Psychological conceptions of randomness

This article presents a critique of the concept of randomness as it occurs in the psychological literature. The first section of our article outlines the significance of a concept of randomness to the process of induction; we need to distinguish random and non-random events in order to perceive lawful regularities and formulate theories concerning events in the world. Next we evaluate the psychological research that has suggested that human concepts of randomness are not normative. We argue that, because the tasks set to experimental subjects are logically problematic, observed biases may be an artifact of the experimental situation and that even if such biases do generalise they may not have pejorative implications for induction in the real world. Thirdly we investigate the statistical methodology utilised in tests for randomness and find it riddled with paradox. In a fourth section we find various branches of scientific endeavour that are stymied by the problems posed by randomness. Finally we briefly mention the social significance of randomness and conclude by arguing that such a fundamental concept merits and requires more serious considerations.     

Lay conceptions of neuroticism

This paper is concerned with various aspects of a lay-person's conceptualization of neuroticism. Three experiments are reported which aim to investigate various determinants of the common-sense conception of neuroticism. In the first experiment subjects completed various standardized psychological tests measuring neuroticism and anxiety, while also estimating the extent of their own anxiety and neuroticism. In the second experiment subjects attempted to detect items measuring neuroticism in a standard personality questionnaire and secondly estimate the extent of their own and the ‘average’ person's neuroticism. Finally, in the third experiment subjects rated the typicality of various neurotic traits and behaviour which had been supplied by subjects in the previous two experiments. The results suggested some similarity in expert explicit theories and lay-person implicit theories, though there appeared to be systematic biases in the subjects' perception of their own neuroticism. The results are discussed in terms of the correspondence between implicit theories and explicit theories, and the functions of each theory in everyday life are considered. Problems associated with these studies and this research in general are discussed.     

Children's conceptions of Jesus

This paper presents findings from a recent study investigating young children's (aged 10–11) conceptions of Jesus in England. The overall picture revealed by the study is that whilst there was a general assent amongst pupils in our sample towards an ethical and humanistic conception of the historical Jesus, there was less of a consensus about those issues which previous research claims children find difficult to understand, namely: the divinity of Jesus; the miracles of Jesus; and Christian beliefs pertaining to Jesus' continued presence in people's lives today. The paper concludes by arguing that the variety of conceptions of Jesus which are encountered in religious education (RE) may be seen by children as a barrier to learning rather than an opportunity to grow in understanding and highlights the need for further research into the relationship between children's hermeneutical horizons and RE curriculum content.     

Contrasting conceptions of human infants

The XIII Biennial International Conference on Infant Studies was held in Toronto, Canada on 18-21 April 2002.     

Two conceptions of subjective experience

Do philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in the same way? In this article, we argue that they do not and that the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness does not coincide with the folk conception. We first offer experimental support for the hypothesis that philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in markedly different ways. We then explore experimentally the folk conception, proposing that for the folk, subjective experience is closely linked to valence. We conclude by considering the implications of our findings for a central issue in the philosophy of mind, the hard problem of consciousness.     

Alternative conceptions of semantic theory

It is argued that theories of semantic memory have diverged in a manner that parallels current linguistic controversy concerning the representation of meaning. The feature-comparison model (Smith, Shoben & Rips, 1974) applies the linguistic theory of Lakoff (1972) to predict people's reaction times to verify sentences, while the marker-search model, described here, uses the type of semantic representation outlined by Katz (1972) to explain a similar range of data. The two models are described and the evidence for each is reviewed. Available evidence supports the marker-search model, but disconfirms a major prediction of the feature-comparison model. It is argued that the feature-comparison model is in principle inadequate as a model of semantic representation, unless its conception of semantic components is substantially alatered.     

Folk conceptions of fairness and unfairness

This study sought to identify the standards people invoke when judging the fairness or unfairness of outcomes of everyday events, and to determine whether their standards of judgment vary according to the fairness of the outcome and to their perspective, i.e. whether the outcomes are ones they personally experienced or witnessed. The standards of fairness laypeople were found to invoke, even when unprompted, coincided with the standards social scientists have emphasized (e.g. distributive, procedural) in their theories of psychological justice. However, laypeople emphasized these standards differently when accounting for the fairness–unfairness of personal experiences versus those they had witnessed, and when accounting for fair versus unfair outcomes. As predicted, they were more likely to invoke procedural and interpersonal criteria when judging the fairness–unfairness of their own outcomes, but more likely to invoke distributive criteria when judging others' outcomes. Regardless of perspective, laypeople cited procedural criteria as the major determinants of their fairness judgements; but cited procedural, distributive and interpersonal criteria as comparably influential in determining their unfairness judgments. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Contrasting conceptions of perception and action

An examination of contrasting conceptions of perceptual processes, control of action and the nature of the linkage between perception and action leads to identification of a family of options. Two of these options, labeled pure realism and pure constructivism, are widely recognized. The argument is offered that the other options, which are hybrid networks of propositions, cannot be ruled out on a priori grounds. Nevertheless, the hybrids are usually ignored. It is proposed that investigators in the field of perception and action should embark on programmatic research that evaluates these contrasting conceptions on common empirical terrain.     

Some conceptions of the new age

To verify and supplement a series of quantitative studies of attitudes about the New Age in which 143 panelists were surveyed, I analyzed qualitatively 86 comments. In general, findings were consistent with those yielded by statistical analyses. An expert panel was more tolerant of terms, practices, and beliefs than a panel of critics. Many respondents characterized the New Age as complex, diverse, and eclectic. When I examined those comments that were concerned with the survey itself, I classified them as predominantly unfavorable, with most charging ambiguity of items and bias on the part of the investigators. When I inspected the comments for frequent topics, those with off-beat religious preferences were more favorable to the New Age than those with traditional preferences. Positive suggestions, expressions of tolerance, and other remarks were noted. I concluded that skeptics and anti-cult specialists may have to change their conceptions of the New Age.An active member of the American Family Foundation, he is on the Board of Directors, the Research Advisory Committee, and the New Age Study Group. He is also on the Editorial Advisory Boards of theCultic Studies Journal andthe Journal of Religion and Health.