Deciding between accounts of the selection task: A reply to Oaksford (2002)

In this paper we report on our attempts to fit the optimal data selection (ODS) model (Oaksford & Chater, 1994; Oaksford, Chater, & Larkin, 2000) to the selection task data reported in Feeney and Handley (2000) and Handley, Feeney, and Harper (2002). Although Oaksford (2002b) reports good fits to the data described in Feeney and Handley (2000), the model does not adequately capture the data described in Handley et al. (2002). Furthermore, across all six of the experiments modelled here, the ODS model does not predict participants' behaviour at the level of selection rates for individual cards. Finally, when people's probability estimates are used in the modelling exercise, the model adequately captures only 1 out of 18 conditions described in Handley et al. We discuss the implications of these results for models of the selection task and claim that they support deductive, rather than probabilistic, accounts of the task.     

Logical reasoning and probabilities: A comprehensive test of Oaksford and Chater (2001)

We report two experiments testing a central prediction of the probabilistic account of reasoning provided by Oaksford and Chater (2001): Acceptance of standard conditional inferences, card choices in the Wason selection task, and quantifiers chosen for conclusions from syllogisms should vary as a function of the frequency of the concepts involved. Frequency was manipulated by a probability-learning phase preceding the reasoning tasks to simulate natural sampling. The effects predicted by Oaksford and Chater (2001) were not obtained with any of the three paradigms.     

Reaching a Decision: A Reply to Oaksford

In his commentary, Oaksford makes two main claims: (1) that the externalisation method used by Green, Over, and Pyne (1997) enforces the correlation observed between probability estimates and selection, and (2) that these estimates support the prediction of a downward revision of P(p) when P(p) > P(q). In this reply, we rebut claim 1 by describing the instructions more comprehensively, and claim 2 by reiterating the importance of making certain theoretical distinctions which Oaksford does not make. Our interest is the psychological process of reaching decision: externalisation methods provide a means of exploring this process and of assessing the value of Bayesian approaches.     

Logic programming,probability, and two-system accounts of reasoning: a rejoinder to Oaksford and Chater (2014)

This reply to Oaksford and Chater’s (O&C)’s critical discussion of our use of logic programming (LP) to model and predict patterns of conditional reasoning will frame the dispute in terms of the semantics of the conditional. We begin by outlining some common features of LP and probabilistic conditionals in knowledge-rich reasoning over long-term memory knowledge bases. For both, context determines causal strength; there are inferences from the absence of certain evidence; and both have analogues of the Ramsey test. Some current work shows how a combination of counting defeaters and statistics from network monitoring can provide the information for graded responses from LP reasoning. With this much introduction, we then respond to O&C’s specific criticisms and misunderstandings.     

Context,goal, utility,and relevance: A reply to Evans (2002) considering Oaksford (2002)

Yama (2001) argued that the matching bias effect was an amalgam of a genuine matching effect and a set size effect. However, Evans (2002) pointed out some problems with Yama's argument. One was on the matching index used in Yama (2001). The others concerned a gap between Yama's (2001) interpretation of matching bias and Evans' (1998) recent discussions that had placed emphasis on the problem of implicit negation. I reply to these claims taking Oaksford (2002) into consideration. Further, I propose a framework connecting context, goal, utility, and relevance, and including a hierarchical structure of goals. I argue that theories of reasoning can be developed and extended with the framework.     

Theories of categorical reasoning and extended syllogisms

The aim of this study was to examine the predictions of three theories of human logical reasoning, (a) mental model theory, (b) formal rules theory (e.g., PSYCOP), and (c) the probability heuristics model, regarding the inferences people make for extended categorical syllogisms. Most research with extended syllogisms has been restricted to the quantifier “All” and to an asymmetrical presentation. This study used three-premise syllogisms with the additional quantifiers that are used for traditional categorical syllogisms as well as additional syllogistic figures. The predictions of the theories were examined using overall accuracy as well as a multinomial tree modelling technique. The results demonstrated that all three theories were able to predict response selections at high levels. However, the modelling analyses showed that the probability heuristics model did the best in both Experiments 1 and 2.     

