The role of unattended distractors in sustained inattentional blindness

When participants are attending to a subset of visual targets or events and ignoring irrelevant distractors (“selective looking”), they often fail to detect the appearance of an unexpected visual object or event even when the object is visible for several seconds (“sustained inattentional blindness”). An important factor influencing detection rates in selective looking is the attentional set of the participant: the more similar the features of the unexpected object are to the attended ones, the more probably it will be detected. We examined the possible contribution of active ignoring to this similarity effect by studying the role of the distractor objects in sustained inattentional blindness. First we showed the similarity effect for chromatic colors and then we manipulated the similarity of the unexpected object in relation to the distractor objects and did not find any effects. Moreover, we found that inattentional blindness was present even when the displays did not contain any irrelevant to-be-ignored objects. We conclude that attending to target items on the basis of attentional set, but not active ignoring of nontargets items, is sufficient for the occurrence of sustained inattentional blindness.     

The attentional cost of inattentional blindness

When our attention is engaged in a visual task, we can be blind to events which would otherwise not be missed. In three experiments, 97 out of the 165 observers performing a visual attention task failed to notice an unexpected, irrelevant object moving across the display. Surprisingly, this object significantly lowered accuracy in the primary task when, and only when, it failed to reach awareness. We suggest that an unexpected stimulus causes a state of alert that would normally generate an attentional shift; if this response is prevented by an attention-consuming task, a portion of the attentional resources remains allocated to the object. Such a portion is large enough to disturb performance, but not so large that the object can be recognized as task-irrelevant and accordingly ignored. Our findings have one counterintuitive implication: irrelevant stimuli might hamper some types of performance only when perceived subliminally.     

The role of perceptual load in inattentional blindness

Perceptual load theory offers a resolution to the long-standing early vs. late selection debate over whether task-irrelevant stimuli are perceived, suggesting that irrelevant perception depends upon the perceptual load of task-relevant processing. However, previous evidence for this theory has relied on RTs and neuroimaging. Here we tested the effects of load on conscious perception using the "inattentional blindness" paradigm. As predicted by load theory, awareness of a task-irrelevant stimulus was significantly reduced by higher perceptual load (with increased numbers of search items, or a harder discrimination vs. detection task). These results demonstrate that conscious perception of task-irrelevant stimuli critically depends upon the level of task-relevant perceptual load rather than intentions or expectations, thus enhancing the resolution to the early vs. late selection debate offered by the perceptual load theory.     

Attentional biases in social anxiety: an investigation using the inattentional blindness paradigm

One line of research has examined attentional bias as a potential maintenance factor in social anxiety using cognitive experiment paradigms. The present study sought to examine the utility of the inattentional blindness (IB) paradigm for assessing attentional bias in social anxiety. Unlike other existing paradigms such as the emotional Stroop or dot-probe tasks, the IB paradigm has the advantage of eliminating the individual's expectation and intention to search for social cues, which would reduce strategic or effortful responses. Two independent experiments were conducted using college students scoring high or low on the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale. In both Experiments 1 and 2, participants were randomized to one of three IB experiment conditions, in which a positive face, a negative face, or a neutral item was unexpectedly presented, in the presence/absence of a bogus-speech threat. The overall pattern of our data suggests the presence of hypervigilant attentional processing in social anxiety. The IB paradigm appears to be a useful addition to existing experiment paradigms for investigating attentional bias in social anxiety and perhaps other psychopathology.     

Visual distraction increases the detection of an unexpected object in inattentional blindness

Distraction is typically thought to be detrimental to performance and concentration, and stimuli are classified as “distractions” if they take attention away from a primary task. However it has been shown that, under certain circumstances, distractors can also improve task performance. The current study extends this literature by exploring the role of a single discrete transient visual distracting event in increasing attention to an unexpected visual object in an inattentional blindness (IB) paradigm. Experiment 1 investigated the impact of a 48 ms visual distraction stimulus on rates of IB; a second experiment used a shortened, 16 ms visual distracting event. Both the long 48 ms and brief 16 ms distractors significantly reduced overall IB rates, by approximately 50% compared to a no distractor condition. Moreover, this reduction in IB is obtained independent of whether the visual distracting event was noted by the observer. Our findings demonstrate that a single discrete visual distraction can improve the detectability of an unexpected object in an IB task. Implications for theories of distributed attention in such tasks are discussed.     

