Psychology is About Persons: On Brinkmann’s Expansion of Harré’s Hybrid Psychology

Brinkmann has recently put forward an integrative theory of the mind by expanding Harré’s hybrid psychology. The theory is integrative because it establishes that in order for one to gain a full understanding of the mind—which is represented as a set of dispositions—one has to take into account theories about the brain, the body, social practices, and technological artifacts. All of these are said to be ‘mediators’ upon which the mind depends. An important claim underlying the theory is that in psychology the basic ontological unit is the person. We agree with Brinkmann both on this and on the dispositional nature of the mind. Still, he does not make a strong case for the latter. Furthermore, we believe the concept of mediation is by no means helpful to produce an integrative view in psychology, not only because the theoretical job of such a concept is unclear but also because qua unifying concept it may end up undermining the ontological primacy of the person (in psychology). In this paper we refer to these issues and suggest some ideas that may help improve Brinkmann’s (and Harré’s) proposal.     

Psychology’s Adaptation to Academic Medical Settings

This introduction provides an overview of the papers that follow. Each paper contributes to the central theme of the issue, psychologists’ adaptation to the realities of academic medical settings. The specific approach of each paper to the shared theme of “adaptation” is described in some detail so the busy reader can go directly to the papers of greatest interest.     

Psychology, epistemology, and skepticism in Hume’s argument about induction

Since the mid-1970s, scholars have recognized that the skeptical interpretation of Hume’s central argument about induction is problematic. The science of human nature presupposes that inductive inference is justified and there are endorsements of induction throughout Treatise Book I. The recent suggestion that I.iii.6 is confined to the psychology of inductive inference cannot account for the epistemic flavor of its claims that neither a genuine demonstration nor a non-question-begging inductive argument can establish the uniformity principle. For Hume, that inductive inference is justified is part of the data to be explained. Bad argument is therefore excluded as the cause of inductive inference; and there is no good argument to cause it. Does this reinstate the problem of induction, undermining Hume’s own assumption that induction is justified? It does so only if justification must derive from “reason”, from the availability of a cogent argument. Hume rejects this internalist thesis; induction’s favorable epistemic status derives from features of custom, the mechanism that generates inductive beliefs. Hume is attracted to this externalist posture because it provides a direct explanation of the epistemic achievements of children and non-human animals—creatures that must rely on custom unsupplemented by argument.     

Shifting Loyalties: Reconsidering Psychology’s Subject Matter

Schwarz (IPBS: Integrative Psychology & Behavioral Science 43:3, 2009) cogently demonstrates that in conjunction with scientific conventionalism psychology has developed a rather deficient view of their subject matter: the human being. Psychology based on an impoverished notion of empirical has rendered subjectivity or ‘the measuring apparatus man’ invisible. As his story implicitly demonstrates, psychologists supported by a positivistic view of science (in part to be empirical) and notion of ‘objectivity’ have learned to trust their ‘rigorous’ methods instead of their participants as capable of revealing important and interesting phenomena. If we are going to take subjectivity and experience seriously there should be a cultivation of a new attitude or orientation regarding psychology’s subject matter (i.e., the human being) and science. This commentary discusses Mark Freeman’s (2007) argument that the first requirement of science should be ‘fidelity to the phenomena’ and elaborates on the implications for psychology grounded in this view of science.     

Mahatma Gandhi’s Pragmatic Spirituality: Its Relevance to Psychology East and West

M. K. Gandhi is no academic psychologist; but his philosophy and practice of pragmatic spirituality have important implications for psychology in general and Indian psychology in particular. Psychology as taught and practised in India is mostly Western and not Indian psychology. Indian psychology is an emerging system of psychology with its roots in classical Indian thought. According to Gandhi, the person is instinctively brute, but inherently spiritual. Consequently, he/she has on the one hand natural attraction to sensory gratification and indulgence, selfish desires and craving. On the other hand, he or she aspires for self-realization. Human development is a dialectical process where people seek to find a workable synthesis between sensory indulgence and spiritual aspirations, between egotistic selfishness and altruistic urges. Gandhi’s life provides an excellent case study of the ways of spiritual development. The techniques he crafted like satyagraha and the strategies he followed in his public life give us insights into how spirituality can be applied to improve human condition. The applications are not India specific, but universal. Therefore, psychologists from the East as well as from the West can join in exploring Gandhian ideas and techniques of psycho-spiritual development and their relevance to today’s troubled world.     

