Implicatures et développement

We summarize our work on pragmatic inference-making in children, while generally focusing on scalar implicatures. Such inferences arise when a relatively weak term implies the rejection of a stronger one. For example, some is often understood to mean not all. While adults readily draw such implicatures, children tend to rely on the terms’ minimal, lexically encoded meanings (with which some is compatible with all). Given that children’s treatments coincide with logical ones, children end up appearing more logical than adults on standard reasoning tasks. We describe this effect in detail while showing that (a) even young children can be encouraged to carry out implicatures and, that; (b) evidence of non-pragmatic behavior is best explained as due to unavailable effort.     

Availability of Alternatives and the Processing of Scalar Implicatures: A Visual World Eye‐Tracking Study

Two visual world experiments investigated the processing of the implicature associated with some using a “gumball paradigm.” On each trial, participants saw an image of a gumball machine with an upper chamber with orange and blue gumballs and an empty lower chamber. Gumballs dropped to the lower chamber, creating a contrast between a partitioned set of gumballs of one color and an unpartitioned set of the other. Participants then evaluated spoken statements, such as “You got some of the blue gumballs.” Experiment 1 investigated the time course of the pragmatic enrichment from some to not all when the only utterance alternatives available to refer to the different sets were some and all. In Experiment 2, the number terms two, three, four, and five were also included in the set of alternatives. Scalar implicatures were delayed relative to the interpretation of literal statements with all only when number terms were available. The results are interpreted as evidence for a constraint‐based account of scalar implicature processing.     

The story of some: everyday pragmatic inference by children and adults.

The statement, some elephants have trunks, is logically true but pragmatically infelicitous. Whilst some is logically consistent with all, it is often pragmatically interpreted as precluding all. In Experiments 1 and 2, we show that with pragmatically impoverished materials, sensitivity to the pragmatic implicature associated with some is apparent earlier in development than has previously been found. Amongst 8-year-old children, we observed much greater sensitivity to the implicature in pragmatically enriched contexts. Finally, in Experiment 3, we found that amongst adults, logical responses to infelicitous some statements take longer to produce than do logical responses to felicitous some statements, and that working memory capacity predicts the tendency to give logical responses to the former kind of statement. These results suggest that some adults develop the ability to inhibit a pragmatic response in favour of a logical answer. We discuss the implications of these findings for theories of pragmatic inference.     

BRIEF REPORT

The aim of this study was to explore the impact of quantifiers on depressed future thinking. Universal quantifiers, such as all and none, express bleak expectations and their global nature suggests no alternatives or exceptions (e.g., “ None of the future will be happy; all of it will be bleak”). We hypothesised that less extreme quantifiers would access alternative future perspectives. Depressed participants with high levels of hopelessness generated continuations to sentence stems that quantified different amounts of future time. Averaging over conditions, the depressed were more negative than never-depressed controls, but differences were attenuated in response to the quantifier some —the depressed were more positive and less negative under this condition (e.g., “ Some of the future…will be good”). By differentiating subsets of the future, some produced contrasts with negative global models and accessed positive alternatives.     

When children are more logical than adults: experimental investigations of scalar implicature

A conversational implicature is an inference that consists of attributing to a speaker an implicit meaning that goes beyond the explicit linguistic meaning of an utterance. This paper experimentally investigates scalar implicature, a paradigmatic case of implicature in which a speaker's use of a term like Some indicates that the speaker had reasons not to use a more informative term from the same scale, e.g. All; thus, Some implicates Not all. Pragmatic theorists like Grice would predict that a pragmatic interpretation is determined only after its explicit, logical meaning is incorporated (e.g. where Some means at least one). The present work aims to developmentally examine this prediction by showing how younger, albeit competent, reasoners initially treat a relatively weak term logically before becoming aware of its pragmatic potential. Three experiments are presented. Experiment 1 presents a modal reasoning scenario offering an exhaustive set of conclusions; critical among these is participants' evaluation of a statement expressing Might be x when the context indicates that the stronger Must be x is true. The conversationally-infelicitous Might be x can be understood logically (e.g. as compatible with Must) or pragmatically (as exclusive to Must). Results from 5-, 7-, and 9-year-olds as well as adults revealed that (a) 7-year-olds are the youngest to demonstrate modal competence overall and that (b) 7- and 9-year-olds treat the infelicitous Might logically significantly more often than adults do. Experiment 2 showed how training with the modal task can suspend the implicatures for adults. Experiment 3 provides converging evidence of the developmental pragmatic effect with the French existential quantifier Certains (Some). While linguistically-sophisticated children (8- and 10-year-olds olds) typically treat Certains as compatible with Tous (All), adults are equivocal. These results, which are consistent with unanticipated findings in classic developmental papers, reveal a consistent ordering in which representations of weak scalar terms tend to be treated logically by young competent participants and more pragmatically by older ones. This work is also relevant to the treatment of scalar implicatures in the reasoning literature.     

