Fooled by first impressions? Reexamining the diagnostic value of appearance-based inferences

We often form opinions about the characteristics of others from single, static samples of their appearance - the very first thing we see when, or even before, we meet them. These inferences occur spontaneously, rapidly, and can impact decisions in a variety of important domains. A crucial question, then, is whether appearance-based inferences are accurate. Using a naturalistic data set of more than 1 million appearance-based judgments obtained from a popular website (Study 1) and data from an online experiment involving over a thousand participants (Study 2), we evaluate the ability of human judges to infer the characteristics of others from their appearances. We find that judges are generally less accurate at predicting characteristics than they would be if they ignored appearance cues and instead only relied on their knowledge of characteristic base-rate frequencies. The findings suggest that appearances are overweighed in judgments and can have detrimental effects on accuracy. We conclude that future research should (i) identify the specific visual cues that people use when they draw inferences from appearances, (ii) determine which of these cues promote or hinder accurate social judgments, and (iii) examine how inference goals and contexts moderate the use and diagnostic validity of these cues.     

Reasoning with realistic disjunctives

The research reported here investigated how people interpret and reason with disjunctive statements. Experiment 1 demonstrated a general preference for exclusive over inclusive interpretations, although this varied as a function of the context in which the statement occurred, and there were some contexts in which other, quite different, interpretations were possible. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that the logical inferences subjects would draw from disjunctive statements also varied with context. It is concluded that or permits a number of different interpretations, which are determined by contextual cues. Previous research may have underestimated disjunctive reasoning performance by using contexts that lead to non-logical responses; certainly in the present experiments reasoning was generally accurate given the interpretation adopted.     

"If …": Satisficing algorithms for mapping conditional statements onto social domains

People regularly use conditional statements to communicate promises and threats, advices and warnings, permissions and obligations to other people. Given that all conditionals are formally equivalent--"if P, then Q"--the question is: When confronted with a conditional statement, how do people know whether they are facing a promise, a threat, or something else? In other words, what is the cognitive algorithm for mapping a particular conditional statement onto its corresponding social domain? This paper introduces the pragmatic cues algorithm and the syntactic cue algorithm as partial answers to this question. Two experiments were carried out to test how well these simple satisficing algorithms approximate the performance of the actual cognitive algorithm people use to classify conditional statements into social domains. Conditional statements for promises, threats, advices, warnings, permissions, and obligations were collected from people, and given to both other people and the algorithms for their classification. Their corresponding performances were then compared. Results revealed that even though these algorithms utilised a minimum number of cues and drew only a restricted range of inferences from these cues, they performed well above chance in the task of classifying conditional statements as promises, threats, advices, warnings, permissions, and obligations. Moreover, these simple satisficing algorithms performed comparable to actual people given the same task.     

The polite wiggle‐room effect in charity donation decisions

We extend research on charity donations by exploring an everyday tactic for increasing compliance: asking politely. We consider three possible effects of politeness on charity donations: a positive effect, a negative effect, and a wiggle‐room effect where the perception of the request is adjusted to decline donating without feeling selfish. Results from six experiments systematically supported the polite wiggle‐room effect. In hypothetical donations contexts, indirect requests were judged more polite. In real donation contexts, though, indirect requests were not judged as more polite and had no consistent effect on donation decision. Rather, the decision to donate predicted the perceived politeness of the request, independently of its phrasing. Experiment 4 provided causal evidence that participants justified their donation decisions by adjusting their perception of the request. The polite wiggle‐room effect has important implications for organizations that seek to increase compliance while maintaining a positive image.     

Familiarity-Matching: An Ecologically Rational Heuristic for the Relationships-Comparison Task

Previous studies have shown that people often use heuristics in making inferences and that subjective memory experiences, such as recognition or familiarity of objects, can be valid cues for inferences. So far, many researchers have used the binary choice task in which two objects are presented as alternatives (e.g., “Which city has the larger population, city A or city B?”). However, objects can be presented not only as alternatives but also in a question (e.g., “Which country is city X in, country A or country B?”). In such a situation, people can make inferences based on the relationship between the object in the question and each object given as an alternative. In the present study, we call this type of task a “relationships-comparison task.” We modeled the three inference strategies that people could apply to solve it (familiarity-matching [FM; a new heuristic we propose in this study], familiarity heuristic [FH], and knowledge-based inference [KI]) to examine people's inference processes. Through Studies 1, 2, and 3, we found that (a) people tended to rely on heuristics, and that FM (inferences based on similarity in familiarity between objects) well explained participants' inference patterns; (b) FM could work as an ecologically rational strategy for the relationships–comparison task since it could effectively reflect environmental structures, and that the use of FM could be highly replicable and robust; and (c) people could sometimes use a decision strategy like FM, even in their daily lives (consumer behaviors). The nature of the relationships–comparison task and human cognitive processes is discussed.     

