Reasoning from unfamiliar premises: a study with unschooled adults

A long tradition of research initiated by Luria in the 1930s has established that unschooled adults perform poorly on reasoning tasks. Particularly when the premises are unfamiliar, they adopt an inappropriate empirical bias. However, recent findings show that young children with little or no schooling reason competently if prompted to think of the unfamiliar premises as pertaining to a distant planet. We tested two groups of adults: illiterate, unschooled adults and adults with limited schooling. Both groups received problems that included either a premise with unknown content or a premise contradicting their everyday experience. When given a minimal prompt, both groups manifested the customary empirical bias. By contrast, when explicitly prompted to think of the unfamiliar premises as pertaining to a distant planet, they reasoned accurately and appropriately justified their conclusions in terms of the supplied premises.     

The capacity to generate alternative ideas is more important than inhibition for logical reasoning in preschool-age children

There is little consensus about the nature of logical reasoning and, equally important, about how it develops. To address this, we looked at the early origins of deductive reasoning in preschool children. We examined the contribution of two factors to the reasoning ability of very young children: inhibitory capacity and the capacity to generate alternative ideas. In a first study, a total of 32 preschool children were all given generation, inhibition, and logical reasoning measures. Logical reasoning was measured using knowledge-based premises such as “All dogs have legs,” and two different inferences: modus ponens and affirmation of the consequent. Results revealed that correctly reasoning with both inferences is not related to the measure of inhibition, but is rather related to the capacity to generate alternative ideas. In a second study, 32 preschool children were given either the generation or the inhibition task before the logical reasoning measure. Results showed that receiving the generation task beforehand significantly improved logical reasoning compared to the inhibition task given beforehand. Overall, these results provide evidence for the greater importance of idea generation in the early development of logical reasoning.     

条件推理中否定前件下信念偏差发生阶段的ERP研究

以日常生活中的条件推理语句为实验材料,采用大、小前提和结论依次呈现的“推断-判断”范式,利用事件相关电位(event-related brain potential, ERP)技术探讨了条件推理中否定前件下信念偏差效应的脑内时程动态变化。结果发现：在行为反应上,较信念促进,信念阻碍下的正确率更低反应时更长;在脑电上,两条件(信念阻碍和信念促进)诱发的ERP波形仅在大前提加工阶段出现明显的分离。这表明该推理下的信念偏差效应可能早在对大前提的语义表征阶段就已发生。     

Tense,Aspect, and Temporal Reasoning

We report two experiments on temporal reasoning with problems, such as: John has cleaned the house. John is taking a shower. John is going to read the paper. Mary always does the dishes when John cleans the house. Mary always drinks her coffee when John reads the paper. What for Mary is the relation between doing the dishes and drinking coffee? The experiments showed that problems such as this one, which require one mental model, elicited correct answers more often than did those requiring multiple models (e.g. with the second premise modified to “John has taken a shower”, so that the order between the events in the first two premises is not fixed). These multiple-model problems, in turn, elicited more correct answers than did multiple-model problems with no valid answers (e.g. with the second premise modified to “John has taken a shower”, and the fifth premise modified to “Mary always drinks her coffee when John takes a shower”). One-model problems were also solved more quickly than multiple-model problems, which were solved more quickly than problems with no valid answers. These results corroborated the predictions of the mental model theory of reasoning.     

Reconnecting interpretation to reasoning through individual differences

Computational theories of mind assume that participants interpret information and then reason from those interpretations. Research on interpretation in deductive reasoning has claimed to show that subjects' interpretation of single syllogistic premises in an “immediate inference” task is radically different from their interpretation of pairs of the same premises in syllogistic reasoning tasks (Newstead, 1989, 1995; Roberts, Newstead, & Griggs, 2001). Narrow appeal to particular Gricean implicatures in this work fails to bridge the gap. Grice's theory taken as a broad framework for credulous discourse processing in which participants construct speakers' “intended models” of discourses can reconcile these results, purchasing continuity of interpretation through variety of logical treatments. We present exploratory experimental data on immediate inference and subsequent syllogistic reasoning. Systematic patterns of interpretation driven by two factors (whether the subject's model of the discourse is credulous, and their degree of reliance on information packaging) are shown to transcend particular quantifier inferences and to drive systematic differences in subjects' subsequent syllogistic reasoning. We conclude that most participants do not understand deductive tasks as experimenters intend, and just as there is no single logical model of reasoning, so there is no reason to expect a single “fundamental human reasoning mechanism”.     

