Do we listen to advice just because we paid for it? The impact of advice cost on its use

When facing a decision, people often rely on advice received from others. Previous studies have shown that people tend to discount others’ opinions. Yet, such discounting varies according to several factors. This paper isolates one of these factors: the cost of advice. Specifically, three experiments investigate whether the cost of advice, independent of its quality, affects how people use advice. The studies use the Judge–Advisor System (JAS) to investigate whether people value advice from others more when it costs money than when it is free, and examine the psychological processes that could account for this effect. The results show that people use paid advice significantly more than free advice and suggest that this effect is due to the same forces that have been documented in the literature to explain the sunk costs fallacy. Implications for circumstances under which people value others’ opinions are discussed.     

Advice Taking in Decision Making: Egocentric Discounting and Reputation Formation

Our framework for understanding advice-taking in decision making rests on two theoretical concepts that motivate the studies and serve to explain the findings. The first is egocentric discounting of others' opinions and the second is reputation formation for advisors. Advice discounting is attributed to differential information, namely, the notion that decision makers have privileged access to their internal reasons for holding their own opinion, but not to the advisors' internal reasons. Reputation formation is related to the negativity effect in impression formation and to the trust asymmetry principle. In three studies we measured decision makers' weighting policy for advice and, in a fourth study, their willingness to pay for it. Briefly, we found that advice is discounted relative to one's own opinion, while advisors' reputations are rapidly formed and asymmetrically revised. The asymmetry implies that it may be easier for advisors to lose a good reputation than to gain one. The cognitive and social origins of these phenomena are considered.     

Tell Me What I Wanted to Hear: Confirmation Effect in Lay Evaluations of Financial Expert Authority

In real life, people engage in interactive decision processes by consulting with experts. However, before taking advice, they must recognise the authority of an expert to assess the quality of the advice. The main goal of this research was to investigate how the confirmation effect affects lay evaluations of the epistemic authority of financial experts. Experiment 1 showed that lay people tend to ascribe greater epistemic authority to those experts whose advice confirms people's opinions, both measured and manipulated. Experiment 2 revealed that when participants' own opinions are not salient, people tend to evaluate experts' authority as higher when their advice confirms social norms. In Experiment 3 we jointly investigated the effects of participants' own opinions and social norms on the evaluations of authority. When both sources of expertise were made salient, decision‐makers favoured advice confirming their own beliefs and used it to evaluate experts' authority. Three interpretations of the role confirmation plays in the experts' authority evaluations are proposed: (1) self‐defensive strategies; (2) processing fluency; and (3) psychological consequences of naïve realism. The paper discusses practical implications of the results. We propose that increasing consumers' knowledge about biases might protect their evaluations of financial advice from being susceptible to the confirmation effect.     

Predictors of situational disengagement in the academic setting: The contribution of grades,perceived competence,and academic motivation

Background. Although psychological disengagement is a well‐documented phenomenon in the academic setting, the attempts to identify its predictors are scarce. In addition, existing research has mainly focused on chronic disengagement and less is known on the determinants of situational disengagement. Aims. The purpose of the present study was to identify the predictors of situational disengagement in a physical education (PE) setting. In line with the core postulate of psychological disengagement, it was hypothesized that grades contribute to discounting through a decrease in perceived competence. Drawing upon self‐determination theory, it was also expected that devaluing reflects the motivational orientations of individuals. Sample. A total of 120 students who were in seventh, eighth, and ninth grades. Method. Students were asked to report their motivation towards PE and their perceived competence at the beginning of a 10‐week cycle. Perceived competence in PE and psychological disengagement were assessed at the end of cycle, after grades were communicated individually to each student. Results. The results revealed that grades significantly predicted discounting, through perceived competence, but did not predict devaluing. Devaluing was negatively predicted by integrated and identified regulations, and positively predicted by amotivation, whereas no motivational variables were related to discounting. Conclusion. The present study extends the core postulate of psychological disengagement to situational disengagement. It revealed that students may temporarily disengage their self‐esteem from performance feedback through discounting, but are less inclined to devalue the academic domain when faced with negative feedback in a particular situation because of their motivational orientations.     

Individual and group advice taking in judgmental forecasting: Is group forecasting superior to individual forecasting?

