共查询到20条相似文献，搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Harel Goren Robert Kurzban Amnon Rapoport 《Organizational behavior and human decision processes》2003,90(2):277-290
Whereas most experimental studies of public goods provisioning require that all players make their decisions simultaneously, in most organizational settings contribution decisions are made in real time. To account for this aspect of the decision process, we introduce a real-time protocol of play in which, at any point in time, players can either withhold or contribute their entire endowment to a step-level public good. Once contributed, the individual endowments—that in the present experiment differ from one group member to another—cannot be withdrawn. Our results show that contribution levels under the real-time protocol with irrevocable commitments significantly exceed those observed in previous studies under the more common simultaneous protocol of play, thereby considerably reducing social loafing (free riding). Consistent with our equilibrium analysis, over multiple iterations of the game play converges to an equilibrium set of players who maximize the sum of their individual benefit-to-contribution ratios. 相似文献
2.
Cooperation is the crux of many social problems, thus third‐party sanction, as one of the most important ways to promote cooperation, is worth studying. The present study compared the effects of third‐party punishment alone, third‐party reward alone, and the combination of third‐party reward and third‐party punishment on cooperation in the context of a public goods experiment. In addition, we explored the characteristics of third‐party sanctioning behaviors. A total of 280 students participated in the present study. The results showed that the operation of third‐party sanctions did raise the level of cooperation and changed the discrete trend of cooperation—specifically, the differences between the cooperation level of every group member and the average level of the whole group. Furthermore, when third‐party rewards and third‐party punishments were used simultaneously in the public goods game (PGG), the level of cooperation was greatly enhanced, which meant that in the context of the third party, when punishment opportunities and reward opportunities coexist, they may have a “compensatory effect.” In terms of the characteristics of sanctioning behaviors, the frequency of third‐party sanctions did not differ significantly under different conditions (third‐party punishment alone, third‐party reward alone, and a combination of third‐party reward and third‐party punishment), and neither did expenditures on third‐party sanctions, but the strategies that third parties used changed under different conditions, thus their effects on other group members’ cooperative behavior varied under different conditions. The present study provides a comprehensive picture of how third parties behave in different conditions of third‐party sanctions and how these sanctions exert influence on cooperation. Understanding these mechanisms can help us build more effective institutions. 相似文献
3.
研究采用公共物品博弈并通过2个实验考察了时间限制对合作的影响及其作用机制。结果发现时间压力感越强,决策时间越短,合作水平越高,且合作情境比竞争情境更有利于直觉合作;相似性和质询顺序差异分别中介和链式中介时间限制对合作的影响,且中介受到决策情境的调节。研究表明相比于竞争情境,合作情境中的时间压力感越强,且决策时间越短,感知与他人的相似性越高,越容易先产生利他想法,从而促进启发式思考和直觉合作。 相似文献
4.
Sigurdsson SO Ring BM Needham M Boscoe JH Silverman K 《Journal of applied behavior analysis》2011,44(1):157-161
Improving employees' posture may decrease the risk of musculoskeletal disorders. The current paper is a systematic replication and extension of Sigurdsson and Austin (2008), who found that an intervention consisting of information, real-time feedback, and self-monitoring improved participant posture at mock workstations. In the current study, participants worked in an applied setting, and posture data were collected at participants' own workstations and a mock workstation. Intervention in the mock setting was associated with consistent improvement in safe posture at the mock workstation, but generalization to the actual workstation was limited. 相似文献
5.
In this article we assert that much of the public good associated with teaching and research in higher education is gradually being displaced. This privatization of higher education is reflected in increased licensing of research and in the fragmentation of the traditional general education core. Taxpayer de-funding and institutional substitution are economic consequences of public good displacement. 相似文献
6.
A fundamental problem in organizations is designing mechanisms for eliciting voluntary contributions from individual members of a team who are entrapped in a social dilemma. To solve the problem, we utilize a game‐theoretical framework that embeds the traditional within‐team social dilemma in a between‐team competition for an exogenously determined prize. In equilibrium, such competition enhances the incentive to contribute, thereby reducing free‐riding. Extending existing literature, we focus on asymmetric competitions between teams of unequal size, and competitions between more than two teams. Comparing two protocols for sharing the prize—egalitarian and proportional profit‐sharing rules—we find that (i) free‐riding diminishes and (ii) team members contribute more toward their team's effort when they belong to the larger team and when the profit‐sharing rule is proportional. (iii) Additionally, under the egalitarian profit‐sharing rule team members contribute more than predicted by the equilibrium solution. We discuss implications of our findings for eliciting contributions in competitive environments. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
7.
