Status Quo Effects in Decision-Making about Training and Career Development

Within the context of the Theory of Work Adjustment and Image Theory, two studies examined status quo effects in “mini” decisions about training and career development. In Study 1 (N= 78), 32% of the employees demonstrated a status quo effect in that they were not considering any training or skill development options. As predicted by consistency theory, positive information was considered more important than negative information among the non status quo group, particularly for the non status quo alternative. In Study 2 (N= 114) training was given a low priority, although a “major change” frame of reference did increase the priority accorded to training to improve future job prospects. Results are discussed in relation to theoretical issues and the wider implications of encouraging investment in skill development where outcomes are delayed.     

Deep thoughts and shallow frames: on the susceptibility to framing effects

This paper examines the occurrence of framing effects when more thought is given to problems. In Study 1, participants were presented with one of two frames of several decision problems. Participants' Need for Cognition (NC) scores were obtained, and half the participants were asked to justify their choices. Substantial framing effects were observed, but the amount of thought purportedly given to a problem, whether manipulated by justification elicitation or measured by NC scores, did not reduce the incidence of framing effects. In Study 2, participants responded to both frames of problems in a within‐subjects design. Again, NC scores were unrelated to responses on the first frame encountered. However, high‐NC, compared to low‐NC, participants were more consistent across frames of a problem. More thought, as indexed here, does not reduce the proclivity to be framed, but does promote adherence to normative principles when the applicability of those principles is detectable. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Need for Cognition and Choice Framing Effects

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that framing biases in decision making would affect more strongly individuals with relatively low levels of need for cognition (NC). Participants were classified as high or low NC based on responses to a standard scale and subsequently were exposed to one of two framings of a choice problem. Different choice problems were used in each experiment, modeled after those developed by Kahneman and Tversky. Experiment 1 employed a monetary task and Experiment 2 a medical decision-making task. Consistent with expectations, framing effects on choice were observed in both experiments, but only for low NC participants. High NC participants were unaffected by problem framing, showing that they were less susceptible to attempts to alter their frame of reference.     

Construction of Smoking-Relevant Risk Perceptions Among College Students: The Influence of Need for Cognition and Message Content1

Changing smokers' health-risk perceptions has been difficult. This study tested whether need for cognition (NC)—a factor within Petty & Cacioppo's (1986) elaboration likelihood model that reflects the preference for effortful cognitive information processing—moderated responses to a smoking risk message intervention. College smokers (n=227) evaluated a fact-based or emotion-based smoking risk pamphlet or a control pamphlet. Among occasional but not daily smokers, NC interacted as hypothesized with type of message to moderate risk perceptions. Among participants with higher NC, the fact-based message produced the greatest increase in risk perception; whereas among participants with lower NC, the emotion-based message produced the greatest change. Findings demonstrate that individual differences in cognitive processing can influence the potency of health-risk messages.     

Dispositional optimism,self‐framing and medical decision‐making

Self‐framing is an important but underinvestigated area in risk communication and behavioural decision‐making, especially in medical settings. The present study aimed to investigate the relationship among dispositional optimism, self‐frame and decision‐making. Participants (N = 500) responded to the Life Orientation Test‐Revised and self‐framing test of medical decision‐making problem. The participants whose scores were higher than the middle value were regarded as highly optimistic individuals. The rest were regarded as low optimistic individuals. The results showed that compared to the high dispositional optimism group, participants from the low dispositional optimism group showed a greater tendency to use negative vocabulary to construct their self‐frame, and tended to choose the radiation therapy with high treatment survival rate, but low 5‐year survival rate. Based on the current findings, it can be concluded that self‐framing effect still exists in medical situation and individual differences in dispositional optimism can influence the processing of information in a framed decision task, as well as risky decision‐making.     