We examined how individuals and groups behave in making judgmental forecasts when they are given external forecast advice. We compare individual and group advice-taking behavior under different conditions: (a) when advice quality is fixed, (b) when advice quality is randomly varied, and (c) when there is feedback on advice quality or not. Participants in Study 1 received fixed advice of either reasonable or unreasonable quality while making their decisions. Participants in Study 2 randomly received both reasonable and unreasonable advice. We found in both studies that groups feel more confident than individuals. This greater confidence decreased the groups' reliance on advice. We also found that groups are better than individuals at discerning the quality of advice. In the group treatment, the group's reliance on advice increased according to the degree of disagreement with the initial decisions of the group members. In Study 3, participants randomly received both reasonable and unreasonable advice, and in addition, they received feedback on actual realizations that enabled them to learn about the quality of advice. In the presence of feedback on random advice quality, groups are no longer less receptive to advice than individuals; with feedback, both individuals and groups discount advice more than they do without feedback. Nevertheless, groups are still better than individuals at discerning the quality of advice. We conclude that group forecasting is better than individual forecasting across various conditions that we investigate except when advice quality is known to be consistently reliable.     

Effects of task difficulty on use of advice

Although prior studies have found that people generally underweight advice from others, such discounting of advice is not universal. Two studies examined the impact of task difficulty on the use of advice. In both studies, the strategy participants used to weigh advice varied with task difficulty even when it should not have. In particular, the results show that people tend to overweight advice on difficult tasks and underweight advice on easy tasks. This pattern held regardless of whether advice was automatically provided or whether people had to seek it out. The paper discusses implications for the circumstances under which people will be open to influence by advisors. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Role of Anticipated Regret in Advice Taking

Across five studies, we demonstrate that anticipated future regret influences receptiveness to advice. While making a revision to one's own judgment based on advice, people can anticipate two kinds of future regret: (a) the regret of following non‐beneficial advice and (b) the regret of ignoring beneficial advice. In studies 1a (scenario task) and 1b (judgment task), we find that anticipated regret from erring after following advice is greater than anticipated regret from erring after ignoring advice. Furthermore, receptiveness decreases as the difference between anticipated regret from following and from ignoring advice increases. In study 2, we demonstrate that perceived justifiability of one's own initial decision is greater than that of advice. This difference in perceived justifiability influences anticipated regret and that, in turn, influences receptiveness. In study 3, we investigate the effect of advisor's expertise on perceived justifiability, anticipated regret, and receptiveness. In study 4, we propose and test an intervention to improve receptiveness based on self‐generation of advice justifications. Participants who were asked to self‐generate justifications for the advice were more receptive to it. This effect was mediated by perceived justifiability and anticipated regret. These findings shed further light on what prevents people from being receptive to advice and how this can be improved. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

情境公开性与印象管理动机对建议采纳的影响

实验1和实验2分别探讨在公开和匿名条件下期望印象和印象标签对建议采纳的影响。结果表明：（1）期望印象会影响建议采纳，在公开情境中，当个体期望形成温暖的印象时，会更多采纳建议；当个体期望形成能力印象时，建议采纳程度更低。（2） 印象标签会影响建议采纳，在公开情境中，当个体期望维持原有的温暖印象时，会更多采纳建议；个体期望维持原有的能力印象时，建议采纳程度更低。本研究证明建议采纳过程中存在印象管理机制。     

Attitude learning through exploration: advice and strategy appraisals

Processes of attitude learning were investigated through a game requiring discrimination between good and bad objects, where feedback about object valence (involving gain or loss) is contingent on approach. Previous research demonstrates a preponderance of false‐negative errors, with some good objects (‘learning asymmetry’) and most novel objects (‘generalization asymmetry’) being judged as bad, but provides no direct evidence concerning how participants appraise alternative strategies and their own performance. To compare alternative strategies, participants received advice, supposedly from a previous participant, that most objects were bad and should be avoided, or good and should be approached. Learning and generalization asymmetries were replicated, especially among participants who followed the former (risk‐averse) advice. Additionally, participants' evaluations of their own game strategy were inversely related to amount of negative feedback (the number of bad objects approached), but unrelated to positive feedback (from good objects approached), pointing to the salience of negative information for self‐appraisals. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social Discounting and Cigarette Smoking During Pregnancy

In this study, we examined the association between social discounting and smoking status in a cohort of pregnant cigarette smokers (n = 91), quitters (n = 27), or never‐smokers (n = 30). The smokers and quitters were participants in clinical trials on smoking cessation and relapse prevention, whereas the never‐smokers were controls in a study on nicotine withdrawal during pregnancy. Social discounting was assessed using a paper‐and‐pencil task that assesses the amount of hypothetical money a person is willing to forgo in order to share with individuals in their social network ranging from the person who is emotionally closest to them to a mere acquaintance. The amount that women were willing to forgo in order to share decreased hyperbolically as a function of social distance, with smokers exhibiting steeper discounting functions (i.e., less generosity) than quitters or never‐smokers; discounting functions of quitters and never‐smokers did not differ significantly. In multivariate analyses controlling for potential sociodemographic and other confounds, social discounting remained a significant predictor of smoking status among smokers versus quitters. Overall, these results suggest that individual differences in social discounting may be a factor influencing the choices that women make about quitting smoking upon learning of a pregnancy. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of immediacy of feedback on estimations and performance