The Role of Executive Function and Theory of Mind in Pragmatic Computations

In sentences such as “Some dogs are mammals,” the literal semantic meaning (“Some and possibly all dogs are mammals”) conflicts with the pragmatic meaning (“Not all dogs are mammals,” known as a scalar implicature). Prior work has shown that adults vary widely in the extent to which they adopt the semantic or pragmatic meaning of such utterances, yet the underlying reason for this variation is unknown. Drawing on theoretical models of scalar implicature derivation, we explore the hypothesis that the cognitive abilities of executive function (EF) and theory of mind (ToM) contribute to this observed variation. In Experiment 1, we show that individuals with better ToM are more likely to compute a scalar implicature and adopt the pragmatic meaning of an utterance; however, EF makes no unique contribution to scalar implicature comprehension after accounting for ToM. In Experiment 2, we replicate this finding and assess whether it generalizes to the comprehension of other pragmatic phenomena such as indirect requests (e.g., “It's hot in here” uttered to ask for something to be done) and metaphor (e.g., “to harvest courage”). This is the first evidence that differences in ToM are associated with pragmatic competence in neurotypical adults across distinct pragmatic phenomena.     

Children's Developing Intuitions About the Truth Conditions and Implications of Novel Generics Versus Quantified Statements

Generic statements express generalizations about categories and present a unique semantic profile that is distinct from quantified statements. This paper reports two studies examining the development of children's intuitions about the semantics of generics and how they differ from statements quantified by all, most, and some. Results reveal that, like adults, preschoolers (a) recognize that generics have flexible truth conditions and are capable of representing a wide range of prevalence levels; and (b) interpret novel generics as having near‐universal prevalence implications. Results further show that by age 4, children are beginning to differentiate the meaning of generics and quantified statements; however, even 7‐ to 11‐year‐olds are not adultlike in their intuitions about the meaning of most‐quantified statements. Overall, these studies suggest that by preschool, children interpret generics in much the same way that adults do; however, mastery of the semantics of quantified statements follows a more protracted course.     

The logic in language: How all quantifiers are alike,but each quantifier is different

Quantifier words like each, every, all and three are among the most abstract words in language. Unlike nouns, verbs and adjectives, the meanings of quantifiers are not related to a referent out in the world. Rather, quantifiers specify what relationships hold between the sets of entities, events and properties denoted by other words. When two quantifiers are in the same clause, they create a systematic ambiguity. “Every kid climbed a tree” could mean that there was only one tree, climbed by all, or many different trees, one per climbing kid. In the present study, participants chose a picture to indicate their preferred reading of different ambiguous sentences – those containing every, as well as the other three quantifiers. In Experiment 1, we found large systematic differences in preference, depending on the quantifier word. In Experiment 2, we then manipulated the choice of a particular reading of one sentence, and tested how this affected participants’ reading preference on a subsequent target sentence. We found a priming effect for all quantifiers, but only when the prime and target sentences contained the same quantifier. For example, all-a sentences prime other all-a sentences, while each-a primes each-a, but sentences with each do not prime sentences with all or vice versa. In Experiment 3, we ask whether the lack of priming across quantifiers could be due to the two sentences sharing one fewer word. We find that changing the verb between the prime and target sentence does not reduce the priming effect. In Experiment 4, we discover one case where there is priming across quantifiers – when one number (e.g. three) is in the prime, and a different one (e.g. four) is in the target. We discuss how these findings relate to linguistic theories of quantifier meaning and what they tell us about the division of labor between conceptual content and combinatorial semantics, as well as the mental representations of quantification and of the abstract logical structure of language.     

The Quantificational Domain of <Emphasis Type="BoldItalic">dou</Emphasis>: An Experimental Study

Which NP does all associate with in e.g. “The pandas, the children all saw”—the pandas, the children, or both? The intuition of adult Mandarin Chinese native speakers regarding the interpretation of the adverbial quantifier dou ‘all’ remains unclear and controversial, and various incommensurate theories of domain selection have been proposed. These studies may have failed to yield clear results because they used testing materials in which the interpretation of dou is confounded with other principles of NP interpretation (e.g. zhexie xiaohai ‘these children’ is truth-functionally synonymous with ‘all these children’). To address these concerns, we present the first set of experimental studies on adult knowledge and use of syntactic constraints on the quantifier domain of dou. The results support the hypothesis that dou can take one and only one c-commanding NP as its domain, but falsify interesting theoretical accounts that assume a strict locality constraint on dou quantification.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Wh</Emphasis>-Questions,Universal Statements and Free Choice Inferences in Child Mandarin

