Diversion of mentally disordered offenders: A legitimate role for clinicians?

Consultations to the courts often extend beyond criminal competencies and may include implicit statements regarding the diversion of mentally disordered offenders to treatment facilities. Arguments for diversion are based on humanitarian interests and treatment needs. Arguments opposing diversion recommendations emphasize (a) the variability of opinions regarding treatability, (b) the lack of sufficient outcome data, and (c) the potential for negative consequences in offering unsolicited opinions on diversion. Initial data from 271 pretrial evaluations underscore the range in psychiatric use of diversion recommendations, although inpatient referrals in particular appear to be based on clinical status.     

Empowerment or disempowerment? A review of youth training schemes for non-engaged young people in Hong Kong

This paper investigates the school-to-work experiences of non-engaged youth aged 15-24 who do not participate in education, training, and employment. Based on data from focus groups involving 50 non-engaged young people in Hong Kong, it examines how they are being systematically propelled to the edges of conventional pathways to adulthood, and assesses the efficacy of governmental training schemes that aim to develop employability as a strategy for engaging this population. The paper concludes by outlining prospects for future policy development, focusing on gaps and weaknesses in current provision and practice. It is suggested that effective guidance for non-engaged young people must pay attention to the social context of the individual. Assumptions behind the government's individualistic lifelong learning policy are called into question.     

Bad for me or bad for us? Interpersonal orientations and the impact of losses on unethical behavior

The present research examines the role of allocations of losses versus gains on the emergence of unethical behavior as a function of people's social value orientation. The authors demonstrate that (a) proselfs regard unethical behavior to prevent losses as more justified than prosocials (Study 1) and (b) proselfs engage in more unethical behavior to prevent losses than prosocials (Study 2). These differences are explained by prosocials' greater concern for harm to interdependent others in the domain of losses. A third study further substantiates these findings by revealing that unethical behavior to prevent losses increases among prosocials as harm to others is reduced. In sum, these results reveal that depending on whether people attend only to their self-interest or also consider the outcomes of others, losses either may increase or curtail unethical conduct. Considering social value orientations thus may reconcile conflicting theoretical perspectives on the impact of losses on social decisions.     

Beyond Good and Evil? A Buddhist critique of Nietzsche

In what ways was Nietzsche right, from a Buddhist perspective, and where did he go wrong? Nietzsche understood how the distinction we make between this world and a higher spiritual realm serves our need for security, and he saw the bad faith in religious values motivated by this need. He did not perceive how his alternative, more aristocratic values, also reflects the same anxiety. Nietzsche realised how the search for truth is motivated by a sublimated desire for symbolic security; philosophy's attempt to create the world reflects the tyrannical will‐to‐power, becoming the most ‘spiritualised’ version of the need to impose our will. Insofar as truth is our intellectual effort to grasp being symbolically, however, Nietzsche overlooks a different reversal of perspective which could convert the ‘bad infinite’ of heroic will into the good infinite of disseminating play. What he considered the crown of his system—eternal recurrence—is actually its denouement. Having seen through the delusion of Being, Nietzsche still sought a Being within Becoming. Nietzsche is able to affirm the value of this moment only by making it recur eternally. Rather than the way to vanquish nihilism, will‐to‐power turns out to be pure nihilism, for nihilism is not the debacle of all meaning but our dread of that debacle and what we do to avoid it.     

A critique of Confucius’ philosophy

Throughout the millennia since the composition of the Analects, orthodox scholars have maintained that Confucius faithfully passed down the thought of early eras, particularly those of Yao and Shun: ‘I transmit but do not create ideas.’ This paper shows that Confucius actually subverted the essence of orthodox thought represented mainly by Yao and Shun. His subversion of orthodox thought compels perforce the idea of ‘ren (humanity),’ which concerns itself with the human world, to stand out with the near exclusion of otherworldliness in his teaching. As a result of the misunderstanding of Confucius’ heritage, scholars in the past tended to equate Confucius’ idea of ‘ren’ with specific moral attributes. Again taking exception to the interpretations of bygone eras, this essay demonstrates that humanity in Confucius’ theory signifies a dynamic process rather than a specific attribute or a static rule, changing constantly with different people, different places, and different times.     

A critique of the Flynn Effect: massive IQ gains, methodological artifacts, or both?

