“The First Man Speaking”: Merleau-Ponty on Expression as the Task of Phenomenology

This article aims to establish an understanding of Merleau-Ponty's view of creative expression, and of its phenomenological function, setting out from the intriguing statement in his essay “Cézanne's Doubt” that the painter (or writer or philosopher) finds himself in the situation of the first human being trying to express herself. Although the importance of primary or creative expression in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is well known, there is no consensus among commentators with respect to how this notion is to be understood, and of its apparently paradoxical relation to experience in his philosophy. On the one hand, Merleau-Ponty seems to presuppose that there is an original meaning pre-given in experience; on the other hand, expression is described as a hazardous enterprise, because the meaning to be expressed does not exist before expression has succeeded. In order to resolve this tension, I explore the significance of the precariousness of creative expression, arguing that it must be related to its other side: the constituted, all too often petrified meaning that we must start out from.     

How are bodies special? Effects of body features on spatial reasoning

Embodied views of cognition argue that cognitive processes are influenced by bodily experience. This implies that when people make spatial judgments about human bodies, they bring to bear embodied knowledge that affects spatial reasoning performance. Here, we examined the specific contribution to spatial reasoning of visual features associated with the human body. We used two different tasks to elicit distinct visuospatial transformations: object-based transformations, as elicited in typical mental rotation tasks, and perspective transformations, used in tasks in which people deliberately adopt the egocentric perspective of another person. Body features facilitated performance in both tasks. This result suggests that observers are particularly sensitive to the presence of a human head and body, and that these features allow observers to quickly recognize and encode the spatial configuration of a figure. Contrary to prior reports, this facilitation was not related to the transformation component of task performance. These results suggest that body features facilitate task components other than spatial transformation, including the encoding of stimulus orientation.     

Why do alternative ways of responding improve children's performance on tests of strategic reasoning?

Changing the way in which children respond significantly improves performance across a variety of cognitive domains. However, the basis for this response‐mode effect is unknown. To address this issue, the current study tested 78 preschool children on a measure of executive functioning (the windows task: Hala & Russell, 2001 ). The task requires children to point to an empty box to receive a box with a treat in it. There were four versions of the task, differing only in the way in which children made their responses. Children in the baseline condition, who pointed with their finger, performed poorly. However, children in three alternative response‐mode conditions won the treat significantly more often. Strikingly, even children who pretended to be pointing with an arrow – but were in reality pointing with their finger – performed significantly better than baseline. We suggest that non‐standard response modes encourage children to reflect on their actions and that this reduces the number of unreflective errors they make. The findings demonstrate that response‐mode effects do not depend on the presence of a physical means of responding (such as an arrow), but can be achieved via a purely cognitive means (such as engaging in pretence).     

Provider gender and moral reasoning: The politics of an “ethics of care”

Women constitute 35% of providers in genetics at the doctoral level. A survey of 682 geneticists in 19 nations showed that gender was the single most important determinant of ethical decision making. Women were less directive and more observant of patient autonomy than men. In the United States, women were twice as likely as men to accede to patient requests for prenatal diagnosis for sex selection. Women now constitute 30% of all medical students, about half of all obstetrical residents, and 94% of master's-level genetic counselors. Evidence that women providers respond differently to some ethical problems suggests that in the future, as more women enter the field, provider-patient relationships may become more egalitarian.     

Rationality,reasoning and rules: reflections on Broome’s rationality through reasoning

Philosophical Studies - The paper provides a critical discussion of some key aspects of John Broome’s theories of rationality, reasoning and the relations between them.     

Relevance-driven information search in “pseudodiagnostic” reasoning

When faced with two competing hypotheses, people sometimes prefer to look at multiple sources of information in support of one hypothesis rather than to establish the diagnostic value of a single piece of information for the two hypotheses. This is termed pseudodiagnostic reasoning and has often been understood to reflect, among other things, poor information search strategies. Past research suggests that diagnostic reasoning may be more easily fostered when participants seek data to help in the selection of one of two competing courses of action as opposed to situations where they seek data to help infer which of two competing hypotheses is true. In the experiment reported here, we provide the first empirical evidence demonstrating that manipulating the relevance of the feature for which participants initially receive information determines whether they will make a nominally diagnostic or pseudodiagnostic selection. The discussion of these findings focuses on implications for the ability to engage in diagnostic hypothesis testing.     

