Strategy selection in causal reasoning: when beliefs and covariation collide.

The present study investigated how people combine covariation information (Cheng & Novick, 1990, 1992) with pre-existing beliefs (White, 1989) when evaluating causal hypotheses. Three experiments, using both within- and between-subjects designs, found that the use of covariation information and beliefs interacted, such that the effects of covariation were larger when people assessed hypotheses about believable than about unbelievable causal candidates. In Experiment 2, this interaction was observed when participants made judgments in stages (e.g., first evaluating covariation information about a causal candidate and then evaluating the believability of a candidate), as well as when the information was presented simultaneously. Experiment 3 demonstrated that this pattern was also reflected in participants' metacognitive judgments: Participants indicated that they weighed covariation information more heavily for believable than unbelievable candidates. Finally, Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated the presence of individual differences in the use of covariation- and belief-based cues. That is, individuals who tended to base their causality judgments primarily on belief were less likely to make use of covariation information and vice versa. The findings were most consistent with White's (1989) causal power theory, which suggests that covariation information is more likely to be considered relevant to believable than unbelievable causes.     

When Mental States Matter,When They Don't,and What That Means for Morality

Research has shown that moral judgments depend on the capacity to engage in mental state reasoning. In this article, we will first review behavioral and neural evidence for the role of mental states (e.g., people's beliefs, desires, intentions) in judgments of right and wrong. Second, we will consider cases where mental states appear at first to matter less (i.e., when people assign moral blame for accidents and when explicit information about mental states is missing). Third, we will consider cases where mental states, in fact, matter less, specifically, in cases of “purity” violations (e.g., committing incest, consuming taboo foods). We will discuss how and why mental states do not matter equivalently across the multi‐dimensional space of morality. In the fourth section of this article, we will elaborate on the possibility that norms against harmful actions and norms against “impure” actions serve distinct functions – for regulating interpersonal interactions (i.e., harm) versus for protecting the self (i.e., purity). In the fifth and final section, we will speculate on possible differences in how we represent and reason about other people's mental states versus our own beliefs and intentions. In addressing these issues, we aim to provide insight into the complex structure and distinct functions of mental state reasoning and moral cognition. We conclude that mental state reasoning allows us to make sense of other moral agents in order to understand their past actions, to predict their future behavior, and to evaluate them as potential friends or foes.     

Eye movements as a gatekeeper for memorization: evidence for the persistence of attentional sets in visual memory search

Attention is known to serve multiple goals, including the selection of information for further perceptual analysis (selection for perception) and for goal-directed behavior (selection for action). Here, we study the role of overt attention (i.e., eye movements) as a gatekeeper for memorization processes (selection for memorization). Subjects memorized complex multidimensional stimulus displays and subsequently indicated whether a specific (probe) item was present. In Experiment 1 we utilized an incidental learning setting where in the beginning only a subset of display stimuli was relevant, whereas in a transfer block all stimuli were possible probe items. In Experiment 2, we used an explicit learning setting within a between-group design. Response times and gaze patterns indicated that subjects learned to ignore irrelevant stimuli while forming memory representations. The findings suggest that complex feature binding processes in peripheral vision may serve to guide overt selective attention, which eventually contributes to filtering out irrelevant information even in highly complex environments. Gaze patterns suggested that attentional control settings persisted even when they were no longer required.     

The cost of thinking about false beliefs: evidence from adults' performance on a non-inferential theory of mind task

Much of what we know about other people's beliefs comes non-inferentially from what people tell us. Developmental research suggests that 3-year-olds have difficulty processing such information: they suffer interference from their own knowledge of reality when told about someone's false belief (e.g., [Wellman, H. M., & Bartsch, K. (1988). Young children's reasoning about beliefs. Cognition, 30, 239-277.]). The current studies examined for the first time whether similar interference occurs in adult participants. In two experiments participants read sentences describing the real colour of an object and a man's false belief about the colour of the object, then judged the accuracy of a picture probe depicting either reality or the man's belief. Processing costs for picture probes depicting reality were consistently greater in this false belief condition than in a matched control condition in which the sentences described the real colour of one object and a man's unrelated belief about the colour of another object. A similar pattern was observed for picture probes depicting the man's belief in most cases. Processing costs were not sensitive to the time available for encoding the information presented in the sentences: costs were observed when participants read the sentences at their own pace (Experiment 1) or at a faster or a slower pace (Experiment 2). This suggests that adults' difficulty was not with encoding information about reality and a conflicting false belief, but with holding this information in mind and using it to inform a subsequent judgement.     

