Categorization of visual stimuli in the honeybee Apis mellifera

Categorization refers to the classification of perceptual input into defined functional groups. We present and discuss evidence suggesting that stimulus categorization can also be found in an invertebrate, the honeybee Apis mellifera, thus underlining the generality across species of this cognitive process. Honeybees show positive transfer of appropriate responding from a trained to a novel set of visual stimuli. Such a transfer was demonstrated for specific isolated features such as symmetry or orientation, but also for assemblies (layouts) of features. Although transfer from training to novel stimuli can be achieved by stimulus generalization of the training stimuli, most of these transfer tests involved clearly distinguishable stimuli for which generalization would be reduced. Though in most cases specific experimental controls such as stimulus balance and discriminability are still required, it seems appropriate to characterize the performance of honeybees as reflecting categorization. Further experiments should address the issue of which categorization theory accounts better for the visual performances of honeybees.This contribution is part of the special issue “Animal Logics” (Watanabe and Huber 2006).     

具身认知:认知心理学的新取向

具身认知强调身体在认知的实现中发挥着关键作用。其中心含义包括:(1)认知过程的进行方式和步骤实际上是被身体的物理属性所决定的;(2)认知的内容是身体提供的;(3)认知、身体、环境是一体的,认知存在于大脑,大脑存在于身体,身体存在于环境。具身认知最初仅仅是一种哲学思考,有深刻的哲学思想渊源,但是现在这种哲学思考已经开始走向实证领域,实验的认知心理学家开始从具身的角度看待认知,形成了具身认知研究思潮。但是具身认知研究也面临着许多亟待解决的问题。     

Do birds (pigeons and bantams) know how confident they are of their perceptual decisions?

Rhesus monkeys are known to recognize confidence about their immediate perceptual and cognitive decisions by using a betting procedure (Son and Kornell in The missing link in cognition: origins of self-reflective consciousness. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 296–320, 2005; Kornell et al. in Psychol Sci 18:64–71, 2007). In this report, we examined whether this ability is shared in two avian species (pigeons and bantams) in order to know how widespread this metacognitive ability is among animals. We trained pigeons and bantams to search for a differently colored disk (target) among others (distracters) displayed on a touch-sensitive monitor. In test, the subjects were required to choose one of two confidence icons, “risk” and “safe”, after the visual search. A peck at the “risk” icon after a correct response in the visual search (i.e., a peck at the target) was reinforced by food and light, while that after an incorrect response (i.e., a peck at a distracter) resulted in a timeout. A peck at the “safe” icon was always reinforced by food and light, or by light only, regardless of the visual search result. The percentages of “safe” choices after incorrect responses were higher than after correct responses in all six pigeons and two of three bantams. This behavior generalized to novel stimuli in some subjects, and even to a novel line-classification task in a pigeon. These results suggest that these two distantly related avian species have in common a metacognitive ability that allows them to recognize confidence about their immediate perceptual decisions.     

The extended mind: born to be wild? A lesson from action-understanding

The extended mind hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers in Analysis 58(1):7–19, 1998; Clark 2008) is an influential hypothesis in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I argue that the extended mind hypothesis is born to be wild. It has undeniable and irrepressible tendencies of flouting grounding assumptions of the traditional information-processing paradigm. I present case-studies from social cognition which not only support the extended mind proposal but also bring out its inherent wildness. In particular, I focus on cases of action-understanding and discuss the role of embodied intentionality in the extended mind project. I discuss two theories of action-understanding for exploring the support for the extended mind hypothesis in embodied intersubjective interaction, namely, simulation theory and a non-simulationist perceptual account. I argue that, if the extended mind adopts a simulation theory of action-understanding, it rejects representationalism. If it adopts a non-simulationist perceptual account of action-understanding, it rejects the classical sandwich view of the mind.     

Climbing the cortical ladder from sensation to perception

A recent study using displays that are ambiguous for motion direction demonstrates that the current perceptual interpretation of such a stimulus is encoded in the highest areas of visual cortex whereas earlier areas encode only its sensory properties. This finding implies that cortical processing pathways perform a transition from a sensory representation to a representation that emphasizes the input's perceptual interpretation and ultimately the organism's behavioral state.     