The effects of individual differences and task difficulty on inattentional blindness

Most studies of inattentional blindness—the failure to notice an unexpected object when attention is focused elsewhere—have focused on one critical trial. For that trial, noticing the unexpected object might be a result of random variability, so that any given individual would be equally likely to notice the unexpected object. On the other hand, individual differences in the ability to perform the primary task might make noticing more likely for some individuals than for others. Increasing the difficulty of the primary task has been shown to decrease noticing rates for both brief static displays (Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2007) and dynamic monitoring tasks (Simons & Chabris, 1999). However, those studies did not explore whether individual differences in noticing arise from differences in the ability to perform the primary task. For our Experiment 1, we used a staircase procedure to equate primary task performance across individuals in a dynamic inattentional blindness task and found that the demands of the primary task affected noticing rates when individual differences in accuracy were minimized. In Experiment 2, we found that individual differences in primary task performance did not predict noticing of an unexpected object. Together, these findings suggest that although the demands of the primary task do affect inattentional blindness rates, individual differences in the ability to meet those demands do not.     

Minds on the blink: The relationship between inattentional blindness and attentional blink

Failures of conscious visual awareness occur when specific task demands prevent an observer from detecting a stimulus that would otherwise be clearly visible. Two examples are inattentional blindness (IB) and attentional blink (AB). IB is the failure to detect an unexpected stimulus when attention is otherwise engaged. AB describes the inability to detect a second target that is presented within 180-500?ms of the first target. Previous research has suggested that similar cognitive processes underlie both IB and AB; however, they are distinct phenomena, and no evidence has directly linked the two. We tested the same group of observers on an IB task and an AB task. Consistent with our hypotheses, we found that "non-noticers" who failed to detect an unexpected stimulus in the IB task also demonstrated a larger AB effect. This suggests that some observers may be more generally susceptible to failures of conscious visual awareness, regardless of specific context.     

Examining effects of preconscious mere exposure: An inattentional blindness approach

An increase in affective preference for stimuli, which a person has been repeatedly exposed to, is known as mere exposure effect. This effect has been shown for stimuli that are processed subliminally, that is, below the threshold of awareness. This study fills a current research gap by investigating mere exposure effects under processing that is preconscious, which follows from a high stimulus strength but absence of top-down amplification. In three experiments (N = 240 in total) preconscious processing was evoked using an inattentional blindness paradigm, which allowed the processing of stimuli (nonwords or Chinese symbols) under complete inattention. Contrary to our hypothesis, we did not find a mere exposure effect in our experiments. We expand the current state of knowledge by discussing the distractor devaluation effect and the attentional set of participants as possible reasons for the absence of the mere exposure effect. Directions for future investigations are outlined.     

The unexpected killer: effects of stimulus threat and negative affectivity on inattentional blindness

Inattentional blindness (IB) occurs when observers fail to detect unexpected objects or events. Despite the adaptive importance of detecting unexpected threats, relatively little research has examined how stimulus threat influences IB. The current study was designed to explore the effects of stimulus threat on IB. Past research has also demonstrated that individuals with elevated negative affectivity have an attentional bias towards threat-related stimuli; therefore, the current study also examined whether state and trait levels of negative affectivity predicted IB for threat-related stimuli. One hundred and eleven participants (87 female, aged 17–40 years) completed an IB task that included both threat-related and neutral unexpected stimuli, while their eye movements were tracked. Participants were significantly more likely to detect the threatening stimulus (19%) than the neutral stimulus (11%) p = .035, odds ratio (OR) = 4.0, 95% confidence interval OR [1.13, 14.17]. Neither state nor trait levels of negative affectivity were significantly associated with IB. These results suggest observers are more likely to detect threat-related unexpected objects, consistent with the threat superiority effect observed in other paradigms. However, most observers were blind to both unexpected stimuli, highlighting the profound influence of expectations and task demands on our ability to perceive even potentially urgent and life-threatening information.     

