Naive Modus Ponens and Failure of Transitivity

In the recent paper “Naive modus ponens”, Zardini presents some brief considerations against an approach to semantic paradoxes that rejects the transitivity of entailment. The problem with the approach is, according to Zardini, that the failure of a meta-inference closely resembling modus ponens clashes both with the logical idea of modus ponens as a valid inference and the semantic idea of the conditional as requiring that a true conditional cannot have true antecedent and false consequent. I respond on behalf of the non-transitive approach. I argue that the meta-inference in question is independent from the logical idea of modus ponens, and that the semantic idea of the conditional as formulated by Zardini is inadequate for his purposes because it is spelled out in a vocabulary not suitable for evaluating the adequacy of the conditional in semantics for non-transitive entailment. I proceed to generalize the semantic idea of the conditional and show that the most popular semantics for non-transitive entailment satisfies the new formulation.     

The elusive pragmatic reasoning schemas effect

The present study examined the pragmatic reasoning schema theory of deductive reasoning—specifically, its explanation of performance on the selection task. Experiment 1 replicated a result crucial to the theory, the finding of facilitation on abstract versions of the selection task based on pragmatic reasoning schemas. However, Experiments 2, 3, and 4 established that this facilitation was dependent upon two presentation factors: (1) the presence of explicit negatives on the NOT P and NOT Q cards and (2) the inclusion of a checking context in the problem statement. These results are discussed in terms of Evans's two-stage (heuristic/analytic processing) model of reasoning.     

Modus Tollens,Modus Shmollens: Contrapositive reasoning and the pragmatics of negation

The utterance of a negative statement invites the pragmatic inference that some reason exists for the proposition it negates to be true; this pragmatic inference paves the way for the logically unexpected Modus Shmollens inference: “If p then q; not-q; therefore, p.” Experiment 1 shows that a majority of reasoners endorse Modus Shmollens from an explicit major conditional premise and a negative utterance as a minor premise: e.g., reasoners conclude that “the soup tastes like garlic” from the premises “If a soup tastes like garlic, then there is garlic in the soup; Carole tells Didier that there is no garlic in the soup they are eating.” Experiment 2 shows that this effect is mediated by the derivation of a pragmatic inference from negation. We discuss how theories of conditional reasoning can integrate such a pragmatic effect.     

Traces of reasoning with pragmatic schemas

Holyoak and Cheng's (1995) account of Wason's (1966) selection task was evaluated by testing participants' recognition memory for the rule. To accommodate the finding that participants' selections are systematically influenced by manipulating their perspective on the rule to be tested, Holyoak and Cheng put forward a development of Pragmatic Reasoning Schema (PRS) theory, according to which the rule being tested is mapped onto different schematic rules depending on the perspective taken. The instantiated schema then becomes the basis for reasoning, and the different schemas encourage the selection of different cases. We hypothesised that if participants interpret the rule by instantiating a particular schema, then they should falsely recognise a sentence corresponding to the instantiated schema a short time after performing the task. An experimental test provided limited support for this hypothesis.     

The emergence of inferential rules: The use of pragmatic reasoning schemas by preschoolers

This study contrasts the pragmatic view with the natural logic view regarding the origin of inferential rules in conditional reasoning. The pragmatic view proposes that pragmatic rules emerge first, and the generalizations of these produce formal rules. In contrast, the natural logic view proposes that the formal rules emerge first and serve as a core that is then supplemented by pragmatic rules. In an experiment, scenarios involving conditional rules in different contexts, permission and arbitrary, were administered to independent groups of preschool children. To rule out the matching bias [Evans, J. St. B. T., & Lynch, J. S. (1973). Matching bias in the selection task. Br J Psychol 64, 391–397] as a possible explanation of reasoning performance, children were given conditional rules with a negated consequent. The results show that in the arbitrary context modus tollens (MT) was unavailable, and the use of modus ponens (MP) was unstable. In contrast, children in the permission context reliably used both MP and MT. In addition, they realized that a conditional rule does not imply a definite answer when the consequent holds. These findings suggest that, in their explicit forms, pragmatic rules emerge earlier than formal rules and in particular, even as basic a rule as MP is generalized from a context-specific form to a context-general one in preschool children.     

