Individual differences in spatial mental imagery

In this article, we report a new image-scanning paradigm that allowed us to measure objectively individual differences in spatial mental imagery—specifically, imagery for location. Participants were asked to determine whether an arrow was pointing at a dot using a visual mental image of an array of dots. The degree of precision required to discriminate “yes” from “no” trials was varied. In Experiment 1, the time to scan increasing distances, as well as the number of errors, increased when greater precision was required to make a judgement. The results in Experiment 2 replicated those results while controlling for possible biases. When greater precision is required, the accuracy of the spatial image becomes increasingly important—and hence the effect of precision in the task reflects the accuracy of the image. In Experiment 3, this measure was shown to be related to scores on the Paper Folding test, on the Paper Form Board test, and on the visuospatial items on Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices—but not to scores on questionnaires measuring object–based mental imagery. Thus, we provide evidence that classical standardized spatial tests rely on spatial mental imagery but not object mental imagery.     

True Overconfidence in Interval Estimates: Evidence Based on a New Measure of Miscalibration

Overconfidence is often regarded as one of the most prevalent judgment biases. Several studies show that overconfidence can lead to suboptimal decisions of investors, managers, or politicians. Recent research, however, questions whether overconfidence should be regarded as a bias and shows that standard “overconfidence” findings can easily be explained by different degrees of knowledge of agents plus a random error in predictions. We contribute to the current literature and ongoing research by extensively analyzing interval estimates for knowledge questions, for real financial time series, and for artificially generated charts. We thereby suggest a new method to measure overconfidence in interval estimates, which is based on the implied probability mass behind a stated prediction interval. We document overconfidence patterns, which are difficult to reconcile with rationality of agents and which cannot be explained by differences in knowledge as differences in knowledge do not exist in our task. Furthermore, we show that overconfidence measures are reliable in the sense that there exist stable individual differences in the degree of overconfidence in interval estimates, thereby testing an important assumption of behavioral economics and behavioral finance models: stable individual differences in the degree of overconfidence across people. We do this in a “field experiment,” for different levels of expertise of subjects (students on the one hand and professional traders and investment bankers on the other hand), over time, by using different miscalibration metrics, and for tasks that avoid common weaknesses such as a non‐representative selection of trick questions. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

More about linda or conjunctions in context

Abstract

Tversky and Kahneman (1982; 1983) reported that subjects rated the con junction of two events as more likely than one of the component events. This “conjunction effect” is an error in terms of formal probability, where the probability of more happening is always smaller than the probability of less. They explained this effect in terms of a “representativeness” heuristic. This paper focuses on the context of the problem and the suggestions implied by the questions in the task. The three studies reported here provide evidence that context effects and implicit suggestions alter subjects' judgements. Tvenky and Kahneman's models take no account of such factors. Two studies show that when implicit suggestions are reduced, subjects are much less prone to the conjunction “effect”. Subjects take being asked the question “Is person X a Y?”, as providing evidence that X may be Y.     

Decision bias and personnel selection strategies

The purpose of this study was to examine the influence of two decisional biases—framing and cost salience—on personnel selection decisions. One hundred twenty-eight graduate and undergraduate students participated in a personnel selection simulation. Framing was manipulated by inducing participants to use either a “rejecting” strategy (identify those applicants whom you would not interview) or an “accepting” strategy (list those applicants whom you would interview). Cost salience was manipulated by making selection-related costs either implicit or explicit. Results showed that “accepting” strategy subjects selected less applicants to be interviewed than “rejecting” strategy subjects, but only when selection-related costs were made salient. More time was required for subjects to make their selection decisions when selection-related costs were made salient. Framing and cost salience also influenced the success probability thresholds used by subjects to select applicants. Limitations of this research and directions for future study were discussed.     

An experimental analysis of psychometric functions in a threshold discrimination task with four response categories1

An experiment on a threshold discrimination task with four response categories was conducted to check the implicit assumptions of a threshold discrimination task with three response categories. Consideration of a task with three response categories, for example, “stronger,”“don't know,” and “weaker,” leads us to anticipate a relation between position parameters and that between the sizes of scale parameters of a model for a task with four response categories, such as, “stronger,”“probably stronger,”“probably weaker,” and “weaker.” That is, position parameters will be equidistant between adjacent categories and the middle scale parameter will be the largest. The results of the experiment on a four‐category task did not support these anticipated relation, and a possibility of biases in the estimation of point of subjective equality (PSE), using a three‐category task is pointed out. As an alternative to a three‐category task, a four‐category task is suggested when more than two categories are required.     

