Ostracism Reduces Reliance on Poor Advice from Others during Decision Making

Decision making is rarely context‐free, and often, both social information and non‐social information are weighed into one's decisions. Incorporating information into a decision can be influenced by previous experiences. Ostracism has extensive effects, including taxing cognitive resources and increasing social monitoring. In decision making situations, individuals are often faced with both objective and social information and must choose which information to include or filter out. How will ostracism affect the reliance on objective and social information during decision making? Participants (N = 245) in Experiment 1 were randomly assigned to be included or ostracized in a standardized, group task. They then performed a dynamic decision making task that involved the presentation of either non‐social (i.e. biased reward feedback) or social (i.e., poor advice from a previous participant) misleading information. In Experiment 2, participants (N = 105) completed either the ostracism non‐social condition or social misleading information condition with explicit instructions stating that the advice given was from an individual who did not partake in the group task. Ostracized individuals relied more on non‐social misleading information and performed worse than included individuals. However, ostracized individuals discounted misleading social information and outperformed included individuals. Results of Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1. Across two experiments, ostracized individuals were more critical of advice from others, both individuals who may have ostracized them and unrelated individuals. In other words, compared with included individuals, ostracized individuals underweighted advice from another individual but overweighed non‐social information during decision making. We conclude that when deceptive objective information is present, ostracism results in disadvantageous decision making. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Evaluating advisors: A policy‐capturing study under conditions of complete and missing information

Decision‐makers' relative preferences for various advisor characteristics were investigated in two multilevel policy‐capturing studies. The characteristics under consideration were: advisor expertise, advisor confidence, advisor intentions, and whether that advisor was the sole available source of advice. In Study 1, decision‐makers had access to all relevant information about the advisors. In contrast, some relevant information about the advisors was systematically made unavailable in Study 2, which allowed an investigation of the effect of missing information on decision‐makers' evaluations of advisors. Results from both studies indicated that advisor expertise and intentions were most important in promoting decision‐makers' positive evaluations of advisors, that this effect was even more pronounced under conditions of missing information, and that advisor expertise and intentions also interacted synergistically. Given that expertise and good intentions are determinants of an advisor's trustworthiness, the results highlight the interpersonal nature of advice giving and taking. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Estimating the growth of internal evidence guiding perceptual decisions

Perceptual decision-making is thought to involve a gradual accrual of noisy evidence. Temporal integration of the evidence reduces the relative contribution of dynamic internal noise to the decision variable, thereby boosting its signal-to-noise ratio. We aimed to estimate the internal evidence guiding perceptual decisions over time, using a novel combination of external noise and the response signal methods. Observers performed orientation discrimination of patterns presented in external noise. We varied the contrast of the patterns and the delay at which observers were forced to signal their decision. Each test stimulus (patterns and noise sample) was presented twice. Across two experiments we varied the availability of the visual stimulus for processing. Observer model analyses of discrimination accuracy and response consistency to two passes of the same stimulus, suggested that there was very little growth in the internal evidence. The improvement in accuracy over time characterised by the speed-accuracy trade-off function predominantly reflected a decreasing proportion of non-visual decisions, or pure guesses. There was no advantage to having the visual patterns visible for longer than 80 ms, indicating that only the visual information in a short window after display onset was used to drive the decisions. The remarkable constancy of the internal evidence over time suggests that temporal integration of the sensory information was very limited. Alternatively, more extended integration of the evidence from memory could have taken place, provided that the dominant source of internal noise limiting performance occurs between-trials, which cannot be reduced by prolonged evidence integration.     

Consumer Trust and Advice Acceptance: The Moderating Roles of Benevolence,Expertise, and Negative Emotions

I explored advice acceptance for high‐stakes decisions (i.e., those with subjectively important and risky outcomes), focusing on the relative influence of two components of consumer trust—benevolence and expertise—as well as perceived emotional decision difficulty. Participants solicited advice from experts when their decisions were low in perceived emotional difficulty but favored the advice of predominantly benevolent providers when making highly emotionally difficult decisions. Although consumers who faced emotionally difficult decisions were willing to trade off expertise for benevolence, they did not perceive this non‐normative trade‐off to influence decision quality. Instead, the results support a “stress buffering” effect whereby consumers were more confident in the accuracy of predominantly benevolent providers’ advice.     

