Reducing the own-race bias in face recognition by shifting attention

The own-race bias (ORB) in face recognition can be interpreted as a failure to generalize expert perceptual encoding developed for own-race faces to other-race faces. Further, black participants appear to use different features to describe faces from those used by white participants (Shepherd & Deregowski, 1981). An experiment is reported where the size of the ORB was assessed using a standard face recognition procedure. Four groups were tested at two time intervals. One group received a training regime involving learning to distinguish faces that varied only on their chin, cheeks, nose, and mouth. Three control groups did not receive this training. The ORB, present prior to training, was reduced after the critical perceptual training. It is concluded that the ORB is a consequence of a failure of attention being directed to those features of other race faces that are useful for identification.     

Reducing the own-race bias in face recognition by shifting attention

The own-race bias (ORB) in face recognition can be interpreted as a failure to generalize expert perceptual encoding developed for own-race faces to other-race faces. Further, black participants appear to use different features to describe faces from those used by white participants (Shepherd & Deregowski, 1981). An experiment is reported where the size of the ORB was assessed using a standard face recognition procedure. Four groups were tested at two time intervals. One group received a training regime involving learning to distinguish faces that varied only on their chin, cheeks, nose, and mouth. Three control groups did not receive this training. The ORB, present prior to training, was reduced after the critical perceptual training. It is concluded that the ORB is a consequence of a failure of attention being directed to those features of other race faces that are useful for identification.     

Social and Cognitive Factors Affecting the Own-Race Bias in Whites

This study investigated factors associated with the commonly found own-race bias (ORB) in face recognition. We utilized several measures of general face-recognition memory, visual perception and memory, general cognitive functioning, racial attitudes, and cross-race experience in an attempt to distinguish those individuals more likely to demonstrate the effect. White respondents (N = 129) were presented two facial-recognition tests (immediate and delayed) involving Black and White faces of both genders. The resulting ORB stemmed largely from a bias to respond "seen before" to Black faces, and produced an effect that was reliable across a 2-day period. An own-sex bias in accuracy was also found. The Benton Facial Recognition test and the Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure test, 2 central measures of visual memory, were related to ability to recognize White faces. Self-reported amount of recent cross-race experiences was also correlated with overall accuracy on Black and White faces.     

Eye-tracking the own-race bias in face recognition: Revealing the perceptual and socio-cognitive mechanisms

Own-race faces are recognised more accurately than other-race faces and may even be viewed differently as measured by an eye-tracker (Goldinger, Papesh, & He, 2009). Alternatively, observer race might direct eye-movements (Blais, Jack, Scheepers, Fiset, & Caldara, 2008). Observer differences in eye-movements are likely to be based on experience of the physiognomic characteristics that are differentially discriminating for Black and White faces. Two experiments are reported that employed standard old/new recognition paradigms in which Black and White observers viewed Black and White faces with their eye-movements recorded. Experiment 1 showed that there were observer race differences in terms of the features scanned but observers employed the same strategy across different types of faces. Experiment 2 demonstrated that other-race faces could be recognised more accurately if participants had their first fixation directed to more diagnostic features using fixation crosses. These results are entirely consistent with those presented by Blais et al. (2008) and with the perceptual interpretation that the own-race bias is due to inappropriate attention allocated to the facial features ( and ).     

Believing is seeing: the effects of racial labels and implicit beliefs on face perception

Two studies tested whether racial category labels and lay beliefs about human traits have a combined effect on people's perception of, and memory for, racially ambiguous faces. Participants saw a morphed target face accompanied by a racial label (Black or White). Later, they were asked to identify the face from a set of two new morphed faces, one more Black and the other more White than the target. As predicted, entity theorists, who believe traits are immutable, perceived and remembered the target face as consistent with the racial label, whereas incremental theorists, who believe traits are malleable, perceived and remembered the face as inconsistent with the racial label. In Study 2, participants also drew the target face more consistently (entity theorists) or less consistently (incremental theorists) with the racial label. Results of both studies confirm that social variables can affect how physical features are seen and remembered.     

