Action-feature integration blinds to feature-overlapping perceptual events: Evidence from manual and vocal actions

Previous studies showed that the identification of a left- or right-pointing arrowhead is impaired when it appears while planning and executing a spatially compatible left or right keypress (Müsseler & Hommel, 1997a). We attribute this effect to stimulus processing and action control operating on the same feature codes so that, once a code is integrated in an action plan, it is less available for perceptual processing. In three pairs of experiments we tested the generality of this account by using stimulus–response combinations other than arrows and manual keypresses. Planning manual left–right keypressing actions impaired the identification of spatially corresponding arrows but not of words with congruent meaning. On the contrary, planning to say “left” or “right” impaired the identification of corresponding spatial words but not of congruent arrows. Thus, as the feature-integration approach suggests, stimulus identification is impaired only with overlap of perceptual or perceptually derived stimulus and response features while mere semantic congruence is insufficient.     

Congruency-induced blindness: a cost-benefit analysis

Targets are identified more accurately when they are presented during an incongruent response (e.g., a left-pointing arrowhead presented during a right key press) than during a congruent response (e.g., a left-pointing arrowhead presented during a left key press). This effect, referred to here as congruency-induced blindness, has been hypothesised to result from the occupation of feature codes. According to the code occupation hypothesis (Behav. Brain Sci.; J. Experim. Psychol.: Human Percept. Perform.; Vis. Cogn., in press), only costs of congruency between features of a planned or executed action and a to-be-perceived target should be observed; neither costs nor benefits of incongruency are predicted by this account. In the present study, we investigated costs and benefits in identifying left and right targets directly by manipulating neutral response type and the symbols used to cue the neutral response, which produced four neutral conditions. Three important results emerged: (1). a significant main effect of RSI (suggesting that increasing temporal overlap between a planned action and target presentation interferes with perceptual reports of the target), (2). a significant main effect of congruency (showing that impairment is code-specific), and (3). clear-cut costs with little evidence for benefits. Other complex patterns of results provided additional information relevant for extant theories of perception-action interactions.     

“Remembering” emotional words is based on response bias,not recollection

Recent studies have demonstrated that emotional stimuli result in a higher proportion of recognized items that are “remembered” (e.g., Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Ochsner, 2000), leading to greater estimates of recollection by the dual-process model (Yonelinas, 1994). This result suggests that recognition judgments to emotional stimuli depend on a recollection process. We challenge this conclusion with receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve data from two experiments. In both experiments, subjects studied neutral and emotional words. During the recognition test, subjects made old-new confidence ratings as well as remember-know judgments. Four models of remember-know judgments were fit to individual subjects’ data: two versions of a one-dimensional signaldetection-based model (Donaldson, 1996; Wixted & Stretch, 2004), the dual-process model (Yonelinas, 1994), and the two-dimensional signal-detection-based model known as STREAK (Rotello, Macmillan, & Reeder, 2004). Consistent with the literature, we found that emotion increases subjective reports of “remembering.” However, our ROC analyses and modeling work reveal that the effect is due to response bias differences rather than sensitivity change or use of a high-threshold recollection process.     

Blinded by headlights.

Target identification is impaired when targets are presented during the planning or execution of a compatible response (e.g., right-pointing arrow during a right keypress) relative to an incompatible response (Müsseler & Hommel, 1997 a, b). Examinations of this blindness to response-compatible stimuli have typically used arrowheads as targets ("<" and ">"). The importance of the target symbol was examined by manipulating subjects' interpretation of that symbol (i.e., ">" interpreted as a right-pointing arrow or as a headlight shining to the left). Targets were presented at varying times during the planning or execution of a response in order to examine the time-course of the effect. Results showed that the interpretation, and not the physical identity, of the target was important for the blindness effect. Although the blindness effect was largest during the planning and execution of a response, it was not always confined to that temporal interval.     

Lengthening the duration of response execution does not modulate blindness to action-compatible stimuli.

Action-compatible blindness refers to the finding that target stimuli are perceived less frequently if they are presented during the planning or execution of a compatible action (e.g., a left arrow presented during a left manual key press) than during an incompatible action (Müsseler & Hommel, 1997 a, b). We investigated the effect of lengthening the response execution phase in the action-compatible blindness paradigm by requiring subjects to tap a response key once or three times on the assumption that tapping three times would increase the duration of the execution phase of the response. Prior research (e.g., Stevanovski, Oriet, & Jolicoeur, 2002; Wühr & Müsseler, 2001) has shown that larger blindness effects are observed for targets presented during the execution phase of a response than after the response has been made. We investigated whether a larger blindness effect would be observed in the three-tap condition than in the one-tap condition, or whether lengthening the duration of the response would extend the time course of the blindness effect. Neither of these possibilities was supported by the data irrespective of whether the number of taps to be made was blocked or mixed within a block of trials. The results are discussed in terms of current accounts of action-compatible blindness and the possible cognitive differences between making a single response and repeating a response.     