Decisional strategy determines whether frame influences treatment preferences for medical decisions

Decision makers are influenced by the frame of information such that preferences vary depending on whether survival or mortality data are presented. Research is inconsistent as to whether and how age impacts framing effects. This paper presents two studies that used qualitative analyses of think-aloud protocols to understand how the type of information used in the decision making process varies by frame and age. In Study 1, 40 older adults, age 65 to 89, and 40 younger adults, age 18 to 24, responded to a hypothetical lung cancer scenario in a within-subject design. Participants received both a survival and mortality frame. Qualitative analyses revealed that two main decisional strategies were used by all participants: one strategy reflected a data-driven decisional process, whereas the other reflected an experience-driven process. Age predicted decisional strategy, with older adults less likely to use a data-driven strategy. Frame interacted with strategy to predict treatment choice; only those using a data-driven strategy demonstrated framing effects. In Study 2, 61 older adults, age 65 to 98, and 63 younger adults, age 18 to 30, responded to the same scenarios as in Study 1 in a between-subject design. The results of Study 1 were replicated, with age significantly predicting decisional strategy and frame interacting with strategy to predict treatment choice. Findings suggest that framing effects may be more related to decisional strategy than to age.     

Framing Effects and Arenas of Choice: Your Money or Your Life?

This paper investigates the consistency of outcome framing effects on choice across two arenas of outcome: human life and money. Past research has yielded notable variability in the magnitude of framing effects. One possible contributor to the variation in magnitude is outcome arena. Past research has varied along this dimension without systematically assessing its effects. Undergraduates (N= 297) responded to three decision scenarios involving either human lives or money in which outcomes were framed either positively or negatively. Based on prospect theory, an interaction between framing and arena was predicted, such that a greater framing effect was expected in the human life arena (i.e., more risky choices were expected when outcomes involved human life than money in the negative frame and the reverse in the positive frame). Results were only partly consistent with this prediction. Regardless of frame, subjects made riskier choices when outcomes involved human lives rather than money. This was not expected for the positive frame. Even though human lives presumably have greater utility than dollars, subjects in the positive framing condition made riskier choices regarding human life than money. Additionally, no overall framing effect was observed. There was a significant sex by frame interaction such that only women exhibited framing effects on choice. This extends the finding of sex differences in framing to the monetary arena. This has important implications for the conduct of future studies on framing as well as for the interpretation of past and future framing research.     

认知资源投入对框架效应的影响的实验研究

框架效应是描述决策理论违背规范决策理论的经典"异像",它的产生被认为是"不理性"的表现。投入认知资源有望削弱框架效应。为验证这一假设,本研究以128名有管理经验的文科类专业企业员工为被试,通过两个创业风险决策情景的重复验证,研究得出了一致的结论,即认知需求、加工深度和与创业决策情境的内在相关影响框架效应。研究还发现,认知需求高的个体框架效应减弱,信息加工深度会加重这种效应。     

The differential processing of price in gains and losses: the effects of frame and need for cognition

Perhaps the most fundamental principle of decision theory is that more money is preferred to less: the principle of desired wealth. Based on this and other principles such as reference dependence and loss aversion, researchers have derived and demonstrated mental accounting (MA) rules for multiple outcome situations. Experiment 1 tested the invariance of the desired wealth principle and two mental accounting rules (mixed gain, e.g. $100 gain and a $50 loss; mixed loss, e.g. $100 loss and a $50 gain) across types of decision maker and frame. The desired wealth principle and the MA rule for mixed gains were found to vary depending upon (1) the thoughtfulness of the decision maker (need for cognition, NC), and (2) the frame used to describe gains and losses (e.g. a gain of $x versus a gain of y%). The MA rule for mixed losses, however, was found to be immune to framing effects, even among people who are generally less thoughtful. The differential processing of gains and losses across frames (dollar versus percentage) and individuals (less versus more thoughtful) was tested further in Experiment 2 where evaluations of mixed losses were made at the level of the gestalt as well as the constituent (the gain and the loss being evaluated separately). Framing effects were evidenced only among subjects lower in NC and only when the constituent gain was evaluated. Evaluations of the overall mixed loss and the constituent loss were comparable across situation and individual, suggesting that losses motivate greater processing among people otherwise inclined toward cognitive miserliness. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Die‐by Framing both Lengthens and Shortens Life: Further Evidence on Constructed Beliefs in Life Expectancy

