmatic situation are conflicted in order to prioritize moral decision making in contemporary society. We argue that in our current era, characterized by a multiplicity of faiths and by pronounced value pluralism, a philosophical basis for moral decision making needs to be clearly attuned with intersubjectivity and interconnectivity among people. It should be able to determine principles of conduct toward others, no matter how one’s own ethical values, conceptions of the good, or life choices might differ from those of others. To do this, we relocate ethical decision making away from an essentially monological reflection on our own values and purposes into a social space wherein we have an inclusive, noncoercive, and reflective dialogue.     

Should We Respond to Evil with Indifference?

In a recent article, Adam Elga outlines a strategy for Defeating Dr Evil with Self-Locating Belief. The strategy relies on an indifference principle that is not up to the task. In general, there are two things to dislike about indifference principles: adopting one normally means confusing risk for uncertainty, and they tend to lead to incoherent views in some 'paradoxical' situations. I argue that both kinds of objection can be levelled against Elga's indifference principle. There are also some difficulties with the concept of evidence that Elga uses, and these create further difficulties for the principle.     

Who Should Do Faculty Development and What Should It Be?

In the face of widespread public dissatisfaction with higher education, faculty development programs—especially semester- and year-long leaves—have become more important than ever before as a means of helping faculty broaden their scholarship and enhance their teaching. Department chairs should play an important hand in decisions on faculty development assignments. Given that they also have other important responsibilities, however, ways must be found to entice department chairs to become as involved in faculty development as they are in promotion and tenure, curriculum review, and decisions on merit salary increments. The particular value of faculty development programs for women and members of minority groups must also be recognized. These two groups of faculty may experience special problems in adjusting to faculty life, which make faculty development opportunities even more valuable to them than to others.     

How Should We Treat Animals? A Confucian Reflection

Contrary to the views proposed by modern animal rights scholars, this essay reconstructs the Confucian argument for the moral defensibility of the Confucian ritual use of animals by providing an expository analysis of classical Confucian literature. The argument is developed by focusing on the issue of the sacrificial use of animals in the Confucian tradition. While animals are treated according to certain regulations and restrictions, they are not spared from being offered as sacrifices. An essential component of Confucian virtues, reverence, requires showing deep respect to Heaven, gods, spirits, and humans but not to animals. If Confucians change the rituals in ways that spare animals, they would fail to show the depth of reverence to gods, spirits, and humans that they should.     

What Should a Correspondence Theory Be and Do?

Correspondence theories are frequently either too vaguely expressed – “true statements correspond to the way things are in the world,” or implausible – “true statements mirror raw, mind-independent reality.” I address this problem by developing features and roles that ought to characterize what I call ldquo;modest” correspondence theories. Of special importance is the role of correspondence in directing our responses to cases of suspected non-factuality; lack of straightforward correspondence shows the need for, and guides us in our choice of, various kinds of reconstrual projects. This, I argue, is in contrast to the approaches suggested by deflationism and coherence, and thus modest correspondence theories are appropriately distinct from rivals     

We Were,We Are,Will We Be? The Social Psychology of Collective Angst

Not all social groups survive the passage of time. Groups once in existence are now but memories of the past. If history is any indication, other social groups are likely to experience a similar fate and join the list of groups that once were. The concern that one’s group might one day join such a list is the focus of this paper. Specifically, we examine the social psychology of collective angst – a group‐based emotion that stems from concern for the future vitality of one’s social group. We begin by discussing the anatomy of collective angst and how it differs from other collective emotions. We then outline factors that foster collective angst. Importantly, we provide a novel theoretical framework outlining both constructive and destructive means by which members may defend against a future that does not include their group. For example, we examine collective angst as a facilitator of, among other things, ingroup cohesion and outgroup aggression. Finally, we discuss how collective angst has manifested on the world stage as well as implications for relations within and between groups.     

Should We Teach Patriotism?

This article examines a particular debate between Eamonn Callan and William Galston concerning the need for a civic education which counters the divisive pull of pluralism by uniting the citizenry in patriotic allegiance to a single national identity.The article offers a preliminary understanding of nationalism and patriotism before setting out the terms of the debate. It then critically evaluates the central idea of Callan that one might be under an obligation morally to improve one's own patriotic inheritance, pointing to the ineliminable tension between the valuation of one's own patria by its own terms and a detached critical reason.It concludes by suggesting that we are, in advance of our education, members of a particular patria and that any education must be particularistic. Finally, the danger is noted of presuming that, in each case, there is a single, determinate national tradition.     

