Changing beliefs and memories through dream interpretation

Autobiographical memory is malleable, but how much can we change people's beliefs and memories about the past? We approached this question with a method designed to supply subjects with a highly personalized suggestion about what probably happened in their childhood. In the current study, one group of subjects (the ‘Dream’ subjects) had their dreams interpreted to indicate that they had experienced a critical childhood event (e.g. being harassed by a bully) before the age of 3. Relative to control subjects who did not receive personalized suggestion, the Dream subjects were more likely to increase their belief that they had the critical experience, and approximately half of these also produced concrete memory reports. These findings are discussed in terms of their implications for autobiographical memory, and also for psychotherapy practice. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Background beliefs in Bayesian inference

We report five experiments in which the role of background beliefs in social judgments of posterior probability was investigated. From a Bayesian perspective, people should combine prior probabilities (or base rates) and diagnostic evidence with equal weighting, although previous research shows that base rates are often underweighted. These experiments were designed so that either piece of information was supplied either by personal beliefs or by presented statistics, and regression analyses were performed on individual participants to assess the relative influence of information. We found that both prior probabilities and diagnostic information significantly influenced judgments, whether supplied by beliefs or by statistical information, but that belief-based information tended to dominate the judgments made.     

Causal beliefs and empirical evidence

Causal beliefs often facilitate decision making. However, strong causal beliefs can also lead to neglect of relevant empirical evidence causing errors in risky decision making (e.g., medical, financial). We investigated the impact of pre-training and post-experience on the evaluation of empirical evidence in a two-alternative medical diagnostic task. Participants actively searched for information about two patients on the basis of four available cues. The first experiment indicated that pre-training can weaken the strong influence of causal beliefs reducing neglect of empirical evidence. The second experiment demonstrated that increasing amounts of empirical evidence can improve people's ability to decide in favor of a correct diagnosis. The current research converges with other recent work to clarify key mechanisms and boundary conditions shaping the influence of causal beliefs and empirical evidence in decisions and causal judgments.     

Implicit negotiation beliefs and performance: experimental and longitudinal evidence

The authors argue that implicit negotiation beliefs, which speak to the expected malleability of negotiating ability, affect performance in dyadic negotiations. They expected negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are malleable (incremental theorists) to outperform negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are fixed (entity theorists). In Study 1, they gathered evidence of convergent and discriminant validity for the implicit negotiation belief construct. In Study 2, they examined the impact of implicit beliefs on the achievement goals that negotiators pursue. In Study 3, they explored the causal role of implicit beliefs on negotiation performance by manipulating negotiators' implicit beliefs within dyads. They also identified perceived ability as a moderator of the link between implicit negotiation beliefs and performance. In Study 4, they measured negotiators' beliefs in a classroom setting and examined how these beliefs affected negotiation performance and overall performance in the course 15 weeks later. Across all performance measures, incremental theorists outperformed entity theorists. Consistent with the authors' hypotheses, incremental theorists captured more of the bargaining surplus and were more integrative than their entity theorist counterparts, suggesting implicit theories are important determinants of how negotiators perform. Implications and future directions are discussed.     

Biased interpretation of evidence by mock jurors

Predecisional distortion is jurors' biased interpretation of new evidence to support whichever verdict is tentatively favored as a trial progresses. In 2 experiments, students and prospective jurors distorted evidence from a mock trial. Further, the magnitude of prospective jurors' distortion was twice that of students. Consistent with previous research, distortion increased with juror confidence in whichever verdict was currently leading. In spite of clear instructions to ignore prior beliefs, general proplaintiff or prodefendant attitudes influenced the verdicts of prospective jurors, but not of students. These findings suggest that jury instructions should warn against not only premature decisions but also any tentative judgments, lest such opinions influence jurors' evaluations of subsequent evidence. Predecisional distortion in jury trials may lead to biased outcomes resulting from evidence order effects.     

Development and initial validation of the obsessive beliefs questionnaire and the interpretation of intrusions inventory

In 1995 the Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group initiated a collective process to develop two measures of cognition relevant to current cognitive-behavioural models of OCD. An earlier report (Behav. Res. Therapy, 35 (1997) 667) describes the original process of defining relevant domains. This article describes the subsequent steps of the development and validation process: item generation, scale reduction, and initial examination of reliability and validity. Two scales were developed. The Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire consists of 87 items representing dysfunctional assumptions covering six domains: overestimation of threat, tolerance of uncertainty, importance of thoughts, control of thoughts, responsibility, and perfectionism. The Interpretation of Intrusions Inventory consists of 31 items that refer to interpretations of intrusions that have occurred recently. Three of the above domains are represented: importance of thoughts, control of thoughts, and responsibility. The item reduction and validation analyses were conducted on clinical and non-clinical samples from multiple sites. Initial examination of reliability and validity indicates excellent internal consistency and stability and encouraging evidence of validity. However, high correlations indicating overlap between some of the scales, particularly importance of thoughts, control of thoughts, and responsibility will need to be addressed in subsequent empirical and theoretical investigations.     