Decisions regarding consumption over the lifespan require some estimate of how long that lifespan is likely to be. Payne et al. (2013) found that respondents' estimates of their own life expectancy are on average 8.6 years shorter when elicited using a die‐by frame than when elicited by a live‐to frame. If decision makers act on these life expectancies, then an arbitrary detail of framing will lead to drastically different choices. We propose that the framing effect is sensitive to the iterative probabilistic elicitation procedure employed by the previous literature. Study 1 compares the framing effect across the iterative probabilistic procedure and a point estimate procedure that simply asks respondents the age they will live to/die by. The iterative probabilistic procedure implies a life expectancy six years shorter in the die‐by frame than in the live‐to frame, replicating the results of Payne et al. (2013). With the point estimate procedure, however, the framing effect reverses: the die‐by frame increases life expectancy by three years. In Study 2, we test for the framing effect using a point estimate procedure on a representative sample of 2000 Britons. Again, and in contrast with the previous literature, we find that the die‐by frame implies longer life. Our results reinforce the previous literature that beliefs around life expectancy are constructed. We recommend caution when attempting to debias life expectancy estimates or using life expectancies in choice architecture. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of humorous instructional materials on interest in a math task

Two studies tested the effect of humor, embedded in learning materials, on task interest. College student participants (N _{Study 1} = 359, N _{Study 2} = 172) learned a new math technique with the presence or absence of humor in the learning program and/or test instructions. Individual interest in math was measured initially and also tested as a factor. The results showed that the effect of humor in the learning program depended on individual interest in math. Humor raised task interest for those with low individual interest in math but slightly lowered task interest for those with high individual interest in math. Mediating variables of this effect were tested across both studies. Although the mediating variables showed inconsistency, humor may affect task interest through affective responses immediately following the instruction, rather than in subsequent interaction with the task.     

The role of rational and experiential processing in influencing the framing effect

Research on individual differences and the framing effect has focused primarily on how variability in rational processing influences choice. However, we propose that measuring only rational processing presents an incomplete picture of how participants are responding to framed options, as orthogonal individual differences in experiential processing might be relevant. In two studies, we utilize the Rational Experiential Inventory, which captures individual differences in rational and experiential processing, to investigate how both processing types influence decisions. Our results show that differences in experiential processing, but not rational processing, moderated the effect of frame on choice. We suggest that future research should more closely examine the influence of experiential processing on making decisions, to gain a broader understanding of the conditions that contribute to the framing effect.     

The Interplay of News Frames on Cognitive Complexity

This research considers how distinct news frames work in combination to influence information processing. It extends framing research grounded in prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) and attribution theory (Iyengar, 1991) to study conditional framing effects on associative memory. Using a 2 × 3 experimental design embedded within a probability survey (N= 379), tests examined the effects of two different frame dimensions—loss‐gain and individual‐societal—on the complexity of individuals' thoughts concerning the issue of urban growth. Findings indicate that news frames interact to generate more or less complex cognitive responses, with societal‐gain frame combinations generating the most detailed cognitions about the causes, components, and consequences of urban growth. Directions for research on media framing are discussed.     

The Impact of Positive and Negative Affect and Issue Framing on Issue Interpretation and Risk Taking

Two studies examined the influence of transient affective states and issue framing onissue interpretationandrisk takingwithin the context of strategic decision making. In Study 1, participants in whom transient positive or negative affective states were induced by reading a short story showed systematic differences in issue interpretation and risk taking in a strategic decision making context. Compared to negative mood participants, those in a positive mood were more likely to interpret the strategic issue as an opportunity and displayed lower levels of risk taking. Study 2 replicated and extended these results by crossing affective states with threat and opportunity frames. Results showed that framing an issue (as a threat or an opportunity) had a stronger impact on issue interpretation among negative affect participants than among positive affect participants. Affective states also moderated the impact of issue framing on risk taking: the effect of framing on risk-taking was stronger under negative rather than positive affect. These results are interpreted via information-processing and motivational effects of affect on a decision maker.     