Time course of the blindness to response-compatible stimuli

This article examines the time course of a deficit in identifying a stimulus sharing a compatible feature with a response that is executed in parallel ("blindness to response-compatible stimuli," J. Müsseler & B. Hommel, 1997a). In 5 experiments, participants performed a timed response, and the presentation point of time of a to-be-identified stimulus was varied in respect to response execution. A blindness effect was observed when the stimulus was presented between response cue offset and response execution. In contrast, the identification of a stimulus presented before the response cue or after response execution was not affected by stimulus-response compatibility--a finding that rules out a retention-based explanation. These results support an explanation that states that the perceptual processing of a stimulus feature is impaired as long as the shared perception-action feature code is integrated into the representation of a to-be-executed response.     

Shift and deviate: Saccades reveal that shifts of covert attention evoked by trained spatial stimuli are obligatory

The premotor theory of attention predicts that motor movements, including manual movements and eye movements, are preceded by an obligatory shift of attention to the location of the planned response. We investigated whether the shifts of attention evoked by trained spatial cues (e.g., Dodd & Wilson, 2009) are obligatory by using an extreme prediction of the premotor theory: If individuals are trained to associate a color cue with a manual movement to the left or right, the shift of attention evoked by the color cue should also influence eye movements in an unrelated task. Participants were trained to associate an irrelevant color cue with left/right space via a training session in which directional responses were made. Experiment 1 showed that, posttraining, vertical saccades deviated in the direction of the trained response, despite the fact that the color cue was irrelevant. Experiment 2 showed that latencies of horizontal saccades were shorter when an eye movement had to be made in the direction of the trained response. These results demonstrate that the shifts of attention evoked by trained stimuli are obligatory, in addition to providing support for the premotor theory and for a connection between the attentional, motor, and oculomotor systems.     

Response-response compatibility during bimanual movements: Evidence for the conceptual coding of action

The present study investigated response-response (R-R) compatibility in a bimanual keypressing task. Numeric and spatial stimuli were used to cue responses for each hand. Two groups of participants differed in terms of the stimulus-response mappings for the numeric stimuli. For one group, the numeric stimuli were mapped so that the same number for each hand indicated responses that were anatomically compatible (e.g., index finger of both hands). For the other group, the same number for each hand indicated responses that were left-right compatible (e.g., leftmost finger of both hands). The spatial stimuli were mapped in a spatially compatible manner to the responses for both groups. For numeric stimuli, reaction times (RTs) were faster when the same number indicated the response for each hand, regardless of the mapping. For the spatial stimuli, RTs were determined not only by the pairing of stimuli or responses, but also by how the responses were indicated by numeric stimuli. The results indicate that R-R compatibility effects are mediated by abstract codes that reflect individuals’ conceptualizations of their actions.     

How to keep attention from straying: Get engaged!

Previous research has suggested that the involuntary allocation of spatial attention to salient, irrelevant stimuli (i.e., attentional capture) is prevented when attention is in a focused state (e.g., Yantis & Jonides, 1990). Recent work has suggested that although focused attention may be necessary to prevent attentional capture by irrelevant stimuli, it is not sufficient (e.g., Folk, Leber, & Egeth, 2002). The present experiments provide evidence that attentional engagement, rather than attentional focusing, prevents capture. Observers performed a rapid serial visual presentation task in which they were asked to identify a target letter defined by color. Peripheral distractors that shared the color of the target produced evidence of attentional capture. This effect was completely eliminated, however, when the peripheral distractor was preceded by a central distractor designed to engage attention on the stream. It is concluded that attentional engagement serves to lock out capture by irrelevant, salient stimuli.     

Action-feature integration blinds to feature-overlapping perceptual events: evidence from manual and vocal actions

Previous studies showed that the identification of a left- or right-pointing arrowhead is impaired when it appears while planning and executing a spatially compatible left or right keypress (Müsseler & Hommel, 1997a). We attribute this effect to stimulus processing and action control operating on the same feature codes so that, once a code is integrated in an action plan, it is less available for perceptual processing. In three pairs of experiments we tested the generality of this account by using stimulus-response combinations other than arrows and manual keypresses. Planning manual left-right keypressing actions impaired the identification of spatially corresponding arrows but not of words with congruent meaning. On the contrary, planning to say "left" or "right" impaired the identification of corresponding spatial words but not of congruent arrows. Thus, as the feature-integration approach suggests, stimulus identification is impaired only with overlap of perceptual or perceptually derived stimulus and response features while mere semantic congruence is insufficient.     

