Structure Compatibility and Restructuring in Judgment and Choice

The use of different response modes has been found to influence how subjects evaluate pairs of alternatives described by two attributes. It has been suggested that judgments and choices evoke different kinds of cognitive processes, leading to an overweighing of the prominent attribute in choice (Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988; Fischer & Hawkins, 1993). Four experiments were conducted to compare alternative cognitive explanations of this so-called prominence effect in judgment and choice. The explanations investigated were the structure compatibility hypothesis and the restructuring hypothesis. According to the structure compatibility hypothesis, it was assumed that the prominence effect is due to a lack of compatibility between the required output from subjects and the structure of information in input. The restructuring hypothesis stated that the decision maker uses mental restructuring operations on a representation of decision options to make the options more clearly differentiated. In Experiment 1, a matching procedure was used to provide pairs of equally attractive options (medical treatments) for the following experiments. In Experiments 2, 3, and 4, preferences were elicited with two different response modes, choice and preference rating. Value ranges on the prominent and nonprominent attributes were manipulated to test the structure compatibility hypothesis. Accountability was also subject to manipulation as it was assumed to stimulate restructuring. Since the prominence effect was not restricted to choices, and effects of value ranges were obtained but not of accountability, the results were interpreted in line with the structure compatibility hypothesis.     

Compatibility and the use of information processing strategies

When a prominent attribute looms larger in one response procedure than in another, a violation of procedure invariance occurs. A hypothesis based on compatibility between the structure of the input information and the required output was tested as an explanation of this phenomenon. It was also compared with other existing hypotheses in the field. The study had two aims: (1) to illustrate the prominence effect in a selection of preference tasks (choice, acceptance decisions, and preference ratings); (2) to demonstrate the processing differences in a matching procedure versus the selected preference tasks. Hence, verbal protocols were collected in both a matching task and in subsequent preference tasks. Silent control conditions were also employed. The structure compatibility hypothesis was confirmed in that a prominence effect obtained in the preference tasks was accompanied by a lower degree of attention to the attribute levels in these tasks. Furthermore, as predicted from the structure compatibility hypothesis, it was found that fewer comparisons between attribute levels were performed in the preference tasks than in the matching task. It was therefore concluded that both these processing differences may explain the occurrence of the prominence effects. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Information Processing Strategies in Riskless Preference Reversals: The Prominence Effect

A preference reversal occurs whenever an individual prefers one alternative to another in one response mode (e.g., choice) but shows the opposite preference order in another response mode (e.g., attractiveness ratings, matching). In previous studies of riskless multiattribute preferences the most common reversal pattern involves a prominence effect: The more important attribute has a greater influence in choices than in matching judgments. Previous research has suggested that the prominence effect can be accounted for by the strategy compatibility principle, which states that response tasks can evoke different decision strategies and these strategies determine the relative impact of the various attributes. This article attempts to establish the mediating role of decision processes in determining the occurrence and pattern of riskless preference reversals. In a process tracing experiment we replicate previous findings of a prominence effect in riskless two-attribute preferences. In addition, there are clear differences in process between response modes, and these differences are consistent with previous explanations of riskless preference reversals. Finally, we are able to predict subject level differences in choice preferences and choice versus matching reversals using measures of information search.     

Leader‐driven distortion of probability and payoff information affects choices between risky prospects

Research indicating that decision makers often distort new information to favor nascent preferences has focused primarily on riskless choice rather than risky choice. In addition, the critical assumption that information distortion mediates the link between the initially preferred alternative and the final choice has not been tested in a compelling manner. In an experiment designed to fill these gaps, participants made six choices involving pairs of hypothetical three‐outcome monetary gambles. We manipulated initial preferences by varying the order in which gamble features were presented. Multilevel regressions indicated that participants distorted their evaluations of precise probabilities and payoffs in the direction of their emerging preferences and that they used their biased evaluations to update those preferences. As expected, information distortion mediated the effect of initial preferences on final choices and final preference strength. In a follow‐up experiment, we compared a standard measure of information distortion (based on comparisons to mean ratings in a no‐choice control task) to a more personalized measure (based on participants' own ratings in the control task) and found the mean‐based measure to be superior for the probability and payoff information in question. Other findings in Experiment 2 corroborated the results of Experiment 1. In both studies, the distortion of quantitative inputs in a simple task highlights the non‐normative circularity of the choice process. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Response Mode Bias in the Formation of Preference: Boundary Conditions of the Prominence Effect

Prior research has discovered that the most prominent attribute has greater influence on the formation of preference in choice versus matching tasks. We extend the research on this phenomenon, which is known as the prominence effect (Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988), by examining its generalizability and by providing insight into the psychological processes involved. The effects of task characteristics (i.e., the number of attributes and alternatives) and the effects of subject characteristics (i.e., processing goal) on the prominence effect were examined. In the first experiment we found that the prominence effect reverses when the number of attributes increases from two to four. That is, the prominent attribute is given greater weight in matching tasks rather than in choice tasks. A second experiment demonstrated that processing goal does influence the robustness of the prominence effect. We found that the influence of the prominent attribute on the formation of preference did not differ in choice and matching tasks when subjects′ processing goal was to form an overall impression of each of the alternatives. A third experiment, which explored the interaction between the response mode and processing goal in the four attribute case replicated this finding. Findings from Experiment 1 were also extended so that the reverse prominence effect was found when subjects processing goal was to memorize the information. Implications of these results are discussed.     

The judgment-choice discrepancy: Noncompatibility or restructuring?

The study examines the relative merits of a noncompatibility and a restructuring explanation of the recurrent empirical finding that a prominent attribute looms larger in choices than in judgments. Pairs of equally attractive options were presented to 72 undergraduates who were assigned to six conditions in which they performed (1) only preference judgments or choices, (2) preference judgments or choices preceded by judgments of attractiveness of attribute levels, or (3) preference judgments or choices accompanied by think-aloud reports. The results replicated the prominence effect for choices, but a prominence effect was also found for preference judgments. In accordance with the restructuring explanation, the think-aloud protocols indicated that options were more often restructured in choices than in preference judgments. However, restructuring could not explain the prominence effect observed for preference judgments. A modified compatibility hypothesis is offered as an alternative explanation.     

The Δ–∑ hypothesis: How contrast and reinforcement rate combine to generate suboptimal choice

When given a choice between two alternatives, each offering food after the same delay with different but signaled probabilities, pigeons often prefer the low probability alternative. This preference is surprising because pigeons fail to maximize the rate of food intake; they exhibit a suboptimal preference. We advance a new explanation, the Δ–∑ hypothesis, in which the difference in probability of reinforcement within terminal links (Δ) and the overall reinforcement probability rate of each alternative (∑) are the key variables responsible for such suboptimal preference. We tested the Δ–∑ hypothesis in two experiments. In Experiment 1, we manipulated the Δs while maintaining constant all other parameters of the task, in particular the ∑s. We predicted a preference for the alternative with the larger Δ. In Experiment 2, we examined the effect of the overall reinforcement probabilities, the ∑s, while maintaining constant all other parameters of the task, in particular the Δs. We predicted a preference for the larger ∑. The results of both experiments support the Δ–∑ hypothesis.     

Individual differences in the use of simplification strategies in a complex decision-making task

Decision time results were used to assess the strategies that 90 college undergraduates used in a complex decision-making task. Trend analyses revealed that the functions relating choice time to the number of choice alternatives in a set and the number of attributes comprising those alternatives contained linear (increasing) components. In addition, for a portion of the subjects, there was a quadratic effect of the number of attributes available to the decision maker on choice time, suggesting that these subjects adopted simplification strategies at high levels of task complexity. Reliable individual differences in these trend components were observed, consistent with individual differences in motivation and/or processing capacities. These individual differences were included in an information-processing model of decision behavior that captured the choice time data observed in this study. Subjects' ratings of apartments were used as a basis to assess the extent to which the use of simplification strategies resulted in preference reversals. Contrary to expectation, subjects whose choice times contained quadratic components demonstrated fewer preference reversals at high levels of information load.     

Construction of preferences by constraint satisfaction

Participants were given a choice between two multiattribute alternatives (job offers). Preferences for the attributes were measured before, during, and after the choices were made. We found that over the course of decision making, the preferences shifted to cohere with the choice: The attributes of the option that was eventually chosen came to be rated more favorably than they had been rated initially, while the attributes of the rejected option received lower preference ratings than before. These coherence shifts were triggered by a single attribute that decisively favored one option (Experiment 1), and occurred spontaneously in the absence of a decisive attribute (Experiment 2). The coherence shift preceded commitment to choice. These findings favor constraint-satisfaction models of decision making.     

Negative-based prominence: the role of negative features in matching and choice

Previous research related to the prominence effect (e.g., Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988) has mainly focused on the causes and boundary conditions of the effect. This article investigates the determinants of prominence and explores a negative-based prominence effect in which the negative attribute becomes the prominent one. Using a matching-choice procedure, Experiments 1 and 2 show that the negative dimension became the prominent one under two different cover stories, suggesting that the negative feature looms larger in choice than in matching. The robustness of negative-based prominence was further demonstrated in a direct choice task without matching (Experiment 3) and was shown to be resistant to the impact of added positive features (Experiment 4). Finally, Experiments 5 and 6 distinguish between two determinants of prominence: intrinsic prominence caused by attribute importance and negative-based prominence caused by negative attribute values. By lowering the values on the positive dimension and enhancing the values on the negative dimension, one can reverse the prominence effect. The results suggest that, compared to a matching task, choice leads to enhanced sensitivity to negative features. The relations between negative characteristics of an attribute and other factors that determine prominence are discussed in the final section.     

Response-outcome contingency: Behavioral and judgmental effects of appetitive and aversive outcomes with college students

In two experiments, positive, negative, and zero response-outcome contingencies were responded to and rated by college students under a free-operant procedure. In Experiment 1, outcomes were either neutral or were associated with point gain. In Experiment 2, subjects were administered different outcome treatments: neutral outcomes, outcomes associated with money gain, or outcomes associated with money loss. In both experiments, subjects' judgments of response-outcome contingency and their operant responses were each strong linear functions of ΔP, the difference between the probability of an outcome given a response and the probability of an outcome given no response. Appetitive and aversive outcomes produced opposite and symmetrical response patterns. In Experiment 1, no differences in ratings occurred with neutral or appetitive outcomes; however, in Experiment 2, more potent appetitve outcomes led to somewhat more extreme ratings than either neutral or aversive outcomes. Increasing outcome probability produced only a slight bias in ratings of noncontingent problems in Experiment 1 and no bias in Experiment 2. Contrary to predictions derived from an analysis of superstitious behavior, increasing outcome probability in noncontingent problems decreased operant responding when outcomes were appetitive and increased operant responding when outcomes were aversive. Trend analyses revealed that Δ P was superior to several other metrics in predicting subjects' estimates of contingency and the behavioral effects of contingency. Operant responding was in closer accord with matching predictions than with maximizing predictions.     

“金钱-环境”复合收益的风险决策:价值取向的影响

现实中的环境决策,往往要在多个由"金钱-环境"复合而成的结果间做选择。人们如何对异质复合结果进行评估与选择,是决策研究面临的新课题。本研究着重考察个体金钱取向和环境取向的相对强度对复合收益风险决策的影响。结果表明,无论是采用自陈量表(实验1)或内隐联想测验(实验2)来测量价值取向,还是采用混词造句任务(实验3)来启动价值取向,均发现价值取向相对强度对复合风险决策有显著影响。(1)相比于金钱取向占优的个体,环境取向占优的个体在进行复合风险决策时更偏好环境风险较小的复合选项;(2)在复合选项等价匹配任务中,环境取向占优的个体会赋予复合选项中的环境收益以更高权重,倾向于用更多的金钱收益来弥补环境收益的风险折扣;(3)在复合收益风险概率匹配任务中,环境取向占优的个体更倾向于为获取倍增的环境收益而承担更大的复合收益风险。作为对复合结果风险决策的首次探索,本研究初步回答了不同价值取向的个体在金钱-环境复合风险决策中更倾向于规避什么风险、拿什么冒险以及为什么冒险等问题,为今后进一步开展复合决策研究打下了理论和方法基础。     

Effect of local context of responding on human judgment of causality

Two experiments examined the effect of various relationships between a response (pressing the space bar of a computer) and an outcome (a triangle flashing on a screen) on judgments of the causal effectiveness of the response. In Experiment 1, when responses were required to be temporarily isolated from each other prior to an outcome, ratings of the causal effectiveness of the responses were higher than in a condition in which the probability of an outcome following a response was the same but in which no temporal isolation was required. In Experiment 2, when a number of responses were required to be emitted temporally close to the outcome, ratings of the causal effectiveness of the responses were lower than in a condition in which the probability of an outcome following a response was the same but in which no temporal proximity was required. These results suggest that, in addition to the overall probability that an outcome will follow a response, the local context of responding at the time an outcome is presented is critical in influencing ratings of causal effectiveness.     

Choice Blindness and Preference Change: You Will Like This Paper Better If You (Believe You) Chose to Read It!

Choice blindness is the finding that participants both often fail to notice mismatches between their decisions and the outcome of their choice and, in addition, endorse the opposite of their chosen alternative. But do these preference reversals also carry over to future choices and ratings? To investigate this question, we gave participants the task of choosing which of a pair of faces they found most attractive. Unknown to them, we sometimes used a card trick to exchange one face for the other. Both decision theory and common sense strongly suggest that most people would easily notice such a radical change in the outcome of a choice. But that was not the case: no more than a third of the exchanges were detected by the participants. We also included a second round of choices using the same face pairs, and two stages of post‐choice attractiveness ratings of the faces. This way we were able to measure preference strength both as choice consistency and by looking at measures of rating differences between chosen and rejected options. We found that the initially rejected faces were chosen more frequently in the second choice, and the perceived attractiveness of these faces was increased even in uncoupled individual ratings at the end of the experiment. This result is discussed in relation to Chen and Risen's recent criticism of the Free Choice Paradigm, as it shows that choices can affect future preferences. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What people say and what they do: The differential effects of informational cues and task design