Counterfactual syllogistic reasoning in normal 4-year-olds, children with learning disabilities, and children with autism

Instruction encouraging imagery improves logical reasoning with counterfactual premises by normal preschool children. In contrast, children with autism have been reported to reason accurately with counterfactual premises in the absence of such instruction (F. J. Scott, S. Baron-Cohen, & A. M. Leslie, 1999). To investigate this pattern of findings, we compared the performance of children with autism, children with learning disabilities, and normally developing 4-year-olds, who were given reasoning problems both with and without instruction in two separate testing sessions 2 to 3 weeks apart. Overall, instruction to use imagery led to persistent logical performance. However, children with autism displayed a distinctive pattern of responding, performing around chance levels, showing a simple response bias, and rarely justifying their responses by elaborating on the premises. We propose that instruction boosts logical performance by clarifying the experimenter's intention that a false proposition be accepted as a basis for reasoning and that children with autism have difficulty grasping this intention.     

Effects of order of presentation on conditional reasoning

ABSTRACT

The main goal of this research is to study whether or not the order of presentation of the premises in a logical argument form, such as a conditional reasoning task, could affect the processing time of premises and conclusion and the conclusions that participants accept as valid in an evaluation task. One experiment is reported in which participants are asked to evaluate computer-presented conditionals. Half of the problems were presented in traditional order (“if p then q, p, therefore q”) and half in inverse order (“p, if p then q, therefore q”). The experiment showed that there was an order effect in processing the premises and conclusion: participants took longer to read the premises in traditional order than in inverse order, but they took longer to read the conclusion in inverse order than in traditional order. The finding is discussed with respect to the main theories of conditional reasoning.     

Modus Tollens,Modus Shmollens: Contrapositive reasoning and the pragmatics of negation

The utterance of a negative statement invites the pragmatic inference that some reason exists for the proposition it negates to be true; this pragmatic inference paves the way for the logically unexpected Modus Shmollens inference: “If p then q; not-q; therefore, p.” Experiment 1 shows that a majority of reasoners endorse Modus Shmollens from an explicit major conditional premise and a negative utterance as a minor premise: e.g., reasoners conclude that “the soup tastes like garlic” from the premises “If a soup tastes like garlic, then there is garlic in the soup; Carole tells Didier that there is no garlic in the soup they are eating.” Experiment 2 shows that this effect is mediated by the derivation of a pragmatic inference from negation. We discuss how theories of conditional reasoning can integrate such a pragmatic effect.     

Development of comprehension of “or”: Evidence for a sequence of competencies

Comprehension of various usages of “or” was investigated in children 5–6, 7–8, and 9–10 years old, and in college students. One task used imperatives containing “or.” and investigated the set union interpretation. In a second task, one puppet asserted a statement and another puppet contradicted it: subjects were asked whether both could be right, and whether one had to be right. A third task investigated the truth conditions for disjunctions. The fourth task presented reasoning problems that tested principles of inference involving “or.” It was found that all age groups, even the youngest, could make the logical inferences involving “or.” All age groups could also perceive contradictions, but subjects were less than unanimous that one of the puppets contradicting each other had to be right. Sensible truth judgments for disjunctions began to develop around 7–8 years. Set union was elicited in only a few adults. In general, except when it indicates set union, “or” is understood substantially earlier than the current literature suggests. Logical inference is one of the first uses in which children become competent, suggesting that the basic meaning of “or” is given by inference forms for reasoning with alternatives, not by truth conditions.     

Information processing and reasoning with premises that are empirically false: Interference,working memory,and processing speed

In this study, we looked at the contributions of individual differences in susceptibility to interference and working memory to logical reasoning with premises that were empirically false (i.e., not necessarily true). A total of 97 university students were given a sentence completion task for which a subset of stimuli was designed to generate inappropriate semantic activation that interfered with the correct response, a measure of working memory capacity, and a series of logical reasoning tasks with premises that were not always true. The results indicate that susceptibility to interference, as measured by the error rate on the relevant subset of the sentence completion task, and working memory independently account for variation in reasoning performance. The participants who made more errors in the relevant portion of the sentence completion task also showed more empirical intrusions in the deductive reasoning task, even when the effects of working memory were partialed out. Working memory capacity was more clearly related to processes involved in generating uncertainty responses to inferences for which there was no certain conclusion. A comparison of the results of this study with studies of children's reasoning suggests that adults are capable of more selective executive processes than are children. An analysis of latency measures on the sentence completion task indicated that high working memory participants who made no errors on the sentence completion task used a strategy that involved slower processing speed, as compared with participants with similar levels of working memory who did make errors. In contrast, low working memory participants who made no errors on the sentence completion task had relatively shorter reaction times than did comparable participants who did make errors.     