Inhibitory and facilitatory effects of cue onset and offset

The response speed to a visual target is modulated by the position of previous events (cues) even if their position is not predictive of the target position. The modulation has been considered biphasic, with an early facilitatory and a later inhibitory component. We conducted three experiments that investigated the importance of the onset and offset features of the cue for the facilitatory and inhibitory effects and estimated their separate and joint effects. The two possible target locations, one in the right and one in the left visual field, were indicated by two empty boxes, and the cue consisted of the onset and/or offset of an arrowhead located just under one of the two boxes. Different time intervals were used between cue and target. Subjects were instructed to ignore the cue and to respond to the target (a cross inside one of the two boxes). The data showed only consistent effects of inhibition (inhibition of return) with the long intervals, but the pattern was different depending on the cue type. The amount of inhibition was much greater when the onset of the cue was followed by its offset. Apparently, inhibition of return depended on the dynamic changes of the cue. Received: 23 October 1996 / Accepted: 3 June 1997     

More conflict does not trigger more adjustment of cognitive control for subsequent events: A study of the bivalency effect

Encountering a conflict triggers an adjustment of cognitive control. This adjustment of cognitive control can even affect subsequent performance. The purpose of the present study was to determine whether more conflict triggers more adjustment of cognitive control for subsequent performance. To this end, we focussed on the bivalency effect, that is, the adjustment of cognitive control following the conflict induced by bivalent stimuli (i.e., stimuli with relevant features for two tasks). In two experiments, we tested whether the amount of conflict triggered by bivalent stimuli affected the bivalency effect. Bivalent stimuli were either compatible (i.e., affording one response) or incompatible (i.e., affording two different responses). Thus, compatible bivalent stimuli involved a task conflict, whereas incompatible bivalent stimuli involved a task and a response conflict. The results showed that the bivalency effect was not affected by this manipulation. This indicates that more conflict does not trigger more adjustment of cognitive control for subsequent performance. Therefore, only the occurrence of conflict – not its amount – is determinant for cognitive control.     

Action effects in saccade control

According to the ideomotor principle, action preparation involves the activation of associations between actions and their effects. However, there is only sparse research on the role of action effects in saccade control. Here, participants responded to lateralized auditory stimuli with spatially compatible saccades toward peripheral targets (e.g., a rhombus in the left hemifield and a square in the right hemifield). Prior to the imperative auditory stimulus (e.g., a left tone), an irrelevant central visual stimulus was presented that was congruent (e.g., a rhombus), incongruent (e.g., a square), or unrelated (e.g., a circle) to the peripheral saccade target (i.e., the visual effect of the saccade). Saccade targets were present throughout a trial (Experiment 1) or appeared after saccade initiation (Experiment 2). Results showed shorter response times and fewer errors in congruent (vs. incongruent) conditions, suggesting that associations between oculomotor actions and their visual effects play an important role in saccade control.     

Constraints on strategy construction in a speeded discrimination task

In three experiments, subjects reported the identity of a word (above or below) that appeared above or below a fixation point. On some trials, a cue presented 100, 200, 400, 600, 800, or 1,000 msec before the word indicated the relation between position and identity (i.e., whether the dimensions were compatible, e.g., above/above and below/below, or conflicted, e.g., above/below and below/above). On the other trials, the cue was withheld (Experiment 2) or it bore no information about the relation between dimensions (Experiment 1 and 3). In each experiment, the cue reduced reaction time below the level of no-cue or neutral-cue controls, indicating strategic use of the relation between dimensions. Experiments 1 and 2 manipulated the number of potential cues that could occur in a block. A stronger cuing effect was found when one cue could occur (Experiment 2) than when two cues could occur (Experiment 1). Experiment 3 manipulated practice; it revealed that with practice the cuing effect reached asymptote at shorter delays. The asymptote itself did not change. Experiment 4 showed that cue-delay effects were independent of warning interval (warning interval and cue delay confounded in Experiment 1, 2, and 3). The experiments demonstrate construction and utilization of strategies; they show that construction is sensitive to constraints imposed by the subject's goals and abilities and by the structure of the task environment.     

Actions blind to conceptually overlapping stimuli

Participants are worse at identifying spatial symbols (arrowheads) while performing spatially compatible manual key presses. The present experiments investigated the generality of this blindness effect to response-compatible stimuli. In Experiment 1 a left key press deteriorated the identification of left-pointing arrows, and a right key press deteriorated the perception of right-pointing arrows, independent of the hands used to press the key. Thus the blindness effect is based on codes of the distal response location rather than on the body-intrinsic anatomical connection of the hands. Experiment 2 extended the blindness effect to verbal responses and written position words (left, right, up, down). Vocalizing a position word blinded to directly compatible position words (e.g., left-left), but not to orthogonally compatible position words (e.g., left-down). This result suggests that the use of identical stimulus-response codes, and not the use of saliency-matching but distinct codes, suffices to produce blindness effects. Finally, Experiment 3 extended the blindness phenomenon beyond the spatial domain by demonstrating blindness between saying color words and perceiving color patches. Altogether, the experiments revealed action-induced blindness to be a phenomenon of broad empirical validity occurring whenever action and perception afford simultaneous access to the same conceptual codes.     

