Understanding causal conditionals: A study of individual differences

Previous studies have suggested that a minority of university students, of lower cognitive ability, are inclined to interpret abstract conditional statements, if p then q, as if they were conjunctions: p and q. In the present study we administered the conditional truth table task to a large sample of students (n = 160), but using realistic, everyday causal conditionals. We also measured their general intelligence. While individual differences were found, these were not consistent with some participants adopting a conjunctive interpretation of such statements. Rather, it appears that students of lower cognitive ability are rather likely to assume that a conditional implies its converse, so that it means also if q then p. The results are discussed with reference to the suppositional theory of conditionals and our more general account of hypothetical thinking.     

Truth table tasks: The relevance of irrelevant

Two types of truth table tasks are used investigating mental representations of conditionals: a possibilities-based and a truth-based one. In possibilities tasks, participants indicate whether a situation is possible or impossible according to the conditional rule. In truth tasks participants evaluate whether a situation makes the rule true or false, or is irrelevant with respect to the truth of the rule. Comparing the two-option version of the possibilities task with the truth task in Experiment 1, the possibilities task yields logical answer patterns whereas the truth task yields defective patterns. Adding the irrelevant option to the possibilities task in Experiment 2 leads to a considerable amount of defective patterns in the possibilities task, but still to more logical patterns in the possibilities task than in the truth task. Experiment 3 shows that directionality matters since rule-to-situation tasks yield more logical answer patterns than do situation-to-rule tasks. We conclude that both task types are not comparable as such since wording, number of options and directionality influence the results.     

Theory of mind and its relationship with behavioural inhibition in Chilean preschools / Teoría de la mente y su relación con inhibición conductual en pre-escolares chilenos

Abstract

This study’s main objective was to determine whether the five-step theory of mind scale is associated with responses to behavioural inhibition tasks. The data collected for this were the responses to the scale given by 65 Chilean children aged three to five from medium-low socioeconomic levels, and were derived from the changing locations, happy-sad Stroop, day-night and Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) tasks they carried out. Results showed that there was a significant association between the five-step theory of mind scale and behavioural inhibition (r = .28) and behavioural inhibition with the false belief task (r = .31), controlling for age, sex and language. These data support the emergence model as the best model to describe the relationship between theory of mind and behavioural inhibition. Finally, the results are discussed and future lines of study in this subject are put forward.     

Scarecrow,Tin Woodsman,and Cowardly Lion: The three-factor model of virtue

Recent research has identified three virtues from the 24 strengths in the VIA Classification of Strengths and Virtues, labeled caring, inquisitiveness, and self-control. This article explored this model further. Study 1 demonstrated substantial congruence in three-factor loadings across 12 samples (total N = 1,082,230) despite substantial differences in methodology. Study 2 (N = 1719) provided support for the use of aggregate scores for the three virtues. Study 3 (N = 498) demonstrated substantial overlap between measures of personality and the virtues. We conclude these three are potentially essential components of a theory of virtue. They cannot be considered a sufficient model, which may be unattainable. We also note that treating virtue as an individual difference concept neglects key elements of our understanding of virtue as a social construct, and these more amorphous elements must be considered in developing an optimal model of virtue.     

Theory of Mind and the Video Deficit Effect: Video Presentation Impairs Children’s Encoding and Understanding of False Belief

The video deficit effect (VDE) has been demonstrated in several studies on word learning, self-recognition, and imitation: Younger children (up to 3 years old) solved tasks more easily in a direct interaction with an examiner than when instructed by video (Anderson & Pempek, 2005). Older children might also be susceptible to a VDE, especially with more complex tasks; however, evidence is sparse. Furthermore, to what extent preschoolers’ understanding of others’ mental states (theory of mind) is impaired by video presentations has not been tested. We tested 174 children of 4 and 5 years of age in a traditional change of location task for false belief understanding (cf. Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). Children were presented with the original story, enacted by adult actors, in either a video or a live demonstration. Children watched the events in 2 live conditions, either through a 1-way mirror or directly. Our results indicate a significant VDE for 4- and 5-year-old children regarding the encoding and solution of the false belief task, respectively.     