Same—differentjudgments of multiletter strings: Insensitivity to positional bias and spacing

Several recent studies of multiletter matching have included pairs of strings that have-the-same letters in different positions (rearranged pairs). The task can be defined such that these rearranged pairs are correctly classified asdifferent (i.e., subjects respond “same” only if the strings have the same letters in the same positions—the order task) or assame (i.e., subjects respond “same” if the strings have the same letters regardless of their positions—the item task). The order task produces left-to-right serial-position effects, whereas the item task produces U-shaped serial position effects. Because these differences suggest that subjects may be able to exert strategic control over the comparison process, two sets of experiments were designed to test whether or not subjects can change the relative weightings devoted to the respective serial positions. In Experiments 1 and 2, the probability that a mismatch occurred in the different positions was manipulated. In Experiments 3 and 4, the physical spacing between letters, as well as whether or not the spaces were filled with neutral noise characters, was varied. None of the manipulations had much influence on the serial-position effects. Thus, the distinct serial-position effects for the order and item tasks apparently are mandatory and not due-to-any voluntary-comparison strategy.     

The dynamics of motivated perception: Effects of control and status on the perception of ambivalent stimuli

Previous studies on attentional biases often show contradictory results. This suggests that important moderating variables have been neglected so far. We suggest that (1) control over potential consequences and (2) satisfaction with the current status are important factors that need to be considered. We explored the influence of these variables using a colour classification task, where colours are associated with financial gains and losses. Data were analysed with hierarchical logistic regression models and with stochastic diffusion models. The latter approach has the special advantage that it allows separating perceptual and judgemental biases. Results show an overall positive judgemental bias. In the absence of control, this positivity bias increases with the amount of money that has been gained, whereas the opposite pattern is present when dangers can be controlled. In the second experiment, no general feedback was given, which led to an increasing negativity bias. Results are discussed within an action theoretic framework.     

Rationality and Judgment

Abstract: Philosophical/epistemic theories of rationality differ over the role of judgment in rational argumentation. According to the “classical model” of rationality, rational justification is a matter of conformity with explicit rules or principles. Critics of the classical model, such as Harold Brown and Trudy Govier, argue that the model is subject to insuperable difficulties. They propose, instead, that rationality be understood, ultimately, in terms of judgment rather than rules. In this article I respond to Brown's and Govier's criticisms of the classical model, and to the “judgment model” they propose in its place. I argue that that model is unable both to distinguish between rational and irrational judgment and to avoid recourse to rules, and is therefore inadequate as an account of rationality, critical thinking, or argument appraisal. More positively, I argue that an adequate account of rationality must include a place for both rules and judgment.     

Comparisons of some learning models for response bias in signal detection

The effects of variations in signal probability and varying degrees of correct feedback on response bias were studied in a yes-no auditory signal detection task. The main finding was that the bias towards saying yes was an increasing function of the frequency of signal feedback events, but did not depend on the correctness of the feedback. Several learning models coupled with a simple psychophysical and decision model yielded predictions about overall biases and certain sequential statistics. Only one model, which can be decribed as an “informational” model, gave a good account of both observed overall biases and sequential statistics. This model assumes the observer’s response bias is strengthened for the feedback-reinforced response when the observer’s sensory information is ambiguous or is contradicted by the feedback information.     

Challenges for the sequential two-system model of moral judgement

Considerable evidence supports the sequential two-system (“default interventionist”) model of moral judgement, as proposed by Greene and others. We tested whether judgement speed and/or personal/impersonal moral dilemmas can predict the kind of moral judgements (utilitarian or deontological) subjects make for each dilemma, and whether personal dilemmas create difficulty in moral judgements. Our results showed that neither personal/impersonal conditions nor spontaneous/thoughtful-reflection conditions were reliable predictors of utilitarian or deontological moral judgements. Yet, we found support for an alternative view, in which, when the two types of responses are in conflict; the resolution of this conflict depends on both the subject and the dilemma. While thinking about this conflict, subjects sometimes change their minds in both directions, as suggested by the data from a mouse-tracking task.     