Removing the own-race bias in face recognition by attentional shift using fixation crosses to diagnostic features: An eye-tracking study

Hills and Lewis (2011) have demonstrated that the own-race bias in face recognition can be reduced or even removed by guiding participants' attention and potentially eye movements to the most diagnostic visual features. Using the same old/new recognition paradigm as Hills and Lewis, we recorded Black and White participants' eye movements whilst viewing Black and White faces following fixation crosses that preceded the bridge of the nose (between the eyes) or the tip of the nose. White faces were more accurately recognized when following high fixation crosses (that preceded the bridge of the nose) than when following low fixation crosses. The converse was true for Black faces. These effects were independent of participant race. The fixation crosses attracted the first fixation but had less effect on other eye-tracking measures. Furthermore, the location of the first fixation was predictive of recognition accuracy. These results are consistent with an attentional allocation model of the own-race bias in face recognition and highlight the importance of the first fixation for face perception (cf. Hsiao & Cottrell, 2008).     

I know your face but not where I saw you: Context memory is impaired for other-race faces

People are more likely to falsely identify a face of another race than a face of their own race. When witnesses make identifications, they often need to remember where they have previously encountered a face. Failure to remember the context of an encounter can result in unconscious transference and lead to misidentifications. Forty-five White participants were shown White and Black faces, each presented on one of five backgrounds. The participants had to identify these faces in an old/new recognition test. If participants stated that they had seen a face, they had to identify the context in which the face had originally appeared. Participants made more context errors with Black faces than with White faces. This shows that the own-race bias extends to context memory.     

Pain in the eye of the beholder: Variations in pain visual representations as a function of face ethnicity and culture

Pain experienced by Black individuals is systematically underestimated, and recent studies have shown that part of this bias is rooted in perceptual factors. We used Reverse Correlation to estimate visual representations of the pain expression in Black and White faces, in participants originating from both Western and African countries. Groups of raters were then asked to evaluate the presence of pain and other emotions in these representations. A second group of White raters then evaluated those same representations placed over a neutral background face (50% White; 50% Black). Image-based analyses show significant effects of culture and face ethnicity, but no interaction between the two factors. Western representations were more likely to be judged as expressing pain than African representations. For both cultural groups, raters also perceived more pain in White face representations than in Black face representations. However, when changing the background stimulus to the neutral background face, this effect of face ethnic profile disappeared. Overall, these results suggest that individuals have different expectations of how pain is expressed by Black and White individuals, and that cultural factors may explain a part of this phenomenon     

An ambiguous-race illusion in children's face memory

Adults show better memory for ambiguous faces of their own race than for ambiguous faces of another race, even when the faces are identical and differentiated only by extraneous cues to racial category. We investigated whether similar context effects operate early in development. Young children raised in predominantly White environments were presented with computer-generated White-Black morphed faces, each paired with either the White or the Black face that contributed to its construction, and were told that the two faces in each pair were siblings. The children's subsequent recognition memory was more accurate for faces that had been paired with White siblings than for faces that had been paired with Black siblings. The same effect did not obtain when the ambiguous faces were paired with White or Black faces that did not contribute to their construction and did not look like siblings. These findings suggest that face memory in children is not driven exclusively by visual information present in faces and instead depends on an interplay of categorical and perceptual information about race and relationships.     

Choosing Your Words and Pictures Wisely: When Do Individuation Instructions Reduce the Cross‐Race Effect?

Recognition accuracy for faces of an individual's own race typically exceeds recognition accuracy for other‐race faces. The categorization–individuation model (Hugenberg, Young, Bernstein, & Sacco, 2010) attributes this cross‐race effect to motivation to encode distinctive features of own‐race faces but category defining features for other‐race faces. Two experiments using different stimuli tested hypotheses generated from this model with both Black and White participants. For White participants, instructions to individuate reduced the cross‐race effect in both studies but did not eliminate it in Study 1. Black participants did not exhibit the cross‐race effect in either study, but individuation instructions improved both their same‐race and other‐race sensitivity. The present quality of interracial contact moderated the relationship between instructions and other‐race sensitivity for both Black and White participants in Study 1 but not in Study 2. Overall, results provide mixed support for this social categorization model. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Memory for disguised same- and cross-race faces: The eyes have it

According to research on the cross-race effect, through experience, observers learn which diagnostic facial features are important for recognizing same-race compared to cross-race faces. These diagnostic facial features differ across racial groups; whereas the upper facial region is more diagnostic for White faces, the lower facial region is more diagnostic for Black faces. We tested how disguises at encoding (sunglasses [upper region] or bandana [lower region]) affect White and Black observers’ recognition memory for White and Black faces. We found that disguises override the diagnosticity of race-specific regions and have similar effects on recognition of same- and cross-race faces. Relative to no disguise, recognition memory was impaired more by disguising upper (sunglasses) than lower (bandana) facial regions. This supports the hypothesis that facial features trump race-specific diagnostic regions, and the eye region provides relatively more diagnostic information than lower facial features.     