Forensic voice discrimination by lay listeners: The effect of speech type and background noise on performance

In forensic settings, lay (nonexpert) listeners may be required to compare voice samples for identity. In two experiments we investigated the effect of background noise and variations in speaking style on performance. In each trial, participants heard two recordings, responded whether the voices belonged to the same person, and provided a confidence rating. In Experiment 1, the first recording featured read speech and the second featured read or spontaneous speech. Both recordings were presented in quiet, or with background noise. Accuracy was highest when recordings featured the same speaking style. In Experiment 2, background noise either occurred in the first or second recording. Accuracy was higher when it occurred in the second. The overall results reveal that both speaking style and background noise can disrupt accuracy. Although there is a relationship between confidence and accuracy in all conditions, it is variable. The forensic implications of these findings are discussed.     

Correcting erroneous inferences in memory: The role of source credibility

People often continue to rely on erroneous information about people and events, even in the face of subsequent counter information. The current study examined whether this information could be effectively corrected by a credible source. We examined two aspects of credibility: trustworthiness and expertise. Experiment 1 showed that receiving a correction from a source high in trustworthiness and expertise reduced participants’ use of original information when making inferences. Experiment 2 showed that source expertise alone was not sufficient to reduce participants’ reliance on the original information. The results from Experiment 3 showed that source trustworthiness alone significantly decreased participants’ use of the original information when making inferences. The results suggest that people may be able to reduce their use of original information if they receive a correction from a person who is deemed to be highly trustworthy. These findings have implications for decision making in politics and other applied areas.     

Information search and mental representation in risky decision making: The advantages first principle

In three experiments the problem is investigated how people identify early in the decision process those alternatives that are worthwhile to be examined in more detail. We assume that decision makers employ the Advantages first Principle: They first search for information about positive outcomes and then focus their information search (e.g., for negative consequences or for risk defusing operators) on those alternatives that appear attractive after this initial evaluation. In Experiment 1 (120 participants), initial information about consequences was varied for eight alternatives (no information, positive consequences, negative, or mixed for four alternatives). In all conditions, the great majority of participants followed both aspects of the Advantages first Principle. In Experiment 2, 60 participants decided in two quasi‐realistic scenarios with two alternatives each. Initial information was presented so that one alternative had better positive consequences, worse negative consequences, or both. In all conditions, more information was searched for in the initially better alternative. In Experiment 3 (20 participants) the Advantages first Principle was not only confirmed for a scenario but also for choices in traditional gambling tasks with two and eight alternatives, respectively. Participants could win or lose real money. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Predicting Soccer Matches After Unconscious and Conscious Thought as a Function of Expertise

ABSTRACT— In two experiments, we investigated the effects of expertise and mode of thought on the accuracy of people's predictions. Both experts and nonexperts predicted the results of soccer matches after conscious thought, after unconscious thought, or immediately. In Experiment 1, experts who thought unconsciously outperformed participants in all other conditions. Whereas unconscious thinkers showed a correlation between expertise and accuracy of prediction, no such relation was observed for conscious thinkers or for immediate decision makers. In Experiment 2, this general pattern was replicated. In addition, experts who thought unconsciously were better at applying diagnostic information than experts who thought consciously or who decided immediately. The results are consistent with unconscious-thought theory.     

The perception of scatterplots

Four experiments investigated the perception of correlations from scatterplots. All graphic properties, other than error variance, that have been shown to affect subjective but not objective correlation (r) were held constant. Participants in Experiment 1 ranked 21 scatterplots according to the magnitude of r. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants made yes/no judgments to indicate whether a scatterplot was high (signal) or low (noise). Values of r for signal and noise scatterplots varied across participants. Differences between correlations for signal and for noise scatterplots were constant in r in Experiment 2, and constant in r2 in Experiment 3. Standard deviations of the ranks in Experiment 1 and d' values in Experiments 2 and 3 showed that discriminability increased with the magnitude of r. In Experiment 4, faculty and graduate students in psychology and sociology made point estimates of r for single scatterplots. Estimates were negatively accelerated functions of objective correlation.     

