No Empathy for Empathy: An Existential Reading of Husserl’s Forgotten Question

ABSTRACT

Empathy is a term used to denote our experience of connecting or feeling with an Other. The term has been used both by psychologists and phenomenologists as a supplement for our biological capacity to understand an Other. In this paper I would like to challenge the possibility of such empathy. If empathy is employed to mean that we know another person’s feelings, then I argue that this is impossible. I argue that there is an equivocation in the use of the term ‘empathy’ which conditions the appropriation of the Other as we think that we know how the Other feels. To claim that we do know an Other’s feelings – or any kind of their intentional experience – means to appropriate their experience through our own. I will first reveal the equivocal use of the term ‘empathy’ and, then, I will explore Husserl’s use of the term. In Husserl, the understanding of an Other as empathy is only partial. I shall conclude by reiterating a thesis from philosophy of existence and feminist theory according to which to know another person comes from creating a community with them and not because we have a biological structure that can mirror each other’s feelings.     

Stimmung and Einfühlung: Hydraulic model and analogic model in the theories of empathy

6. Conclusions This synthetic survey of the models on which theEinflihlungstheorie is based has showed the deficiency of a pattern and the oscillation of a distinction. The hydraulic model, which following a radical subjectivism is specified as a projection or transfer of pathemic contents from the subject into the object, experiences a crisis if confronted with the rights of the object, which claims to be empathized in this way or in that way. Such a claim induces to recognize a character proper to the object, which does not accept to be reduced to a mere neutral container ready to receive the subjective pathemic contents. Consequently, the distinction between empathy towards the human and empathy towards the sub-human — which appeared to be a major difference —vanishes, since the relation with the object (natural or artistic) is specified in terms of intersubjectivity andalter-ego. The subjectivistic hydraulic pattern is not just substituted by an opposite, objectivistic pattern, which would create the same difficulties, only upset; but rather by ananalogic model, in which sense is established in the correlation between subject and object, and on the aesthetic ground of the qualitative affinities, which determine a horizon of style. It is an analogic model which characterizes, in Husserl, the constitution of the transcendental intersubjectivity: empathy becomes the condition of possibility of the comprehension of other subjects in their typic or stylistic structure. InAesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft Max Dessoir severely criticizes the theorists of empathy because they hyposthatize organic metaphors creating a “schablonenhafte Versprachlichung.”⁴⁴ Empathy is certainly metaphor, yet not in the sense of a figurative expression, but as a realmetapherein ortransfert: as translation of sense — not from a full to an empty vessel, but rather in the circular form of the analogic circuit.      

Reading and Empathy

The relationship between reading and empathy was explored. Controlling for GPA and gender, reading variables were hypothesized as related to empathy; the relationship was expected to differ for males and females. For the complete sample, affective components were related to GPA but not reading. Perspective taking was related to reading appreciation but not GPA. For females, reading appreciation was related to perspective taking and empathic concern. For males, GPA and non-fiction reading were positively related, but both were negatively related to empathic concern. Results suggest reading may promote both academic achievement and social development. Findings and social implications are discussed.     

Reading <Emphasis Type="Italic">Principia Iuris</Emphasis>

This paper illustrates the main features of Luigi Ferrajoli’s theoretical approach to law, as they are developed in his Principia Juris. These include his opposition to the traditional perspective of natural law; his anti-cognitivist orientation; and, finally, his fundamentally normative approach. Among the numerous problems discussed in Ferrajoli’s compendious book, the paper focuses on his definition of constitutional democracy. In particular, the paper discusses the way in which Ferrajoli defines the complementarity between democracy and rights; Ferrajoli’s own criticism of T. H. Marshall’s idea of citizenship; and the importance that the distinction between ‘decidable’ and ‘non-decidable’ rights have in Ferrajoli’s own system. Other issues of interests that are briefly discussed include the constitutionalisation of private law, and the defence of different kinds of liberty-rights.     

Expressing counselor empathy through the use of possible selves

The construct of possible selves, which represents the multifaceted aspects of an individual's self‐concept, is proposed in this theoretical article as a means by which employment and career counselors can extend greater empathy to their clients. The construct of empathy is reviewed first, followed by the construct of possible selves. Possible selves are suggested as a means to encourage greater perspective‐taking by both the client and the counselor, which reflects a greater empathic process.     