Priming in a free association task as a function of association directionality

Two experiments investigated priming in free association, a conceptual implicit memory task. The stimuli consisted of bidirectionally associated word pairs (e.g., BEACH-SAND) and unidirectionally associated word pairs that have no association from the target response back to the stimulus cue (e.g., BONE-DOG). In the study phase, target words (e.g., SAND, DOG) were presented in an incidental learning task. In the test phase, participants generated an associate to the stimulus cues (e.g., BEACH, BONE). In both experiments, priming was obtained for targets (e.g., SAND) that had an association back to the cue, but not for targets (e.g., DOG) for which such a backward association was absent. These results are problematic for theoretical accounts that attribute priming in free association to the strengthening of target responses. It is argued that priming in free association depends on the strengthening of cue-target associations.     

Linear versus Hierarchical Agreement Feature Processing in Comprehension

Two experiments examined whether syntactic number features are tracked during comprehension with a linear slot-based memory system or with a hierarchical feature-passing system. In a construction such as The pond near the trail(s) for the horse(s) was ¨, a linear account of subject-number tracking predicts greater interference from horses (N3), whereas a hierarchical account predicts greater interference from trails (N2). Experiment 1 used singular-head subject noun phrases (e.g., pond) and showed equal interference from N2 and N3, failing to differentiate between linear and hierarchical accounts. Experiment 2 used plural-head subjects and revealed more interference from N2 than N3. The pattern across the experiments accords with the ideas that (1) feature-tracking is hierarchical (e.g., Vigliocco & Nicol, 1997), (2) plurals are marked (e.g., Eberhard, 1997), and (3) subject-number information decays across intervening number-marked elements.     

Influence of flicker on perceived size and depth

Previous research (e.g., Wong & Weisstein, 1984a, 1985) has shown that flickering stimuli appear to be more distant than nonflickering stimuli at the same physical distance. Given this relation between flicker and perceived depth, inappropriate constancy scaling theories predict that flickering stimuli should be perceived as larger than nonflickering ones. In contrast, links between flicker and motion perception suggest that flickering stimuli should be perceived as smaller than nonflickering ones. Two experiments tested these contrasting predictions. In Experiment 1, 22 subjects compared flickering and nonflickering vertical lines and reported that the flickering stimulus appeared significantly smaller than the nonflickering one. In Experiment 2, 21 subjects reported that the stimuli used in Experiment 1 produced depth effects similar to those reported in previous experiments: flickering stimuli were perceived as more distant than nonflickering ones. The observed effect of flicker on perceived size was contrary to predictions from inappropriate constancy scaling theory, but consistent with views that motion and flicker are processed by the same pathway.     

Varying the response code in the blindness to response-compatible stimuli

Previous work has indicated that action-control processes can specifically influence perceptual processes. The identification of a left- or right-pointing arrow is impaired when it appears during the preparation and execution of a compatible left-right keypress (Müsseler & Hommel, 1997a, b). The present study examines the role of the response-specifying cue in order to manipulate the coding of the action-control processes. Experiment 1 shows that the size of the perceptual impairment is not affected by whether the cue has high or little feature overlap with the to-be-performed response. Cues were omitted in Experiment 2 and participants generated their responses endogenously, but the perceptual impairment still occurred. Experiment 3 examines in more detail which feature of the response contributes to the effect. The results show that it needs both an intended action goal and a corresponding motor activity to bring about the perceptual impairment.     

Does test-enhanced learning transfer for triple associates?

Test-enhanced learning and transfer for triple-associate word stimuli was assessed in three experiments. In each experiment, training and final-test trials involved the presentation of two words per triple associate (triplet), with the third word having to be retrieved. In agreement with the prior literature on different stimuli, training through testing with feedback yielded markedly better final-test performance than did restudy. However, in contrast to the positive transfer reported for paired associate stimuli, minimal or no positive transfer was observed, relative to a restudy control, from a trained cue combination (e.g., A, B, ?) to other cue combinations from the same triplet that required a different response (e.g., B, C, ?). That result also held when two unique cue combinations per triplet were tested during training, and for triplets with low and high average associative strengths. Supplementary analyses provided insight into the overall transfer effect: An incorrect response during training appears to yield positive transfer relative to restudy, whereas a correct response appears to yield no, or even negative, transfer. Cross-experiment analyses indicated that test-enhanced learning is not diminished when two or three cue combinations are presented during training. Thus, even though learning through testing is highly specific, testing on all possible stimulus–response combinations remains the most efficient strategy for the learning of triple associates.