This study investigated 5-year-old Mandarin-speaking children’s comprehension of wh-questions, universal statements and free choice inferences. Previous research has found that Mandarin-speaking children assign a universal interpretation to sentences with a wh-word (e.g., shei ‘who’) followed by the adverbial quantifier dou ‘all’ (Zhou in Appl Psycholinguist 36:411–435, 2013). Children also compute free choice inferences in sentences that contain a modal verb in addition to a wh-word and dou (Zhou, in: Nakayama, Su, Huang (eds.) Studies in Chinese and Japanese language acquisition: in honour of Stephen Crain. John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam, pp 223–235, 2017). The present study used a Question-Statement Task to assess children’s interpretation of sentences containing shei + dou, both with and without the modal verb beiyunxu ‘was allowed to’, as well as the contrast between sentences with shei + dou, which are statements for adults, versus ones with dou + shei, which are wh-questions for adults. The 5-year-old Mandarin-speaking child participants exhibited adult-like linguistic knowledge of the semantics and pragmatics of wh-words, the adverbial quantifier dou, and the deontic modal verb beiyunxu.     

Practice makes perfect: Training the interpretation of emotional ambiguity

The interpretation of emotionally ambiguous words, sentences, or scenarios can be altered through training procedures that are collectively called cognitive bias modification for interpretation (CBM-I). In three experiments, we systematically manipulated the nature of the training in order to discriminate between emotional priming and ambiguity resolution accounts of training effects. In Experiment 1 participants completed word fragments that were consistently related to either a negative or benign interpretation of an ambiguous sentence. In a subsequent semantic priming task they demonstrated an interpretation bias, in that they were faster to identify relatedness of targets that were associated with the training-congruent meaning of an emotionally ambiguous homograph. We then manipulated the training sentences to show that interpretation bias was eliminated when participants simply completed valenced word fragments following unrelated sentences (Experiment 2), or completed fragments that were related to emotional but unambiguous sentences (Experiment 3). Only when participants were required to actively resolve emotionally ambiguous sentences during training did changes in interpretation emerge at test. Findings suggest that CBM-I achieves its effects by altering a production rule that aids the selection of meaning from emotionally ambiguous alternatives, in line with an ambiguity resolution account.     

The Compositionality of Logical Connectives in Child Italian

This paper investigates the interpretation that Italian-speaking children and adults assign to negative sentences with disjunction and negative sentences with conjunction. The aim of the study was to determine whether children and adults assign the same interpretation to these types of sentences. The Semantic Subset Principle (SSP) (Crain et al., in: Clifton, Frazer, Rayner (eds) Perspective on sentence processing, Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillside, 1994) predicts that children’s initial scope assignment should correspond to the interpretation that makes sentences true in the narrowest range of circumstances, even when this is not the interpretation assigned by adults. This prediction was borne out in previous studies in Japanese, Mandarin and Turkish. As predicted by the SSP, the findings of the present study indicate that Italian-speaking children and adults assign the same interpretation to negative sentences with conjunction (conjunction takes scope over negation). By contrast, the study revealed that some children differed from adults in the interpretation they assigned to negative sentences with disjunction. Adults interpreted disjunction as taking scope over negation, whereas children were divided into two groups: one group interpreted disjunction as taking scope over negation as adults did; another group interpreted negation as taking scope over disjunction, as predicted by the SSP. To explain the findings, we propose that Italian-speaking children initially differ from adults as dictated by the SSP, but children converge on the adult grammar earlier than children acquiring other languages due to the negative concord status of Italian, including the application of negative concord to sentences with disjunction.     

Beyond brands: Happy adolescents see the good in people

How does happiness affect adolescents’ stereotypes of other people? Using a collage methodology with 60 adolescents aged 12–18, we find that happier adolescents hold more positive stereotypes of others compared to those who are less happy. We also find that happier adolescents are less likely to form impressions of people based on surface level cues such as the products and brands that people own. Finally, our results show that happier adolescents have a more nuanced view of others, (e.g., some cool kids wear expensive brands, but some shop at thrift stores), compared to their less happy counterparts, who tend to oversimplify their view of others (e.g., all cool kids wear expensive brands, all doctors drive a BMW).     

