Mistaking the instance for the rule: A critical analysis of the truth-table evaluation paradigm

Many studies probe for interpretations of < if A then C> by having people evaluate truth-table cases (<A and C>, < A and not-C>, < not-A and C>, < not-A and not-C>) as making the rule true or false, or being irrelevant. We argue that a single case can never prove a general rule to be true, as philosophy of science has taught any researcher. Giving participants the impossible “true” option would therefore bias results away from this response. In Experiment 1 people judged instead whether cases make a rule false, do not make the rule false, or are irrelevant to the rule. The experimental group (N = 44) showed a significant increase in not-false responses compared with true responses of the control group (N = 39). In Experiments 2 and 3 the experimental groups judged whether cases make a rule true, corroborate it (i.e., make the rule more plausible, but neither true nor false), make it false, or are irrelevant. There was a significant reduction of irrelevant responses as compared to the default true/false/irrelevant task for the control groups. Even < A and C> cases were often no longer considered to make an < if A then C> rule true and were correctly judged to corroborate (vs. verify) rules. Results corroborate our conceptual analyses of the unsuitable “true” response option and put into question arguments that hinge on the presumed likelihood by which people consider truth contingencies to make a rule “true”.     

Attention switching and working memory spans

Barrouillet and Camos () concluded from their developmental study on working memory that when performing complex span tasks, individuals maintain memory items by switching rapidly their attention from processing to storage while performing the concurrent task. Thus, a processing component that would require a continuous attentional focusing should have a highly detrimental effect on span. The present study verifies two predictions issuing from this hypothesis by comparing the classical self‐paced reading and operation span tasks with new computer‐paced tasks in adults. First, any increase in the pace at which the processing component of a working memory span task has to be performed impedes switching and then leads to lower spans. Second, when presented at a fast pace, even simple activities such as reading letters or adding and subtracting 1 to small numbers have an effect on spans as detrimental as complex activities like reading and understanding sentences or solving complex equations.     

Reasoning with conditionals: a test of formal models of four theories

The four dominant theories of reasoning from conditionals are translated into formal models: The theory of mental models (Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2002). Conditionals: a theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference. Psychological Review, 109, 646-678), the suppositional theory (Evans, J. S. B. T., & Over, D. E. (2004). If. Oxford: Oxford University Press), a dual-process variant of the model theory (Verschueren, N., Schaeken, W., & d'Ydewalle, G. (2005). A dual-process specification of causal conditional reasoning. Thinking &Reasoning, 11, 278-293), and the probabilistic theory (Oaksford, M., Chater, N., & Larkin, J. (2000). Probabilities and polarity biases in conditional inference. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 26, 883-899). The first three theories are formalized as multinomial models. The models are applied to the frequencies of patterns of acceptance or rejection across the four basic inferences modus ponens, acceptance of the consequent, denial of the antecedent, and modus tollens. Model fits are assessed for two large data sets, one representing reasoning with abstract, basic conditionals, the other reflecting reasoning with pseudo-realistic causal and non-causal conditionals. The best account of the data was provided by a modified version of the mental-model theory, augmented by directionality, and by the dual-process model.     

The personality traits of liked people

There is surprisingly little understanding of how personality traits are associated with being generally liked by others after adolescence (Ozer & Benet-Martinez, 2006). We examined the relationship between self-reported personality traits and being generally liked in young adulthood in Greek organizations and freshman dormitories. We found a high level of consistency in which traits were associated with being liked. We examined the relationship between liked and socially desirable traits, using a recent theory on agency and communion (Wojciszke, Abele, & Baryla, 2009). Results help to create a personality profile of the person who is more liked by others, especially pointing to the importance of communal characteristics that are associated with behavior benefiting others.     

The initial representation in reasoning towards an interpretation of conditional sentences

All accounts of human reasoning (whether presented at the symbolic or subsymbolic level) have to reckon with the temporal organization of the human processing systems and the ephemeral nature of the representations it uses. We present three new empirical tests for the hypothesis that people commence the interpretational process by constructing a minimal initial representation. In the case of if A then C the initial representation captures the occurrence of the consequent, C, within the context of the antecedent, A. Conditional inference problems are created by a categorical premise that affirms or denies A or C. The initial representation allows an inference when the explicitly represented information matches (e.g., the categorical premise A affirms the antecedent “A”) but not when it mismatches (e.g., “not-A” denies A). Experiments 1 and 2 confirmed that people tend to accept the conclusion that “nothing follows” for the denial problems, as indeed they do not have a determinate initial-model conclusion. Experiment 3 demonstrated the other way round that the effect of problem type (affirmation versus denial) is reduced when we impede the possibility of inferring a determinate conclusion on the basis of the initial representation of both the affirmation and the denial problems.     