The effects of eye movements, age, and expertise on inattentional blindness

Based on various stimuli, the findings for the inattentional blindness paradigm suggest that many observers do not perceive an unexpected object in a dynamic setting. In a first experiment, inattentional blindness was combined with eye tracking data from children. Observers who did not notice the unexpected object in the basketball game test by spent on average as much time (about one second) looking at the unexpected object as those subjects who did perceive it. As such, individual differences that are responsible for the recognition of unexpected objects have to be found as further indicators. In a second experiment, the expert-novice paradigm was used to show that the probability of seeing an unexpected object can be increased with specific previous experience. The results in the same task indicate significant differences between basketball experts and basketball novices. The ages of the subjects in both experiments are discussed in connection with the inattentional blindness paradigm.     

New objects do not capture attention without a top-down setting: Evidence from an inattentional blindness task

Past studies have suggested that a new object can involuntarily capture attention in a visual search task (Yantis & Jonides, 1984 Yantis, S. and Jonides, J. 1984. Abrupt visual onsets and selective attention: Evidence from visual search. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 10: 601–621. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). However, trials in these experiments usually begin with abrupt onsets that are considered to signal new objects; thus, there may be a bias toward paying attention to new objects. We examine whether new objects can still capture attention when this bias is excluded, using an inattentional blindness task. Our results showed that when the trials began with new objects, a new object captured attention. When new objects were totally irrelevant and all top-down settings for new objects were prevented, a new object did not capture attention. Our findings argue against the view that new objects capture attention in a purely stimulus-driven fashion.     

ERP signatures of conscious and unconscious word and letter perception in an inattentional blindness paradigm

A three-phase inattentional blindness paradigm was combined with ERPs. While participants performed a distracter task, line segments in the background formed words or consonant-strings. Nearly half of the participants failed to notice these word-forms and were deemed inattentionally blind. All participants noticed the word-forms in phase 2 of the experiment while they performed the same distracter task. In the final phase, participants performed a task on the word-forms. In all phases, including during inattentional blindness, word-forms elicited distinct ERPs during early latencies (∼200–280 ms) suggesting unconscious orthographic processing. A subsequent ERP (∼320–380 ms) similar to the visual awareness negativity appeared only when subjects were aware of the word-forms, regardless of the task. Finally, word-forms elicited a P3b (∼400–550 ms) only when these stimuli were task-relevant. These results are consistent with previous inattentional blindness studies and help distinguish brain activity associated with pre- and post-perceptual processing from correlates of conscious perception.     

What you see is what you set: sustained inattentional blindness and the capture of awareness

This article reports a theoretical and experimental attempt to relate and contrast 2 traditionally separate research programs: inattentional blindness and attention capture. Inattentional blindness refers to failures to notice unexpected objects and events when attention is otherwise engaged. Attention capture research has traditionally used implicit indices (e.g., response times) to investigate automatic shifts of attention. Because attention capture usually measures performance whereas inattentional blindness measures awareness, the 2 fields have existed side by side with no shared theoretical framework. Here, the authors propose a theoretical unification, adapting several important effects from the attention capture literature to the context of sustained inattentional blindness. Although some stimulus properties can influence noticing of unexpected objects, the most influential factor affecting noticing is a person's own attentional goals. The authors conclude that many--but not all--aspects of attention capture apply to inattentional blindness but that these 2 classes of phenomena remain importantly distinct.     

Perception in the absence of attention: perceptual processing in the Roelofs effect during inattentional blindness

We present two experiments that examine sensory processing during conditions of inattentional blindness. A large rectangular frame that normally induces a Roelofs effect can go unreported due to inattentional blindness. Even when participants fail to report the frame, they mislocalize an attended target in a way consistent with having processed the frame. A more demanding visuospatial distractor task can increase inattentional blindness during conditions of divided attention, but has no effect on the spatial mislocalization illusion. Our results support theories that postulate a significant amount of perceptual processing in the absence of attention.     

Children’s scientific curiosity: In search of an operational definition of an elusive concept

Although curiosity is an undeniably important aspect of children’s cognitive development, a universally accepted operational definition of children’s curiosity does not exist. Almost all of the research on measuring curiosity has focused on adults, and has used predominately questionnaire-type measures that are not appropriate for young children. In this review we (a) synthesize the range of definitions and measures of children’s curiosity and (b) propose a new operational definition and measurement procedure for assessing and advancing scientific curiosity in young children. In the first part of the paper, we summarize Loewenstein’s (1994) review of theoretical perspectives on adult curiosity, and critically evaluate a wide range of efforts to create and implement operational measures of curiosity, focusing mainly on behavioral measures of curiosity in children. In the second part, we return to Loewenstein’s theory and present an argument for adopting his “information-gap” theory of curiosity as a framework for reviewing various procedures that have been suggested for measuring children’s exploratory curiosity. Finally, we describe a new paradigm for measuring exploratory curiosity in preschool children, defining curiosity as the threshold of desired uncertainty in the environment that leads to exploratory behavior. We present data demonstrating the reliability and validity of this measure, discuss initial results on developmental differences in young children’s curiosity, and conclude with a general summary and suggestions for future research.     

