Bringing culture to basic psychological theory--beyond individualism and collectivism: comment on Oyserman et al. (2002)

D. Oyserman, H. M. Coon, and M. Kemmelmeir (2002) offered a comprehensive literature review on individualism and collectivism that forwards valuable suggestions for ways to enhance future research conducted within this framework. The author argues that although their criticisms of much contemporary social psychological research on individualism and collectivism are valid, even more fundamental problems need to be recognized as characterizing work within this tradition, such as the insufficiently subtle nature of the views held of culture, the limited attention given to meanings, and the downplaying of contextual variation. The author suggests adopting more nuanced and process-oriented conceptions of culture and more contextually grounded views of its impact on psychological functioning as a way of realizing the promise of cultural psychology to broaden and provide insight into basic psychological theory.     

Reclaiming the individual from Hofstede's ecological analysis--a 20-year odyssey: comment on Oyserman et al. (2002)

D. Oyserman, H. M. Coon, and M. Kemmelmeier (2002) challenge the stereotype that European Americans are more individualistic and less collectivistic than persons from most other ethnic groups. The author contends that this stereotype took firm empirical root with G. Hofstede's (1980) monumental publication identifying the United States as the most individualistic of his then 40 nations. This empirical designation arose because of challengeable decisions Hofstede made about the analysis of his data and the labeling of his dimensions. The conflation of concepts under the rubric of cultural individualism plus psychologists' unwarranted psychologizing of the construct then combined with Hofstede's empirical location of America to set a 20-year agenda for data collection. Oyserman et al. disentangle and organize this mass of studies, enabling the discipline of cross-cultural psychology to forge ahead in more productive directions, less reliant on previous assumptions and measures.     

Using individualism and collectivism to compare cultures--a critique of the validity and measurement of the constructs: comment on Oyserman et al. (2002)

Analyzing national and ethnic differences in individualism and collectivism, D. Oyserman, H. M. Coon, and M. Kemmelmeier (2002) showed that small differences in scales or samples produce markedly divergent results, challenging the validity of these constructs. The author examines the following limitations of research on individualism and collectivism: It treats nations as cultures and culture as a continuous quantitative variable; conflates all kinds of social relations and distinct types of autonomy; ignores contextual specificity in norms and values; measures culture as the personal preferences and behavior reports of individuals; rarely establishes the external validity of the measures used; assumes cultural invariance in the meaning of self-reports and anchoring and interpretation of scales; and reduces culture to explicit, abstract verbal knowledge.     

Supernumerary phantoms: a comment on Grossi, et al.'s (2002) spare thoughts on spare limbs

A recently published case report of a supernumerary phantom limb in a man with left-sided hemiplegia did not take note that this phenomenon has been extensively documented in the neurological literature for well over 100 years. The present comment provides a brief introduction to the clinical and experimental approaches to supernumerary phantom limbs. It also emphasizes the theoretical importance of this condition for understanding the neurological mechanisms subserving the experience of having a body.     

Assessment of ADHD symptoms: comment on Gomez et al. (2003)

R. Gomez, G. L. Burns, J. A. Walsh, and M. A. de Moura (2003) examined the degree to which parent and teacher ratings of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) symptoms are accounted for by trait, source, and error variance. The importance and limitations of Gomez et al.'s findings are discussed in the context of clinical and research assessments of children suspected of having ADHD. Gomez et al.'s findings make clear that multimethod and multisource assessment protocols should be used in diagnosing children with this disorder. Further, clinicians and researchers must avoid relying too heavily on 1 source of data when evaluating the severity and frequency of ADHD symptoms.     

Evolving science in adolescence: comment on Ellis et al. (2012)

Ellis et al. (2012) bring an evolutionary perspective to bear on adolescent risky behavioral development, clinical practice, and public policy. The authors offer important insights that (a) some risky behaviors may be adaptive for the individual and the species by being hard-wired due to fitness benefits and (b) interventions might be more successful if they move with, rather than against, the natural tendencies of an adolescent. Ellis and colleagues criticize the field of developmental psychopathology, but we see the 2 fields as complementary. Their position would be enhanced by integrating it with contemporary perspectives on dynamic cascades through which normative behavior turns into genuinely maladaptive outcomes, dual processes in adolescent neural development, and adolescent decision making. Finally, they rightly note that innovation is needed in interventions and policies toward adolescent problem behavior.     

Avoiding death or engaging life as accounts of meaning and culture: comment on Pyszczynski et al. (2004)

Terror management theory emphasizes that self-esteem consists of a sense of meaning and significance, which serves mainly to defend against death awareness. The current authors counter that people's search for meaning and significance cannot be wholly reduced to defensive processes because it also reflects intrinsic developmental processes. Sociometer theory similarly offers a mainly defensive account of self-esteem, and its exclusive focus on belongingness versus exclusion ill equips it to deal with the multiple needs underlying self-esteem. The current authors suggest that self-esteem resulting from defenses against anxiety (whether about death or exclusion) is akin to contingent self-esteem, whereas true self-esteem is based in ongoing satisfaction of needs for competence, autonomy, and relatedness.     