The experience of watching dance: phenomenological–neuroscience duets

This paper discusses possible correspondences between neuroscientific findings and phenomenologically informed methodologies in the investigation of kinesthetic empathy in watching dance. Interest in phenomenology has recently increased in cognitive science (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008) and dance scholars have recently contributed important new insights into the use of phenomenology in dance studies (e.g. Legrand and Ravn (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8(3):389–408, 2009); Parviainen (Dance Research Journal 34(1):11–26, 2002); Rothfield (Topoi 24:43–53, 2005)). In vision research, coherent neural mechanisms for perceptual phenomena were uncovered, thus supporting correlation of phenomenology and neurophysiology Spillmann (Vision Research 49(12):1507–1521, 2009). Correspondingly, correlating subjects’ neurophysiological data with qualitative responses has been proposed as a means to research the human brain in the study of consciousness (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008), with similar issues in clinical psychology Mishara (Current Opinion in Psychiatry 20(6):559–569, 2007) and biology Kosslyn et al. (American Psychologist 57:341–351, 2002). Yet the relationship between neuroscience and qualitative research informed by phenomenology remains problematic. How qualitative research normally handles subjective experiences is difficult to reconcile with standard statistical analysis of objective data. Recent technological developments in cognitive neuroscience have inspired a number of researchers to use more naturalistic stimuli, outside the laboratory environment, such as dance, thereby perhaps helping to open up the cognitive sciences to more phenomenologically informed approaches. A question central to our research, addressed here, is how the phenomenal experiences of a dance audience member, as accessed by qualitative research methods, can be related to underlying neurophysiological events. We outline below some methodological challenges encountered in relating audiences’ first-person accounts of watching live dance performance to neurophysiological evidence of their experiences.     

Unitization,similarity, and overt attention in categorization and exposure

Unitization, the creation of new stimulus features by the fusion of preexisting features, is one of the hypothesized processes of perceptual learning (Goldstone Annual Review of Psychology, 49:585–612, 1998). Some argue that unitization occurs to the extent that it is required for successful task performance (e.g., Shiffrin & Lightfoot, 1997), while others argue that unitization is largely independent of functionality (e.g., McLaren & Mackintosh Animal Learning & Behavior, 30:177–200, 2000). Across three experiments, employing supervised category learning and unsupervised exposure, we investigated three predictions of the McLaren and Mackintosh (Animal Learning & Behavior, 30:177–200, 2000) model: (1) Unitization is accompanied by an initial increase in the subjective similarity of stimuli sharing a unitized component; (2) unitization of a configuration occurs through exposure to its components, even when the task does not require it; (3) as unitization approaches completion, salience of the unitized component may be reduced. Our data supported these predictions. We also found that unitization is associated with increases in overt attention to the unitized component, as measured through eye tracking.     

Interference from familiar natural distractors is not eliminated by high perceptual load

A crucial prediction of perceptual load theory is that high perceptual load can eliminate interference from distractors. However, Lavie et al. (Psychol Sci 14:510–515, 2003) found that high perceptual load did not eliminate interference when the distractor was a face. The current experiments examined the interaction between familiarity and perceptual load in modulating interference in a name search task. The data reveal that high perceptual load eliminated the interference effect for unfamiliar distractors that were faces or objects, but did not eliminate the interference for familiar distractors that were faces or objects. Based on these results, we proposed that the processing of familiar and natural stimuli may be immune to the effect of perceptual load.     

Visual marking and change detection

The preview benefit from prior exposure of response-irrelevant (distracter) objects in visual search has been accounted for in terms of top-down inhibition (i.e. visual marking), bottom-up abrupt onset capture, or asynchrony-dependent perceptual segregation. We assess the relative contribution of abrupt onset and visual marking in a paradigm combining visual search with a visual working memory task. We investigated time-based selection of multiple objects for storage in visual working memory, using a change detection paradigm (Luck and Vogel in Nature 390:279–281, 1997) with distracter preview. We varied preview exposure (short vs. long), in a series of three experiments. The contribution of asynchrony-related perceptual segregation was assessed across experiments by varying the complexity of the stimuli (colored squares, oriented bars and oriented T-shapes) and the type of change detection (color or orientation), resulting in different levels of perceptual segregation between visual elements. The results suggest that bottom-up abrupt onset, visual marking and perceptual segregation factors co-operate in time-based selection for storage in visual working memory.     