Effects of information accuracy and volume on decision making

Recent advances in information technology have resulted in increasingly complex work environments. Much of the complexity is due to a deluge of information available across networks (Gleick, 2011) and unknown reliability, which introduces additional uncertainty (Platt & Huettel, 2008). Understanding the performance characteristics of human information processing for optimal decision making under such conditions of data abundance and uncertainty is critical in complex networked information environments, such as military operations. One focus of the United States military is providing troops with the richness of information formally reserved for higher echelons (Bawden & Robinson, 2009). However, this effort risks cognitive overload, where too much information can result in impaired performance. The present study examined human decision making under varying levels of cognitive load and source reliability. Participants determined the reliability of two information sources and decided how to use them to minimize cognitive load and improve performance in a visual search task. Unbeknownst to participants, one source provided highly accurate information and one provided moderately accurate information. Results showed that participants had more trust in the more accurate than the less accurate source, and decision making accuracy decreased as cognitive load increased. When cognitive load was highest, participants were more accurate on trials with the more accurate source. Thus, the more accurate source facilitated better performance, whether through better intel or through participants offloading some of the cognitive load to the reliable source.     

When and why do we want to know? How experienced regret promotes post‐decision information search

The effect of emotional and situational factors on the decision to seek out post‐decision information about un‐chosen alternative was examined in five experiments. Experiment 1 tested participants' willingness to find out the outcome of an un‐chosen investment that was likely to have a higher value than the chosen investment. It was found that participants were more willing to acquire information when they were responsible for the decision. Experiment 2 showed that responsibility affects information seeking, in particular when one suspects that a wrong decision was made. Experiments 3–5 examined the role of regret on information seeking. It was shown that regret about making the wrong investment (Experiment 3), forgetting to send in a lottery ticket (Experiment 4), and missing an opportunity to use a discount card after spending a month in Australia (Experiment 5), mediates the information‐seeking behavior. Experiment 5 also demonstrated that the experience of regret (and not its anticipation) influences post‐decision information seeking even when the information is of no future use. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Effects of Expertise on the Hindsight Bias

We present data from three experiments examining the effects of objective and subjective expertise on the hindsight bias. In Experiment 1, participants read an essay about baseball or dogs and then answered questions about the baseball essay to the best of their ability, as if they had not read the essay, or to the best of their ability, although they read about dogs. Participants also completed a quiz about baseball rules and terminology, which was an objective measure of expertise. Results demonstrated that as participants' baseball expertise increased, their inability to act as if they never read the essay also increased; expertise exacerbated the hindsight bias. To test the effects of subjective expertise on hindsight bias and investigate factors underlying the relationship, participants in Experiment 2 ranked five topics in order of expertise and gave feeling‐of‐knowing (FOK) ratings for questions from these topics. Foresight participants then saw each question again and answered the questions; hindsight participants saw the questions and answers and gave the probability they would have known the answers had they not been provided. Hindsight bias increased with subjective expertise as did average FOK ratings. In Experiment 3, we experimentally manipulated perceived expertise but found that neither average FOK ratings nor hindsight bias was affected by experimentally induced expertise. Taken together, the results demonstrate that expertise exacerbates both objective and subjective hindsight bias but that an FOK, which likely exists only when expertise is naturally acquired, is necessary to engender the detrimental effect of expertise on the hindsight bias. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Source Credibility and Attitude Certainty: A Metacognitive Analysis of Resistance to Persuasion

Recent research (Tormala & Petty, 2002) has demonstrated that when people resist persuasion, they can perceive this resistance and become more certain of their initial attitudes. This research explores the role of source credibility in determining when this effect occurs. In two experiments, participants received a counterattitudinal persuasive message. When participants counterargued this message, they became more certain of their attitudes, but only when it came from a source with high expertise. When the message came from a source with low expertise, resisting it had no impact on attitude certainty. This effect was shown using both a traditional measure of attitude certainty (Experiment 1) and a well‐established consequence of certainty—the correspondence between attitudes and behavioral intentions (Experiment 2). In addition, the effect was confined to high elaboration conditions, and occurred even when participants were not explicitly instructed to counterargue. These results are consistent with a metacognitive framework proposed to understand resistance to persuasion.     