Belief-based and analytic processing in transitive inference depends on premise integration difficulty

Three experiments investigated belief-based versus analytic processing in transitive inference. Belief-based and analytic processing were inferred from conclusion acceptance rates for problems with conclusions that were either valid or invalid and believable or unbelievable. Premise integration difficulty was manipulated by varying premise integration time (Experiment 1), premise presentation order (Experiment 2), and the markedness of the relational terms in the premises (Experiment 3). In all the conditions, reasoning accuracy and rated confidence were lower on conflict problems, where belief-based and analytic processes yielded different responses. Participants relied more on analytic processing and less on belief-based processing in conditions in which premise integration was easier. Fluid intelligence and premise integration ability predicted analytical reasoning on conflict problems after reasoning on the no-conflict problems was controlled for. The findings were related to three dual-process models of belief bias. They provide the first evidence of belief bias in transitive inference.     

The initial representation in reasoning towards an interpretation of conditional sentences

All accounts of human reasoning (whether presented at the symbolic or subsymbolic level) have to reckon with the temporal organization of the human processing systems and the ephemeral nature of the representations it uses. We present three new empirical tests for the hypothesis that people commence the interpretational process by constructing a minimal initial representation. In the case of if A then C the initial representation captures the occurrence of the consequent, C, within the context of the antecedent, A. Conditional inference problems are created by a categorical premise that affirms or denies A or C. The initial representation allows an inference when the explicitly represented information matches (e.g., the categorical premise A affirms the antecedent “A”) but not when it mismatches (e.g., “not-A” denies A). Experiments 1 and 2 confirmed that people tend to accept the conclusion that “nothing follows” for the denial problems, as indeed they do not have a determinate initial-model conclusion. Experiment 3 demonstrated the other way round that the effect of problem type (affirmation versus denial) is reduced when we impede the possibility of inferring a determinate conclusion on the basis of the initial representation of both the affirmation and the denial problems.     

A Probabilistic Approach to Conditional Reasoning Development

How likely is the glass to break, given that it is heated? The present study asks questions such as this with or without the premise if the glass is heated, it breaks. A reduced problem (question without premise) measures the statistical dependency (conditional probability) of an event to occur, given that another has occurred. Such statistical dependency represents knowledge-based reasoning (inferring from “glass heated” to “its breaking”) and is a component of the response to the complete problem (question with premise). The complete problems therefore measure not only knowledge-based reasoning in terms of statistical dependencies (inductive component) but assumption-based reasoning (deductive component). Two experiments revealed: a) Knowledge-based reasoning continues to develop and attains adult levels at 7th grade for the problems tested, and b) assumption-based reasoning (deductive component) is reliable only for secondary school students (7th graders).     

Reasoning with contrary-to-fact propositions

In the initial study, the ability of subjects at four age levels (10, 13, 15, 18 years) (1) to accept if-then premises as a basis for reasoning and (2) to reason correctly with if-then premises was examined. Half the subjects were assessed with four reasoning problems involving factually accurate premises. The other half received factually inaccurate premises which were derived from the preceding ones by altering a single term. Both tests included an abstract problem which preceded the concrete propositions. Results indicate that the 10 year olds, and to a lesser extent the 13 year olds, did have difficulty in accepting contrary-to-fact premises as a basis for reasoning. The 15 and 18 year olds did not, but did find reasoning correctly more difficult with contrary-to-fact premises. The second study examined the ability of 5 and 7 year olds to accept contrary-to-fact premises. Subjects were given factually false premises either alone or within a fantasy context. Results indicate that the fantasy context decreases the extent to which empirical knowledge interferes with accepting contrary-to-fact premises. This result supports the notion that a representational process may be involved in accepting contrary-to-fact premises.     

Brain states matter. A reply to the unfolding argument

Recently, it has been claimed that Integrated Information Theory and other theories of its type cannot explain consciousness (“unfolding argument”). We unravel this argument mathematically and prove that the premises of the argument imply a much stronger result according to which the observed problem holds for almost all theories of consciousness. We find, however, that one of the premises is unwarranted and show that if this premise is dropped, the argument ceases to work. Thus our results show that the claim of the unfolding argument cannot be considered valid. The premise in question is that measures of brain activity cannot be used in an empirical test of theories of consciousness.     