An inquiry on radical empathy and the phenomenological reduction in Sartre and Merleau-Ponty

In this paper, I wish to explore the contribution of the phenomenological reduction to a distinct form of empathy, which has been identified and called by Ratcliffe (Inquiry 55(5):473–495, 2012) radical empathy. This form of empathy brings to light the sense of reality experienced by the subject rather than a mere mental state. However, I shall consider whether and how the phenomenological reduction allows different interpretations of the same experience, thereby impacting on our understanding of another’s sense of reality. Far from dismissing the role of the reduction, I propose a reconsideration of its relevance for radical empathy. In order to spell out my argument, I propose a case ex negativo that looks at Sartre’s and Merleau-Ponty’s different analyses of the sense of reality experienced by obsessive patients. I argue that this interpretative difference ultimately depends on two opposite uses of the reduction itself, and that Merleau-Ponty’s account offers a promising perspective to reintegrate and contextualize the phenomenological reduction into radical empathy.     

Ethnotherapeutic empathy (EthE)—Part I: Definition,theory, and process

This paper introduces the concept of ethnotherapeutic empathyin working with ethnoculturally different patients to increase the efficacy of therapy. This form of empathy is used instrumentally to get to know the patient's inner problematic images, anxieties, fears, depressive affect, suffering, hurt, disillusionment, rage, joy, and triumph. Clinical empathy with ethnic patients is instrumental in that it is purposive:it sets out to achieve what might be called patient-comprehending(that is, finding out the nature of the patient's problems) using this as guide to intervening—a form of creativity-in-action. Ethnotherapeutic empathy utilizes active ego processes, in contrast to the passive processes implied in artistic appreciation and surrender. This article presents the definitions of empathy, and associated intrapsychic and social factors, as well as physiological responses in empathie responding. The implications for clinical practice with patients of differing ethnocultural and racial groups are discussed. The article develops a foundation for understanding the therapeutic matrix of applied ethnotherapeutic empathy which is detailed in the second part of this article (Ethnotherapeutic Empathy [EthE]—Part II: Techniques of Vicarious experiencing Across Cultures).     

Why the Capacity to Pretend Matters for Empathy

A phenomenological insight in the debate on empathy is that it is possible to directly perceive other people’s emotions in their expressive bodily behaviour. Contrary to what is suggested by many phenomenologists, namely that this perceptual skill is immediately available if one has vision, this paper argues that the perceptual skill for empathy is acquired. Such a skill requires that we have undergone certain emotional experiences ourselves and that we have had the experience of seeing the world differently, which is a form of pretence. By investigating how we retain knowledge of what is real while pretending, that is, how we anchor the experience of pretence in something that is not pretended, the paper argues that we split our experiential perspective into a double perspective, which differs from the cognitive act of understanding what a perspective is. With this notion in hand, we can return to the debate on empathy. It is argued that in order to have the capacity for direct empathic perception, one must have undergone experiences involving a double perspective.     

Cognitive and emotional control and perspective taking and their relations to empathy in 5-year-old children

The experience of empathy has been described as involving both emotional and cognitive components. The primary hypothesis tested in this study is that cognition and emotion are integrated within 2 distinct types of abilities-control and perspective taking-and that interactions between emotional and cognitive control and between affective and cognitive perspective taking would be related to children's empathic responding. We also hypothesized that boys' control and perspective-taking skills would be more strongly related to empathy than would those of girls. Fifty-seven 5-year-olds completed tasks measuring cognitive control, cognitive and affective perspective taking, and empathy, and their mothers completed a measure of children's emotional control. Results indicated that cognitive perspective taking moderated the relation between affective perspective taking and empathy. In addition, the relation between cognitive inhibitory control and empathy was moderated by gender; boys' control was positively related to empathy, but girls' control was marginally negatively related to empathy.     

General Theory of the Commutator for Deductive Systems. Part I. Basic Facts

The purpose of this paper is to present in a uniform way the commutator theory for k-deductive system of arbitrary positive dimension k. We are interested in the logical perspective of the research — an emphasis is put on an analysis of the interconnections holding between the commutator and logic. This research thus qualifies as belonging to abstract algebraic logic, an area of universal algebra that explores to a large extent the methods provided by the general theory of deductive systems. In the paper the new term ‘commutator formula’ is introduced. The paper is concerned with the meanings of the above term in the models provided by the commutator theory and clarifies contexts in which these meanings occur. The work is presented in an abstracted form: main ideas are outlined but proofs are deferred to the second part of the paper. Dedicated to the memory of Willem Johannes Blok     

Empathy as a cognitive inhibitor of interpersonal aggression

The studies presented in this paper examined empathy, especially perspective taking, as a potential inhibitor of interpersonal aggression. The theoretical rationale for these investigations derived from Zillmann's [(1988): Aggressive Behavior 14: 51–64] cognitive excitation model. Study 1 revealed that dispositional empathy correlates negatively with self-reported aggression and with conflict responses that reflect little concern for the needs of the other party. Empathy also was positively related to constructive responses to interpersonal conflict (i. e., those that do involve concern for the needs of the other party). In Study 2, perspective taking was manipulated with instructions to subjects prior to participation in a reaction-time task designed to measure aggression. When threat was relatively low, subjects who were instructed to take the perspective of the target responded less aggressively than did those who had been instructed to focus on the task. Study 3 examined the effect of dispositional perspective taking on verbal aggression. Threat was manipulated in terms of the combination of provocation and gender of the interactants. As predicted, perspective taking related to aggression inhibition under conditions of moderate threat–for males under low provocation and females under high provocation. These effects were predicted and explained in the context of the cognitive-excitation model. © 1994 Wiley-Liss, Inc.     