Should We Treat Depression with drugs or psychological interventions? A Reply to Ioannidis

We reply to the Ioannidis's paper "Effectiveness of antidepressants; an evidence based myth constructed from a thousand controlled trials." We disagree that antidepressants have no greater efficacy than placebo. We present the efficacy from hundreds of trials in terms of the percentage of patients with a substantial clinical response (a 50% improvement or more symptomatic reduction). This meta-analysis finds that 42-70% of depressed patients improve with drug and 21%-39% improve with placebo. The response benefit of antidepressant treatment is 33%-11% greater than placebo. Ioannidis argues that it would be vanishingly smaller because systematic biasing in these clinical trials would reduce the drug-placebo difference to zero. Ioannidis' argument that antidepressants have no benefit is eroded by his failures of logic because he does not present any evidence that there are a large number of studies where placebo is substantially more effective than drug. (To reduce to zero, one would also have to show that some of the unpublished studies find placebo better than drug and have substantial systematic or methodological bias). We also present the empirical evidence showing that these methodological concerns generally have the opposite effect of what Ioannidis argues, supporting our contention that the measured efficacy of antidepressants likely underestimates true efficacy. Our most important criticism is Ioannidis’ basic underlying argument about antidepressants that if the existing evidence is imperfect and methods can be criticized, then this proves that antidepressant are not efficacious. He presents no credible evidence that antidepressants have zero effect size. Valid arguments can point out difficulties with the data but do not prove that a given drug had no efficacy. Indeed better evidence might prove it was more efficacious that originally found. We find no empirical or ethical reason why psychiatrists should not try to help depressed patients with drugs and/or with psychotherapeutic/behavioral treatments given evidence of efficacy even though our treatment knowledge has limitations. The immense suffering of patients with major depression leads to ethical, moral, professional and legal obligations to treat patients with the best available tools at our disposal, while diligently and actively monitoring for adverse effects and actively revising treatment components as necessary.     

What Kind of Empirical Research Should We Publish, Fund, and Reward?

ABSTRACT— When evaluating empirical papers for publication, grant proposals, or individual contributions (e.g., awarding tenure), the basic question one should ask is how much the contribution adds to understanding in psychology and not whether the contribution takes a particular form or represents one particular model of how to do empirical studies. Academic psychology has flourished with its mastery of the hypothesis–experiment model of science and its expertise in generating and eliminating alternative hypotheses and isolating causation. These accomplishments are a critical part of psychology, and they are well and appropriately taught by psychologists. However, they are only a part of science and should not comprise the almost exclusive criteria for evaluating research. In particular, discovery of fundamental phenomena, such as functional relations that apply to the real world and have generality, should have a higher priority in psychology. Such findings have been the basis for theoretical advances in other natural sciences.     

Infinitism Redux? A Response to Klein

Foundationalist, Coherentist. Skeptic etc., have all been united in one respect—all accept epistemic justification cannot result from an unending, and non-repeating. chain of reasons. Peter Klein has recently challenged this minimal consensus with a defense of what he calls "Intinitism"—the position that justification can result from such a regress. Klein provides surprisingly convincing responses to most of the common objections to Infinitism, but I will argue that he fails to address a venerable metaphysical concern about a certain type of regress. My conclusion will be that until Klein answers these metaphysical worries he will not have restored Infinitism as a viable option in epistemology.     

Patenting and the Gender Gap: Should Women Be Encouraged to Patent More?

The commercialization of academic science has come to be understood as economically desirable for institutions, individual researchers, and the public. Not surprisingly, commercial activity, particularly that which results from patenting, appears to be producing changes in the standards used to evaluate scientists’ performance and contributions. In this context, concerns about a gender gap in patenting activity have arisen and some have argued for the need to encourage women to seek more patents. They believe that because academic advancement is mainly dependent on productivity (Stuart and Ding in American Journal of Sociology 112:97–144, 2006; Azoulay et al. in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 63:599–623, 2007), differences in research output have the power to negatively impact women’s careers. Moreover, in the case of patenting activity, they claim that the gender gap also has the potential to negatively affect society. This is so because scientific and technological advancement and innovation play a crucial role in contemporary societies. Thus, women’s more limited involvement in the commercialization of science and technology can also be detrimental to innovation itself. Nevertheless, calls to encourage women to patent on grounds that such activity is likely to play a significant role in the betterment of both women’s careers and society seem to be based on two problematic assumptions: (1) that the methods to determine women’s productivity in patenting activities are an appropriate way to measure their research efforts and the impact of their work, and (2) that patenting, particularly in academia, benefits society. The purpose of this paper is to call into question these two assumptions.     

How Should We Discharge Our Responsibilities to Eradicate Poverty?

In this article I present four central challenges for Hennie Lötter’s book Poverty, Ethics and Justice. The first criticism takes issue with Lötter’s focus on social rather than global justice. Though he seems to be concerned with poverty everywhere, he takes social rather than global justice as the primary unit of analysis and this leads to a certain blindness to the ways in which discharging duties to the poor is a global not just society or state level project. My alternative perspective also gives us more insights into the nature of our duties to one another and can accommodate a wider range of duties. A second set of concerns revolves around what we must do to discharge our duties to the poor and what we need to know to help effectively. We come to appreciate that helping effectively is no easy matter and supplying more guidance would be helpful. Third, after discussing some relevant empirical research, I also discuss the kinds of initiatives that deserve support, that can act as rough guidelines for would-be assisters. These more simplified guidelines do not place such heavy epistemic demands on those aiming to help. Fourth, I explore whether we can offer some more guidelines for determining which of many plausible policy initiatives we should support, given that there are many good ideas and limited resources. I offer one guideline for choosing among what appear to be plausible policies to support.