Theories and Theorizers: A Contextual Approach to Theories of Cognition

An undisputable characteristic of cognitive science is its enormous diversity of theories. Not surprisingly, these often belong to different paradigms that focus on different processes and levels of analysis. A related problem is that researchers of cognition frequently seem to ascribe to incompatible approaches to research, creating a Tower of Babel of cognitive knowledge. This text presents a pragmatic model of meta-theoretical analysis, a theory conceived of to examine other theories, which allows cognitive theories to be described, integrated and compared. After a brief introduction to meta-theoretical analysis in cognitive science, the dynamic and structural components of a theory are described. The analysis of conceptual mappings between components and explanation strategies is also described, as well as the processes of intra-theory generalization and inter-theory comparison. The various components of the meta-theoretical model are presented with examples of different cognitive theories, mainly focusing on two current approaches to research: The dynamical approach to cognition and the computer metaphor of mind. Finally, two potential counter arguments to the model are presented and discussed.     

Police responses to diversity: A social representational study of rural British policing in a changing representational context

In the first decade of the 21st century, British policing faced two new challenges in how it responded to social diversity: As well as instituting reforms in response to a highly publicized report describing the British police as ‘institutionally racist’ (Macpherson, 1999 ), they faced challenges associated with rapid increases in numbers of immigrants into the UK. Studying social representations at such times of change allows access into processes, themes and value systems that may otherwise remain hidden. This paper uses social representations theory to explore interview accounts provided by regular police officers of interactions with members of minority groups. Empirically, we focus on an area of diversity policing that has received relatively little previous attention: Police work in a rural context that has recently played host to large numbers of migrant workers. Our analysis shows that interviews operate as a site of resistance in which respondents attempt to rework hegemonic representations of the police as prejudiced and to re‐present themselves and their work as able to respond appropriately to diversity. Fairness as a defining characteristic of good police practice is a central representational theme that links identity construction processes to police work with minority groups. Recent immigrant groups are represented as both needing and deserving help to assimilate into British culture: Their lack of acculturation and language difficulties provide additional challenges to police work and to how this is judged as ‘fair’. We discuss the broader origins and implications of police officers' understandings of fairness and the use of social representations theory to study representational fields within organizational settings. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Theories of conditional reasoning: a developmental examination of competing hypotheses

Children and adolescents were presented with problems that contained deontic (i.e., if action p is taken, then precondition q must be met) or causal (i.e., if event p occurs, then event q will transpire) conditionals and that varied in the ease with which alternative antecedents could be activated. Results showed that inferences were linked to the availability of alternative antecedents and the generation of "disabling" conditions (claims that the conditionals were false under specific circumstances). Age-related developments were found only on problems involving indeterminate inferences. Correlations among inferences differed for children and adolescents. The findings provide stronger support for domain-general theories than for domain-specific theories of reasoning and suggest, under some conditions, age-related changes in the roles of implicit and explicit processing.     

Understanding the representational mind: A phenomenological perspective

This paper reflects on the relationship between Husserlian phenomenology and scientific psychology. It tries to show how phenomenological results have relevance and validity for present-day cognitive developmental psychology by arguing that consciousness matters in the study of the representational mind. The paper presents some methodological remarks concerning empirical or applied phenomenology; it describes the conception of an exploratory developmental study with 3 to 9-year-old children viewing a complex pictorial display; it then illustrates how a phenomenological interpretation of the data works; in conclusion, it sketches a view of realism about conscious experiences which is taken to be inherent in the phenomenological perspective of understanding the representational mind.     

Accreditation: A reply to mathers

Accreditation in counselling is meant not for the benefit of the counsellor but for the protection of the public. It is concerned more with guaranteeing certain standards of ethics than with the acclamation of status. Whatever method is used, it must avoid the pitfalls of conservatism and academicism which in other professions have been jointly responsible for the attack on accreditation itself as a process. Those involved in counselling and psychotherapy should not wait passively until Parliament acts, but need to be critically involved in bringing into being a system of accreditation which is both flexible and creative.     

Vagueness and incoherence: A reply to Burns

I would like to thank Terence Horgan, William Throop and especially my wife, Diane Schwartz, for helpful suggestions for improving this paper and for valuable and insightful discussions on the topic of vagueness. I would also like to thank Ithaca College for generously supporting the work on this paper with a Summer Research Grant.     

Omniscience and physicalism: A reply to Beyer

In a recent issue ofSophia, Jason A. Beyer introduced objections to the antitheist arguments that purport to show the inconsistencies between God’s attributes. In this short response I argue that Beyer’s objections are untenable.