We investigated the role of anticipation of feedback in performance and estimation about own performance. We submitted 155 participants to a test of verbal aptitude, and we requested them to give estimations of their own performance and the performance of other participants. There were two treatments: immediate feedback and delayed feedback. Participants in the immediate‐feedback group were informed that they would receive feedback on their performance immediately after finishing the test, whereas participants in the delayed‐feedback group were informed that they would receive feedback a week after taking the test. The immediate‐feedback group performed better than the delayed‐feedback group. Furthermore, the former underestimated their own performance. On the other hand, participants on the delayed‐feedback group made unbiased estimations. We present a mathematical model based on construal‐level theory, decision affect theory, temporal discounting, and Moore and Healy's model of overestimation. The model suggests that the source of differences in performance and in estimations of own performance is a construal of the feedback situation that modifies the expected utility of the task.     

Introduction to the special issue on comparative cognition

Prior research has shown that nonhumans show an extreme preference for variable‐ over fixed‐delays to reinforcement. This well‐established preference for variability occurs because a reinforcer's strength or “value” decreases according to a curvilinear function as its delay increases. The purpose of the present experiments was to investigate whether this preference for variability occurs with human participants making hypothetical choices. In three experiments, participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk made choices between variable and fixed monetary rewards. In a variable‐delay procedure, participants repeatedly chose between a reward delivered either immediately or after a delay (with equal probability) and a reward after a fixed delay (Experiments 1 and 2). In a double‐reward procedure, participants made choices between an alternative consisting of two rewards, one delivered immediately and one after a delay, and a second alternative consisting of a single reward delivered after a delay (Experiments 1 and 3). Finally, all participants completed a standard delay‐discounting task. Although we observed both curvilinear discounting and magnitude effects in the standard discounting task, we found no consistent evidence of a preference for variability—as predicted by two prominent models of curvilinear discounting (i.e., a simple hyperbola and a hyperboloid)—in our variable‐delay and double‐reward procedures. This failure to observe a preference for variability may be attributed to the hypothetical, rule‐governed nature of choices in the present study. In such contexts, participants may adopt relatively simple strategies for making more complex choices.     

Individual Differences in Delay Discounting: Differences are Quantitative with Gains,but Qualitative with Losses

Research on delay discounting and inter‐temporal choice has yielded significant insights into decision making. Although research has focused on delayed gains, the discounting of losses is potentially important in precisely those areas where the discounting of gains has proved informative (e.g., substance use and abuse). Participants in the current study completed both a questionnaire consisting of choices between immediate and delayed gains and an analogous questionnaire consisting of choices between immediate and delayed losses. For almost all participants, the likelihood of choosing the delayed gain decreased with increases in the wait until it would be received. In contrast, when losses (i.e., payments) were involved, different participants showed quite different patterns of choices. More specifically, although the majority of the participants became increasingly likely to choose to pay later as the delay was increased, some participants appeared to be debt averse, in that they were more likely to choose the immediate payment option when the delay was long than when it was brief. These debt‐averse participants also were more likely to choose to wait for a larger delayed gain than other participants and scored lower on Impulsiveness than those who showed the typical pattern of discounting delayed losses. Taken together, these results suggest that in the case of delayed gains, people differ only quantitatively (i.e., in how steeply they discount), whereas in the case of delayed losses, people differ qualitatively as well as quantitatively, contrary to the common assumption that a single impulsivity trait underlies choices between immediate and delayed outcomes. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Destructive Criticism Revisited: Appraisals,Task Outcomes,and the Moderating Role of Competitiveness

Destructive criticism is negative feedback that is inconsiderate in style and content, which exists at the intersection of performance feedback and interpersonal mistreatment. The current research integrates these literatures with an investigation of the effects of destructive versus constructive criticism from a co‐worker on recipients' relational appraisals, emotions, and task outcomes. Drawing from theorising about cognitive appraisals after personal affronts, we first propose that those who experience destructive criticism are more likely than those who experience constructive criticism to (a) perceive that the feedback‐giver intended to harm them, (b) blame the feedback‐giver, (c) distrust the feedback‐giver, and (d) feel anger. Second, with regard to task‐related outcomes, we extend research on trait moderators of feedback responses to the study of destructive criticism. We draw from feedback intervention theory ( Kluger & DeNisi, 1996 ) regarding how feedback may alter the locus of attention to be either self‐ or task‐focused, and investigate a trait that may shift one's attention to the self after destructive criticism. Specifically, we proposed that trait competitiveness—i.e. a desire to win over others—interacts with type of criticism to predict task‐related outcomes. The results of two experiments—a scenario study and a behavioral experiment—provide support for our arguments.     