Misreporting signs of child abuse: The role of decision‐making and outcome information

Two studies provided evidence that a decision to report an ambiguous case of child abuse affected subsequent memory of the case information, such that participants falsely recognized details that were not presented in the original information, but that are schematically associated with child abuse. Moreover, post‐decision information that the child had later died from abuse influenced the memory reports of participants who had chosen not to report the case, increasing their reports of false schema‐consistent details. This suggests that false decision‐consistent memories are primarily due to sense‐making, schematic processing rather than the motivation to justify the decision. The present findings points to an important mechanism by which decision information can become distorted in retrospect, and emphasize the difficulties of improving future decision‐making by contemplating past decisions. The results also indicate that decisions may generate false memories in the apparent absence of external suggestion or misleading information. Implications for decision‐making theory, and applied practices are discussed.     

Domain Knowledge and Hindsight Bias among Poker Players

Hindsight bias occurs when individuals believe that events were more predictable after they have occurred than they actually were before they occurred. Although hindsight bias is a well‐studied phenomenon, few studies have examined the role of expertise in this bias. Two experiments investigated the relation between the magnitude of hindsight bias and self‐reported poker expertise (Experiment 1) and assessed poker knowledge (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, self‐rated poker expertise was negatively correlated with hindsight bias. Experiment 2 employed memory and hypothetical hindsight conditions and found that poker knowledge was negatively correlated with hindsight bias in the memory condition, but unrelated to hindsight bias in the hypothetical condition. These results help elucidate the role of expertise in hindsight bias and provide additional support for the separate components view, which claims there are different forms of hindsight bias that are differentially affected by certain factors. Domain knowledge appears to be one of such factors. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A multidimensional approach to skilled perception and performance in sport

Three experiments examined the relative importance of attributes determined largely by the efficiency of the visual/central nervous system versus cognitive domain‐specific skills, in the determination of expertise in soccer. In Experiment 1, expert and intermediate soccer players were assessed on various non‐specific abilities including: processing (simple reaction time, peripheral reaction time, visual correction time), optometric (static, dynamic and mesopic acuity), and perimetric parameters (horizontal and vertical peripheral range). In Experiment 2, domain‐specific variables were assessed including complex decision speed and accuracy, number of visual fixations, fixation duration, and fixation location in solving game problems. Stimuli were initially presented by slides (Experiment 2) and later by 16 mm film (Experiment 3). Eye movements were recorded and analysed. A stepwise discriminant analysis of both non‐specific abilities and soccer‐specific skills revealed an average squared canonical correlation=0.84, with the significant step variables all being domain‐specific skills. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Influence of Confirmation Bias on Memory and Source Monitoring

Two experiments were conducted to examine whether recognition memory for information and/or its source are influenced by confirmation bias. During Phase 1, subjects were shown a summary about the issue of gun control and asked to indicate a position on the issue. During Phase 2, 12 abstracts (Experiment 1) or social media posts (Experiment 2) were shown, one at a time. Posts in Experiment 2 were associated with either friends or strangers. Participants indicated whether they wanted to read a more extensive version of each abstract (Experiment 1) or post (Experiment 2). Phase 3 was the memory phase. Thirty-two abstract titles (Experiment 1) or posts (Experiment 2) were shown one at a time. Participants indicated yes or no, and whether they recognized the titles/posts from the last phase. Recognition memory for information that supported the participants' viewpoint was higher than that for opposing information.     

You don't act like you trust me: dissociations between behavioural and explicit measures of source credibility judgement

This study compared explicit and behavioural measures of source credibility judgements based on two factors: a source's past record of accuracy and its production of predictions that participants would like to believe. The former is considered to be a rational factor for judging credibility, while the latter is considered nonrational (i.e., it does not predict actual credibility). In Experiments 1 and 2, participants saw an equal number of predictions from two sources, one of which was either highly or slightly more accurate/desirable than the other. In Experiment 3, either one source was high accuracy and the other high desirability, or one source was higher on both measures. For all experiments, participants then saw new accurate and inaccurate predictions and said which source they thought was most likely to produce each (behavioural task). Participants then gave a percentage rating for each source's perceived accuracy (explicit judgement task). Participants showed sensitivity to past accuracy differences using both tasks, but not to the size of the differences. Desirability influenced performance only on the behavioural task. However, when the two factors conflicted, participants responded solely using past accuracy information. Behaviours reflect source credibility judgements based on both rational and irrational factors, but participants appear to be both more strongly influenced by the rational factor and more aware of that influence.