On the relation between decision rules and perceptual representation in multidimensional perceptual categorization

This article examines the relation between changing categorization decision rules and the nature of the underlying perceptual representation. Observers completed a matching task that required them to adjust the length and orientation of a single line stimulus until they perceived it to "match" a second line stimulus (Alfonso-Reese, 1996, 1997). The same observers then completed four categorization tasks with the same stimuli. Data from the matching task were used to estimate a perceptual representation for each stimulus and observer. Three hypotheses regarding potential interactions between categorization decision rules and perceptual representation were examined. One assumed that there was no interaction between decision rules and perceptual representation. The second assumed that linear categorization rules affect the perceptual representation differently from nonlinear categorization rules. The third assumed that dimensional integration rules affected the perceptual representation differently from decision rules that require the observer to set a criterion along one stimulus dimension while ignoring the other; this is referred to as decisional selective attention. The results suggested that (1) the matching task perceptual representation provided a good account of the categorization data, (2) decisional selective attention affected the perceptual representation differently from decisional integration, and (3) decisional selective attention generally decreased the perceptual variability along the attended dimension.     

What wild primates know about resources: opening up the black box

We present the theoretical and practical difficulties of inferring the cognitive processes involved in spatial movement decisions of primates and other animals based on studies of their foraging behavior in the wild. Because the possible cognitive processes involved in foraging are not known a priori for a given species, some observed spatial movements could be consistent with a large number of processes ranging from simple undirected search processes to strategic goal-oriented travel. Two basic approaches can help to reveal the cognitive processes: (1) experiments designed to test specific mechanisms; (2) comparison of observed movements with predicted ones based on models of hypothesized foraging modes (ideally, quantitative ones). We describe how these two approaches have been applied to evidence for spatial knowledge of resources in primates, and for various hypothesized goals of spatial decisions in primates, reviewing what is now established. We conclude with a synthesis emphasizing what kinds of spatial movement data on unmanipulated primate populations in the wild are most useful in deciphering goal-oriented processes from random processes. Basic to all of these is an estimate of the animal’s ability to detect resources during search. Given knowledge of the animal’s detection ability, there are several observable patterns of resource use incompatible with a pure search process. These patterns include increasing movement speed when approaching versus leaving a resource, increasingly directed movement toward more valuable resources, and directed travel to distant resources from many starting locations. Thus, it should be possible to assess and compare spatial cognition across a variety of primate species and thus trace its ecological and evolutionary correlates. This contribution is part of the special issue “A Socioecological Perspective on Primate Cognition” (Cunningham and Janson 2007b)     

Has 60 Years of Research in Psychology Really Gone Astray?

The author presents several arguments against Toomela’s (Culture of science: Strange history of the methodological thinking in psychology. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 2007a, doi:, History of methodology in psychology: Starting point, not the goal. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 2007b, doi:) pessimistic thesis: “The last 60 years of research in psychology seems to have gone astray.” Nevertheless he admits that Toomela’s article despite the excessively categorical assessments contained in it and the undue pessimism crowing its conclusion, represents a substantial contribution to the highlighting of socio-cultural impact on various models of psychological cognition, which lurks behind the international unification of globalizing science.

Does response interference depend on the subjective visibility of flanker distractors?

Response interference (or response conflict) refers to the phenomenon whereby response times to a target stimulus are longer in the presence of distractor stimuli that indicate contrary motor responses. Response interference has been observed even when the distractor stimuli cannot be discriminated above chance levels. These results raise the question of whether response interference might be driven automatically by the physical distractor stimuli, independently of one??s subjective perception of the distractors. Using a modified version of the Eriksen flanker task, we applied metacontrast masks to the flanker stimuli and measured their subjective visibility after each trial. We found converging lines of evidence that the subjective perception of flankers contributed to response interference, over and above the contribution of automatic processing of the stimulus itself. A factorial analysis revealed that the objective, physical congruency of target and flankers and the subjective, perceptual congruency of target and flankers make additive, noninteracting contributions to target response interference, suggesting that the two interference effects originate from independent levels or stages of cognitive processing.     

Marking the Perception–Cognition Boundary: The Criterion of Stimulus-Dependence

Philosophy, scientific psychology, and common sense all distinguish perception from cognition. While there is little agreement about how the perception–cognition boundary ought to be drawn, one prominent idea is that perceptual states are dependent on a stimulus, or are stimulus-dependent, in a way that cognitive states are not. This paper seeks to develop this idea in a way that can accommodate two apparent counterexamples: hallucinations, which are prima facie perceptual yet stimulus-independent; and demonstrative thoughts, which are prima facie cognitive yet stimulus-dependent. The payoff is not only a specific proposal for marking the perception–cognition boundary, but also a deeper understanding of the natures of hallucination and demonstrative thought.     