注意资源对正常人消极情绪偏向的影响

本研究以正常人为研究对象,分别采用词汇判断任务和后掩蔽范式,以两个行为实验考察了阈上/阈下两种情况下,注意资源的多少对消极情绪偏向的影响.结果发现,在阈上条件下,只有当注意资源缺乏时,才能出现消极情绪偏向;在阈下条件下,无论注意资源多少,都没有出现消极情绪偏向.表明消极情绪偏向在正常人中的出现不是"无条件的",而是受到注意资源多少的影响.     

Negations and natural sampling in data selection: Ecological versus heuristic explanations of matching bias

Matching bias occurs when people ignore negations when testing a hypothesis--for example, if A, then not 2--and select possible data types that are named in the hypothesis (i.e., A and 2; Evans & Lynch, 1973). There are two explanations of this bias: the heuristic account and the contrast class account. The latter is part of Oaksford and Chater's (1994) ecological approach to data selection. On this account, a contrast set (i.e., birds that are not ravens) has a higher probability than the original set (i.e., birds that are ravens). This article reports two experiments in which these accounts make divergent predictions. The same materials were used as those in Yama (2001), who found more support for the heuristic approach. Experiment 1 replicated Yama with Western participants. Experiment 2 used a procedure introduced by Oaksford and Wakefield (2003). Rather than present participants with one of each of the four possible data types all at once, 50 were presented one at a time. The proportions of each data type reflected the relevant probabilities. The results supported the ecological approach, showing that people constructed contrast sets that strongly influenced their data selection behavior. The results were not consistent with the heuristic approach.     

Effects of relevant and irrelevant color singletons on inhibition of return and attentional capture

We tested whether color singletons lead to saccadic and manual inhibition of return (IOR; i.e., slower responses at cued locations) and whether IOR depended on the relevance of the color singletons. The target display was preceded by a nonpredictive cue display. In three experiments, half of the cues were response-relevant, because participants had to perform a discrimination task at the cued location. With the exception of Experiment 2, none of the cue colors matched the target color. We observed saccadic IOR after color singletons, which was greater for slow than for fast responses. Furthermore, when the relevant cue color matched the target color, we observed attentional capture (i.e., faster responses at cued locations) with rapid responses, but IOR with slower responses, which provides evidence for attentional deallocation. When the cue display was completely response-irrelevant in two additional experiments, we did not find evidence for IOR. Instead, we found attentional capture when the cue color matched the target color. Also, attentional capture was greater for rapid responses and with short cue–target intervals. Thus, IOR emerges when cues are relevant and do not match the target color, whereas attentional capture emerges with relevant and irrelevant cues that match the target color.     

Immunity to attentional capture at ignored locations

Certain stimuli have the power to rapidly and involuntarily capture spatial attention against our will. The present study investigated whether such stimuli capture spatial attention even when they appear in ignored regions of visual space. In other words, which force is more powerful: attentional capture or spatial filtering? Participants performed a spatial cuing task, searching for a letter target defined by color (e.g., green) and then reporting that letter’s identity. Two of the four search locations were always irrelevant. Unlike many previous experiments, participants were forced to ignore these locations because they always contained a target-colored distractor letter. Experiment 1 assessed capture by a salient-but-irrelevant abrupt onset cue appearing 150 ms before the search display. One might expect onset cues to capture attention even at ignored locations given that the main function of capture, presumably, is to rapidly alert observers to unexpected yet potentially important stimuli. However, they did not. Experiment 2 replicated this result with a different neutral baseline condition. Experiment 3 replicated the absence of capture effects at ignored locations with an even more potent stimulus: a relevant cue possessing the target color. We propose that people are effectively immune to attentional capture by objects in ignored locations – spatial filtering dominates attentional capture.     

Where is the chocolate? Rapid spatial orienting toward stimuli associated with primary rewards

Some stimuli can orient attentional resources and access awareness even if they appear outside the focus of voluntary attention. Stimuli with low-level perceptual salience and stimuli with an emotional content can modulate attention independently of voluntary processes. In Experiment 1, we used a spatial cuing task to investigate whether stimuli that are controlled for their perceptual salience can modulate the rapid orienting of attention based exclusively on their affective relevance. Affective relevance was manipulated through a Pavlovian conditioning paradigm in which an arbitrary and affectively neutral perceptual stimulus was associated with a primary reward (i.e., a chocolate odor). Results revealed that, after conditioning, attentional resources were rapidly oriented toward the stimulus that was previously associated with the reward. In Experiment 2, we used the very same conditioning procedure, but we devaluated the reward after conditioning for half of the participants through a sensory-specific satiation procedure. Strikingly, when the reward was devaluated, attention was no longer oriented toward reward-associated stimuli. Our findings therefore suggest that reward associations rapidly modulate visual processing independently of both voluntary processing and the perceptual salience of the stimulus. This supports the notion that stimuli associated with primary rewards modulate rapid attention orienting on the basis of the affective relevance of the stimulus.     

On the inability to ignore touch when responding to vision in the crossmodal congruency task

We investigated the extent to which people can selectively ignore distracting vibrotactile information when performing a visual task. In Experiment 1, participants made speeded elevation discrimination responses (up vs. down) to a series of visual targets presented from one of two eccentricities on either side of central fixation, while simultaneously trying to ignore task-irrelevant vibrotactile distractors presented independently to the finger (up) vs. thumb (down) of either hand. Participants responded significantly more slowly, and somewhat less accurately, when the elevation of the vibrotactile distractor was incongruent with that of the visual target than when they were presented from the same (i.e., congruent) elevation. This crossmodal congruency effect was significantly larger when the visual and tactile stimuli appeared on the same side of space than when they appeared on different sides, although the relative eccentricity of the two stimuli within the hemifield (i.e., same vs. different) had little effect on performance. In Experiment 2, participants who crossed their hands over the midline showed a very different pattern of crossmodal congruency effects to participants who adopted an uncrossed hands posture. Our results suggest that both the relative external location and the initial hemispheric projection of the target and distractor stimuli contribute jointly to determining the magnitude of the crossmodal congruency effect when participants have to respond to vision and ignore touch.     

Dialectical beliefs and savings tendency: Opposite patterns in good versus bad current status

People often experience a dilemma: whether we should invest now for a better future or save now for an unexpected future. The current research investigated the influence of dialecticism, a constellation of lay beliefs stating that the world is full of constant changes, coexisting contradictions, and interdependent relationships, on people's savings tendencies when they are with good versus bad status. Study 1 verified that dialectical beliefs were negatively associated with optimistic expectations among people with good status (i.e., high socioeconomic status) but positively associated with optimistic expectations among people with bad status (i.e., low socioeconomic status). Next, Studies 2 and 3 examined the interaction effect between dialectical beliefs and people's current status in predicting their savings tendencies in the investment scenarios with the focus on savings decision‐making and emotional experiences related to savings scenarios, respectively. Finally, to test generalizability, Study 4 examined people's savings tendencies in the situation that they needed to prevent failure instead of doing investments. The results converged to support the hypothesis that stronger dialectical beliefs predicted greater savings tendencies among people with good current status but weaker savings tendencies among people with bad current status. These findings demonstrated that the effect of dialectical beliefs on savings tendencies varies as a function of the characteristics of the situations, which advances the theoretical understanding of dialecticism in decision‐making research.     

The influence of relevant and irrelevant stereoscopic depth cues: Depth information does not always capture attention

Previous research reported ambiguous findings regarding the relationship of visuospatial attention and (stereoscopic) depth information. Some studies indicate that attention can be focused on a distinct depth plane, while other investigations revealed attentional capture from irrelevant items located in other, unattended depth planes. To evaluate whether task relevance of depth information modulates the deployment of attentional resources across depth planes, the additional singleton paradigm was adapted: Singletons defined by depth (i.e., displayed behind or in front of a central depth plane) or color (green against gray) were presented among neutral items and served as targets or (irrelevant) distractors. When participants were instructed to search for a color target, no attentional capture from irrelevant depth distractors was observed. In contrast, it took substantially longer to search for depth targets when an irrelevant distractor was presented simultaneously. Color distractors as well as depth distractors caused attentional capture, independent of the distractors’ relative depth position (i.e., in front of or behind the target). However, slight differences in task performance were obtained depending on whether or not participants fixated within the target depth plane. Thus, the current findings indicate that attentional resources in general are uniformly distributed across different depth planes. Although task relevant depth singletons clearly affect the attentional system, this information might be processed subsequent to other stimulus features.     

Processing deceptive information in sports: Individual differences for responding to head fakes depends on the attentional capability of the observer

In team sports, players sometimes try to deceive their opponents by providing misleading information in order to gain a temporal advantage. Head-fakes are often applied when a player gazes in one direction, while passing/shooting the ball in another direction. The opponent is challenged to focus attention on the relevant information (i.e., pass direction), while ignoring the conflicting information (i.e., gaze direction). The present study aimed to identify the link between attentional capabilities and the effectiveness of head fakes. Twenty-seven novices performed in a basketball-specific head-fake task and in the attention-window task. A correlation between performances in both tasks revealed that participants with higher attentional capabilities were better able to focus their attention on the relevant feature (pass direction), when judging basketball situations, than participants with lower attentional capabilities. The results emphasize the relevance of high attentional capabilities in team sports and indicate that focusing one’s attention to the pass direction poses a possibility of reducing the effects of head fakes.     

Cultivating the Opinionated: The Need to Evaluate Moderates the Relationship Between Crime Drama Viewing and Scary World Evaluations

The literature on cultivation processes assumes that second‐order judgments (e.g., attitudes) are repeatedly updated during viewing (i.e., on‐line) and can be reported when asked. In this article, we propose this reasoning only holds for people high in their need to evaluate (NTE). Low‐NTE individuals do not update their opinions on‐line and have to construct their attitudes memory‐based, limiting the likelihood of finding second‐order relationships. Results from a cross‐sectional survey among 226 adolescents indicate that crime drama viewing and scary world beliefs are only correlated among high‐NTE individuals. NTE does not moderate cultivation through nonfiction. The theoretical implications of memory‐based attitudes for second‐order cultivation are discussed, and suggestions are made for future research on attitudinal media effects.     

Adjusting for the correspondence bias: Effects of causal uncertainty, cognitive busyness, and causal strength of situational information

This research examined the conditions under which people who have more chronic doubt about their ability to make sense of social behavior (i.e., are causally uncertain; [Weary and Edwards, 1994] and [Weary and Edwards, 1996]) are more likely to adjust their dispositional inferences for a target’s behaviors. Using a cognitive busyness manipulation within the attitude attribution paradigm, we found in Study 1 that higher causal uncertainty predicted increased correction of dispositional inferences, but only when participants had sufficient attentional resources to devote to the task. In Study 2, we found that higher-causal uncertainty predicted greater inferential correction, but only when the additional information provided a more compelling alternative explanation for the observed behavior. Results of this research are discussed in terms of their relevance to the Causal Uncertainty (Weary & Edwards, 1994) and dispositional inference models.     

