A note on Horwich’s notion of grounding

Synthese - Horwich (Deflationism and paradox, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 75–84, 2005) proposes a solution to the liar paradox that relies on a particular notion of...     

Are moods cognitive?: A critique of Schmitt on Heidegger

Conclusion If, as Schmitt suggests, Heidegger bases the claim that moods are cognitive on the philosophical distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical knowing, then much of what Heidegger says in this connection turns out to be either unclear, trivially true, or else false. Yet Schmitt himself only occasionally seems to recognize how dubious this account really is. Moreover, in attempting to help Heidegger say what he means, Schmitt's interpretation in Chapter 5 falters. It falters because(1) the emphatic likening of moods to skills,(2) the introduction of the bizzare notion knowing how occurrently, and (3) the misconceiving of self-deception, are not to be found in Sein und Zeit. They represent, rather, an imposition upon Sein und Zeit from without. This fact means either that Schmitt's interpretation is faulty or else that it is as much reconstructive as explicative. And if reconstructive, then several conceptual mistakes are attributable to him more than to Heidegger. In spite of these difficulties Martin Heidegger on Being Human is a prize book. It attempts to understand a thinker better than he understood himself. And according to Schleiermacher this is the goal of every hermeneutic.In contrast to the successful parts of the book, the chapter on moods fails to make sense out of Heidegger's view - one reason being, I would guess, that Heidegger is, after all, equivocating on the German word Stimmung. Sometimes he uses it to refer specifically to states such as being depressed, being serene, being anxious. At other times he uses it to refer vaguely to Dasein's attunement to the world. If the human being is always already (immer schon) attuned to the world, and if such a posture toward the world is also considered a mood, then in some imprecise way one's being in a mood might be a necessary condition for any belief to affect him emotionally. But, of course, mood in this broad sense would indicate an ontologically, and not a causally, necessary condition. And so, it would not follow that every belief which affected one emotionally need have some specific mood (e.g., depression, serenity, anxiety) as its necessary causal antecedent. Nor would it follow that, as a matter of fact, a change of belief could not effect a specific change of mood.I fear that with regard to some topics the sense in which one understands Heidegger better than he understood himself may well be the original Socratic sense: one knows what Heidegger himself does not know, viz., that the conceptions of Sein und Zeit are not always intelligible. And one wonders whether any philosophical midwifery can really be of aid - at least with respect to the claim that moods are cognitive.     

The effects of extrinsic rewards on “intrinsic motivation”: A critique

Recently a number of cognitive theorists have prescribed widely against the use of reinforcement procedures in organizations, citing as evidence those studies in which contingent extrinsic reinforcers seemed to impair intrinsically motivated behavior. However, a review of those studies reveals that (a) there is no acceptable evidence that extrinsic reinforcers inevitably disrupt behavior maintained by other, but perhaps less obvious, reinforcing events and (b) the meaning of “intrinsic motivation” remains obscure. Unfortunately, the postulation of autonomous central processes continues to produce studies that neither clarify those processes nor increase our knowledge of the manner in which human task performance is acquired and maintained. A reinforcement analysis is proposed as a more fruitful alternative.     

Suicide and public policy: A critique of the “New consensus”

Several writers have recently developed proposals calling for a public policy that would allow a number of individuals to commit suicide if they so choose. Suicide, it is argued, is a fundamental matter of personal liberty and as such only very minimal restrictions should be placed on it. In this essay I offer a critique of these views and the public policies they entail. The result is a defense of the general outlines of current professional and legal policies which permit intervention, even coercive intervention, with suicidal persons in almost every case.     