Two meanings of “if”? Individual differences in the interpretation of conditionals

This work investigates the nature of two distinct response patterns in a probabilistic truth table evaluation task, in which people estimate the probability of a conditional on the basis of frequencies of the truth table cases. The conditional-probability pattern reflects an interpretation of conditionals as expressing a conditional probability. The conjunctive pattern suggests that some people treat conditionals as conjunctions, in line with a prediction of the mental-model theory. Experiments 1 and 2 rule out two alternative explanations of the conjunctive pattern. It does not arise from people believing that at least one case matching the conjunction of antecedent and consequent must exist for a conditional to be true, and it does not arise from people adding the converse to the given conditional. Experiment 3 establishes that people's response patterns in the probabilistic truth table task are very consistent across different conditionals, and that the two response patterns generalize to conditionals with negated antecedents and consequents. Individual differences in rating the probability of a conditional were loosely correlated with corresponding response patterns in a classical truth table evaluation task, but there was little association with people's evaluation of deductive inferences from conditionals as premises. A theoretical framework is proposed that integrates elements from the conditional-probability view with the theory of mental models.     

Assessing declarative memory in 12-month-old infants: A test – retest reliability study of the deferred imitation task

This study examined whether declarative memory in infants can be reliably assessed using the deferred imitation task. Twenty-four infants at the age of 12 months were given the same deferred imitation task twice within a short period of time (week-to-week assessment). Replicating the results of former studies the second memory test yielded better memory performances on the group level than the first one, indicating a memory benefit as is typically found in older children as well as in adults. Stability of memory performance level was analysed using two indicators, namely test – retest correlations assessing stability of individual memory performances for the whole sample, as well as corrected test – retest correlations using individual consistency scores. Test – retest reliability was highly significant (r = .52, p = .009), as well as corrected test – retest reliability (r = .62, p = .001), thus demonstrating that the individual memory performance level in infants can reliably be assessed using the deferred imitation task.     

The influences of partner accuracy and partner memory ability on social false memories

In this study, we examined whether increasing the proportion of false information suggested by a confederate would influence the magnitude of socially introduced false memories in the social contagion paradigm Roediger, Meade, & Bergman (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 8:365–371, 2001). One participant and one confederate collaboratively recalled items from previously studied household scenes. During collaboration, the confederate interjected 0 %, 33 %, 66 %, or 100 % false items. On subsequent individual-recall tests across three experiments, participants were just as likely to incorporate misleading suggestions from a partner who was mostly accurate (33 % incorrect) as they were from a partner who was not at all accurate (100 % incorrect). Even when participants witnessed firsthand that their partner had a very poor memory on a related memory task, they were still as likely to incorporate the confederate’s entirely misleading suggestions on subsequent recall and recognition tests (Exp. 2). Only when participants witnessed firsthand that their partner had a very poor memory on a practice test of the experimental task itself were they able to reduce false memory, and this reduction occurred selectively on a subsequent individual recognition test (Exp. 3). These data demonstrate that participants do not always consider their partners’ memory ability when working on collaborative memory tasks.     

Perceptual load in sport and the heuristic value of the perceptual load paradigm in examining expertise-related perceptual-cognitive adaptations

In two experiments, we transferred perceptual load theory to the dynamic field of team sports and tested the predictions derived from the theory using a novel task and stimuli. We tested a group of college students (N = 33) and a group of expert team sport players (N = 32) on a general perceptual load task and a complex, soccer-specific perceptual load task in order to extend the understanding of the applicability of perceptual load theory and further investigate whether distractor interference may differ between the groups, as the sport-specific processing task may not exhaust the processing capacity of the expert participants. In both, the general and the specific task, the pattern of results supported perceptual load theory and demonstrates that the predictions of the theory also transfer to more complex, unstructured situations. Further, perceptual load was the only determinant of distractor processing, as we neither found expertise effects in the general perceptual load task nor the sport-specific task. We discuss the heuristic utility of using response-competition paradigms for studying both general and domain-specific perceptual-cognitive adaptations.     

The collapse illusion effect: A semantic-pragmatic illusion of truth and paradox

Abstract

Two Experiments demonstrate the existence of a “collapse illusion”, in which reasoners evaluate Truthteller-type propositions (“I am telling the truth”) as if they were simply true, whereas Liar-type propositions (“I am lying”) tend to be evaluated as neither true nor false. The second Experiment also demonstrates an individual differences pattern, in which shallow reasoners are more susceptible to the illusion. The collapse illusion is congruent with philosophical semantic truth theories such as Kripke's (1975 Kripke, S. 1975. Outline of a theory of truth. The Journal of Philosophy, 72: 690–716. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), and with hypothetical thinking theory's principle of satisficing, but can only be partially accounted for by the model theory principle of truth. Pragmatic effects related to sentence cohesion further reinforce hypothetical thinking theory interpretation of the data, although the illusion and cohesion data could also be accounted for within a modified mental model theory.     