Markers of Topical Discourse in Child‐Directed Speech

Although the language we encounter is typically embedded in rich discourse contexts, many existing models of processing focus largely on phenomena that occur sentence‐internally. Similarly, most work on children's language learning does not consider how information can accumulate as a discourse progresses. Research in pragmatics, however, points to ways in which each subsequent utterance provides new opportunities for listeners to infer speaker meaning. Such inferences allow the listener to build up a representation of the speakers' intended topic and more generally to identify relationships, structures, and messages that extend across multiple utterances. We address this issue by analyzing a video corpus of child–caregiver interactions. We use topic continuity as an index of discourse structure, examining how caregivers introduce and discuss objects across utterances. For the analysis, utterances are grouped into topical discourse sequences using three annotation strategies: raw annotations of speakers' referents, the output of a model that groups utterances based on those annotations, and the judgments of human coders. We analyze how the lexical, syntactic, and social properties of caregiver–child interaction change over the course of a sequence of topically related utterances. Our findings suggest that many cues used to signal topicality in adult discourse are also available in child‐directed speech.     

Do People Order Cues by Retrieval Fluency when Making Probabilistic Inferences?

In multiple‐cue probabilistic inferences, people infer alternatives' unknown values on decision criteria, using alternatives' attributes as cues. Some inferential strategies, like take‐the‐best, assume that people consider relevant cues sequentially in order of decreasing validity. This assumption has been deemed cognitively implausible by some, who suggest memory retrieval principles to guide cue order. We test whether memory‐based inferences are better described by a model considering cues in order of validity or in order of memory retrieval. In an experiment, we manipulated the frequency with which cues appeared in a learning phase, increasing retrieval fluency of cue values related to the more frequently appearing cue. In a subsequent decision phase, participants made a series of two‐alternative decisions based on the learned cue values. We compared two sequential sampling models, which differed in whether cues are sampled in order of subjective cue validity or in order of retrieval fluency. To model retrieval order of cues in the fluency sampling model, we used the declarative memory theory embedded in the ACT‐R cognitive architecture. Most participants' decisions were best described by the model sampling cues in order of memory retrieval. Only a minority of participants were classified as sampling cues by validity. Our result suggests that retrieval fluency is the primary driver of cue order in inferences from memory, irrespective of the cues' validities. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Egocentrism over e-mail: can we communicate as well as we think?

Without the benefit of paralinguistic cues such as gesture, emphasis, and intonation, it can be difficult to convey emotion and tone over electronic mail (e-mail). Five experiments suggest that this limitation is often underappreciated, such that people tend to believe that they can communicate over e-mail more effectively than they actually can. Studies 4 and 5 further suggest that this overconfidence is born of egocentrism, the inherent difficulty of detaching oneself from one's own perspective when evaluating the perspective of someone else. Because e-mail communicators "hear" a statement differently depending on whether they intend to be, say, sarcastic or funny, it can be difficult to appreciate that their electronic audience may not.     

Ten reasons why ANOVA theory and research fail to explain attribution processes: 1. Conceptual problems

Ten reasons are proposed to explain why Kelley’s attribution theory and related questionnaire research fail to account for the cognitive processes underlying ordinary explanations of behaviour. In this first paper, five salient conceptual problems of the ANOVA model are reviewed: the inadequate analysis of behaviours and their contexts, and the inferences to which they give rise; deployment of the vague and ambiguous internal-external distinction; the normative view of people as poor social scientists; the crude analogy between ordinary reasoning and statistical procedures; and, fundamentally, the naive conceptualization of cognitive processes. Schank’s computational theory of social inference is identified as a sophisticated process model which avoids the conceptual problems inherent in the ANOVA model.     