Eknath Easwaran’s Mantram and Passage Meditation as Applied Indian Psychology: Psycho-Spiritual and Health Effects

We review the life and legacy of Eknath Easwaran (1910–1999) from the perspective of modern and Indian Psychology. A Kerala-born professor of English literature, Easwaran in 1959 travelled to the USA where he taught a system of eight spiritual practices known as passage meditation (PM). Its characteristic features include its meditative focus on memorized inspirational passages and using mantram repetition as a primarily “portable” practice throughout the day. The PM method is distinctive in emphasizing the principle, otherwise neglected in the modern psychology of meditation, that “we become what we meditate on”—a principle that possesses a basis in traditional Indian sources that include the Vedas, Puranas, Adi ?a?kara, and Ramakrishna Paramahamsa. Two major programs of empirical research have evaluated Easwaran’s practices, each publishing multiple randomized controlled trials. We summarize findings from (i) studies of the full PM program, and (ii) studies of the Mantram Repetition Program (MRP), based on three of the eight PM points. Randomized evidence links each program to reduced stress, improved mental health, improved mindfulness, and increases in various spiritual measures. We describe ways that PM/MRP empirical research has reflected Indian Psychology perspectives, and suggest that Easwaran’s legacy enriches Indian Psychology with added value in at least three ways: emphasizing the importance of the choice of meditative focus, offering universally framed support for devotional (bhakti) orientations to spirituality, and supplying tools for improving how spiritual diversity is addressed in modern institutions such as health care, schools, and other organizations.     

Women Healers: Global and Local Women’s Knowledge in Psychology—An Introduction

ABSTRACT

This article briefly addresses key events throughout recorded history of indigenous healing, highlighting the role of women and their work despite predominant patriarchal, societal views and subsequent hardships for women engaging in healing roles. Additionally, this article identifies terms and definitions that will be used throughout the special issue and introduces articles for the special issue which have been written by women around the world. The editors invite readers to question Western dominant discourse about healing, and, in particular, indigenous healing by women.     

McTaggart’s Paradox and Crisp’s Presentism

In his review of The Ontology of Time, Thomas Crisp (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2005a) argues that Oaklander's version of McTaggart's paradox does not make any trouble for his version of presentism. The aim of this paper is to refute that claim by demonstrating that Crisp's version of presentism does indeed succumb to a version of McTaggart's argument. I shall proceed as follows. In Part I I shall explain Crisp's view and then argue in Part II that his analysis of temporal becoming, temporal properties and temporal relations is inadequate. Finally, in Part III, I shall demonstrate that his presentist ontology of time is susceptible to the paradox he so assiduously sought to avoid.     

A Broader Perspective: Counseling Psychology’s Emphasis on Evidence

The process of identifying empirically supported treatments developed by the Division 12 of the American Psychological Association has been criticized from various perspectives. However, there are a number of alternative evidence-based models for using research findings to increase the efficacy of mental health services. In this article, the principles of empirically supported interventions developed and adopted by Division 17 (Society of Counseling Psychology) are presented. These principles (a) utilize a broad perspective of evidence, (b) consider a range of psychological interventions, (c) emphasize the quantitative aggregate of research evidence, (d) consider various levels of specificity, and (e) recognize philosophy of science issues that impinge on the types of conclusions that can be made.     

Patients’ Pregnancies During Treatment: The Influence of the Analyst’s Psychology

Psychoanalytic therapists are today far more aware of countertransference effects, intersubjectivity, and mutual influence. The area that has been explored least in this two-person appreciation of psychoanalytic process is the effect of the psychodynamics of the therapist in a wide sense—that is, how the therapist brings a whole psychology, with a wide array of potential transferences, to each treatment. Triggered by the unexpected announcement of a patient’s expecting a baby, the author reviewed his practice and found that a large portion of his women patients ages 30–45 had become pregnant during therapy or psychoanalysis. The particulars were varied: how much the patient wanted a baby, whether the treatment was psychotherapy or psychoanalysis, the patients’ personality structure. Was the analyst’s psychology a common factor? The paper presents three quite different case examples and examines whether and how the author’s developmental and inner experience of women, sexuality, pregnancy could have contributed to a dyadic process that, in turn, could lead to pregnancy. If such effects happen, then it is important to look beyond and behind “anonymity” and “neutrality,” as well as momentary countertransferences, to the real-life effects that we have in our treatments.     