Statistical regularities modulate attentional capture independent of search strategy

An earlier study using the additional singleton task showed that statistical regularities regarding the distractor location can cause an attentional bias that affects the amount of attentional capture by distractors and the efficiency of selection of targets. The distractor singleton was systematically present more often in one location than in all other locations. The present study investigated whether this bias also occurs when observers adopt a feature search mode, i.e., when they search for a specific feature (circle) between elements with different shapes, while ignoring a colored distractor singleton. It is assumed that in feature search, observers can ignore distractors in a top-down way and as such one expects that statistical regularities about the distractor location should not play a role. Contrary to this prediction, we found that even in feature search, both attentional capture by the distractors and the efficiency of selecting the target were impacted by these statistical regularities. Moreover, statistical regularities regarding the feature value of the distractor (its color) had no effect on the amount of capture or the efficiency of selection. We claim that statistical regularities cause passive lingering biases of attention such that on the priority map, the location containing a high probability distractor competes less for attention than locations that are less likely to contain distractors.     

Is cross-modal integration of emotional expressions independent of attentional resources?

In this study, we examined whether integration of visual and auditory information about emotions requires limited attentional resources. Subjects judged whether a voice expressed happiness or fear, while trying to ignore a concurrently presented static facial expression. As an additional task, the subjects had to add two numbers together rapidly (Experiment 1), count the occurrences of a target digit in a rapid serial visual presentation (Experiment 2), or judge the pitch of a tone as high or low (Experiment 3). The visible face had an impact on judgments of the emotion of the heard voice in all the experiments. This cross-modal effect was independent of whether or not the subjects performed a demanding additional task. This suggests that integration of visual and auditory information about emotions may be a mandatory process, unconstrained by attentional resources.     

WHAT LIARS CAN TELL US ABOUT THE KNOWLEDGE NORM OF PRACTICAL REASONING

If knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning, then we should be able to alter people's behavior by affecting their knowledge as well as by affecting their beliefs. Thus, as Roy Sorensen (2010 ) suggests, we should expect to find people telling lies that target knowledge rather than just lies that target beliefs. In this paper, however, I argue that Sorensen's discovery of “knowledge‐lies” does not support the claim that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. First, I use a Bayesian framework to show that in each of Sorensen's examples, knowledge‐lies alter people's behavior by affecting their beliefs. Second, I show that while we can imagine lies that target knowledge without targeting beliefs, they cannot alter people's behavior. In other words, knowledge‐lies actually work (i.e., manipulate behavior) by targeting beliefs or they do not work at all.     

(Why) do I think what you think? Epistemic social tuning and implicit prejudice

This research examines whether people who experience epistemic motivation (i.e., a desire to acquire knowledge) came to have implicit attitudes consistent with the apparent beliefs of another person. People had lower implicit prejudice when they experienced epistemic motivation and interacted with a person who ostensibly held egalitarian beliefs (Experiments 1 and 2). Implicit prejudice was not affected when people did not experience epistemic motivation. Further evidence shows that this tuning of implicit attitudes occurs when beliefs are endorsed by another person, but not when they are brought to mind via means that do not imply that person's endorsement (Experiment 3). Results suggest that implicit attitudes of epistemically motivated people tune to the apparent beliefs of others to achieve shared reality.     

Background beliefs and evidence interpretation

In this paper we argue that it is often adaptive to use one's background beliefs when interpreting information that, from a normative point of view, is incomplete. In both of the experiments reported here participants were presented with an item possessing two features and were asked to judge, in the light of some evidence concerning the features, to which of two categories it was more likely that the item belonged. It was found that when participants received evidence relevant to just one of these hypothesised categories (i.e. evidence that did not form a Bayesian likelihood ratio) they used their background beliefs to interpret this information. In Experiment 2, on the other hand, participants behaved in a broadly Bayesian manner when the evidence they received constituted a completed likelihood ratio. We discuss the circumstances under which participants, when making their judgements, consider the alternative hypothesis. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our results for an understanding of hypothesis testing, belief revision, and categorisation.