The Flynn Effect proposed by Flynn (1984; 1987) is reviewed and evaluated. Even in the presence of a skeptical and critical scrutiny of the effect, it appears that there is more than just methodological artifact to be explained. But the acceptance of the effect has been too quick. The proper explanations for the effect will not be meaningful until the nature of the effect is much better understood than it is now. Six questions are raised that have not been adequately answered. Two criticisms of the logic underlying the Flynn Effect are presented — one showing that even if IQ and SAT are highly correlated, their secular means will not necessarily track one another; the second showing that results by Flynn, (1984) are as consistent with a changing IQ variance as with a changing mean. The second of these is empirically evaluated with a re-analysis of a subset of the sources of Flynn's original 1984 data. Finally, 10 research strategies and designs are suggested that would help us better understand the effect. The critique is developed with the goal of clarifying the nature, meaning and causes of the Flynn Effect. The author hopes that this critique will stimulate both healthy skepticism about the Flynn Effect and careful research into its actual causes.     

Is Spousal Similarity for Personality A Matter of Convergence or Selection?

We investigated whether spousal similarity for personality traits results from convergence (i.e., couples becoming more similar to one another over time) or selection (i.e., individuals selecting partners with similar traits) in a sample of 1,296 married couples. Personality was assessed using the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire. We evaluated whether similarity increased with increasing length of marriage. Evidence of spousal convergence was inconsistent across analyses, arguing against this mechanism as a compelling explanation for spousal similarity. Accordingly, selection processes may better explain spousal similarity in these data. The one exception might be for aggressive aspects of personality.     

Are moods cognitive?: A critique of Schmitt on Heidegger

Conclusion If, as Schmitt suggests, Heidegger bases the claim that moods are cognitive on the philosophical distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical knowing, then much of what Heidegger says in this connection turns out to be either unclear, trivially true, or else false. Yet Schmitt himself only occasionally seems to recognize how dubious this account really is. Moreover, in attempting to help Heidegger say what he means, Schmitt's interpretation in Chapter 5 falters. It falters because(1) the emphatic likening of moods to skills,(2) the introduction of the bizzare notion knowing how occurrently, and (3) the misconceiving of self-deception, are not to be found in Sein und Zeit. They represent, rather, an imposition upon Sein und Zeit from without. This fact means either that Schmitt's interpretation is faulty or else that it is as much reconstructive as explicative. And if reconstructive, then several conceptual mistakes are attributable to him more than to Heidegger. In spite of these difficulties Martin Heidegger on Being Human is a prize book. It attempts to understand a thinker better than he understood himself. And according to Schleiermacher this is the goal of every hermeneutic.In contrast to the successful parts of the book, the chapter on moods fails to make sense out of Heidegger's view - one reason being, I would guess, that Heidegger is, after all, equivocating on the German word Stimmung. Sometimes he uses it to refer specifically to states such as being depressed, being serene, being anxious. At other times he uses it to refer vaguely to Dasein's attunement to the world. If the human being is always already (immer schon) attuned to the world, and if such a posture toward the world is also considered a mood, then in some imprecise way one's being in a mood might be a necessary condition for any belief to affect him emotionally. But, of course, mood in this broad sense would indicate an ontologically, and not a causally, necessary condition. And so, it would not follow that every belief which affected one emotionally need have some specific mood (e.g., depression, serenity, anxiety) as its necessary causal antecedent. Nor would it follow that, as a matter of fact, a change of belief could not effect a specific change of mood.I fear that with regard to some topics the sense in which one understands Heidegger better than he understood himself may well be the original Socratic sense: one knows what Heidegger himself does not know, viz., that the conceptions of Sein und Zeit are not always intelligible. And one wonders whether any philosophical midwifery can really be of aid - at least with respect to the claim that moods are cognitive.     

Category-specific impairments? No. A critique of Sartori et al.

In this paper we examine the claim by Sartori, Miozzo, and Job (this issue) that their patient Michelangelo exhibits a category-specific deficit in naming living things. We conclude that their data are flawed in many respects and offer no reasonable basis for the conclusions they wish to draw. In addition their further claim that the data reported by Stewart, Parkin, and Hunkin (1992) are artefactual is not supported in any substantial way by examination of the findings.     