Deductive schemas with uncertain premises using qualitative probability expressions

The new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning redirects the investigation of deduction conceptually and methodologically because the premises and the conclusion of the inferences are assumed to be uncertain. A probabilistic counterpart of the concept of logical validity and a method to assess whether individuals comply with it must be defined. Conceptually, we used de Finetti's coherence as a normative framework to assess individuals' performance. Methodologically, we presented inference schemas whose premises had various levels of probability that contained non-numerical expressions (e.g., “the chances are high”) and, as a control, sure levels. Depending on the inference schemas, from 60% to 80% of the participants produced coherent conclusions when the premises were uncertain. The data also show that (1) except for schemas involving conjunction, performance was consistently lower with certain than uncertain premises, (2) the rate of conjunction fallacy was consistently low (not exceeding 20%, even with sure premises), and (3) participants' interpretation of the conditional agreed with de Finetti's “conditional event” but not with the material conditional.     

Suppression of valid inferences and knowledge structures: the curious effect of producing alternative antecedents on reasoning with causal conditionals

These studies looked at the difficulty that reasoners have in accepting conditional ("If P then Q") major premises that are not necessarily true empirically, as a basis for deductive reasoning. Preliminary results have shown that when reasoners are asked to produce possible alternate antecedents to the major premise ("If A then Q"), they paradoxically tend to deny the modus ponens (MP) inference ("If P is true, then Q is true"). Three studies further explored these results. The first study gave university students paper-and-pencil tests in which instructions to "suppose that the major premise is true" was followed by a request to determine the next number in a sequence, to retrieve information unrelated to the premises, or to retrieve a possible case of "If A then Q." Relative to a control group, reasoners asked to produce an alternative antecedent showed a significant tendency to deny the MP inference, whereas no such tendency was observed for the two other tasks used. A second study compared performance on a condition in which reasoners were asked to produce an alternative antecedent with that when they were given an explicit alternative. Premises used in this study were such that the latter alternative antecedent was also spontaneously produced by over 70% of reasoners. Results showed that the tendency to refuse the MP premise could not be accounted for by the specific nature of the alternative produced. A third study found that the tendency to refuse the MP inference after producing an alternative antecedent was affected by the number of "disabling conditions" (i.e., conditions that allow "P to be true" and "Q to be false") available for the major premise. These results are interpreted as being consistent with a model that supposes that logical reasoning requires selective inhibition of real-world knowledge.     

中外两种主要推理模型的实验再比较研究

本研究采用2X2两因素(自变量分别为“心理模型数量”和不同“内容性质”)重复测量拉丁方实验方法,在范畴三段论推理题的内在结构为“形式正确”,且“推理者已经掌握相应的形式逻辑推理规则”的前提条件下,对西方学者提出的“心理模型”与中国学者提出的“推理题和推理者的推理知识双重结构模型”这两种理论模型再次进行了实验比较研究。结果表明,对于“正确形式—正确内容”和“正确形式—错误内容”两种不同结构的推理题,若按照形式逻辑规则来判定推理者“对各推理题的结论能否从两个前提中推论出来的推论结果”是否正确,则有:(1)当推理题含有错误内容的情况下,即使该推理题只是由“一个心理模型”所构成,也会使推理者降低对其结论判定为“正确”的可能性;(2)当推理题是由正确内容所构成时,即使该推理题是由三个心理模型所构成,对其结论判定为“正确”的可能性也要比“单模型——错误内容”构成的推理题的可能性更高。由此得到的比较结论是:在本实验条件下,“推理题和推理者的推理知识双重结构模型”对实验结果所做的解释要比“心理模型”理论所做的解释更为贴切。     

Parent‐infant‐psychotherapy and psychoanalytic treatment: contradiction or mutual inspiration?

Psychoanalysis and parent‐infant‐psychotherapy are compared. Although parent‐infant‐psychotherapy developed from psychoanalysis, it appears at first glance not to be “analytic” with its aim of dealing quickly with the symptoms presented and also with its different setting. The author shows that an analytic approach in understanding the multi‐facetted net of relationships between family members and the infant in its “phantasmic interaction” and a consideration of the implication for analysis of the empirical research carried out in conjunction with parent‐infant‐therapy can lead to a fruitful exchange of ideas. One example of this is research into the correlation between attachment patterns and the processing of conflicts. Furthermore a dialogue between these two disciplines can remind psychoanalysts that a critical discussion of the external circumstances of their methods does not immediately call into question their fundamental approach to therapy: the work in transference on relationship fantasies.