The case for a dual-process theory of transitive reasoning

Ever since its popularisation by Piaget around 60 years ago, transitive reasoning (deductively-inferring A > C from premises A > B and B > C) has been of psychological interest both as a mental phenomenon and as a tool in areas of psychological discourse. However, the focus of interest in it has shifted periodically first from child development, to learning disability, to non-humans and currently to cognitive and clinical neuroscience. Crucially, such shifts have always been plagued by one core question – the question of which of two competing paradigms (extensive-training paradigm versus non-training paradigm) is valid for assessing transitive reasoning as originally conceived in Piagetian research. The continued avoidance of this question potentially undermines several important findings recently reported: Such as about exactly what is involved in deducing transitive inferences, which brain regions are critical for reaching transitive inference, and what links exist between weakened deductive transitivity and mental illnesses like schizophrenia. Here, we offer the view that both of the competing paradigms are indexing transitivity, but each one tends to tap a different aspect of it. Then, we summarise studies from child and adult cognitive psychology, disabilities research, and from cognitive neuroscience. These, together with studies of non-human reasoning, seem to afford a theory of transitive reasoning that has two major components; one deductive but the other associative. It is proposed that only a dual-process theory of transitivity (having analytic versus intuitive routes approximate to deductive versus associative processing respectively) can account both for the variety of findings and the apparently-disparate paradigms. However, fuzzy-trace theory (“Gist” processes and representations), if not already embodying such a dual-process theory, will need to be incorporated into any complete theory.     

The case for motivated reasoning

It is proposed that motivation may affect reasoning through reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes--that is, strategies for accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs. The motivation to be accurate enhances use of those beliefs and strategies that are considered most appropriate, whereas the motivation to arrive at particular conclusions enhances use of those that are considered most likely to yield the desired conclusion. There is considerable evidence that people are more likely to arrive at conclusions that they want to arrive at, but their ability to do so is constrained by their ability to construct seemingly reasonable justifications for these conclusions. These ideas can account for a wide variety of research concerned with motivated reasoning.     

Temporalizing ontology: a case for pragmatic emergence

Synthese - Despite an attempt to break with the hierarchical picture in traditional emergentist thought, non-standard accounts of emergence are often still committed to a premise that ontology is...     

Begging the question as a pragmatic fallacy

The aim of this paper is to make it clear how and why begging the question should be seen as a pragmatic fallacy which can only be properly evaluated in a context of dialogue. Included in the paper is a review of the contemporary literature on begging the question that shows the gradual emergence over the past twenty years or so of the dialectical conception of this fallacy. A second aim of the paper is to investigate a number of general problems raised by the pragmatic framework.The work in this paper was supported by a Fellowship from the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS) and a Research Grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Thanks are due to Erik Krabbe for discussions, and to the members of the NIAS Research Group on Fallacies as Violations of Rules of Argumentative Discourse: Frans van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst, Sally Jackson, Scott Jacobs, Agnes Haft van Rees, Agnes Verbiest, Charles Willard, and John Woods.     