群体共情对群际关系的影响：基于社会冲突解决的视角

摘要：群体共情是指群体成员内化和间接体验另一群体成员的认知和情绪情感的过程。群体共情与个体共情不同,表现在身份感、共情偏好和文化影响的差异等方面。群体共情对群际关系具有促进作用,有助于减少群际冲突,促进群际亲社会行为。共情动机和文化框架转换是分析群体共情对群际关系促进机制的两个视角。未来研究可以探索群体共情与个体共情神经机制的差异,建立群体共情对群际关系影响的综合模型,探索群体共情在群际关系改善中的作用机制。     

Reading qualitative research

In recent years, qualitative research has emerged as an increasingly significant source of evidence for counselling and psychotherapy policy and practice. As a result, it is important for readers of qualitative studies to develop an appreciation of what kind of knowledge is made available, and not available, through this form of inquiry. The present paper offers a critical reflection on a series of qualitative studies published in the current issue of this journal. From a reader perspective, it is possible to identify a set of key themes: the capacity of qualitative research to address major issues within the field; contrasts between professional knowledge and other sources of evidence; the positionality of the author; the challenges associated with the accomplishment of contextuality; and, the struggle to determine the credibility and reliability of findings. The paper concludes by suggesting a shift in publication practice that might enhance the value and readability of qualitative articles.     

Behind Our I’s: Grief and Loss in the Poetry of Li-Young Lee

This article uses Kenneth R. Mitchell and Herbert Anderson’s (1983) six modalities of grieving as presented in Donald Capps’ (1993) The Poet’s Gift to bring a pastoral theological perspective to bear on Li-Young Lee’s Behind My Eyes (2008), a collection of thirty-nine poems. In specifically focusing on Lee’s poem “To Hold,” it makes the case for a seventh grieving modality, that of preemptive loss. Employing Mitchell and Anderson’s distinction between faithful and unfaithful grieving, it argues that preemptive loss is an unfaithful form or expression of grieving, and notes the irony and sadness in this regard, as this unfaithful response to grief is informed by what is widely considered to be a faithful Judeo–Christian perspective, rooted in the inescapable sinfulness of humanity.     

Fiction as a Base of Interpretation Contexts

In this paper, I want to deal with the problem of how to find an adequate context of interpretation for indexical sentences that enables one to account for the intuitive truth-conditional content which some apparently puzzling indexical sentences like “I am not here now” as well as other such sentences contextually have. In this respect, I will pursue a fictionalist line. This line allows for shifts in interpretation contexts and urges that such shifts are governed by pretense, which has to be understood in terms of socially shared make-believe games. By appealing to pretense so conceived, I will show that the fictionalist perspective is halfway between an intentionalist perspective, according to which the above indexical sentences have to be interpreted in a shifted intended context, (this perspective is primarily defined by Predelli 1998, Analysis 58, 107; Mind and Language 13, 400) and a conventionalist perspective, according to which indexical reference shifts in accordance with a conventional setting. (For this perspective, cf. Corazza et al. 2002, Philosophical Studies 107, See also Corazza 2004, Reflecting the Mind: Indexicality and Quasi-Indexicality, Oxford University Press). Finally, I will claim that the fictionalist analysis of cases of non-ordinary uses of indexicals like “here” and “now” can be retained in face of a new alternative analysis of those cases in terms of an ‘unbound anaphora’ – theory (cf. Corazza 2004, Synthese 138, 145).     