Queuing or sharing? A critical evaluation of the single-bottleneck notion

The model of a single central bottleneck for human information processing is critically examined. Most evidence cited in support of the model has been observed within the overlapping tasks paradigm. It is shown here that most findings obtained within that paradigm and that were used to support the model are also consistent with a simple resource model. The most prominent findings are the millisecond-for-millisecond slope at the left of the RT2-SOA curve, the high RT1-RT2 correlation, the additivity of the effects on RT2 of SOA and of the difficulty of selecting R2, and the washout of the effect of S2 discriminability on RT2 in a dual-task condition. In addition, the asymmetry of the effects of the dual-task requirement on RT1 and RT2 can be accounted for by the resource model provided that it assumes uneven allocation of resources, which is quite reasonable in view of the task asymmetry inherent in the demand characteristics of the paradigm. The same is true for two other findings that appear to support the single-bottleneck model-that in the dual-task condition, the demand of the first task affects equally RT1 and RT2 and that its effect on RT1 is the same as the corresponding effect in the single-task condition. Furthermore, the single-bottleneck model is hard to reconcile with a negative slope at the left of the RT1-SOA curve or a positive slope at the left of the IRI-SOA curve, unless augmented by ancillary assumptions that are yet to be substantiated. Representative data were fit by each of the models using its optimal set of parameters. Both models achieved quite good degrees of fit. It is further argued that since the overlapping tasks paradigm is heavily biased in favor of a speedy reaction to the stimulus that appears first, it is nonoptimal for testing the central bottleneck model. Finally, the bottleneck model is examined in terms of other scientific criteria.     

A critique of Confucius’ philosophy

Throughout the millennia since the composition of the Analects, orthodox scholars have maintained that Confucius faithfully passed down the thought of early eras, particularly those of Yao and Shun: ‘I transmit but do not create ideas.’ This paper shows that Confucius actually subverted the essence of orthodox thought represented mainly by Yao and Shun. His subversion of orthodox thought compels perforce the idea of ‘ren (humanity),’ which concerns itself with the human world, to stand out with the near exclusion of otherworldliness in his teaching. As a result of the misunderstanding of Confucius’ heritage, scholars in the past tended to equate Confucius’ idea of ‘ren’ with specific moral attributes. Again taking exception to the interpretations of bygone eras, this essay demonstrates that humanity in Confucius’ theory signifies a dynamic process rather than a specific attribute or a static rule, changing constantly with different people, different places, and different times.     

How valid is the psychoticism scale? A comment on the Van Kampen critique

Van Kampen (1993) has published a paper in which he criticizes the concept of psychoticism and the use of the P scale as a measuring device, and advances measures for his own S scale and its validity. This reply attempts to clarify the notion of ‘validity’, and to demonstrate that there is a considerable body of experimental evidence to show that P has a high degree of construct validity, whereas the Van Kampen S scale lacks completely any degree of construct validity. Several examples are given of how the experimental evidence legitimates both the P scale, and the theory (nomological network) on which it is based.     

From the “metaphysics of the individual” to the critique of society: on the practical significance of Michel Henry’s phenomenology of life

This essay explores the practical significance of Michel Henry??s ??material phenomenology.?? Commencing with an exposition of his most basic philosophical intuition, i.e., his insight that transcendental affectivity is the primordial mode of revelation of our selfhood, the essay then brings to light how this intuition also establishes our relation to both the world and others. Animated by a radical form of the phenomenological reduction, Henry??s material phenomenology brackets the exterior world in a bid to reach the concrete interior transcendental experience at the base of all exteriority. The essay argues that this ??counter reduction,?? designed as a practical orientation to the world, suspends all traditional parameters of onto(theo)logical individuation in order to rethink subjectivity in terms of its transcendental corporeality, i.e., in terms of the invisible display of ??affective flesh.?? The development of this ??metaphysics of the individual?? anchors his ??practical philosophy?? as he developed it??under shifting accents??throughout his oeuvre. In particular, the essay brings into focus Henry??s reflections on modernity, the industry of mass culture and their ??barbaric?? movements. The essay briefly puts these cultural and political areas of Henry??s of thinking into contact with his late ??theological turn,?? i.e., his Christological account of Life and the (inter)subjective self-realization to which it gives rise.     