Dissociable perceptual-learning mechanisms revealed by diffusion-model analysis

Performance on perceptual tasks improves with practice. Most theories address only accuracy data and tacitly assume that perceptual learning is a monolithic phenomenon. The present study pioneers the use of response time distributions in perceptual learning research. The 27 observers practiced a visual motion-direction discrimination task with filtered-noise textures for four sessions with feedback. Session 5 tested whether the learning effects transferred to the orthogonal direction. The diffusion model (Ratcliff, Psychological Review, 85, 59–108, 1978) achieved good fits to the individual response time distributions from each session and identified two distinct learning mechanisms with markedly different specificities. A stimulus-specific increase in the drift-rate parameter indicated improved sensory input to the decision process, and a stimulus-general decrease in nondecision time variability suggested improved timing of the decision process onset relative to stimulus onset (which was preceded by a beep). A traditional d’ analysis would miss the latter effect, but the diffusion-model analysis identified it in the response time data.     

Neural and cognitive plasticity: from maps to minds

Some species and individuals are able to learn cognitive skills more flexibly than others. Learning experiences and cortical function are known to contribute to such differences, but the specific factors that determine an organism's intellectual capacities remain unclear. Here, an integrative framework is presented suggesting that variability in cognitive plasticity reflects neural constraints on the precision and extent of an organism's stimulus representations. Specifically, it is hypothesized that cognitive plasticity depends on the number and diversity of cortical modules that an organism has available as well as the brain's capacity to flexibly reconfigure and customize networks of these modules. The author relates this framework to past proposals on the neural mechanisms of intelligence, including (a) the relationship between brain size and intellectual capacity; (b) the role of prefrontal cortex in cognitive control and the maintenance of stimulus representations; and (c) the impact of neural plasticity and efficiency on the acquisition and performance of cognitive skills. The proposed framework provides a unified account of variability in cognitive plasticity as a function of species, age, and individual, and it makes specific predictions about how manipulations of cortical structure and function will impact intellectual capacity.     

Identity concept learning in matching-to-sample tasks by tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)

The abstract concept of equivalence is considered one of the bases of higher-order cognition, and it has been the subject of considerable research in comparative cognition. This study examined the conditions under which tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) are able to acquire an identity concept. Six capuchin monkeys were trained to solve a visual matching-to-sample (MTS) task on the basis of perceptual identity. The acquisition of the identity rule was inferred from the subject’s ability to solve transfer tests with novel stimuli. We evaluated the ability of the capuchin monkeys to match the shape of novel stimuli after training with both several small stimulus sets (Experiment 1) and a large stimulus set (Experiment 2). Moreover, we examined the ability of capuchins to transfer the concept to novel visual dimensions, such as colour and size and to transfer to novel spatial arrangements of the stimuli (Experiment 2). We demonstrated that the ability of capuchins to match novel stimuli was improved by increasing the number of stimuli used during training (Experiments 1 and 2) and that after a widely applicable identity concept based on the stimulus shape was acquired, the capuchins were able to match stimuli according to an identity rule based on both the colour and size of the stimuli and when the spatial arrangement of the stimuli was varied (Experiment 2). This study is the first to demonstrate that the size of the training set affects the acquisition of an abstract identity concept in an MTS task in non-human primates.     

At the boundaries of automaticity: negation as reflective operation

The present research investigated whether automatic social-cognitive skills are based on the same representations and processes as their controlled counterparts. Using the cognitive task of negating valence, the authors demonstrate that enhanced practice in negating the valence of a stimulus can lead to changes in the underlying associative representation. However, procedural, rule-based components of negations were generally unaffected by practice (Experiments 1-3). Moreover, negations of evaluative stimuli did not influence automatic evaluative responses to these stimuli, unless the negation was included in the associative representation of a stimulus (Experiments 4-6). These results suggest that some practice-related skill improvements are limited to conditions in which a general procedure can be substituted by the retrieval of results of previous applications from associative memory. Implications for research on automaticity and social cognition are discussed.     

具身概念表征的研究及理论述评

具身认知强调认知在本质上是具身的, 身体在认知的实现中发挥着关键作用。传统的符号加工理论认为, 概念表征独立于主体的知觉运动系统并以抽象符号的形式储存于语言记忆中。概念表征的具身理论则认为, 概念表征与知觉运动系统具有共同的神经基础, 概念在本质上是主体经验客体时知觉与运动体验的神经记录, 而概念加工的基本形式则是身体经验的模拟与还原。关于该理论的实证研究主要集中于概念加工引发的知觉动作变化、身体动作对概念加工的影响、抽象概念加工的具身特征等领域。今后的研究应关注符号加工理论与具身理论的整合等。