The validity of dietary restraint scales: comment on Stice et al. (2004)

In 4 empirical studies, E. Stice, M. Fisher, and M. R. Lowe calculated the correlations between some widely used dietary restraint scales and food intake. Failing to find substantial negative correlations, they concluded that these scales were invalid. The current article challenges this conclusion. For one thing, there is some evidence that restrained eaters do eat less than do unrestrained eaters under controlled experimental conditions favoring self-control. Dietary restraint is also associated with tendencies toward disinhibition under conditions favoring loss of self-control; such disinhibition often masks (but does not invalidate) the construct of dietary restraint. For these and other reasons, the assessment of food intake at a single eating episode may not capture overall dietary restriction. Finally, how much one eats does not necessarily indicate whether one has eaten less than one desired to eat. The authors suggest that the existing restraint scales do in fact validly assess restriction of food intake, albeit in a more complex fashion than is evident from simple correlations in single episodes.     

Mediated and convergent lexical priming in language production: a comment on Levelt et al. (1991)

Levelt et al. (1991) argued that modular semantic and phonological stage theories of lexical access in language production are to be preferred over interactive spreading-activation theories (e.g., Dell, 1986). As evidence, they show no mediated semantic-phonological priming during picture naming: Retrieval of sheep primes goat, but the activation of goat is not transmitted to its phonological relative, goal. This research reconciles this result with spreading-activation theories and shows how the absence of mediated priming coexists with the convergent priming necessary to account for mixed semantic-phonological speech errors. The analysis leads to the proposal that the language-production system may best be characterized as globally modular but locally interactive.     

An evaluation of a computational model of lexical access: comment on Dell et al. (1997)

The computational model of lexical access proposed by G. S. Dell, M. F. Schwartz, N. Martin, E. M. Saffran, and D. A. Gagnon (1997) is evaluated. They argued that fits of their model to naming data obtained from normal and brain-damaged patients support assumptions regarding interactivity in the lexicon, global damage in aphasia, and continuity between normal and aphasic naming behavior. Additional analysis reveals that the model fits the empirical data poorly and that the claims Dell et al. made on the basis of the model's performance would not follow even if the model were accurate. Although use of a novel automatic regression procedure improved the model's fit, it cannot account for 5 of Dell et al.'s 21 patients (24%), and its limitations were found to be inherent in its design. It is argued that claims such as those made by Dell et al. can only be addressed by considering evidence from multiple related tasks and by comparing multiple computational models.     

Handedness and drawing: attempting to complete the picture: a comment on Bruckner, et al. (2011)

In a recent study, Bruckner, Kastner-Koller, Deimann, and Voracek (2011) investigated the relationship between hand preference and drawing during preschool years. The present study offers interpretations in a larger framework which could contribute to the better understanding of that relationship, and provides future directions in this area.     

Questioning the goal-switching account of the AB: comment on Ferlazzo et al. (2007)

Identification of the second of two targets (T2) is impaired when presented less than about 500?ms after the first (T1; Attentional Blink: AB). Although the AB is known to be remarkably robust across many manipulations, [Ferlazzo, F., Lucido, S., Di Nocera, F., Fagioli, S., &; Sdoia, S. (2007). Switching between goals mediates the attentional blink effect. Experimental Psychology, 54, 89–98; Ferlazzo, F., Faglioli, S., Sdoia, S., &; Di Nocera, F. (2008). Goal-completion processes affect the attentional blink. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 20, 697–710] found it to be substantially attenuated when the observers were set to accomplish a single goal (e.g. reporting the sum of the T1 and T2 digits) instead of a dual goal (reporting T1 and T2 separately). The larger AB obtained with the dual-goal set was ascribed to the attentional switch necessitated by the goal-switch between T1 and T2. This conclusion is questionable on three grounds: non-equivalent scoring procedures across conditions, range of inter-target lags, and unreliability of the baseline level. These issues were addressed in the present study. Contrary to Ferlazzo et al.’s conclusions, we found no AB attenuation in the single-goal, relative to the dual-goal condition.     

Evaluating the MSCEIT V2.0 via CFA: comment on Mayer et al. (2003)

This investigation uncovered several substantial errors in the confirmatory factor analysis results reported by J. D. Mayer, P. Salovey, D. R. Caruso, and G. Sitarenios (see record 2003-02341-015). Specifically, the values associated with the close-fit indices (normed fit index, Tucker-Lewis Index, and root-mean-square error of approximation) are inaccurate. A reanalysis of the Mayer et al. subscale intercorrelation matrix provided accurate values of the close-fit indices, which resulted in different evaluations of the models tested by J. D. Mayer et al. Contrary to J. D. Mayer et al., the 1-factor model and the 2-factor model did not provide good fit. Although the 4-factor model was still considered good fitting, the non-constrained 4-factor model yielded a non-positive definite matrix, which was interpreted to be due to the fact that two of the branch-level factors (Perceiving and Facilitating) were collinear, suggesting that a model with 4 factors was implausible.