Are natural languages universal?

Summary We began by distinguishing Tarskian and Fitchean notions of universality in such a way that the claim that no language is universal in the sense of Tarski is compatible with accepting Fitchean universality. Then we examined a proposal involving two truth concepts — one that fit the Fitchean notion and another that followed Tarski's views on truth — finding little advantage in such generosity. We attempted a reformulation of Herzberger's argument for the negative view — the view that no language is universal in Tarski's sense — but found it unsuccessful when the language of the argument's formulation was brought under consideration. A more persuasive argument for EI was found, free of the defect of the previous one. EI was then shown to have unsettling consequences, prompting us to inquire about avoiding it. We found this possible, noting that EI is itself a solution to the semantic paradoxes, to which there are alternatives that avoid the unwelcome aspects of EI. However, whether any such alternative is ultimately preferable to EI remains to be seen.Section 4 of this paper was presented at the 1973 Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, and I am particularly grateful to the paper's commentator, Stephen P. Stich, for his helpful comments. I have also profited from correspondence with Paul Teller, whose paper The Universality of Natural Languages and Paradoxes of Grounding in Semantics: A Response to Herzberger (1971, ditto) presents a position similar in certain respects to mine.     

Is knowledge a natural kind?

The project of treating knowledge as an empirical object of study has gained popularity in recent naturalistic epistemology. It is argued here that the assumption that such an object of study exists is in tension with other central elements of naturalistic philosophy. Two hypotheses are considered. In the first, “knowledge” is hypothesized to refer to mental states causally responsible for the behaviour of cognitive agents. Here, the relational character of truth creates a problem. In the second hypothesis “knowledge” is hypothesized to refer to mental states causally responsible for the evolutionarily successful behaviour of cognitive agents. Here, the problem lies in the fact that evolution by natural selection is not necessarily conducive to truth. The result does not necessarily amount to eliminativism, however, since the naturalist may consistently reject the condition of truth that lies behind these problems.     

Does natural law have non-normative foundations?

This paper addresses one aspect of the natural law theory of Germain Grisez. According to Grisez, practical reason identifies the goods of human life prior to the invocation of any moral or normative notions. It can thus provide a non-normative foundation for moral theory. I present Grisez’s position and argue that the apparently non-normative aspect of natural law cannot support the moral position built upon it. I argue, in particular, that practical principles, as Grisez understands them, are best understood as speech acts. If this is correct, it is possible to develop a sceptical challenge to Grisez’s position. I am grateful to Michael Frede, Robert George, Richard Holton, Philip Pettit, and two anonymous reviewers for many helpful comments on this paper. This paper was presented at a seminar in the Department of Philosophy at Princeton University in November 1987, and I am grateful for the comments I received from the audience—in particular, Germain Grisez—on that occasion.     

“Filling-in” colour in natural scenes

Our subjective experience of the world as being in full colour across the entire visual field is at odds with the highly fovea-biased distribution of cones in the retina. It is unclear how this percept of “pan-field colour” comes about. We use novel stimuli—“colour chimeras”—to demonstrate a related visual phenomenon in which observers perceive rich colour throughout images with large achromatic regions. This percept appears to critically depend on natural scene statistics. By separately manipulating chromatic and structural content in such images, we demonstrate that both the spatial distribution of colour and the presence of recognizable scene structure contribute to the experience of pan-field colour in these stimuli. Our results suggest that this percept is unlikely to be due to a low-level colour spreading process. Instead, we suggest that mechanisms dependent on natural scenes’ chromatic and luminance statistics provide the basis for the phenomenon.     

Prototypes of the “natural” concepts discovery

In works of Eleanor Rosch “natural” concepts was introduced that reflect a high correlated structure of features of objects of the external world. Prototypes of the “natural” concepts are clearest cases of objects that reflect this highly correlated structure. The same high correlated structure manifested in the “natural” phenotypical classification. To formalize this highly correlated structure, we define a special type of probabilistic causal relations and then probabilistic formal concepts as a cyclically connected probabilistic causal relations. Based on these definitions, we developed a method of prototypes discovery and illustrate it on the example of digits’ prototypes discovery.     