公共健康领域中个人权利与共同善的冲突往往难以避免,如何调解二者之间的冲突成为公共健康领域的一个核心伦理问题。个人权利与共同善冲突的实质是个人与社会的权利冲突。但是,没有无权利的义务,也没有无义务的权利。如果能够从“义务”的视角思考公共健康问题,个人权利与共同善的冲突或许就可迎刃而解。个人要确保自己的权利,就必须对所处的社会承担义务。同时,社会也要承担保护个人权利的义务。个人与社会之间在履行相互的健康义务中实现了权利与善的和解。 相似文献
8.
Prior research has confirmed Thomas Schelling's observation that people are more sympathetic and hence generous toward specific identified victims than toward “statistical” victims who are yet to be identified. In the study presented in this article we demonstrate an equivalent effect for punitiveness. We find that people are more punitive toward identified wrongdoers than toward equivalent, but unidentified, wrongdoers, even when identifying the wrongdoer conveys no meaningful information about him or her. To account for the effect of identifiability on both generosity and punitiveness, we propose that affective reactions of any type are stronger toward an identified than toward an unidentified target. Consistent with such an account, the effect of identifiability on punishing behavior was mediated by self‐reported anger. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
9.
In social dilemma situations, individuals benefit from uncooperative behaviour while exploiting resources of the collective. One prominent solution to prevent uncooperative behaviour and to increase cooperation is to establish a sanction system in that private resources are invested by individuals to punish uncooperative interaction partners. The present review is intended to provide an overview concerning motivational determinants of punishment in social dilemma situations. Specifically, we (a) outline that fairness concerns and revenge motivate individuals to punish uncooperative other individuals, (b) show that this is done especially when they possess the basic motivational orientation of a prevention focus. We (c) illustrate that individuals do not punish to acquire a good reputation in the eyes of others, and (d) elaborate on whether individuals punish to regulate satisfaction. Finally, we present empirically neglected motivational factors in studies on punishment in social dilemmas and discuss limitations and possible future directions in this field of research. 相似文献
10.
ABSTRACTIn this essay, we respond to Angelo Corlett’s criticism of our paper ‘Ethics, Brain Injuries, and Sports: Prohibition, Reform, and Prudence’. To do so, first, we revisit certain assumptions and arguments Corlett makes concerning intercollegiate football and brain injuries in his 2014 paper ‘Should intercollegiate football be eliminated?’. Second, we identify and criticize two key elements in his response regarding (a) ‘luck egalitarianism’, and (b) ‘public goods’. We conclude by reaffirming our critical reading of Corlett’s original 2014 paper and by identifying further elements (i) luck and the nature of individual responsibility; and (ii) the nature of sports as public rather than merely private goods, that he would have to address for his latter 2018 position to hold true. 相似文献
11.
Li‐Chen Hsu 《决策行为杂志》2008,21(2):151-167
Experiments on three two‐person threshold public good provision games, namely, the simultaneous, sequential, and dictator games, are conducted to explore the motives behind giving. Players who move simultaneously are endowed with equal bargaining power, and players who move first are endowed with more bargaining power than players who move subsequently. Dictators are indubitably endowed with complete bargaining power. Since the differences between the bargaining powers of two players increase from the simultaneous to the sequential to the dictator game, comparisons among games allow us to trace whether the contribution behavior is motivated by fairness or is simply due to the strategic concern. The experimental evidence shows that the strategic concern explains the overall contribution behavior better than the motive of fairness. However, in the final round 26% of the dictators share the threshold evenly with their opponents, suggesting that some subjects do play fairly. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
12.
Recent discussions of genomics and international justice have adopted the concept of 'global public goods' to support both the view of genomics as a benefit and the sharing of genomics knowledge across nations. Such discussion relies on a particular interpretation of the global public goods argument, facilitated by the ambiguity of the concept itself. Our aim in this article is to demonstrate this by a close examination of the concept of global public goods with particular reference to its use in the context of genomic databases. We content that the argument for construing genomics as a global public good depends on seeing it as a natural good by focusing on features intrinsic to genomics knowledge. We shall argue that social and political arrangements are relevant and that recognising this opens the door to construing the use of global public goods language as a strategic one. 相似文献
13.