Selective attention in the speeded classification and comparison of multidimensional stimuli

Selective attention was studied when subjects were required to make either speeded classifications of single stimuli or comparisons of pairs of multidimensional stimuli. Experiment 1 established that subjects were able to attend selectively to form when the irrelevant dimension of size or shading varied in a speeded-classification (card-sorting) task. Experiment 2 confirmed this finding in a discrete-trials task. However, subjects werenot able to filter out irrelevant dimensional disparity in a comparably designed simultaneous-comparison (i.e., “same”-“different”) task. Mean “same” reaction time increased monotonically with increases in disparity between the two stimuli on the irrelevant dimension. Experiment 3 also revealed a monotonie increase in “same” RT as a function of irrelevant disparity in a successive-comparison task. These results were discussed in terms of a normalization model proposed by Dixon and Just (1978) in which it is assumed that a subject equates the two stimuli on the irrelevant dimension before deciding that they are the same along the relevant dimension. It was concluded that: (1) although subjects can efficiently filter out irrelevant disparity in a speeded-classification task, interference due to irrelevant disparity is obtained in the comparison tasks, (2) a common process such as normalization does not necessarily underlie performance in the speeded-classification and comparison tasks, (3) the ability to attend selectively to a stimulus dimension may be task determined as well as stimulus determined, and (4) contrary to the Dixon and Just proposal, normalization of irrelevant disparity occurs in a comparison task, even when the relevant dimension is represented as a separate encoding feature.     

Increased visual bias in children with developmental coordination disorder: Evidence from a visual-tactile temporal order judgment task

BackgroundPrevious studies have suggested that children with developmental coordination disorder (DCD) rely heavily on vision to perform movements, which may contribute to their clumsy movements. However, few studies have objectively and quantitatively investigated the perceptual biases of children with DCD.MethodsA visual-tactile temporal order judgment (TOJ) task was used to measure and compare the perceptual biases of 19 children with DCD and 19 age- and sex-matched typically developing children. The point of subjective equality, which demonstrates when “visual first” and “tactile first” judgment probabilities are equal (50%), obtained by analyzing the results of the visual-tactile TOJ task, was used as an indicator of perceptual biases. Further, variables (age and manual dexterity in all participants; motor function, autism spectrum disorder and attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder traits, and depressive symptoms in children with DCD) associated with perceptual biases were examined with correlation analysis.ResultsChildren with DCD had significantly stronger visual bias than typically developing children. Overall correlation analysis showed that increased visual bias was significantly correlated with poor manual dexterity.ConclusionChildren with DCD had a strong visual bias, which was associated with poor manual dexterity.     

Theory of Tonality

A rationale was sought for the general result that adult subjects find hostile words more difficult to learn than neutral words. A paired-associates task was constructed, and as responses nonsense syllables were used which had previously been experimentally associated with affectively significant adjectives. Three sets of three syllables each were created. One set consisted of syllables previously associated with “hostile” adjectives, one set consisted of syllables previously associated with “kindly” adjectives, and one set consisted of those previously associated with neutral adjectives. Results showed that the “neutral” syllables were more difficult to learn than either of the affectively significant sets. An explanation in terms of the greater dissimilarity in meaning among the neutral adjectives was offered.     

The influence of expertise and of physical complexity on visual short-term memory consolidation

This paper examines controversial claims about the merit of “unconscious thought” for making complex decisions. In four experiments, participants were presented with complex decisions and were asked to choose the best option immediately, after a period of conscious deliberation, or after a period of distraction (said to encourage “unconscious thought processes”). In all experiments the majority of participants chose the option predicted by their own subjective attribute weighting scores, regardless of the mode of thought employed. There was little evidence for the superiority of choices made “unconsciously”, but some evidence that conscious deliberation can lead to better choices. The final experiment suggested that the task is best conceptualized as one involving “online judgement” rather than one in which decisions are made after periods of deliberation or distraction. The results suggest that we should be cautious in accepting the advice to “stop thinking” about complex decisions.     

Giving a Reason for Unfairness: Effects of a Rationale upon Australian Students' Performances Within an Implicit Reward Situation

Two experimental conditions (giving a rationale vs no-rationale for “unfair” rewards) were compared under an implicit reward paradigm in which “target” subjects received rewards directly and contingently for improvements on a simple motor skills task while “peer” subjects who were also performing the same task received no rewards. Data showed that there were significant reinforcement effects on the behavior of both target and peer subjects during the implicit reward situation when no rationale was given for the “unfair” application of rewards. However, when a rationale was given for the non-reward of the peer subjects, neither target nor peer subjects showed significant increases in responses from baseline. Implications for group reinforcement practices are discussed.     