‘Knowledge’ as a natural kind term

Naturalists who conceive of knowledge as a natural kind are led to treat ‘knowledge’ as a natural kind term. ‘Knowledge,’ then, must behave semantically in the ways that seem to support a direct reference theory for other natural kind terms. A direct reference theory for ‘knowledge,’ however, appears to leave open too many possibilities about the identity of knowledge. Intuitively, states of belief count as knowledge only if they meet epistemic criteria, not merely if they bear a causal/historical relation to the term. I will develop this objection and show that it is grounded in modal considerations central to Kripke’s work on reference. I will also argue that a more plausible externalist semantics for natural kind terms disarms the objection.     

Is ecology an ‘alternative’ natural science?

This article discusses whether ecology represents an alternative type of natural science, that is normatively committed. Central questions are:-how man and human action are integrated into the subject matter of ecology;-whether evaluative concepts like health are incorporated into the conceptual structure of ecology; and-whether ecology transcends the image of natural knowledge as control of nature.It is concluded that all hypotheses of ecology being inherently judgmental in character must be rejected.Like all the healing arts, ecology is through and through judgmental in character. It cannot be value-neutral.... What violates the natural harmony must be condemned; what enhances it be endorsed.... Ecology is the closest our science has yet come to an integrative wisdom. It, not physics, deserves to become the basic science of the future.     

Why a hermeneutical philosophy of the natural sciences?

Why a hermeneutical philosophy of the natural sciences? It is necessary to address the philosophic crisis of realism vs relativism in the natural sciences. This crisis is seen as a part of the cultural crisis that Husserl and Heidegger identified and attributed to the hegemonic role of theoretical and calculative thought in Western societies. The role of theory is addressed using the hermeneutical circle to probe the origin of theoretic meaning in scientific cultural praxes. This is studied in Galileo's discovery of the phases of Venus; the practice of measurement; the different theories and practices of space perception; the historicality and temporality of scientific research communities which ground paradigm change; and the process of discovery. The paper draws particularly from the work of Heidegger. Though envisaging all science and scholarship, the highlighted theme is research in the natural sciences.     

Is voluntary control of natural postural sway possible?

The authors explored whether standing human participants could voluntarily decrease the amplitude of their natural postural sway when presented with explicit visual feedback and a target. Participants (N = 9) stood quietly, without any feedback and with feedback on the center of pressure coordinate or the head orientation. They were unable to decrease sway amplitude when presented with visual feedback and a target. Decreasing target size led to contrasting effects on the 2 fractions of sway: rambling and trembling. The smaller target was associated with a decrease in rambling and an increase in trembling. Those observations suggest that sway represents a superposition of at least 2 independent processes. They also suggest that providing visual feedback on a variable tied to body sway may not be an effective way to decrease postural sway in young healthy people.     

A model theoretic approach to ‘natural’ reasoning

A general framework is proposed for accommodating the recent results of studies into ‘natural’ decision making. A crucial element of this framework is the notion of a ‘partial structure’, recently introduced into the semantic approach to scientific theories. It is through the introduction of this element that connections can be made with certain problems regarding inconsistency and rationality in general.     

A hermeneutics of the natural sciences? The debate updated

The initial obstacle to the development of a hermeneutics of the natural sciences has been the inadequate translation, and thus misunderstanding, of the basic terms of Heidegger's ontological analysis ofthe protopractical human situation and its progressive technicization. Pragmatism's parallel analyses of the problem situation of scientists has promoted a more idiomatically English vocabulary. But 1) Gadamer's exclusion of domains and disciplines working with technical methods from his universal hermeneutics continues to be influential, this in spite of the genesis of his project in Helmholtz's insights into the process of scientific discovery. 2) Markus thus depicts a distinctly different style of production, transmission, and reception of the technological texts of natural science. 3) Rouse's 1987 extension of pragmatic hermeneutics into the incipient politics of knowledge/power relations in laboratory science presents the usual frightening prospects connected with laboratory experimentation impacting on disciplinary social institutions. 4) Rouse's 1996 analysis of scientific practices in local narrative situations eschews the banner of hermeneutics and instead proposes to examine scientific-technological work by way of interdisciplinary cultural studies, once the traditional loci of hermeneutic methodology. 5) A hermeneutic phenomenology of the natural sciences thus finds itself fundamentally challenged with respect to its rightful topics and roles in the analysis of increasingly technicized disciplines and domains.     

Wallace’s and Darwin’s natural selection theories

Synthese - This work takes a stand on whether Wallace should be regarded as co-author of the theory of natural selection alongside Darwin as he is usually considered on behalf of his alleged...     

Is there a natural order for expressing semantic relations?

All languages rely to some extent on word order to signal relational information. Why? We address this question by exploring communicative and cognitive factors that could lead to a reliance on word order. In Study 1, adults were asked to describe scenes to another using their hands and not their mouths. The question was whether this home-made "language" would contain gesture sentences with consistent order. In addition, we asked whether reliance on order would be influenced by three communicative factors (whether the communication partner is permitted to give feedback; whether the information to be communicated is present in the context that recipient and gesturer share; whether the gesturer assumes the role of gesture receiver as well as gesture producer). We found that, not only was consistent ordering of semantic elements robust across the range of communication situations, but the same non-English order appeared in all contexts. Study 2 explored whether this non-English order is found only when a person attempts to share information with another. Adults were asked to reconstruct scenes in a non-communicative context using pictures drawn on transparencies. The adults picked up the pictures for their reconstructions in a consistent order, and that order was the same non-English order found in Study 1. Finding consistent ordering patterns in a non-communicative context suggests that word order is not driven solely by the demands of communicating information to another, but may reflect a more general property of human thought.     

Is early word-form processing stress-full? How natural variability supports recognition

In a series of studies, we examined how mothers naturally stress words across multiple mentions in speech to their infants and how this marking influences infants’ recognition of words in fluent speech. We first collected samples of mothers’ infant-directed speech using a technique that induced multiple repetitions of target words. Acoustic analyses revealed that mothers systematically alternated between emphatic and nonemphatic stress when talking to their infants. Using the headturn preference procedure, we then tested 7.5-month-old infants on their ability to detect familiarized bisyllabic words in fluent speech. Stress of target words (emphatic and nonemphatic) was systematically varied across familiarization and recognition phases of four experiments. Results indicated that, although infants generally prefer listening to words produced with emphatic stress, recognition was enhanced when the degree of emphatic stress at familiarization matched the degree of emphatic stress at recognition.     

Anticipatory spatial representation of natural scenes: Momentum without movement?

Does mental representation of the immediate past contain anticipatory projections of the future? In cases of representational momentum (RM), the last remembered location of a moving object is displaced farther along its path of motion. In boundary extension (BE), the remembered view of a scene expands to include a region just outside the boundaries of the original view. Both are "errors", yet they make remarkably good predictions about the real world. The factors affecting these phenomena, the boundary conditions for their occurrence, and their generality to non-visual senses (audition or haptics) are reviewed to determine if RM and BE are fundamentally related. In contrast to Hubbard's (1995b) suggestion that they may share a common underlying mechanism, it is proposed instead that RM and BE are related in a more general sense and may be different instantiations of the dynamic nature of mental representation.     

How do natural environments shape adaptive cognition across the lifespan?

How does human cognition adapt to idiosyncratic features of our real-world experiences across our lifetimes? The dynamic interaction between individuals and their natural environments is rarely the focus of study within cognitive science, but I argue that a more ecological approach will be critical for advancing developmental science and revealing the adaptive nature of cognition.     

Does the use of natural stimuli facilitate amodal completion in pigeons?

Three experiments were carried out to investigate whether amodal completion in pigeons can be facilitated by the use of colour photographs instead of highly artificial stimuli such as geometrical shapes. Ten pigeons were trained in a go/no-go procedure to discriminate between photographs of complete and of incomplete pigeon figures. In the subsequent test, the birds classified pictures of partly occluded pigeons as though they were complete (experiment 1). However, we found evidence that classification was based on spurious stimulus features that paralleled the intended class rule of figural completeness versus incompleteness. In particular, classification was shown to be guided by white background gaps that separated the parts of the fragmented pigeon figures (experiment 2), as well as by cues related to overall Gestalt (experiment 3). In summary, the present results indicate that the use of more natural stimuli such as photographs instead of geometrical shapes is insufficient for providing amodal completion in pigeons. It is suggested that a combination of various cues, including, eg, 3-D information and common motion in addition to surface and contour properties, may be required to induce a perceptual bias favouring visual completion of occluded portions.     

Is theism capable of accounting for any natural evil at all?

Received wisdom has it that a plausible explanation or theodicy for Gods permission of at least some instances of natural evil is not beyond the reach of the theist. In this paper I challenge this assumption, arguing instead that theism fails to account for any instance, kind, quantity, or distribution of natural evil found in the world. My case will be structured around a specific but not idiosyncratic conception of natural evil as well as an examination of three prominent theodicies for natural evil. In contrast, however, to much contemporary discussion, my assessment of these theodicies will be grounded in the prior conviction that a successful theodicy for moral evil is available.