Advice as a form of social influence: Informational motives and the consequences for accuracy

In this article, we ask how well people fulfill informational motives by using the judgments of others. We build on advice‐taking research from the judgment and decision making literature, which has developed a distinct paradigm to test how accurately people incorporate information from others. We use a literature review to show that people have mixed success in fulfilling informational motives—they increase their accuracy through the use of advice, but not as much as they could. We develop insights about how people perceive advisors and try to pursue advice—and where their perceptions may lead them astray. We conclude by proposing that future work further investigate the reasons people fail to use advice by building on the current advice taking paradigm used in judgment and decision making, but with a richer understanding of advice taking as a dynamic process that often entails complex decisions and normative motives.     

Discounting of food and water in rats shows trait- and state-like characteristics

Delay discounting is the loss in value of an outcome as a function of its delay. The present study focused on examining a trait-like characteristic of delay discounting in a preclinical animal model. Specifically, we were interested in whether there was a positive relation between discounting of 2 different outcomes in rats. That is, would rats that discount delayed food steeply also discount delayed water steeply? In addition, we examined how session-to-session variability in discounting could be attributed to differences between subjects (trait variability) and to differences within subjects (state variability). Finally, we measured discounting from early- to mid-adulthood, allowing us to examine changes in discounting as a function of age. Overall, we found a moderate, positive correlation between discounting of food and discounting of water in rats, providing further evidence that the relative consistency with which individuals discount different outcomes is a trait-like characteristic. In addition, we found a high degree of within-subject variability in discounting, indicating strong state-like differences from session to session. Finally, overall, discounting decreased as a function of age; however, individual-subject data showed variability in how discounting changed across time. Overall, our results show that differences in delay discounting between individuals reflect variability in both trait- and state-like characteristics.     

A Measure of Delay Discounting Within the Academic Domain

It is important to better understand the decision‐making processes involved in student procrastination, in order to develop interventions that reduce this common problem. Students may procrastinate because studying produces delayed reinforcers; however, no task measuring delay discounting of academic outcomes currently exists. In Experiment 1, we developed and piloted a measure of academic discounting modeled on titrating‐amount tasks successfully used in the discounting literature. Participants made hypothetical choices between working for money (the smaller, sooner reinforcer) and working on an assignment that was due at various times (the larger, later reinforcer). Participants showed systematic decreases in the subjective value of the assignment as a function of delay, and the hyperbolic and hyperboloid models described the shape of this decrease in value well. In general, larger delayed rewards are discounted less steeply than smaller delayed rewards (the magnitude effect). In Experiment 2, we observed the magnitude effect in academic discounting: Participants discounted a “not important” assignment more steeply than an “important” assignment. In the hyperboloid model, this change was captured by an increase in the s parameter. Results provide support for the validity of the academic discounting task. Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Comparing rapid assessments of delay discounting with real and hypothetical rewards in children

Recent advances in assessment methodology have resulted in a highly efficient procedure for obtaining delay discounting rates for adults: a 5‐trial adjusting delay task (ADT‐5) examining intertemporal choice for hypothetical rewards. The low participant burden of this task makes it potentially useful for children, with whom delay discounting research is relatively limited. However, it is unknown whether results from this task match choice for real rewards. The present study assessed delay discounting for real and hypothetical monetary rewards using a modified ADT‐5 with 9 children admitted to a psychiatric day treatment program. Participants completed up to 3 tasks with each reward type in alternating order. No difference in discounting rate, via log(k), was observed between the first task of each reward type. This finding was replicated across subsequent tasks for the subset of participants (n = 6) who completed all 6 tasks. However, delay discounting of real and hypothetical rewards was not found to be statistically equivalent. These results suggest that a modified ADT‐5 using hypothetical rewards may be a viable option for assessing delay discounting in children with psychiatric diagnoses, but additional research is needed to explicitly examine whether hypothetical and real rewards are discounted equivalently in this population.     

Socially motivated projection: Need to belong increases perceived opinion consensus on important issues

In three studies, we tested whether the need to belong would motivate people to perceive consensus for their opinions on important social issues. In Study 1, a nationally representative telephone survey, participants with a high dispositional need to belong perceived greater consensus for their opinions on immigrant naturalization than did those with a low need to belong. However, this relationship was strongest among participants who reported that the issue was personally important to them. In Study 2, participants primed with rejection‐related (versus acceptance‐related) words, and who reported high levels of issue importance, demonstrated greater false consensus for their opinions on a proposed alcohol tax increase. In Study 3, participants who received random feedback that they held a common (versus uncommon) opinion had a lower subsequent need to belong when the issue was important to them, suggesting that consensus perceptions can in fact mitigate belongingness needs. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.