When will is not the same as should: The role of modals in reasoning with legal conditionals

Naïve reasoners reject logically valid conclusions from conditional rules if they can think of exceptions in which the antecedent is true, but the consequent is not. However, when reasoning with legal conditionals (e.g., “If a person kills another human, then this person should be punished for manslaughter”) people hardly consider exceptions but evaluate conclusions depending on their own sense of justice. We show that participants’ reluctance to consider exceptions in legal reasoning depends on the modal auxiliary used. In two experiments we phrased legal conditionals either with the modal “should” (i.e., “ . . . then this person should be punished”), or with “will” (i.e., “ . . . then this person will be punished”) and presented them as modus ponens or modus tollens inferences. Participants had to decide whether the offender should or will be punished (modus ponens) or whether the offender indeed committed the offence (modus tollens). For modus ponens inferences phrased with “should” we replicate previous findings showing that participants select conclusions on the basis of their own sense of justice (Experiments 1 and 2). Yet, when the legal conditional is phrased with the modal “will” this effect is attenuated (Experiments 1 and 2), and exceptions are considered (Experiment 1). The modal auxiliary did not affect modus tollens inferences.     

The influence of clause order,congruency, and probability on the processing of conditionals

Conditional information can be equally asserted in the forms if p, then q (e.g., “if I am ill, I will miss work tomorrow”) and q, if p (e.g., “I will miss work tomorrow, if I am ill”). While this type of clause order manipulation has previously been found to have no influence on the ultimate conclusions participants draw from conditional rules, we used self-paced reading to examine how it affects the real time incremental processing of everyday conditional statements. Experiment 1 revealed that clause order interacts with presuppositional congruency as readers hypothetically represent counterfactual statements. When if p, then q counterfactuals contained a presupposition that was incongruent with prior context, these statements took longer to read than when the presupposition was congruent, but for q, if p conditionals there was no such congruency effect. Experiment 2 revealed that reading times were influenced by the subjective probability of an indicative conditional regardless of clause order, with a penalty observed for low-probability statements relative to high-probability statements in both conditional clause orders. These data reveal a dissociation whereby clause order mediates the effect of suppositional congruency on reading times, but does not mediate the effect of subjective probability.     

Deduction chains for common knowledge

Deduction chains represent a syntactic and in a certain sense constructive method for proving completeness of a formal system. Given a formula , the deduction chains of are built up by systematically decomposing into its subformulae. In the case where is a valid formula, the decomposition yields a (usually cut-free) proof of . If is not valid, the decomposition produces a countermodel for . In the current paper, we extend this technique to a semiformal system for the Logic of Common Knowledge. The presence of fixed point constructs in this logic leads to potentially infinite-length deduction chains of a non-valid formula, in which case fairness of decomposition requires special attention. An adequate order of decomposition also plays an important role in the reconstruction of the proof of a valid formula from the set of its deduction chains.     

When can we say 'if'?

In this study, we focus on the conditions which permit people to assert a conditional statement of the form 'if p then q' with conversational relevance. In a broadly decision-theoretic approach, also drawing on hypothetical thinking theory [Evans, J. St. B. T. (2007). Hypothetical thinking: Dual processes in reasoning and judgement. Hove, UK: Psychology Press.], we predicted that conditional tips and promises would appear more useful and persuasive and be more likely to encourage an action p when (a) the conditional link from p to q was stronger, (b) the cost of the action p was lower and (c) the benefit of the consequence q was higher. Similarly, we predicted that conditional warnings and threats would be seen as more useful and persuasive and more likely to discourage an action p when (a) the conditional link from p to q was stronger, (b) the benefit of the action p was lower and (c) the cost of the consequence q was higher. All predictions were strongly confirmed, suggesting that such conditionals may best be asserted when they are of high relevance to the goals of the listener.     

Probing item social desirability by correlating personality items with Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR): A validity examination

Researchers often include a social desirability measure in personality measures, commonly the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR), and correlate it with personality items to probe for social desirability of the items. A strong correlation between BIDR scores and a personality item would indicate high item social desirability. The current research assesses the validity of this practice. Results showed that these correlations have high validity only when BIDR scores are calculated as a continuous variable rather than as dichotomized item scores. In addition, self-deception scores have higher validity for detecting item social desirability than do impression management scores. The current research supported the use of the self-deception scores, in particular, to detect highly desirable or undesirable items.     

Self-construal and social anxiety: Considering personality

Self-construal has been identified as a potential means to explain cultural differences in social anxiety. Yet, research findings suggest that self-construal is an individual difference as much as a cultural difference. We tested for mediation and moderation regarding self-construal, social anxiety, and other primary individual difference constructs. Our results indicated that the relation of extraversion and neuroticism to social anxiety was partially mediated by independent self-construal. In addition, the relationship between social anxiety and interdependent self-construal was moderated by neuroticism. These results suggest that personality traits play an important role in the relationship between social anxiety and self-construal. Clinical interventions that consider the interplay between self-construal and personality may be helpful in decreasing social anxiety.     