Cosmic inflation and the past hypothesis

The past hypothesis is that the entropy of the universe was very low in the distant past. It is put forward to explain the entropic arrow of time but it has been suggested (e.g. [Penrose, R. (1989a). The emperor’s new mind. London:Vintage Books; Penrose, R. (1989b). Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 571, 249–264; Price, H. (1995). In S. F. Savitt (Ed.), Times’s arrows today. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Price, H. (1996). Time’s arrow and Archimedes’ point. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Price, H. (2004). In C. Hitchcock (Ed.), Contemporary debates in philosophy of science. Oxford: Blackwell]) that it is itself in need of explanation. It has also been suggested that cosmic inflation could provide the explanation, but Price (2004) raises a serious objection to this suggestion, which has otherwise received very little attention in the philosophical literature. Price points out that the standard inflationary explanation involves a double standard: although the evolution of the universe described by the inflationary model seems natural from the standard temporal perspective it looks highly unnatural from the reversed temporal perspective. The main purpose of this paper is to propose a novel form of the inflationary explanation that avoids this objection. It is argued that the inflationary model would not involve a double standard (but would still explain the past hypothesis) if we construct the model with a global “boundary” condition instead of a conventional boundary condition: if we assume that the universe is as generic as possible overall, rather than as generic as possible at some given point (e.g. the Big Bang) as is assumed in the standard inflationary model. This novel form of the inflationary explanation is then compared with Price’s 1996 preferred explanation, a version of the so-called “Weyl hypothesis”.     

Effects of perspective taking on courtroom decisions

Four experiments examined the hypothesis that perspective taking with a defendant would lead to greater empathy, which would mediate lowered perceptions of culpability, with lowered culpability mediating a lower probability of guilt and recidivism. Experiments 1 and 2 established that perspective taking leads to a lower probability of guilty verdicts and recidivism, mediated by a decreased perception of the defendant's culpability. Experiment 2 showed that it does so by increasing empathy. Experiment 3 showed that perspective taking also heightens the perception of culpability through increased empathy for the victim. Experiment 4 showed that decreased culpability is in part driven by leniency, which is also a function of empathy. We tie our findings into other research investigating links between empathy and perspective taking.     

Which empathy? Limitations in the mirrored “understanding” of emotion

The recent discovery of so-called “mirror-neurons” in monkeys and a corresponding mirroring “system” in humans has provoked wide endorsement of the claim that humans understand a variety of observed actions, somatic sensations, and emotions via a kind of direct representation of those actions, sensations, and emotions. Philosophical efforts to assess the import of such “mirrored understanding” have typically focused on how that understanding might be brought to bear on theories of mindreading (how we represent other creatures as having mental states), and usually in cases of action. By contrast, this paper assesses mirrored understanding in cases of emotion and its import for theories of empathy and especially empathy in ethical contexts. In particular, this paper argues that the mirrored understanding claim is ambiguous and ultimately misleading when applied to emotion, partly because mirroring proponents fail to appreciate the way in which empathy might serve a distinct normative function in our judgments of what other people feel. The paper thus concludes with a call to revise the mirrored understanding claim, whether in neuroscience, psychology, or philosophy.     

The development of cognitive empathy and concern in preschool children: A behavioral neuroscience investigation

This developmental neuroscience study examined the electrophysiological responses (EEG and ERPs) associated with perspective taking and empathic concern in preschool children, as well as their relation to parental empathy dispositions and children's own prosocial behavior. Consistent with a body of previous studies using stimuli depicting somatic pain in both children and adults, larger early (~200 ms) ERPs were identified when perceiving painful versus neutral stimuli. In the slow wave window (~800 ms), a significant interaction of empathy condition and stimulus type was driven by a greater difference between painful and neutral images in the empathic concern condition. Across early development, children exhibited enhanced N2 to pain when engaging in empathic concern. Greater pain‐elicited N2 responses in the cognitive empathy condition also related to parent dispositional empathy. Children's own prosocial behavior was predicted by several individual differences in neural function, including larger early LPP responses during cognitive empathy and greater differentiation in late LPP and slow wave responses to empathic concern versus affective perspective taking. Left frontal activation (greater alpha suppression) while engaging in affective perspective taking was also related to higher levels of parent cognitive empathy. Together, this multilevel analysis demonstrates the important distinction between facets of empathy in children; the value of examining neurobehavioral processes in development. It provides provoking links between children's neural functioning and parental dispositions in early development.     

Cognitive and emotional empathy in typically developing children: The influence of age,gender, and intelligence

In the current study, the influence of age, gender and IQ on cognitive and emotional empathy in school-aged children and adolescents was examined adopting two behavioural paradigms: participants were shown film clips with different scenes of social interaction to which they were asked to respond. Thus, 134 children aged seven to 17 years (mean age = 138.4 months, sd = 31.66 months) were tested for emotion recognition, perspective taking and emotional empathy. Age strongly influenced components of cognitive empathy and explained 33.5% to 39.1% of the variance. Gender and IQ also were significant predictors, yet only explained 3% to 5%, respectively 8% to 9% of the variance. In contrast, neither age, gender nor IQ were related to emotional empathy. Results suggest developmental maturation of cognitive, but not emotional empathy throughout childhood and adolescence. To explain variability in emotional empathy, additional biological and psychosocial factors need to be studied.