Empathy neglect: reconciling the spotlight effect and the correspondence bias

When people commit an embarrassing blunder, they typically overestimate how harshly they will be judged by others. This tendency can seem to fly in the face of research on the correspondence bias, which has established that observers are, in fact, quite likely to draw harsh dispositional inferences about others. These seemingly inconsistent literatures are reconciled by showing that actors typically neglect to consider the extent to which observers will moderate their correspondent inferences when they can easily adopt an actor's perspective or imagine being in his or her shoes. These results help to explain why actors can overestimate the strength of observers' dispositional inferences even when, as the literature on the correspondence bias attests, observers are notoriously prone to drawing those very inferences.     

The road to the unconscious self not taken: Discrepancies between self‐ and observer‐inferences about implicit dispositions from nonverbal behavioural cues

To what extent can individuals gain insight into their own or another person's implicit dispositions' We investigated whether self‐perceivers versus neutral observers can detect implicit dispositions from nonverbal behavioural cues contained in video feedback (cue validity) and whether these cues are in turn used as a valid basis for explicit dispositional inferences (cue utilization). Across three studies in the domains of extraversion and anxiety we consistently obtained reliable cue validity and cue utilization for neutral observers but not for self‐perceivers. An additional measure of state inferences in Study 3 showed that one reason for the lack of mediation in self‐perceivers is their reluctance to use their state inferences as a basis for more general trait inferences. We conclude that people have a ‘blind spot’ with respect to the nonverbal behavioural manifestations of their unconscious selves, even though neutral observers may readily detect and utilize this information for dispositional inferences. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reconciling Compensatory and Noncompensatory Strategies of Cue Weighting: A Causal Model Approach

When forming a judgment about any unknown item, people must draw inferences from information that is already known. This paper examines causal relationships between cues as a relevant factor influencing how people determine the amount of weight to place on each piece of available evidence. We propose that people draw from their beliefs about specific causal relationships between cues when determining how much weight to place on those cues, and that understanding this process can help reconcile differences between predictions of compensatory and lexicographic heuristic strategies. As causal relationships change, different cues become more or less important. Across three experiments, we find support for the use of causal models in determining cue weights, but leave open the possibility that they work in concert with other strategies as well. We conclude by discussing relative strengths and weaknesses of the causal model approach relative to existing models, and suggest areas for future research. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Inferring Behavior From Partial Social Information Plays Little or No Role in the Cultural Transmission of Adaptive Traits

Many human cultural traits become increasingly beneficial as they are repeatedly transmitted, thanks to an accumulation of modifications made by successive generations. But how do later generations typically avoid modifications which revert traits to less beneficial forms already sampled and rejected by earlier generations? And how can later generations do so without direct exposure to their predecessors' behavior? One possibility is that learners are sensitive to cues of non-random production in others' behavior, and that particular variants (e.g., those containing structural regularities unlikely to occur spontaneously) have been produced deliberately and with some effort. If this non-random behavior is attributed to an informed strategy, then the learner may infer that apparent avoidance of certain possibilities indicates that these have already been sampled and rejected. This could potentially prevent performance plateaus resulting from learners modifying inherited behaviors randomly. We test this hypothesis in four experiments in which participants, either individually or in interacting dyads, attempt to locate rewards in a search grid, guided by partial information about another individual's experience of the task. We find that in some contexts, valid inferences about another's behavior can be made from partial information, and these inferences can be used in a way which facilitates trait adaptation. However, the benefit of these inferences appears to be limited, and in many contexts—including some which have the potential to make inferring the experience of another individual easier—there appears to be no benefit at all. We suggest that inferring previous behavior from partial social information plays a minimal role in the adaptation of cultural traits.     

Reasons for Reason-giving in a Public-Opinion Survey

This paper explores why respondents to a telephone public-opinion survey often give reasons for answering as they do, even though reason-giving is neither required nor encouraged and it is difficult to see the reasons as attempts to deal with disagreement. We find that respondents give reasons for the policy claims they make in their answers three times as frequently as they give reasons for value or factual claims, that their reasons tend to involve appeals to personal experience, and that they often talk about their thought processes, especially when the evidentiary stakes are high. We then explore several ways of explaining these findings. We suggest that one useful approach is to see the reason-giving in the survey interviews as deliberative, reflexive argumentation of the sort described as `critical thinking. We further suggest that the reason such argumentation is often conducted out loud in the interviews, rather than internally, is that it functions in the service of rhetorical ethos, in particular the need to display the fact that one is human, with human autonomy and agency. Doing this may be particularly important in contexts such as anonymous survey interviews in which people are at risk of being treated like machines.     