The Force of Truth1

The theme of the paper is that what is true cannot be false and conversely. This position was anticipated by Aristotle in De Interpretatione and by G. H. von Wright. The latter calls it “a truth of the logic of relative modalities.” Aristotle has been taken to task by Susan Haack and others for arguing fallaciously from the Principle of Bivalence, that every statement is either true or false, to fatalism. The implication holds, but we show that it is unreasonable to assume that Aristotle grounded his argument on this implication rather than on what we call the force of truth.     

Effects of context on the rate of conjunctive responses in the probabilistic truth table task

The probabilistic truth table task involves assessing the probability of "If A then C" conditional sentences. Previous studies have shown that a majority of participants assess this probability as the conditional probability P(C│A) while a substantial minority responds with the probability of the conjunction A and C. In an experiment involving 96 participants, we investigated the impact on the rate of conjunctive responses of the context in which the task is framed. We show that a context intended to lead participants to consider all the possible cases (i.e. the throw of a die known to allow six possibilities) elicited more conjunctive responses than a context assumed not to have this effect (an unfamiliar deck of cards). These results suggest that the step of inferring the probability can distort our assessment of participants' interpretation of conditional sentences. This might compromise the validity of the probabilistic task in studying conditional reasoning.     

Two meanings of "if"? Individual differences in the interpretation of conditionals

This work investigates the nature of two distinct response patterns in a probabilistic truth table evaluation task, in which people estimate the probability of a conditional on the basis of frequencies of the truth table cases. The conditional-probability pattern reflects an interpretation of conditionals as expressing a conditional probability. The conjunctive pattern suggests that some people treat conditionals as conjunctions, in line with a prediction of the mental-model theory. Experiments 1 and 2 rule out two alternative explanations of the conjunctive pattern. It does not arise from people believing that at least one case matching the conjunction of antecedent and consequent must exist for a conditional to be true, and it does not arise from people adding the converse to the given conditional. Experiment 3 establishes that people's response patterns in the probabilistic truth table task are very consistent across different conditionals, and that the two response patterns generalize to conditionals with negated antecedents and consequents. Individual differences in rating the probability of a conditional were loosely correlated with corresponding response patterns in a classical truth table evaluation task, but there was little association with people's evaluation of deductive inferences from conditionals as premises. A theoretical framework is proposed that integrates elements from the conditional-probability view with the theory of mental models.     

Transformational leadership,psychological empowerment,and flow at work

ABSTRACT

Frequent experiences of flow – an enjoyable state of optimal challenge – at work are associated with many positive individual and organizational outcomes. In our research, we examine how leaders affect subordinates’ flow experiences through subordinates’ work-related self-concept. Specifically, on the basis of self-concept theory, we propose that transformational leaders affect followers’ work-related self-concept, which we construe as followers’ psychological empowerment, consisting of the four sub-facets of meaning, competence, self-determination and impact. We further propose that psychological empowerment is positively related to flow experiences at work. In sum, we thus hypothesize that the effect of transformational leadership on employees’ flow experiences is mediated by psychological empowerment. Additionally, we propose that this indirect effect is moderated such that it is stronger for employees holding a formal leadership position. We tested the model with two two-wave questionnaire studies with employees (Study 1: N = 307 at time 1; N = 60 at time 2; Study 2: N = 611 at time 1; N = 271 at time 2) from different organizations. Path models reveal support for the mediation hypotheses in both samples but not for the moderated mediation hypothesis.     

The interplay between feelings and beliefs about condoms as predictors of their use

Objective: Negative feelings about condoms are a key barrier to their use. Using the behavioural affective associations model, we examined the joint effects of affective associations and cognitive beliefs about condoms on condom use.

Design: In Study 1 (N = 97), students completed measures of their affective associations and cognitive beliefs about sex and condoms, sexual activity and condom use. In Study 2 (N = 171), a measure of behavioural intentions and condom selection task were added.

Main outcome measures: Condom use measured in Study 1 as (1) current condom use, and (2) willingness to use condoms; in Study 2 as: (1) behavioural intentions, (2) number of condoms selected.

Results: Affective associations with sex and condoms were behaviour-specific, were directly associated with the respective behaviour, and mediated the relations of cognitive beliefs to behaviour, ps < .05. In Study 2, affective associations were associated with behavioural intentions and the number of condoms selected, ps < .05; cognitive beliefs were indirectly associated with these outcomes through affective associations, indirect effects: ps < .05.