“At least one” problem with “some” formal reasoning paradigms

In formal reasoning, the quantifier "some" means "at least one and possibly all." In contrast, reasoners often pragmatically interpret "some" to mean "some, but not all" on both immediate-inference and Euler circle tasks. It is still unclear whether pragmatic interpretations can explain the high rates of errors normally observed on syllogistic reasoning tasks. To address this issue, we presented participants (reasoners) in the present experiments either standard quantifiers or clarified quantifiers designed to precisely articulate the quantifiers' logical interpretations. In Experiment 1, reasoners made significantly more logical responses and significantly fewer pragmatic responses on an immediate-inference task when presented with logically clarified as opposed to standard quantifiers. In Experiment 2, this finding was extended to a variant of the immediate-inference task in which reasoners were asked to deduce what followed from premises they were to assume to be false. In Experiment 3, we used a syllogistic reasoning task and observed that logically clarified premises reduced pragmatic and increased logical responses relative to standard ones, providing strong evidence that pragmatic responses can explain some aspects of the errors made in the syllogistic reasoning task. These findings suggest that standard quantifiers should be replaced with logically clarified quantifiers in teaching and in future research.     

The cumulative record of research on “fear of success”

Based on the collected findings of over 100 studies assessing “fear of success,” the following questions were addressed: (a) Do females show more “fear of success” imagery than do males? (b) Do males respond to a cue depicting an achieving female with more “fear of success” imagery than do females? (c) Have the proportions of “fear of success” imagery elicited by men and women in response to verbal cues changed over the last decade? (d) What are the correlates of “fear of success”? (e) What is the relationship between “fear of success” imagery and performance in different kinds of situations (e.g., female achievement behavior in competition with men)? The answers seemed crudely to be (a) no, (b) no, (c) decreased, (d) few, and (e) unclear due to the many differences in the designs used.     

Feelings of error in reasoning—in search of a phenomenon

Recent research shows that in reasoning tasks, subjects usually produce an initial intuitive answer, accompanied by a metacognitive experience, which has been called feeling of rightness. This paper is aimed at exploring the complimentary experience of feeling of error (FOE), that is, the spontaneous, subtle sensation of cognitive uneasiness arising from conflict detection during thinking. We investigate FOE in two studies with the “bat-and-ball” (B&B) reasoning task, in its standard and isomorphic control versions. Study 1 is a generation study, in which participants are asked to generate their own response. Study 2 is an evaluation study, in which participants are asked to choose between two conflicting answers (normative vs. intuitive). In each study, the FOE is measured by the FOE questionnaire. Results show that the FOE is significantly present in the standard B&B task when participants give a wrong answer, that our questionnaire can measure it, and furthermore, that it is diagnostic of genuine error.     

First come, first served? Influence of changed object configuration on object-based attention

Evidence for object-based attention is based mainly on studies using object displays that remain unchanged throughout, with the assumption that object representation should be completed and stabilized before it is selected for further processing. We used the modified double-rectangle cuing paradigm of Egly, Driver, and Rafal (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 123, 161-177, 1994) but introduced a configuration change to the cued-object display to test whether object-based attention is determined by the cued- or, alternatively, the changed-object display. Four small rectangles were presented in the initial display; critically, after one was cued, an occluder was presented to make the four small rectangles amodally completed into the double-rectangle configuration. Results show that object-based attention is determined by the changed display, but not by the cued display. This suggests that object-based attention is an interactively evolving process between object representation and attention, rather than a serial process in which attention operates after object representation is completed.     

Can there be reasoning with degrees of belief?

In this paper I am concerned with the question of whether degrees of belief can figure in reasoning processes that are executed by humans. It is generally accepted that outright beliefs and intentions can be part of reasoning processes, but the role of degrees of belief remains unclear. The literature on subjective Bayesianism, which seems to be the natural place to look for discussions of the role of degrees of belief in reasoning, does not address the question of whether degrees of belief play a role in real agents’ reasoning processes. On the other hand, the philosophical literature on reasoning, which relies much less heavily on idealizing assumptions about reasoners than Bayesianism, is almost exclusively concerned with outright belief. One possible explanation for why no philosopher has yet developed an account of reasoning with degrees of belief is that reasoning with degrees of belief is not possible for humans. In this paper, I will consider three arguments for this claim. I will show why these arguments are flawed, and conclude that, at least as far as these arguments are concerned, it seems like there is no good reason why the topic of reasoning with degrees of belief has received so little attention.     

Commentary on “six domains of research ethics”

This commentary on K.D. Pimple’s “Six Domains of Research Ethics”, focuses on the area of institutional integrity and looks at “relationships between researchers, their sponsoring institutions, funding agencies, and the government,” considering the implications of institutional demands and support for research, and, in turn, demands and support on research priorities and public education.