What influences how people implicitly associate “past” and “future” with “front” and “back?” Whereas previous research has shown that cultural attitudes toward time play a role in modulating space‐time mappings in people's mental models (de la Fuente, Santiago, Román, Dumitrache & Casasanto, 2014), we investigated real life experiences as potential additional influences on these implicit associations. Participants within the same single culture, who are engaged in different intermediate‐term educational experiences (Study 1), long‐term living experiences (Study 2), and short‐term visiting experiences (Study 3), showed their distinct differences in temporal focus, thereby influencing their implicit spatializations of time. Results across samples suggest that personal attitudes toward time related to real life experiences may influence people's space‐time mappings. The findings we report on shed further light on the high flexibility of human conceptualization system. While culture may exert an important influence on temporal focus, a person's conceptualization of time may be attributed to a culmination of factors. 相似文献
14.
Nicolao Bonini Michele Graffeo Constantinos Hadjichristidis Valentina Perrotta 《PsyCh Journal》2015,4(2):66-73
We investigated whether pleasant ambient scents influence hypothetical and real money contributions toward environmental goods. We hypothesized that they would increase such contributions more when they were congruent with the target goods than when they were incongruent or when no scent was released. The results supported this congruity hypothesis. We offer a mental accessibility account: Pleasant scents that are congruent with a target good make positive information about that good more accessible and thus promote prosocial behavior. 相似文献
15.
本研究分别操纵被试稳定的权力（实验1）和不稳定的权力（实验2）,并与不同权力个体进行公共物品困境任务,以考察了自我权力和他人权力对初中生合作行为的交互作用及其权力稳定性在其中的作用。结果发现,在权力稳定情境下,高权力的初中生合作水平低于低权力组和控制组,而在权力不稳定的情境下,高权力的初中生合作水平高于低权力组。无论权力稳定与否,与低权力同伴合作时,低权力者的合作水平均显著高于与高权力同伴合作时。 相似文献
16.
17.
Anders Christoffersson 《Psychometrika》1977,42(3):433-438
A two-step weighted least squares estimator for multiple factor analysis of dichotomized variables is discussed. The estimator is based on the first and second order joint probabilities. Asymptotic standard errors and a model test are obtained by applying the Jackknife procedure. 相似文献
18.
本研究分别操纵被试稳定的权力（实验1）和不稳定的权力（实验2）,并与不同权力个体进行公共物品困境任务,以考察了自我权力和他人权力对初中生合作行为的交互作用及其权力稳定性在其中的作用。结果发现,在权力稳定情境下,高权力的初中生合作水平低于低权力组和控制组,而在权力不稳定的情境下,高权力的初中生合作水平高于低权力组。无论权力稳定与否,与低权力同伴合作时,低权力者的合作水平均显著高于与高权力同伴合作时。 相似文献
19.
A human social discount function measures the value to a person of a reward to another person at a given social distance. Just as delay discounting is a hyperbolic function of delay, and probability discounting is a hyperbolic function of odds-against, social discounting is a hyperbolic function of social distance. Experiment 1 obtained individual social, delay, and probability discount functions for a hypothetical $75 reward; participants also indicated how much of an initial $100 endowment they would contribute to a common investment in a public good. Steepness of discounting correlated, across participants, among all three discount dimensions. However, only social and probability discounting were correlated with the public-good contribution; high public-good contributors were more altruistic and also less risk averse than low contributors. Experiment 2 obtained social discount functions with hypothetical $75 rewards and delay discount functions with hypothetical $1,000 rewards, as well as public-good contributions. The results replicated those of Experiment 1; steepness of the two forms of discounting correlated with each other across participants but only social discounting correlated with the public-good contribution. Most participants in Experiment 2 predicted that the average contribution would be lower than their own contribution. 相似文献
20.
Van Camp CM Lerman DC Kelley ME Contrucci SA Vorndran CM 《Journal of applied behavior analysis》2000,33(4):545-557
Noncontingent reinforcement (NCR) consists of delivering a reinforcer on a time-based schedule, independent of responding. Studies evaluating the effectiveness of NCR as treatment for problem behavior have used fixed-time (FT) schedules of reinforcement. In this study, the efficacy of NCR with variable-time (VT) schedules was evaluated by comparing the effects of VT and FT reinforcement schedules with 2 individuals who engaged in problem behavior maintained by positive reinforcement. Both FT and VT schedules were effective in reducing problem behavior. These findings suggest that VT schedules can be used to treat problem behavior maintained by social consequences. 相似文献