Conclusions: Affective associations are a behaviour-specific and proximal predictor of condom use, mediating the effect of cognitive beliefs, suggesting they may be a particularly viable intervention target.     

Truth table tasks: Irrelevance and cognitive ability

Two types of truth table task are used to examine people's mental representation of conditionals. In two within-participants experiments, participants either receive the same task-type twice (Experiment 1) or are presented successively with both a possibilities task and a truth task (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 examines how people interpret the three-option possibilities task and whether they have a clear understanding of it. The present study aims to examine, for both task-types, how participants' cognitive ability relates to the classification of the truth table cases as irrelevant, and their consistency in doing so. Looking at the answer patterns, participants' cognitive ability influences their classification of the truth table cases: A positive correlation exists between cognitive ability and the number of false-antecedent cases classified as “irrelevant”, both in the possibilities task and the truth task. This favours a suppositional representation of conditionals.     

Interpretation and matching bias in a reasoning task

Subjects were required to construct verifying and falsifying cases of conditional rules in which the presence and absence of negative components was varied. Their responses gave some indication of consistent interpretation of the rules, generally conforming to Wason's (1966) idea of a “defective” truth table. Much of their behaviour, however, seemed to be determined by a task variable in the form of a tendency to construct instances which matched, rather than altered, the values named in the rules.     

Playing for the thrill and skill. Quiz games as means for mood and competence repair

ABSTRACT

Recent studies have found that digital games can be used to improve the players’ mood, especially after emotionally unpleasant experiences. We introduce competence repair as an extension of previous work on mood repair. To investigate the effects of digital games on both mood and competence repair, we conducted 3 studies using quiz games. In the quasi-experimental Study 1 (N = 143), we manipulated the necessity for repair via a false feedback task (positive vs. negative), and looked at the impact of in-game success (victory vs. defeat). In the experimental Studies 2 (N = 91) and 3 (N = 109), we aimed at conceptually replicating and extending the findings on the impact of in-game success by varying participants’ success over a series of 4 matches (Study 2: close game outcomes, Study 3: clear victory/defeat). The results of these studies indicate that the efficacy of digital games for mood repair, as well as competence repair, depends on the necessity for repair, as well as success in the game. However, competence repair occurred even after participants were defeated repeatedly in a series of close matches. These results are discussed in light of the potential of digital games for fulfilling (previously thwarted) psychological needs.     

Children’s strategy use when playing strategic games

Strategic games require reasoning about other people’s and one’s own beliefs or intentions. Although they have clear commonalities with psychological tests of theory of mind, they are not clearly related to theory of mind tests for children between 9 and 10 years of age “Flobbe et al. J Logic Language Inform 17(4):417–442 (2008)”. We studied children’s (5–12 years of age) individual differences in how they played a strategic game by analyzing the strategies that they applied in a zero, first, and second-order reasoning task. For the zero-order task, we found two subgroups with different accuracy levels. For the first-order task, subgroups of children applied different suboptimal strategies or an optimal strategy. For the second-order task only suboptimal strategies were present. Strategy use for all tasks was related to age. The 5- and 6-year old children were additionally tested on theory of mind understanding and executive functioning. Strategy-use in these children was related to working memory, but not to theory of mind after correction for age, verbal ability and general IQ.     

How to get radical creative ideas into a leader’s mind? Leader’s achievement goals and subordinates’ voice of creative ideas

In the present research we investigated when and why leaders tend to oppose or adopt radical creative ideas voiced by their subordinates. In a field study (Study 1, N = 127) we showed that leaders’ performance goals were positively related to their tendency to oppose radical creative ideas, whereas leaders’ mastery goals were positively related to their tendency to adopt them. We replicated these findings in an experimental study (Study 2, N = 90), in which we showed that performance goal leaders were more likely to oppose radical creative ideas voiced by their subordinates than mastery goal leaders, whereas mastery goal leaders were more likely to adopt those ideas than performance goal leaders. In Study 2, we further showed that the effects of leaders’ achievement goals on their oppose and adopt responses were mediated by the leaders’ interest in exploration. Finally, in Study 3 (N = 91), we experimentally demonstrated that oppose and adopt responses of performance goal leaders, rather than mastery goal leaders, were sensitive to the behavioural mode by which subordinates voiced their radical creative ideas. That is, performance goal leaders were less likely to oppose and more likely to adopt radical creative ideas when subordinates voiced them in a considerate mode rather than an aggressive mode.