Russellizing Russell: A reply to his “A critique of Lehrer's coherentism”

Conclusion Russell's attempt to demonstrate the insufficiency and nonnecessity of Lehrer's epistemology fails on both counts. His modified Nogot example does not constitute a counterexample to Lehrer's theory, though it does establish the insufficiency of (RTK). The relevant versions of both of his counterexamples to necessity occasion radically conflicting intuitions and, as a result, are far from decisive. Moreover, if they work against Lehrer's theory, and it is by no means obvious that they do, then they also demonstrate the nonnecessity of Russell's theory. In the final analysis, we may conclude that if Russell's three counterexamples demonstrate anything, they demonstrate that Lehrer's epistemology is superior to (RTK).     

Who is a homosexual? A critique of the heterosexual‐homosexual dimension

Abstract

The heterosexual‐homosexual distinction as a construction inhibits appreciation of the diversity of sexual experience by encouraging use of static labels to classify people's continually evolving sexual histories. Distinguishing sexual preference may expedite comprehension of sexual acts, but is counterproductive when considering whole persons. We question the need for biological explanations of homosexuality and propose that “coming out” as homosexual is a personal choice to be celebrated, not a biological abnormality. We perceive sexuality as merely one aspect of per‐sonhood. When people instead see self‐proclaimed homosexuals as “homosexuals and only homosexuals” sexual behavior overshadows other salient individual characteristics, and sexual desire becomes inseparable from personality style.     

II. A critique of British empiricism∗

Two points of contact are explored between contemporary philosophy of science and Dialectical Materialism. The first point deals with the interaction view of metaphor as an exemplification of the law of the unity of opposites. The contradiction is then noted between the strategy and tactics of much analytical philosophy and the lesson to be learnt from this account of metaphor. The concern to change category habits into category disciplines rules out the process of conceptual change of the interaction view. G. A. Paul's dismissal of Lenin's theory of reflection is then criticized in the light of the interaction view.     

Postmodernist liberalism: A critique of Richard Rorty’s political philosophy

Richard Rorty’s philosophy has two basic commitments: one to postmodernism and the other to liberalism. However, these commitments generate tension. As a postmodernist, he sharply criticizes the Enlightenment; as a liberal, he forcefully defends it. His postmodernist liberalism actually explains liberalism using irrationalism.     

A critique of the Flynn Effect: massive IQ gains, methodological artifacts, or both?

The Flynn Effect proposed by Flynn (1984; 1987) is reviewed and evaluated. Even in the presence of a skeptical and critical scrutiny of the effect, it appears that there is more than just methodological artifact to be explained. But the acceptance of the effect has been too quick. The proper explanations for the effect will not be meaningful until the nature of the effect is much better understood than it is now. Six questions are raised that have not been adequately answered. Two criticisms of the logic underlying the Flynn Effect are presented — one showing that even if IQ and SAT are highly correlated, their secular means will not necessarily track one another; the second showing that results by Flynn, (1984) are as consistent with a changing IQ variance as with a changing mean. The second of these is empirically evaluated with a re-analysis of a subset of the sources of Flynn's original 1984 data. Finally, 10 research strategies and designs are suggested that would help us better understand the effect. The critique is developed with the goal of clarifying the nature, meaning and causes of the Flynn Effect. The author hopes that this critique will stimulate both healthy skepticism about the Flynn Effect and careful research into its actual causes.     

“Age-associated memory impairment”: A critique

Abstract

This paper is a critical evaluation of the construct of age-associated memory impairment (AAMI) and the criteria for assigning the AAMI label. It is argued that AAMI should not be regarded as a clinical diagnosis; that the AAMI criteria fail to isolate selective memory impairments, ignore crucial longitudinal information, and are vague, arbitrary, and unreliable; that studies of memory loss should examine a wider range of subjects than those who meet the AAMI criteria-moreover, use of the criteria may impede research; and that treatment studies should await investigations of the biological antecedents of memory loss. Several recommendations address subject selection and assessment issues.     

From cover to cover? A critique of Wolterstorff's theory of the Bible as divine discourse

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -