Pragmatic reasoning schemas

We propose that people typically reason about realistic situations using neither content-free syntactic inference rules nor representations of specific experiences. Rather, people reason using knowledge structures that we term pragmatic reasoning schemas, which are generalized sets of rules defined in relation to classes of goals. Three experiments examined the impact of a “permission schema” on deductive reasoning. Experiment 1 demonstrated that by evoking the permission schema it is possible to facilitate performance in Wason's selection paradigm for subjects who have had no experience with the specific content of the problems. Experiment 2 showed that a selection problem worded in terms of an abstract permission elicited better performance than one worded in terms of a concrete but arbitrary situation, providing evidence for an abstract permission schema that is free of domain-specific content. Experiment 3 provided evidence that evocation of a permission schema affects not only tasks requiring procedural knowledge, but also a linguistic rephrasing task requiring declarative knowledge. In particular, statements in the form if p then q were rephrased into the form p only if q with greater frequency for permission than for arbitrary statements, and rephrasings of permission statements produced a pattern of introduction of modals (must, can) totally unlike that observed for arbitrary conditional statements. Other pragmatic schemas, such as “causal” and “evidence” schemas can account for both linguistic and reasoning phenomena that alternative hypotheses fail to explain.     

The elusive pragmatic reasoning schemas effect

The present study examined the pragmatic reasoning schema theory of deductive reasoning—specifically, its explanation of performance on the selection task. Experiment 1 replicated a result crucial to the theory, the finding of facilitation on abstract versions of the selection task based on pragmatic reasoning schemas. However, Experiments 2, 3, and 4 established that this facilitation was dependent upon two presentation factors: (1) the presence of explicit negatives on the NOT P and NOT Q cards and (2) the inclusion of a checking context in the problem statement. These results are discussed in terms of Evans's two-stage (heuristic/analytic processing) model of reasoning.     

Evoking the permission schema: The impact of explicit negation and a violation-checking context

Cheng and Holyoak (1985) proposed that realistic reasoning in deontic contexts is based on pragmatic schemas such as those for assessing compliance with or violation of permission and obligation rules, and that the evocation of these schemas can facilitate performance in Wason's (1966) selection task. The inferential rules in such schemas are intermediate in generality between the content-independent rules proposed by logicians and specific cases stored in memory. In one test of their theory, Cheng and Holyoak demonstrated that facilitation could be obtained even for an abstract permission rule that is devoid of concrete thematic content. Jackson and Griggs (1990) argued on the basis of several experiments that such facilitation is not due to evocation of a permission schema, but, rather, results from a combination of presentation factors: the presence of explicit negatives in the statement of cases and the presence of a violation-checking context. Their conclusion calls into question both the generality of content effects in reasoning and the explanation of these effects. We note that Jackson and Griggs did not test whether the same combination of presentation factors would produce facilitation for an arbitrary rule that does not involve deontic concepts, as their proposal would predict. The present study tested this prediction. Moreover, we extended Jackson and Griggs' comparisons between performance with an abstract permission rule versus an arbitrary rule, introducing clarifications in the statement of each. No facilitation was observed for an arbitrary rule even when explicit negatives and a violation-checking context were used, whereas strong facilitation was found for the abstract permission rule under the same conditions. Performance on the arbitrary rule was not improved even when the instructions indicated that the rule was conditional rather than biconditional. In contrast, a small but reliable degree of facilitation was obtained for the abstract permission rule, with violation-checking content even in the absence of explicit negatives. The theory of pragmatic reasoning schemas can account for both the present findings and those reported by Jackson and Griggs.     

Pragmatic Schemas and the Selection Task: To Reason or Not to Reason

Cheng and Holyoak (1985) have proposed that people possess classes of linguistically based schemas that have an internal structure that is determined by pragmatic considerations. They found that when permission schemas (“If you want to do P, then you must do Q”) are used in the selection task, the success rate is much superior to what is usually observed. According to Cheng and Holyoak, this is due to the fact that the permission schema is defined by a set of production rules that give the same answers to problems of conditional inference as those of formal logic. In order to test this hypothesis specifically, 160 university students were given one of two tests. The first contained two sets of inferential reasoning tasks, one using a permission schema, the second using a relation of multiple causality. The second test employed the same two conditional relations, but in an appropriate context. The results indicated that subjects did better on the reasoning task with the schema of multiple causality when presented in context, but, as predicted, their performance was much worse on the inferential reasoning task with the permission schema, which generated a higher proportion of logically incorrect responses. These results suggest that contrary to what has been affirmed, permission schemas might not have a logical structure that is equivalent to conditional logic. A second experiment examined selection task performance using the same two relations in context. Performance on the permission schema was superior to that found with the relation of multiple causality. This confirmed previous results indicating that permission schemas do improve selection task performance, but also suggests that this effect is not related to understanding of conditional reasoning.     

Création de l’Échelle de Distorsions Cognitives pour adultes (EDC-A) : étude des propriétés psychométriques en population générale et association avec l’anxiété et la dépression

IntroductionCognitive distortions contribute to the maintenance of inappropriate cognitive schemas and play a role in the emergence of pathologies such as anxiety and depression. We developed the Cognitive Distortion Scale for Adults in order to identify distortions in individuals’ reasoning. The main objectives of this study were: (1) to study the psychometric properties of the Cognitive Distortion Scale for Adults, (2) to identify cognitive distortions associated with anxiety and depression in the general population.MethodThe study involved 916 participants (151 men and 765 women) aged 18 to 85-years. The participants completed the Cognitive Distortion Scale for Adults. The tool presents 42 mini scenarios with a daily life situation and a proposition concerning a cognitive distortion. Participants must give their degree of agreement (0 to 10) with this one. Seven cognitive distortions are operationalized (dichotomous reasoning, disqualification of one of the poles, arbitrary focusing, omission of the neutral, requalification in the other pole, maximization and minimization). They also completed the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale. Both scales were available online on the Internet. The total duration of the test was approximately 10 minutes. A group of 35 participants completed the two scale 15 days apart.ResultsThe sub-dimensions of EDC-A obtain Cronbach alphas higher than .65 and EDC-A has a coherent factor structure. The scale has good temporal stability. Anxiety is predicted by dichotomous reasoning, disqualification of one of the poles, arbitrary focusing and maximization. Depression is predicted by dichotomous reasoning, arbitrary focusing, omission of the neutral and requalification in the other pole. Anxiety and depression are associated with negative cognitive distortions in reasoning. However, depression is also associated with positive cognitive distortions. Subjects with depression produce more varied cognitive distortions than subjects with anxiety.DiscussionThe Cognitive Distortion Scale for Adults shows promising psychometric properties. Further studies will need to be conducted to confirm these results. Anxiety would be related to biased information treatment of negative information, whereas depression would be related to more comprehensive biased information treatment, both negative and positive information. Anxiety would be related to suboptimal functioning of reasoning abilities; depression would be more characterized by a structural deficit of reasoning abilities.     

No blank slates: Pre-existing schemas about pharmaceuticals predict memory for side effects

Objectives: Attribution of symptoms as medication side effects is informed by pre-existing beliefs about medicines and perceptions of personal sensitivity to their effects (pharmaceutical schemas). We tested whether (1) pharmaceutical schemas were associated with memory (recall/recognition) for side effect information (2) memory explained the attribution of a common unrelated symptom as a side effect.

Design: In this analogue study participants saw the patient leaflet of a fictitious asthma drug listing eight side effects.

Main outcome measures: We measured recall and recognition memory for side effects and used a vignette to test whether participants attributed an unlisted common symptom (headache) as a side effect.

Results: Participants who perceived pharmaceuticals as more harmful in general recalled fewer side effects correctly (r_{Correct Recall} = ?.273), were less able to differentiate between listed and unlisted side effects (r_{Recognition Sensitivity} = ?.256) and were more likely to attribute the unlisted headache symptom as a side effect (r_{side effect attribution} = .381, ps < .01). The effect of harm beliefs on side effect attribution was partially mediated by correct recall of side effects.

Conclusion: Pharmaceutical schemas are associated with memory for side effect information. Memory may explain part of the association between pharmaceutical schemas and the attribution of unrelated symptoms as side effects.     

Perspective effects in nondeontic versions of the Wason selection task

Perspective effects in the Wason four-card selection task occur when people choose mutually exclusive sets of cards depending on the perspective they adopt when making their choice. Previous demonstrations of perspective effects have been limited to deontic contexts--that is, problem contexts that involve social duty, like permissions and obligations. In three experiments, we demonstrate perspective effects in nondeontic contexts, including a context much like the original one employed by Wason (1966, 1968). We suggest that perspective effects arise whenever the task uses a rule that can be interpreted biconditionally and different perspectives elicit different counterexamples that match the predicted choice sets. This view is consistent with domain-general theories but not with domain-specific theories of deontic reasoning--for example, pragmatic reasoning schemas and social contract theory--that cannot explain perspective effects in nondeontic contexts.     

Abstract Planning and Perceptual Chunks: Elements of Expertise in Geometry

We present a new model of skilled performance in geometry proof problem solving called the Diagram Configuration model (DC). While previous models plan proofs in a step-by-step fashion, we observed that experts plan at a more abstract level: They focus on the key steps and skip the less important ones. DC models this abstract planning behavior by parsing geometry problem diagrams into perceptual chunks, called diagram configurations, which cue relevant schematic knowledge. We provide verbal protocol evidence that DC's schemas correspond with the step-skipping inferences experts make in their initial planning. We compare DC with other models of geometry expertise and then, in the final section, we discuss more general implications of our research. DC's reasoning has important similarities with Larkin's (1988) display-based reasoning approach and Johnson-Laird's (1983) mental model approach. DC's perceptually based schemas are a step towards a unified explanation of (1) experts' superior problem-solving effectiveness, (2) experts' superior problem-state memory, and (3) experts' ability, in certain domains, to solve relatively simple problems by pure forward inferencing. We also argue that the particular and efficient knowledge organization of DC challenges current theories of skill acquisition as it presents an end-state of learning that is difficult to explain within such theories. Finally, we discuss the implications of DC for geometry instruction.     

Why pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms don’t work

Abstract

Pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms tell us to observe these norms as the best means to attaining the things we value. I argue that such justifications do not work, because they harbour an irresolvable tension: their non-alethic character intrinsically conflicts with the truth-aiming character of the epistemic norms they are justifying. We should abandon, then, either epistemic norms or pragmatic justifications of these norms. I therefore argue that we should abandon pragmatic justifications.     

What is Philosophical about Kant’s Anthropology?

Abstract

In this essay, I argue that Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View is fundamentally about the sphere of civilization, and, with this, a particular kind of philosophical self-understanding. By civilization, Kant means to indicate the process by which human beings transform their inner natures based on pragmatic or prudential considerations born of our living together. Civilization is what we do to ourselves in order to get along with others with whom we share the earth. In the Anthropology, what we come to understand about ourselves is the possibility of transforming our inner natures based on our will.     

When Mental States Matter,When They Don't,and What That Means for Morality

Research has shown that moral judgments depend on the capacity to engage in mental state reasoning. In this article, we will first review behavioral and neural evidence for the role of mental states (e.g., people's beliefs, desires, intentions) in judgments of right and wrong. Second, we will consider cases where mental states appear at first to matter less (i.e., when people assign moral blame for accidents and when explicit information about mental states is missing). Third, we will consider cases where mental states, in fact, matter less, specifically, in cases of “purity” violations (e.g., committing incest, consuming taboo foods). We will discuss how and why mental states do not matter equivalently across the multi‐dimensional space of morality. In the fourth section of this article, we will elaborate on the possibility that norms against harmful actions and norms against “impure” actions serve distinct functions – for regulating interpersonal interactions (i.e., harm) versus for protecting the self (i.e., purity). In the fifth and final section, we will speculate on possible differences in how we represent and reason about other people's mental states versus our own beliefs and intentions. In addressing these issues, we aim to provide insight into the complex structure and distinct functions of mental state reasoning and moral cognition. We conclude that mental state reasoning allows us to make sense of other moral agents in order to understand their past actions, to predict their future behavior, and to evaluate them as potential friends or foes.     

The embodied nature of medical concepts: image schemas and language for pain

Cognitive linguistics assumes that knowledge is both embodied and situated as far as it is acquired through our bodily interaction with the world in a specific environment (e.g. Barsalou in Lang Cogn Process 18:513–562, 2003; Connell et al. in PLoS One 7:3, 2012). Therefore, embodiment provides an explanation to the mental representation and linguistic expression of concepts. Among the first, we find multimodal conceptual structures, like image schemas, which are schematic representations of embodied experiences resulting from our conceptualization of the surrounding environment (Tercedor Sánchez et al. in J Spec Transl 18:187–205, 2012). Furthermore, the way we interact with the environment and its objects is dynamic and configures how we refer to concepts both by means of images and lexicalizations. In this article, we investigate how image schemas underlie verbal and visual representations. They both evoke concepts based on exteroception, interoception and proprioception which can be lexicalized through language. More specifically, we study (1) a multimodal corpus of medical texts to examine how image schemas lexicalize in the language of medicine to represent specialized concepts and (2) medical pictures to explore the depiction of image-schematic concepts, in order to account for the verbal and visual representation of embodied concepts. We explore the concept pain, a sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage, using corpus analysis tools (Sketch Engine) to extract information about the lexicalization of underlying image schemas in definitions and defining contexts. Then, we use the image schemas behind medical concepts to consistently select images which depict our experience of pain and the way we understand it. Finally, such lexicalizations and visualizations will help us assess how we refer to pain both verbally and visually.     

Parental socialization of emotion and depression in adulthood: The role of attitudes toward sadness

IntroductionLack of parental care and high parental control have systematically been linked to depression. Dysfunctional schemas explain this relationship.ObjectiveWe propose that a retrospective evaluation of unsupportive parental socialization of emotion should predict depression in adulthood and that this relationship should be mediated by negative attitudes toward sadness.MethodOne hundred and forty undergraduate students (mean age of 22) completed a questionnaire for assessing the socialization of emotion (QSE), another for evaluating types of attitudes toward sadness (QAFET), and the Brief Symptom Inventory Depression scale (BSI-D).ResultsResults show that four attitudes toward sadness, namely perception of sadness as a complaint, anger against the self if sad, fear of being rejected if sad and fear of where sadness might lead, each partially mediate the relationship between unsupportive parental socialization of emotion and adult depression.ConclusionOur findings have both theoretical and practical implications. On the one hand, we demonstrated that unsupportive parental socialization of emotion and some attitudes toward sadness both predict depression. On the other hand, our results justify a closer look at parental socialization of emotion and attitudes toward sadness when clinically investigating depression.     

Link between early maladaptive schemas and defense mechanisms

IntroductionDefense mechanism and early maladaptive schemas are two concepts distorting the perception of reality.ObjectiveThe aim of this study was to explore the link between two reality-distorting concepts from two theoretical models: early maladaptive schemas from the cognitive and behavioral model and defense mechanisms based on the psychoanalytic model.MethodTwo hundred thirty-two non-clinical participants completed the Defense Style Questionnaire and the Young Schema Questionnaire (short version). Then a Bravais Pearson correlation analysis connecting these two concepts, and a multiple regressions analysis using early maladaptive schemas as predictors for defense style mechanisms levels were conducted.ResultsThe results indicate that 2 early maladaptive schema domains (i.e. other-directedness as well as over-vigilance and inhibition) predict the frequency of use of the neurotic defense mechanism, and 3 schema domains (i.e. disconnection and rejection, impaired autonomy and performances as well as impaired limits) predict the frequency of use of the immature defense mechanism.ConclusionTo conclude, two psychological concepts based on two different theoretical models (psychoanalytic and cognitive and behavioral therapy) seem to share an important link justifying the use of integrative therapies such as schema therapy.     

Addressing moral problems through practical reasoning

In this paper, following the work of Hare, we consider moral reasoning not as the application of moral norms and principles, but as reasoning about what ought to be done in a particular situation, with moral norms perhaps emerging from this reasoning. We model this situated reasoning drawing on our previous work on argumentation schemes, here set in the context of Action-Based Alternating Transition Systems. We distinguish what prudentially ought to be done from what morally ought to be done, consider what legislation might be appropriate and characterise the differences between morally correct, morally praiseworthy and morally excusable actions. We also describe an implementation which simulates this reasoning and discuss some issues arising from the simulation.     

Feedback influences children's reasoning about math equivalence: A meta-analytic review

ABSTRACT

Decades of research have focused on children's reasoning about math equivalence problems for both practical and theoretical insights. Not only are math equivalence problems foundational in arithmetic and algebra, they also represent a class of problems on which children's thinking is resistant to change. Feedback is one instructional tool that can serve as a key trigger of cognitive change. In this paper, we review all experimental studies (N = 8) on the effects of feedback on children's (ages 6–11) understanding of math equivalence. Meta-analytic results indicate that feedback has positive effects for low-knowledge learners and negative effects for high-knowledge learners, and these effects are stronger for procedural outcomes than conceptual outcomes. Findings highlight the variable influences of feedback on math equivalence understanding and suggest that models of thinking and reasoning need to consider learner characteristics, learning outcomes, and learning materials, as well as the dynamic interactions among them.     

Implicatures et développement

We summarize our work on pragmatic inference-making in children, while generally focusing on scalar implicatures. Such inferences arise when a relatively weak term implies the rejection of a stronger one. For example, some is often understood to mean not all. While adults readily draw such implicatures, children tend to rely on the terms’ minimal, lexically encoded meanings (with which some is compatible with all). Given that children’s treatments coincide with logical ones, children end up appearing more logical than adults on standard reasoning tasks. We describe this effect in detail while showing that (a) even young children can be encouraged to carry out implicatures and, that; (b) evidence of non-pragmatic behavior is best explained as due to unavailable effort.     

Analysis of early representations and personality among victims of domestic violence

IntroductionThis exploratory study analyses the individual elements of the victims of domestic violence through life events, early dysfunctional representations and personality.ObjectivesThis research aims, firstly, to show the existence of early traumatic experiences for the victims of domestic violence. Secondly, it aims to measure the prevalence of early maladaptive schema and identify personality traits in these subjects. Finally, our aim is to highlight that depending on the violence carried out within the couple (reciprocal/unilateral), activated schemas and personality traits are different.MethodOur sample consists of 80 female subjects, non-abused women (n = 40) and victims of domestic violence (n = 40), of which 22 victims of unilateral violence and 18 victims of reciprocal violence. Participants filled out an initial questionnaire as well as the scales and self-report questionnaires as follows: Life events (Amiel-Lebigre, 1984); TCI (Cloninger et al., 1993); YSQ-S3 (Young et al., 2005). The data were subject to statistical analysis and were processed using the software SPSS 22.ResultsThe results show that the victims have experienced more early traumas than non-victims, that schemas (emotional deprivation, mistrust and abuse, subjugation, self-sacrifice) are more active. We note also different personality traits according to the different groups (victims/non-victims) and subgroups (reciprocal violence/unilateral violence).ConclusionOur study sheds light on the role of the individual elements of the victims on the perception of the relationship and on the process of engagement and disengagement of women in abusive relationships. Limits and expectations of the study are discussed.     

Reasoning about Conditional Promises and Warnings: Darwinian Algorithms, Mental Models, Relevance Judgements or Pragmatic Schemas?

It is proposed that reasoning about social contracts, such as conditional promises and warnings, is under the control of a compound schema made of two pragmatic schemas (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985), expressing an obligation and a permission. Two experiments were run using thematic versions of the Wason selection task in which the rule and the core of the scenario were kept constant and the point of view of the actor (e.g. promisor or promisee) was varied. The results supported the predictions (including the occurrence of a correct pattern of response that consists of all four cards) and falsified predictions derived from Cosmides' (1989) theory of social exchange. The mental models theory and Evans' two-stage theory of reasoning are also discussed in the light of the present results.