The power of causal beliefs and conflicting evidence on causal judgments and decision making

In two experiments, we investigated the relative impact of causal beliefs and empirical evidence on both decision making and causal judgments, and whether this relative impact could be altered by previous experience. Participants had to decide which of two alternatives would attain a higher outcome on the basis of four cues. After completing the decision task, they were asked to estimate to what extent each cue was a reliable cause of the outcome. Participants were provided with instructions that causally related two of the cues to the outcome, whereas they received neutral information about the other two cues. Two of the four cues—a causal and a neutral cue—had high validity and were both generative. The remaining two cues had low validity, and were generative in Experiment 1, but almost not related to the outcome in Experiment 2. Selected groups of participants in both experiments received pre-training with either causal or neutral cues, or no pre-training was provided. Results revealed that the impact of causal beliefs and empirical evidence depends on both the experienced pre-training and cue validity. When all cues were generative and participants received pre-training with causal cues, they mostly relied on their causal beliefs, whereas they relied on empirical evidence when they received pre-training with neutral cues. In contrast, when some of the cues were almost not related to the outcome, participants’ responses were primarily influenced by validity and—to a lesser extent—by causal beliefs. In either case, however, the influence of causal beliefs was higher in causal judgments than in decision making. While current theoretical approaches in causal learning focus either on the effect of causal beliefs or empirical evidence, the present research shows that both factors are required to explain the flexibility involved in human inferences.     

Activities, self-referent memory beliefs, and cognitive performance: evidence for direct and mediated relations

In this study, the authors investigated the role of activities and self-referent memory beliefs for cognitive performance in a life-span sample. A factor analysis identified 8 activity factors, including Developmental Activities, Experiential Activities, Social Activities, Physical Activities, Technology Use, Watching Television, Games, and Crafts. A second-order general activity factor was significantly related to a general factor of cognitive function as defined by ability tests. Structural regression models suggested that prediction of cognition by activity level was partially mediated by memory beliefs, controlling for age, education, health, and depressive affect. Models adding paths from general and specific activities to aspects of crystallized intelligence suggested additional unique predictive effects for some activities. In alternative models, nonsignificant effects of beliefs on activities were detected when cognition predicted both variables, consistent with the hypothesis that beliefs derive from monitoring cognition and have no influence on activity patterns.     

Stakes and beliefs

The idea that beliefs may be stake-sensitive is explored. This is the idea that the strength with which a single, persistent belief is held may vary and depend upon what the believer takes to be at stake. The stakes in question are tied to the truth of the belief—not, as in Pascal’s wager and other cases, to the belief’s presence. Categorical beliefs and degrees of belief are considered; both kinds of account typically exclude the idea and treat belief as stake-invariant, though an exception is briefly described. The role of the assumption of stake-invariance in familiar accounts of degrees of belief is also discussed, and morals are drawn concerning finite and countable Dutch book arguments.     

Irrational beliefs and unconditional self-acceptance. I. Correlational evidence linking two key features of REBT

In a study with 102 non-clinical adults, relationships between measures of irrational beliefs, unconditional self-acceptance, self-esteem and the Big-5 personality dimensions were investigated. As expected, unconditional self-acceptance was highly correlated with self-esteem. In line with key tenets of REBT, individuals who scored highly on unconditional self-acceptance scored low on irrational beliefs even after self-esteem had been partialled out. Unconditional self-acceptance was found to be significantly (negatively) correlated with Neuroticism but not with other Big-5 personality dimensions. Irrational beliefs were found to correlate positively with Neuroticism and negatively with Openness. Factor analysis of the unconditional self-acceptance scale did not show a simple one-dimensional structure. A revised version of the scale comprising those items that did not load on a self-esteem factor produced a purer measure of unconditional self-acceptance that did not correlate significantly with self-esteem. The findings have implications for investigating unconditional self-acceptance in studies of therapeutic outcome.     