Wallace’s and Darwin’s natural selection theories

Synthese - This work takes a stand on whether Wallace should be regarded as co-author of the theory of natural selection alongside Darwin as he is usually considered on behalf of his alleged...     

T. V. Moore’s (1939)Cognitive Psychology

Thomas Verner Moore published a book calledCognitive Psychology in 1939, almost 30 years before Neisser’s (1967) more familiar and far more influential work. Although it covers most of the standard topics found in current cognitive psychology textbooks, and even anticipated several current trends, Moore’s text is not cited by any of the major histories of the “cognitive revolution” or any current cognitive textbook. We provide a brief sketch of Moore’s academic life and summarize several of his papers that are still cited. After describing the psychologies prevalent in 1939, we compare Moore’s text with two contemporary works, Woodworth (1938) and McGeoch (1942). We conclude by comparing the older text with Neisser’s and by offering several reasons why the book is virtually unknown.     

Imagining Hope: William F. Lynch’s Psychology of Hope

This article is a follow-up to my recent article on Erving Goffman’s Asylums (1961), an analysis of the mental hospital environment. I focus here on William F. Lynch’s book Images of Hope (1965) which was written when Lynch was a scholar in residence at St. Elizabeths Hospital in Washington, D.C. in 1962. I take particular note of the fact that Lynch perceived the book to be a venture into the psychology of hope, and that he based this psychology on the complementary relationship of hope and imagination. I also consider the relationship that he draws between hope and help; the dynamic of hope and hopelessness; the roles of wishing and waiting in the development of a mature sense of hope; and the imagination as an instrument of coping. I conclude that among the selves that comprise our composite Self, the hopeful self is essential to life itself.     

Neuroimaging of Wernicke’s Encephalopathy and Korsakoff’s Syndrome

There is considerable evidence that neuroimaging findings can improve the early diagnosis of Wernicke's encephalopathy (WE) in clinical settings. The most distinctive neuroimaging finding of acute WE are cytotoxic edema and vasogenic edema, which are represented by bilateral symmetric hyperintensity alterations on T2-weighted MR images in the periphery of the third ventricle, periaqueductal area, mammillary bodies and midbrain tectal plate. An initial bout of WE can result in Korsakoff's syndrome (KS), but repeated bouts in conjunction with its typical comorbidity, chronic alcoholism, can result in signs of tissue degeneration in vulnerable brain regions. Chronic abnormalities identified with neuroimaging enable examination of brain damage in living patients with KS and have expanded the understanding of the neuropsychological deficits resulting from thiamine deficiency, alcohol neurotoxicity, and their comorbidity. Brain structure and functional studies indicate that the interactions involving the thalamus, mammillary bodies, hippocampus, frontal lobes, and cerebellum are crucial for memory formation and executive functions, and the interruption of these circuits by WE and chronic alcoholism can contribute substantially to the neuropsychological deficits in KS.     

On Tichy’s determiners and Zalta’s abstract objects

It is not a common practice to postulate meaning entities treated as objects of some kind. The paper demonstrates two ways of introducing meaning-objects in two logics of natural language, Tichy’s Transparent Intensional Logic and Zalta’s Intensional Logic of Abstract Objects. Tichy’s theory belongs to the Fregean line of thinking, with what he calls ‘constructions’ as Fregean senses, and ‘determiners’ as object-like meaning entities constructed by the senses. Zalta’s theory belongs to Meinongian logics and he postulates a rich realm of abstract Meinongian objects to play the role of meanings. The paper analyses the mechanisms of reference in both conceptions and it offers a comparison of the mediating meaning-objects and the framework designed to expose this mediation in both theories. An attempt is made to expose how the treatment of the meaning entities depends upon the theory of meaning which is assumed.