Do ratings of tasks accurately reflect the influences on people's choices of tasks? Does information from others have strong effects on attitudes toward tasks, but weak effects on task choices? What effect does direct experience with tasks designed to be stimulating or dull have on task ratings and task choices? To answer these questions, we collected data from 24 male and female undergraduates who individually worked on four tasks involving the analysis of cartoons. Informational cues and task design were cross-cut so that each task was either enriched or unenriched and received either positive or negative cues. Subjects rated the tasks on scales that measured how motivating each task was perceived to be, and how interesting and enjoyable each task was. Then subjects worked on a freely chosen sequence of tasks for 10 min. Cues had significant main effects on task ratings, but not on overall choice of tasks. Task design had no main effect on ratings, but did significantly affect overall choices. These results suggest that behavioral choices are determined more by direct experience with tasks than by information provided by others.     

Differential predictability of preferences and choices

A combined multi-attribute utility and expectancy-value model has repeatedly been found to yield a worse fit to choices than to preference ratings. The present study investigated two possible explanations for this finding. First, people's belief-value structures may change in the choice task as they try to find the best alternative. Second, a difficult choice task may cause the decision maker to use simplifying heuristics. In the first of two experiments, subjective belief-value structures were measured on two occasions separated by about one week. Immediately before the second measurement, different groups of subjects performed a choice task, gave preference ratings, or performed a control task. The results did not support an interpretation of the greater difficulty of predicting choices in terms of changes in belief-value structures. However, the notion of simplifying heuristics received support by the finding that adopting simpler versions of the original model improved the predictions of the choices. In the second experiment, beliefs were measured immediately before or after each of a series of choices or preference ratings. The results indicated that although temporary changes in beliefs may occur, they can hardly provide a full account of the differential predictability of preferences and choices.     

When mixed options are preferred in multiple‐trial decisions

We report three studies showing that in prospective multiple‐trial decisions people often select a mix of sure and risky options over pure bundles of either option. Such a preference is not ‘rational’ because a mixed option cannot be the EV‐maximizing choice. Experiment 1 confirmed a mixed‐option preference for gains but not for losses. Showing a graph of the multiple‐trial outcome distribution reduced but did not eliminate this effect, suggesting that it is not due purely to a failure to aggregate correctly over the multiple trials. Experiment 2 replicated the mixed option preference using a wider range of problems. Experiment 3 compared choices in the trinary choice conditions used in Experiments 1 and 2 with binary choices between pairs of the multiple‐trial sure, mixed, and risky options. In the binary choice condition the mixed option was no longer the modal choice, suggesting that the strong mixed option preference found in the trinary choice conditions is mainly due to a compromise effect. However, the binary choice probabilities did show violations of strong stochastic transitivity in a pattern that suggested a slight bias toward the mixed option. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The influence of affective statements on performance on implicit and explicit memory tasks

Consumers are often exposed to brand names presented concurrently with information such as brand claims and warnings, prior to making product choices. As implicit memory has been implicated in the consumer choice process, two experiments were conducted to assess the influence of additional information, namely simple positive and negative statements, on implicit and explicit memory tasks. In Experiment 1, the mere presence of additional statements at study significantly reduced performance on a two‐alternatives forced recognition task. However, the same manipulation had no effect on implicit preference judgement task performance. The valence of the accompanying information had no effect on either task. In Experiment 2, using modified implicit and explicit choice tasks, performance on the former was unaffected by statement valence, whereas the latter task was. Hence, positive priming was obtained for brand names previously shown with negative information. The results of the experiments are discussed in relation to both implicit memory and consumer choice. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Common Ratio Effect in Choice,Pricing, and Happiness Tasks

The Allais common ratio effect is one of the most robust violations of rational decision making under risk. In this paper, we conduct a novel test of the common ratio effect in which we elicit preferences for the common ratio choice alternatives in choice, pricing, and happiness rating tasks. We find large shifts in preference patterns across tasks, both within and between subjects. In particular, we find that both the consistency and distribution of responses differ systematically across tasks, with modal choices replicating the Allais preference pattern, modal happiness ratings exhibiting consistent risk aversion, and modal prices maximizing expected value. We discuss the predictions of various cognitive explanations of the common ratio effect in the context of our experiment. We find that a dual process framework provides the most complete account of our results. Surprisingly, we also find that although the Allais pattern was the modal behavior in the choice task, none of the 158 respondents in our experiment exhibited the Allais pattern simultaneously in choice, happiness, and pricing tasks. Our results constitute a new paradox for the leading theories of choice under risk. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.