Assessment of tripartite efficacy beliefs within school-based physical education: Instrument development and reliability and validity evidence

Objectives

In educational contexts, Lent and Lopez (2002) proposed that students develop a tripartite network of efficacy beliefs, comprising their confidence in their own capabilities (i.e., self-efficacy), their confidence in their teacher’s ability (i.e., other-efficacy), and their estimation of their teacher’s confidence in their ability (i.e., relation-inferred self-efficacy). In spite of the potential for school-based physical education (PE) to stimulate leisure-time activity patterns among adolescents, it is noteworthy that this framework has yet to be explored in school PE contexts.

Design and methods

In Phase 1, we recruited 62 Australian high school students (aged 11-13) in order to develop instruments designed to assess self-efficacy, other-efficacy, and relation-inferred self-efficacy within PE settings. In Phases 2 and 3, we sought to provide evidence for measurement reliability, validity, and invariance with cross-sectional and prospective data derived from Australian (N = 602, M_age = 13.54, SD = .76) as well as Singaporean (N = 606; M_age = 14.10, SD = 1.01) students.

Results

Results revealed (a) support for the factorial validity of these measures in both locations, (b) evidence of gender-related and cross-national measurement invariance, (c) positive inter-relationships between students’ tripartite efficacy perceptions that were consistent with theory, and (d) positive correlations with key in-class (e.g., effort, enjoyment) and leisure-time (e.g., physical activity levels) outcomes.

Conclusions

Taken together, the results provide preliminary evidence for the reliability and validity of measures derived from these tripartite efficacy instruments, and support their use in future research designed to examine PE engagement.     

Perceptual latency priming by masked and unmasked stimuli: evidence for an attentional interpretation

Four experiments investigated the influence of a metacontrast-masked prime on temporal order judgments. The main results were (1) that a masked prime reduced the latency of the mask's conscious perception (perceptual latency priming), (2) that this effect was independent of whether the prime suffered strong or weak masking, (3) that it was unaffected by the degree of visual similarity between the prime and the mask, and that (4) there was no difference between congruent and incongruent primes. Finding (1) suggests that location cueing affects not only response times but also the latency of conscious perception. (2) The finding that priming was unaffected by the prime's detectability argues against a response bias interpretation of this effect. (3) Since visual similarity had no effect on the prime's efficiency, it is unlikely that sensory priming was involved. (4) The lack of a divergence between the effects of congruent and incongruent primes implies a functional difference between the judgments in the temporal order judgment task and speeded responses that have demonstrated differential effects of congruent and incongruent primes (e.g., Klotz & Neumann, 1999). These results can best be interpreted by assuming that the prime affects perceptual latency by initiating a shift of attention, as suggested by the Asynchronous Updating Model (AUM; Neumann 1978, 1982).     

Delusional verbalizations and beliefs

This study evaluated the intensity of delusional beliefs during the modification of delusional verbalizations with three chronically mentally ill inpatients. The multiple-baseline across responses design was used to evaluate the efficacy of a behavioral treatment package to modify delusional verbalizations. Results revealed that changes were obtained in delusional verbalizations to personal questions without corresponding changes in the subjects' delusional beliefs. Changes in delusional verbalizations were well-maintained for two subjects during a 6-month follow-up period. Mixed results were obtained for generalization probe interviews.     

Autonomy and false beliefs

The majority of current attention on the question of autonomy has focused on the internal reflection of the agent. The quality of an agent’s reflection on her potential action (or motivating desire or value) is taken to determine whether or not that action is autonomous. In this paper, I argue that there is something missing in most of these contemporary accounts of autonomy. By focusing overwhelmingly on the way in which the agent reflects, such accounts overlook the importance of what the agent is reflecting upon. Whichever of these current formulations of autonomy we accept, reflection could be undertaken in full accordance with the conditions set, and yet the action fail to be autonomous. This will occur, I argue, if the agent is mistaken about the object of her reflection. More precisely, if she has a particular kind of false belief about the action she is contemplating undertaking, then no amount of reflection can render that action autonomous. This suggests the need for externalist conditions to be incorporated into an account of autonomy.     

Irrational beliefs and personality

This study investigated the relationship between irrational beliefs and the nonpathological personality characteristics origence and intellectence described by Welsh (1972, 1975b). The Adjective Check List (ACL) and the Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT) were administered to 319 college students. Data were analyzed for the entire sample and for males and females separately. In each case, two combinations of scores yielding significant canonical correlation coefficients were produced. The results offer a refinement to Ellis' personality model and suggest that irrational beliefs are insufficient as indications of psychopathology.