Why do measures of normal and disordered personality correlate? A study of genetic comorbidity

The genetic and environmental correlations between measures of normal (NEO-FFI) and abnormal personality (Dimensional Assessment of Personality Pathology: DAPP-BQ) were estimated in a sample of 545 volunteer general population twin pairs (269 monozygotic and 276 dizygotic pairs). The largest genetic correlations were observed between the 18 DAPP-BQ dimensions and NEO-FFI neuroticism (range = .05 to .81; median = .48), extraversion (range = -.65 to .33; median = -.28), agreeableness (range = -.65 to .00; median = -.38), and conscientiousness (range = -.76 to .52; median = -.31). The smallest genetic correlations were found between the DAPP-BQ dimensions and NEO-FFI openness (range = -.17 to .20; median = -.04). The environmental correlations are lower in magnitude but show the same pattern of correlations between DAPP-BQ and NEO-FFI scales. These results indicate that these two scales share a common broad-based genetic architecture, whereas the environmental influences show greater scale specificity.     

Bad or Mad? Personality disorders and legal responsibility-the German situation

Criminal offenders have a high rate of personality disorders (PDS), especially Antisocial Personality Disorders and psychopathy, but criminal acts are not necessarily the result of PD. Findings from psychiatric research suggest that the development of PD is influenced by genetic factors, that can result in deviant traits in temper, emotionality and cognitive style. There is general agreement that those peculiarities and vulnerabilities find their expression and structure only under a complex interplay of stimulating or impairing environmental influences. Do these genetic factors-or other factors-diminish a person's criminal responsibility? There is no difficulty in diagnosing PDs, but the challenging questions arise in forensic assessments of defendants for criminal responsibility who have a PD. This article discusses the German legal situation and special problems created by the term of "diminished" criminal responsibility. In contrast to the Anglo-American legal situation, the German criminal law obliges the court to order an indeterminate forensic - psychiatric confinement, in addition to punishment, if the offender had acted under diminished criminal responsibility and is now still considered to be dangerous. The convicted offender remains under the control of the criminal court during psychiatric hospitalization. The change from handling the personality disordered offender as a criminal to handling him as someone with a mental disorder creates a social option for extended state interventions, including indeterminate hospitalization.     

Blue or red? The effects of colour on the emotions of Chinese people

Two experiments were performed to examine the effects of red and blue on the emotional pleasure of Chinese people. Experiment 1 explored the effects of the ‘physical’ colours red and blue on emotion, and the results showed that red induced positive and negative emotion, while blue only induced positive emotion. Experiment 2 further explored the effects of the ‘verbal’ colours red and blue on emotion, and the results showed that red induced only positive emotion, while blue induced neither positive nor negative emotion. The findings indicate that the influence of colour on emotion is rooted in both natural and social associations. For Chinese, the associations between blue and positive emotion, and red and negative emotion, were natural associations; however, the associations between red and positive emotion were social associations. Moreover, physical colour and verbal colour stimuli induced emotions by activating different mechanisms: physical colour induced emotions via both natural and social associations, whereas verbal colour induced emotions via social associations.     

A dilemma for non-naturalists: irrationality or immorality?

Either 1. the non-naturalist is in a state of mind that would treat as relevant information about the existence and patterns of non-natural properties and facts as they make up their mind about normative matters, or 2. the non-naturalist is in a state of mind that would treat as irrelevant information about the existence and patterns of non-natural properties and facts as they make up their mind about normative matters. The first state of mind is morally objectionable, for one should not change one’s normative beliefs to pander to the patterns of some non-natural realm. The second state of mind is irrational, for if you think you are aiming to represent non-natural properties correctly, you should (rationally) be interested to know which actions share a non-natural property and which do not, and you should (rationally) be prepared to change your mind accordingly.

     

II. A critique of British empiricism∗

Two points of contact are explored between contemporary philosophy of science and Dialectical Materialism. The first point deals with the interaction view of metaphor as an exemplification of the law of the unity of opposites. The contradiction is then noted between the strategy and tactics of much analytical philosophy and the lesson to be learnt from this account of metaphor. The concern to change category habits into category disciplines rules out the process of conceptual change of the interaction view. G. A. Paul's dismissal of Lenin's theory of reflection is then criticized in the light of the interaction view.