Quantifying genre: an operational definition of tragedy and comedy based on Shakespeare's plays

Emotion and imagery in the words of Shakespeare's plays, as measured by the Dictionary of Affect in Language, were used to predict genre (tragedy or comedy). Genre distinctions, which were associated with small effect sizes, were established on the basis of 23 plays and then applied to other plays. A discriminant function which combined lower emotional Pleasantness with higher emotional Activation or arousal and more pictorial Imagery successfully (91% of the time) predicted whether a play was a tragedy or a comedy. The genre-discriminating formula provided meaningful categorizations of 23 additional plays. As hypothesized, comedies employed more Pleasant words than tragedies. Tragedies employed more Active words (p < .001). Unexpectedly, comedies rather than tragedies employed words with lower Imagery (greater Abstraction). The predicted elevation of language in tragedy was noted instead in the use of more verse, fewer common words, and fewer personal pronouns (less subjectivity).     

The developmental difference of inattentional blindness in 3-to-5-year-old preschoolers and its relationship with fluid intelligence

Preschoolers can focus on the events that they are interested in and shield other information that may still be obvious and important, and this phenomenon is termed as inattentional blindness (IB). The present study investigated the developmental differences in IB and explored its relationship with fluid intelligence in 3-to-5-year-old preschoolers. With the involvement of one hundred and thirty-five preschoolers, it was found that the IB rates decreased with age during 3-to-5-year-olds. Fluid intelligence could significantly predict the incidence of IB in 4-year-olds, which means that those with higher fluid intelligence scores experience less IB. It implied that the ability to detect unintentional stimuli increased from 3-to-5-year-olds, whereas age was an impact factor to the relationship between fluid intelligence and IB.     

The role of social meaning in inattentional blindness: When the gorillas in our midst do not go unseen

Without visual attention, even the obvious–like a gorilla walking through a scene of people–goes undetected (Mack & Rock, 1998; Simons & Chabris, 1999). This “inattentional blindness” is a persistent, well-documented limitation of the human visual system. The current research examines whether social meaning reduces this visual bias by imbuing unexpected objects with signal value, thus increasing their relevance and facilitating perception. Using one of the most established illustrations of inattentional blindness, we show for the first time that activating a social association, even an erroneous one (i.e., the African American–ape association), drastically attenuates inattentional blindness. This is not accounted for by visual feature matching. Rather, these results suggest that social meaning, even when flawed, may direct our visual system towards associated visual information that would otherwise be overlooked. As such, these results provide a powerful replication of the African American–ape association and illustrate that this broadly held association has the power to spontaneously change the content of one's visual world.     

How not to be seen: the contribution of similarity and selective ignoring to sustained inattentional blindness

When people attend to objects or events in a visual display, they often fail to notice an additional, unexpected, but fully visible object or event in the same display. This phenomenon is now known as inattentional blindness . We present a new approach to the study of sustained inattentional blindness for dynamic events in order to explore the roles of similarity, distinctiveness, and attentional set in the detection of unexpected objects. In Experiment 1, we found that the similarity of an unexpected object to other objects in the display influences attentional capture: The more similar an unexpected object is to the attended items, and the greater its difference from the ignored items, the more likely it is that people will notice it. Experiment 2 explored whether this effect of similarity is driven by selective ignoring of irrelevant items or by selective focusing on attended items. The results of Experiment 3 suggest that the distinctiveness of the unexpected object alone cannot entirely account for the similarity effects found in the first two experiments; when attending to black items or white items in a dynamic display, nearly 30% of observers failed to notice a bright red cross move across the display, even though it had a unique color, luminance, shape, and motion trajectory and was visible for 5 s. Together, the results suggest that inattentional blindness for ongoing dynamic events depends both on the similarity of the unexpected object to the other objects in the display and on the observer's attentional set.