Little Bayesians or little Einsteins? Probability and explanatory virtue in children's inferences

Like scientists, children seek ways to explain causal systems in the world. But are children scientists in the strict Bayesian tradition of maximizing posterior probability? Or do they attend to other explanatory considerations, as laypeople and scientists – such as Einstein – do? Four experiments support the latter possibility. In particular, we demonstrate in four experiments that 4‐ to 8‐year‐old children, like adults, have a robust latent scope bias that leads to inferences that do not maximize posterior probability. When faced with two explanations equally consistent with observed data, where one explanation makes an unverified prediction, children consistently preferred the explanation that does not make this prediction (Experiment 1), even if the prior probabilities are identical (Experiment 3). Additional evidence suggests that this latent scope bias may result from the same explanatory strategies used by adults (Experiments 1 and 2), and can be attenuated by strong prior odds (Experiment 4). We argue that children, like adults, rely on ‘explanatory virtues’ in inference – a strategy that often leads to normative responses, but can also lead to systematic error.     

Prior expectation and the interpretation of natural language quantifiers

Abstract

The interpretation of natural language quantifiers depends, in part, on one's prior expectations about what the proportion being described might be. This hypothesis is tested empirically, by comparing the interpretation of 10 different quantifier expressions in three contexts which contained proportions about which subjects' expectations were reliably different (Experiment 1). It is further argued that quantifiers perform many functions which cannot be observed by considering only the proportion(s) denoted by a quantifier. The experimental evidence presented shows that quantifiers can provide information about what the user of the quantifier had expected before “knowing the facts” (Experiment 2). It is also clear that when writers produce a quantifier, they can reveal their assumptions about the prior expectations held by their readers (Experiment 2).     

Scope Processing in Chinese

The standard view maintains that quantifier scope interpretation results from an interaction between different modules: the syntax, the semantics as well as the pragmatics. Thus, by examining the mechanism of quantifier scope interpretation, we will certainly gain some insight into how these different modules interact with one another. To observe it, two experiments, an offline judgment task and an eye-tracking experiment, were conducted to investigate the interpretation of doubly quantified sentences in Chinese, like Mei-ge qiangdao dou qiang-le yi-ge yinhang (Every robber robbed a bank). According to current literature, doubly quantified sentences in Chinese like the above are unambiguous, which can only be interpreted as ‘for every robber x, there is a bank y, such that x robbed y–surface scope reading), contrary to their ambiguous English counterparts, which also allow the interpretation that ‘there is a bank y, such that for every robber x, x robbed y–inverse scope reading). Specifically, three questions were examined, that is, (i) What is the initial reading of doubly quantified sentences in Chinese? (ii) Whether inverse scope interpretation can be available if appropriate contexts are provided? (iii) What are the processing time courses engaged in quantifier scope interpretation? The results showed that (i) Initially, the language processor computes the surface scope representation and the inverse scope representation in parallel, thus, doubly quantified sentences in Chinese are ambiguous; (ii) The discourse information is not employed in initial processing of relative scope, it serves to evaluate the two representations in reanalysis; (iii) The lexical information of verbs affects their scope-taking patterns. We suggest that these findings provide evidence for the Modular Model, one of the major contenders in the literature on sentence processing.     

Components of metaphoric processing

Three experiments examined whether sentences interpretable as metaphorical and literal expressions differed on three components of processing: perceptual decoding, sense selection, and integration of terms. In Experiments 1 and 2 metaphorical words were identified more readily than literal words on separate tests of perceptual identification and word recognition. In Experiment 3 the conveyed meaning of a metaphor was not recalled better than a literal interpretation of the same target sentence. It is concluded that metaphorical and literal sentences utilize separate perceptual and selectional decoding strategies, but do not differ with respect to comprehension processes once metaphorical and literal referents are instantiated. Discussion is given as to whether these differences constitute a separate metaphor strategy.Shinjo and Myers also described a fourth component process,retrieval, involved in the foregrounding of prime words used in their experiments.     

Musical metaphors: Evidence for a spatial grounding of non-literal sentences describing auditory events

This study investigated whether the spatial terms high and low, when used in sentence contexts implying a non-literal interpretation, trigger similar spatial associations as would have been expected from the literal meaning of the words. In three experiments, participants read sentences describing either a high or a low auditory event (e.g., The soprano sings a high aria vs. The pianist plays a low note). In all Experiments, participants were asked to judge (yes/no) whether the sentences were meaningful by means of up/down (Experiments 1 and 2) or left/right (Experiment 3) key press responses. Contrary to previous studies reporting that metaphorical language understanding differs from literal language understanding with regard to simulation effects, the results show compatibility effects between sentence implied pitch height and response location. The results are in line with grounded models of language comprehension proposing that sensory motor experiences are being elicited when processing literal as well as non-literal sentences.