Belief-desire reasoning as a process of selection

Human learning may depend upon domain specialized mechanisms. A plausible example is rapid, early learning about the thoughts and feelings of other people. A major achievement in this domain, at about age four in the typically developing child, is the ability to solve problems in which the child attributes false beliefs to other people and predicts their actions. The main focus of theorizing has been why 3-year-olds fail, and only recently have there been any models of how success is achieved in false-belief tasks. Leslie and Polizzi (Inhibitory processing in the false-belief task: Two conjectures. Developmental Science, 1, 247-254, 1998) proposed two competing models of success, which are the focus of the current paper. The models assume that belief-desire reasoning is a process which selects a content for an agent's belief and an action for the agent's desire. In false belief tasks, the theory of mind mechanism (ToMM) provides plausible candidate belief contents, among which will be a 'true-belief.' A second process reviews these candidates and by default will select the true-belief content for attribution. To succeed in a false-belief task, the default content must be inhibited so that attention shifts to another candidate belief. In traditional false-belief tasks, the protagonist's desire is to approach an object. Here we make use of tasks in which the protagonist has a desire to avoid an object, about which she has a false-belief. Children find such tasks much more difficult than traditional tasks. Our models explain the additional difficulty by assuming that predicting action from an avoidance desire also requires an inhibition. The two processing models differ in the way that belief and desire inhibitory processes combine to achieve successful action prediction. In six experiments we obtain evidence favoring one model, in which parallel inhibitory processes cancel out, over the other model, in which serial inhibitions force attention to a previously inhibited location. These results are discussed in terms of a set of simple proposals for the modus operandi of a domain specific learning mechanism. The learning mechanism is in part modular--the ToMM--and in part penetrable--the Selection Processor (SP). We show how ToMM-SP can account both for competence and for successful and unsuccessful performance on a wide range of belief-desire tasks across the preschool period. Together, ToMM and SP attend to and learn about mental states.     

Relatio as Modus Essendi : The Origins of Henry of Ghent's Definition of Relation

The context in which medieval theologians discuss 'relation' is nearly always a trinitarian one. They have to solve an awkward problem: to explain how in God the persons are identical with the divine essence, yet different among themselves. In this paper I want to argue that Henry of Ghent's interest in the nature of the Trinity acted as an impetus towards the development of his theory of the nature of relations. In this context the accounts of Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome will be considered as important for understand18 ing Henry's account. Henry's positive account of relations stems from Avicenna. For Henry, a relation is not an aliquid but has two modes of being, both as an accident and as a relative. Henry's attempt to think the nature of relation leads to him developing a relational ontology.     

The natural emergence of reasoning about the afterlife as a developmental regularity

Participants were interviewed about the biological and psychological functioning of a dead agent. In Experiment 1, even 4- to 6-year-olds stated that biological processes ceased at death, although this trend was more apparent among 6- to 8-year-olds. In Experiment 2, 4- to 12-year-olds were asked about psychological functioning. The youngest children were equally likely to state that both cognitive and psychobiological states continued at death, whereas the oldest children were more likely to state that cognitive states continued. In Experiment 3, children and adults were asked about an array of psychological states. With the exception of preschoolers, who did not differentiate most of the psychological states, older children and adults were likely to attribute epistemic, emotional, and desire states to dead agents. These findings suggest that developmental mechanisms underlie intuitive accounts of dead agents' minds.     

Analogical reasoning as a tool of epidemiological investigation

Few, if any, scientific inquiries are conducted against a background of complete knowledge, a background in which inquirers are in possession of the full facts that relate to a particular question or issue. More often than not, scientists are compelled to conduct their deliberations in contexts of epistemic uncertainty, in which partial knowledge or even a total absence of knowledge characterise inquiry. Nowhere is this epistemic uncertainty more evident, or indeed more successfully controlled, than in the branch of scientific inquiry called epidemiology. In this paper, I examine how epidemiologists overcome the unique challenges to inquiry that are posed by epistemic uncertainty. In specific terms, I contend that epidemiologists employ analogical reasoning strategies in an attempt to advance their inquiries in situations that are epistemically uncertain. The context for my claims will be the early inquiries that were conducted into the emergence of HIV/AIDS in the United States. I argue that early scientific work in relation to HIV/AIDS was directly premised upon epidemiological investigations in which analogical reasoning with hepatitis B had featured significantly. I conclude that epidemiological investigations of AIDS exemplify the capacity of analogical reasoning to advance inquiry under conditions of epistemic uncertainty. To this extent, analogical reasoning should be a concern both to those who address practical problems of uncertainty management and to those who pursue theoretical debates within argumentation studies and epistemology.     