Matching bias in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a dual-process account from response times and confidence ratings

We examined matching bias in syllogistic reasoning by analysing response times, confidence ratings, and individual differences. Roberts’ (2005) “negations paradigm” was used to generate conflict between the surface features of problems and the logical status of conclusions. The experiment replicated matching bias effects in conclusion evaluation (Stupple & Waterhouse, 2009), revealing increased processing times for matching/logic “conflict problems”. Results paralleled chronometric evidence from the belief bias paradigm indicating that logic/belief conflict problems take longer to process than non-conflict problems (Stupple, Ball, Evans, & Kamal-Smith, 2011). Individuals’ response times for conflict problems also showed patterns of association with the degree of overall normative responding. Acceptance rates, response times, metacognitive confidence judgements, and individual differences all converged in supporting dual-process theory. This is noteworthy because dual-process predictions about heuristic/analytic conflict in syllogistic reasoning generalised from the belief bias paradigm to a situation where matching features of conclusions, rather than beliefs, were set in opposition to logic.     

Understanding causal conditionals: A study of individual differences

Previous studies have suggested that a minority of university students, of lower cognitive ability, are inclined to interpret abstract conditional statements, if p then q, as if they were conjunctions: p and q. In the present study we administered the conditional truth table task to a large sample of students (n = 160), but using realistic, everyday causal conditionals. We also measured their general intelligence. While individual differences were found, these were not consistent with some participants adopting a conjunctive interpretation of such statements. Rather, it appears that students of lower cognitive ability are rather likely to assume that a conditional implies its converse, so that it means also if q then p. The results are discussed with reference to the suppositional theory of conditionals and our more general account of hypothetical thinking.     

The role of personality and learning experiences in social cognitive career theory

We sought to extend the empirical literature on Social Cognitive Career Theory (SCCT) by testing (a) the posited indirect effect of personality on interests through learning experiences and sociocognitive mechanisms, and (b) hypotheses that self-efficacy percepts and outcome expectations derive from corresponding career-relevant learning experiences. Participants (327 college students) completed a measure of the Big Five personality factors and measures of learning experiences, self-efficacy, outcome expectations, and interests corresponding to each of Holland’s (1997) six RIASEC themes. Results of path analyses indicated that personality’s relation to interests was mediated via learning experiences and sociocognitive mechanisms; however, the extent of that mediation varied considerably across the different personality-interest relations. Findings also indicated strong support, across Holland themes, for SCCT’s hypothesized relations of learning experiences to self-efficacy and outcome expectations; however, for five of the six Holland themes, the relation between learning experiences and outcome expectations was at least partially mediated through self-efficacy.     

Perceiving personality in simple motion cues

People often ascribe intentions and personalities to simple motion cues. Two experiments were conducted to examine how variations in motion quality, such as amplitude and frequency, influence a simple stimulus’ ratings on different aspects of personality. In experiment one participants were asked to adjust the motion behavior of a computer animated ball according to different items, which were based on the five factor model of personality. In experiment two participants had to assign the ‘correct’ personality to stimuli that were based on data of experiment one. Recognition rate was high for most personality traits, but there were also some misidentifications. Results suggest that simple features of motion partly influence social perception and human communication.     

The psychological puzzle of Sudoku

Sudoku puzzles, which are popular worldwide, require individuals to infer the missing digits in a 9 × 9 array according to the general rule that every digit from 1 to 9 must occur once in each row, in each column, and in each of the 3-by-3 boxes in the array. We present a theory of how individuals solve these puzzles. It postulates that they rely solely on pure deductions, and that they spontaneously acquire various deductive tactics, which differ in their difficulty depending on their “relational complexity”, i.e., the number of constraints on which they depend. A major strategic shift is necessary to acquire tactics for more difficult puzzles: solvers have to keep track of possible digits in a cell. We report three experiments corroborating this theory. We also discuss their implications for theories of reasoning that downplay the role of deduction in everyday reasoning.     

Using available signals on LinkedIn for personality assessment

LinkedIn is considered the most effective social network website for job seekers and recruiters. Although LinkedIn profiles are regularly accessed to evaluate candidates, we know very little about the type of information conveyed. The aim of this study is to determine if LinkedIn profiles convey accurate information about individuals’ personality traits. Drawing from signaling theory, we expect that individuals portray themselves in a manner that will reflect their personality. To examine this assertion, 607 LinkedIn profiles were coded on 33 indicators. Regression analyses and classification statistics demonstrate that Linkedin profiles contain accurate signals of personality traits. Potential use and limitations of LinkedIn as a source of accurate information about personality are discussed.