Right-left confusion in the adult: A verbal labeling effect

Directional judgments are typically slower when relative location is described by the words “east” and “west” or “right” and “left” than when described by the words “north” and “south” or “up” and “down.” A series of experiments are reported that disentangle verbal from perceptual encoding explanations for right-left difficulty. Overall, our results support a verbal encoding explanation for right-left confusion in the adult. Experiments 1-3 demonstrate that in a response-differentiation task, it is response to the labels “north,” “east,” “south,” and “west” that is responsible for right-left confusion. In addition, Experiments 4-6 demonstrate that right-left difficulty in a mirror image discrimination task is contingent on the use of directional labels. (The data also suggest that it may be more difficult to deal with “up,” “down,” “left,” and “right” than with “north,” “south,” “east,” and “west”) The data are interpreted as inconsistent with a bilateral symmetry explanation for right-left confusion.     

Individual differences in emotional reactivity moderate the strength of the relationship between attentional and implicit-memory biases towards threat-related stimuli

The study investigated whether the strength of the relationship between attentional and implicit-memory biases for threat-related material can be moderated by individual differences in temperament and personality. A spatial cueing task, where task-irrelevant angry, happy, and neutral faces acted as spatial cues preceding a target, was immediately followed by an unexpected “old/new” task involving previously presented faces. Temperament-based emotional reactivity (ER; one's typical response strength to emotional stimuli) predicted improved memory performance for angry faces in the “old/new” task. Critically, the relationship between the attentional bias towards threat (indexed by a cue validity index, i.e., a difference in response times on trials where cues with angry expression were presented in the same versus different location to the subsequent target) and enhanced implicit-memory for previously presented task-irrelevant threat-related information was found to be moderated by ER. The current findings provide the first evidence that temperament traits can offer novel insights into the mechanisms enhancing cognitive biases towards threat in the typical population.     

Judgement bias in pigs is independent of performance in a spatial holeboard task and conditional discrimination learning

Biases in judgement of ambiguous stimuli, as measured in a judgement bias task, have been proposed as a measure of the valence of affective states in animals. We recently suggested a list of criteria for behavioural tests of emotion, one of them stating that responses on the task used to assess emotionality should not be confounded by, among others, differences in learning capacity, i.e. must not simply reflect the cognitive capacity of an animal. We performed three independent studies in which pigs acquired a spatial holeboard task, a free choice maze which simultaneously assesses working memory and reference memory. Next, pigs learned a conditional discrimination between auditory stimuli predicting a large or small reward, a prerequisite for assessment of judgement bias. Once pigs had acquired the conditional discrimination task, optimistic responses to previously unheard ambiguous stimuli were measured in the judgement bias task as choices indicating expectation of the large reward. We found that optimism in the judgement bias task was independent of all three measures of learning and memory indicating that the performance is not dependent on the pig’s cognitive abilities. These results support the use of biases in judgement as proxy indicators of emotional valence in animals.     

Discrepancy between explicit judgement of agency and implicit feeling of agency: Implications for sense of agency and its disorders

The sense of agency refers to the feeling of authorship that “I am the one who is controlling external events through my own action”. A distinction between explicit judgement of agency and implicit feeling of agency has been proposed theoretically. However, there has not been sufficient experimental evidence to support this distinction. We have assessed separate explicit and implicit agency measures in the same population and investigated their relationships. Intentional binding task was employed as an implicit measure and self-other attribution task as an explicit measure, which are known to reflect clinical symptoms of disorders in the sense of agency. The results of the implicit measure and explicit measure were not correlated, suggesting dissociation of the explicit judgement of agency and the implicit feeling of agency.     

Positional discriminability in linear orderings

Subjects were taught two eight-term linear orders of the form “A taller than B taller than C ….,” They were then asked to choose the “taller” term in all possible pairwise combinations within each series, and reaction time was measured for each pair. In addition, subjects performed a further task in which they judged whether or not two terms were adjacent in the ordering. In subsequent sessions, subjects were told that the “shortest” term on one list was taller than the “tallest” term on the other, so that the two lists were merged into a single 16-term series. They were then required to choose the “taller” term for both within-groups and between-groups pairs. Subjects did not appear to use the initial groupings in performing this task, even when given training on differential categorical codes (“tall” vs. “short”) for the two sublists. Rather, subjects in all tasks appeared to represent the items as ordered positions along an internal array, so that comparison times depended largely on the differential discriminability of the item positions. In each task decisions were made more quickly if the terms being compared were near the ends of the ordering, rather than near the middle.