Propositional reasoning and working memory: the role of prior training and pragmatic content

Working memory involvement in propositional reasoning was explored after different kinds of training. The training conditions aimed to reduce the impact of non-analytic heuristics and to enhance analytic inference processes according to mental logic theories, the mental model theory, and the theory of pragmatic reasoning schemata. Following an initial training phase, secondary task interference was investigated using concurrent spatial tapping (Experiment 1), random number generation (Experiment 2), and articulatory suppression (Experiment 3). A training condition practicing the construction and use of mental models via a truth table task increased the disruption of reasoning performance by random number generation and articulatory suppression, whereas the other training conditions did not affect susceptibility to secondary task interference. The results corroborate implications of the mental model theory of reasoning.     

The development of complex metarepresentational reasoning: The case of situational irony

Situational irony requires the representation of events that end contrary to expectation, as if in mockery of the fitness of things. It entails metarepresentational reasoning because event representations must be manipulated to recognize and construct ironic events. Ironic ability in 6-and 8-year-olds was tested in a story-completion task. Story stems based on a familiar event, for which a structured, detailed representation is available, were more facilitative of irony at both ages than stems based on a less familiar activity for which no such representation is available. These data support the idea that irony is a metarepresentational skill. Younger children's irony was restricted to ironic forms that entail cognitively simpler representational manipulations, whereas older children's irony included complex forms. Irony was not easily accomplished at either age, however, suggesting that this metarepresentational skill is more difficult than those theory-of-mind behaviors typical of 5-to 8-year-olds. The relation of Situational irony to consciousness and the self is discussed.     

The latent variable approach as applied to transitive reasoning

We discuss the limitations of hypothesis testing using (quasi-) experiments in the study of cognitive development and suggest latent variable modeling as a viable alternative to experimentation. Latent variable models allow testing a theory as a whole, incorporating individual differences with respect to developmental processes or abilities in the model. Experiments, in contrast, aim at testing hypotheses that refer to a specific part of a theory; also they ignore individual differences or model the individual differences using age group as a proxy for developmental stage. Drawing on a sample of 409 5–13-year olds, we demonstrate the advantages of latent variable models in the area of transitive reasoning. A comparison of three models showed that the latent variable model that represented fuzzy trace theory had a better fit than the models representing Piaget's theory or linear ordering theory.     

The acquisition of conditioned suppression as a function of interstimulus interval duration

The effect of interstimulus interval (ISI) variation on the acquisition of a classically conditioned emotional response was investigated using a one-trial conditioning procedure. The optimum ISI was found to be 10 s with a bidirectional gradient for conditioned suppression at ISI above and below 10 s. Control groups demonstrated that conditioning was not a function of either pseudoconditioning, sensitization or stimulus novelty.     

Children use whole-part juxtaposition as a pragmatic cue to word meaning

When parents label novel parts of familiar objects, they typically provide familiar whole-object terms before offering novel part terms (e.g., "See this cup? This is the rim."). Such whole-part juxtaposition might help children to accurately interpret the meaning of novel part terms, but it can do so only if they recognize the conjunction as a potential cue to part meaning. Two studies examined (a) whether 3- to 4-year-olds use whole-part juxtaposition to accurately interpret novel part terms and (b) how they might do so. Study 1 confirmed that children indeed use juxtaposition to guide learning of novel part terms. Furthermore, 2 control conditions clarified that children's use of juxtaposition was not simply due to memory effects, such as the facilitation of lexical access, nor to recognition of the grammatical frame that typically accompanies juxtaposition. Study 2 revealed that children readily use juxtaposition in a novel, gestural format. Such flexibility in recognizing and utilizing novel variants of juxtaposition strongly suggests that pragmatic understanding lies at the heart of children's sensitivity to whole-part juxtaposition.