Stigmatized‐Identity Cues in Consumer Spaces

Consumers with stigmatized identities may be especially attentive to organizational cues that signal to them whether or not they are welcomed and valued consumers. These stigmatized‐identity cues can become a part of a company's brand, influencing the attractiveness of the company and consumer loyalty, and allowing consumers to draw inferences about an organization's ideologies and attitudes toward multiple stigmatized groups. Consumers with stigmatized identities attend to stigmatized‐identity cues that signal inclusion (or exclusion) toward other stigmatized groups, resulting in stigmatized‐identity cue transfers, especially when similarity mindsets are activated, and among consumers who are high in stigma solidarity. Because identity is central in consumer behavior, stigmatized‐identity threat cues can at times result in anti‐consumption, including boycotts, allowing consumers and companies to engage in collective action. This article reviews this growing body of research, demonstrating the important influence of stigmatized‐identity cues on consumer behavior and discussing ways in which companies can better signal their inclusive attitudes and ideologies to attract consumers.     

社会分类的概念、线索及影响机制

作为社会认知的基本过程和重要途径,社会分类对预测刻板印象和群际感知、减少多元文化群体中的关系冲突、促进推理与决策以及指导社会关系推断等都有重要作用。人们进行社会分类的线索可以概括为明显线索和模糊线索、自然线索和社会线索以及静态线索和动态线索。社会分类会受到分类对象、情境和感知者等的作用,同时对人们认知、情绪、情感和行为等产生一系列影响。未来可以基于跨文化和发展视角探讨社会分类的线索偏向、潜在机制及立足本土文化检验社会分类的影响及干预策略。     

Forward inference using functional neuroimaging: dissociations versus associations

Many people are excited by functional neuroimaging as a new tool for cognitive science; many others are sceptical. In this opinion article, I describe a 'forward inference' that one can make from patterns of brain activity to distinguish between cognitive theories. I give an example of forward inferences in research on recognition memory, and outline some statistical criteria for a 'qualitative difference' in brain activity. Forward inferences resemble the dissociation logic long-used in behavioural studies of healthy and brain-damaged people, although I argue that dissociations in neuroimaging data can go beyond behavioural dissociations. Nonetheless, forward inferences are only as good as the cognitive theories to which they pertain, and are most valuable in conjunction with other types of inference.     

The impact of confidence in evaluating on discounting: A missing information context example

• Consumers often use coping mechanisms to aid in processing imperfect information about products when making choices. Specifically, a common evaluation processing pattern of uncertainty detection, uncertainty resolution and discounting behaviour (U–R–D) has been observed, particularly in studies involving missing information (MI). When consumers detect MI (uncertainty), they often discount the MI alternatives unless confidently held inferences are formed to reduce uncertainty (resolution), which attenuates discounting (U–R–D). This paper proposes consumers' overall confidence in evaluating (CE) plays a role in the U–R–D processing pattern. In MI contexts, inferences formed to fill‐in MI may also increase overall CE which may have an effect on discounting that is separate and distinct to that of the formation of confidently held inferences. While the impact on discounting of inferences formed to fill in MI is only relevant in MI contexts, the impact of the more encompassing CE variable may impact non‐MI contexts (affected by non‐MI uncertainty) as well. The concept of CE broadens the scope of the U–R–D processing pattern commonly observed in MI contexts to other evaluation contexts. Two studies demonstrate the role of CE in the U–R–D evaluation process (in MI contexts). A model proposes more general interactive effects of sources of uncertainty, and uncertainty detection and resolution on CE and discounting.

Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Inference and exact numerical representation in early language development

How do children as young as 2 years of age know that numerals, like one, have exact interpretations, while quantifiers and words like a do not? Previous studies have argued that only numerals have exact lexical meanings. Children could not use scalar implicature to strengthen numeral meanings, it is argued, since they fail to do so for quantifiers [Papafragou, A., & Musolino, J. (2003). Scalar implicatures: Experiments at the semantics–pragmatics interface. Cognition, 86, 253–282]. Against this view, we present evidence that children’s early interpretation of numerals does rely on scalar implicature, and argue that differences between numerals and quantifiers are due to differences in the availability of the respective scales of which they are members. Evidence from previous studies establishes that (1) children can make scalar inferences when interpreting numerals, (2) children initially assign weak, non-exact interpretations to numerals when first acquiring their meanings, and (3) children can strengthen quantifier interpretations when scalar alternatives are made explicitly available.