Self‐Regulation in Goal Striving: Individual Differences and Situational Moderators of the Goal‐Framing/Performance Link1

We propose that negative goal framing (i.e., defining a goal as a negative state to be avoided) can adversely affect performance. Study 1 (N = 133) revealed that negative goal framing predicted poorer future performance independent of goal level, expectancy, and earlier performance. Study 2 (N = 188) examined the relation between goal framing and performance at 2 times in the academic year, and with respect to individual differences in defensive pessimism. As predicted, the negative goal‐framing/poorer‐performance link was greater on a later exam (after receiving feedback) than an earlier one, and was greater for nondefensive pessimists than for defensive pessimists. The findings implicate self‐regulatory processes in understanding how goal framing affects performance.     

Social dominance and the disassociation between explicit and implicit representations of equality

This study tested whether social dominance orientation (SDO) predicted a conceptual disassociation between explicit (declarative or propositional) attitudes about equality and implicit (automatic or associative) views of how representative New Zealand Europeans and Maori are of the New Zealand nation (N = 48 Europeans). Explicitly stated attitudes framing equality in terms of procedural justice or meritocratic treatment were positively correlated with individual differences in the implicit tendency to view New Zealand Europeans as exclusively representative of New Zealand. This tendency to explicitly frame equality as based on individual merit and to implicitly favour the dominant (European) ethnic group as representative of the nation was observed only among people high in SDO. Our analysis provides novel support for the position that meritocratic ideology is malleable and may be employed by those high in SDO to frame concepts of equality and justice in ways that suit their desire for group‐based dominance. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Thinking about product attributes: Investigating the role of unconscious valence processing in attribute framing

In the present investigation we conducted three studies to examine how unconscious valence processing influences participants' quality judgments in an attribute-framing task. In Studies 1 and 2 we observed how individuals who had depleted cognitive resources, through distraction (Study 2) and time constraint (Study 3), differed in their responses to an attribute-framing task. In Study 3 we subliminally primed participants with attribute frames and then presented them with a frameless decision task. Our results revealed that attribute framing arises from unconscious valence processing and conscious processing may only play a role when the frame is especially salient.     

Effects of problem frame and gender on principals’ decision making

Research indicates people’s decisions can sometimes be influenced by seemingly trivial differences in the framing (i.e., wording) of alternative options. The tendency to prefer risk averse options when framed positively and risky options when framed negatively is known as the framing effect. The current study examined the susceptibility of school principals to the framing effect. Additionally, analytical and intuitive decision styles, the degree to which one’s typical goal is to maximize (rather than satisfice), gender, and years of experience as a principal were measured to assess whether they are predictive of principals’ choices, and to test whether they moderate the effects of framing on choice. Seventy-one principals completed six decision problems (framed either positively or negatively) and instruments assessing decision style, typical decision goal, gender, and experience. Analyses demonstrated that principals are influenced by framing. Although the positively and negatively framed versions of the decision problems were objectively identical, negative framing resulted in more risky choices. Additionally, regardless of frame, men made more risky choices than women. There was no evidence that experience, decision style, or the degree to which one’s typical decision goal was to maximize, decreased framing effects. Several potential debiasing strategies are described, and limitations are noted.     

The construction of risk in relationships: The role of framing in decisions about intimate relationships

Two studies examined the applicability of Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) notion of “framing” to decision making in romantic relationships. Using scenarios about hypothetical relationships, the results of Study 1 demonstrated that framing objectively identical alternatives in terms of losses versus gains affected participants' preferences for risky versus cautious actions. Furthermore, adult attachment style was found to moderate the impact of this framing effect. Study 2 examined individual differences in people's spontaneous tendencies to frame their feelings about their actual relationships in terms of losses or gains. Consistent with the findings of Study 1, attachment style was reliably associated with spontaneous framing. Secure individuals were most likely to represent their feelings in terms of a “gains frame” whereas fearful individuals were most likely to represent their feelings in terms of a “loss frame.”