Hemispheric asymmetry in cross-race face recognition

This study examines two phenomena related to face perception, both of which depend on experience and holistic processing: perceivers process faces more efficiently in the right hemisphere of the brain (a hemispheric asymmetry), and they typically show greater recognition accuracy for members of their racial ingroup (a cross-race recognition deficit). The current study tests the possibility that these two effects are related. If asymmetry depends on experience, it should be particularly evident with (more familiar) ingroup faces; if cross-race recognition relies on holistic processing, it should be particularly evident for faces presented to the right hemisphere. Black and White participants viewed Black and White faces presented to either the left or right visual field. As predicted, participants showed a more pronounced asymmetry for ingroup (rather than outgroup) faces, and cross-race recognition deficits were more pronounced for stimuli presented to the left (rather than the right) visual field.     

Look Black in anger: The role of implicit prejudice in the categorization and perceived emotional intensity of racially ambiguous faces

Research has demonstrated that individuals high in implicit prejudice are more likely to classify a racially ambiguous angry face as Black compared to individuals low in implicit prejudice [Hugenberg, K., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2004). Ambiguity in social categorization. Psychological Science, 15, 342-345]. The current study sought to replicate and extend this finding by examining whether the same expression of anger on a racially ambiguous face is perceived to be differentially intense when the face is judged to be Black or White. White participants viewed racially ambiguous, White, and Black faces displaying angry, neutral, or happy emotions. Participants’ task was to identify the race, emotion, and intensity of emotion display. The results revealed that participants high in implicit prejudice reported significantly more of the racially ambiguous angry faces as Black compared to participants low in implicit prejudice. Further, participants high in implicit prejudice reported the intensity of the racially ambiguous angry emotion as greater when the same face had been categorized as Black compared to White. The results suggest that implicit prejudice is not only associated with the racial categorization of an ambiguous face but also the perceived intensity of the emotion displayed.     

A multidimensional scaling analysis of own- and cross-race face spaces

We examined predictions derived from Valentine’s (1991) Multidimensional Space (MDS) framework for own- and other-race face processing. A set of 20 computerized faces was generated from a single prototype. Each face was saved as Black and White, changing only skin tone, such that structurally identical faces were represented in both race categories. Participants made speeded “same-different” judgments to all possible combinations of faces, from which we generated psychological spaces, with “different” RTs as the measure of similarity. Consistent with the MDS framework, all faces were pseudo-normally distributed around the (unseen) prototype. The distribution of faces was consistent with Valentine’s (1991) predictions: despite their physical identity to the White faces, Black faces had lower mean inter-object distances in psychological space. Other-race faces are more densely clustered in psychological space, which could underlie well-known recognition deficits.     

Ingroup and outgroup differences in face detection

Humans show improved recognition for faces from their own social group relative to faces from another social group. Yet before faces can be recognized, they must first be detected in the visual field. Here, we tested whether humans also show an ingroup bias at the earliest stage of face processing – the point at which the presence of a face is first detected. To this end, we measured viewers' ability to detect ingroup (Black and White) and outgroup faces (Asian, Black, and White) in everyday scenes. Ingroup faces were detected with greater speed and accuracy relative to outgroup faces (Experiment 1). Removing face hue impaired detection generally, but the ingroup detection advantage was undiminished (Experiment 2). This same pattern was replicated by a detection algorithm using face templates derived from human data (Experiment 3). These findings demonstrate that the established ingroup bias in face processing can extend to the early process of detection. This effect is ‘colour blind’, in the sense that group membership effects are independent of general effects of image hue. Moreover, it can be captured by tuning visual templates to reflect the statistics of observers' social experience. We conclude that group bias in face detection is both a visual and a social phenomenon.     

Inter‐racial contact and the own‐race bias for face recognition in South Africa and England

Own‐race bias, where people are more accurate recognizing faces of people from their own race than other races, can lead to misidentification and, in some cases, innocent people being convicted. This bias was explored in South Africa and England, using Black and White participants. People were shown several photographs of Black and White faces and were later asked if they had seen these faces (and several fillers). In addition, participants were given a questionnaire about inter‐racial contact. Cross‐race identification accuracy for Black participants was positively correlated with self‐reported inter‐racial contact. The confidence–accuracy relationship was strongest when making own‐race judgements. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Narrowing in categorical responding to other‐race face classes by infants

Infants can form object categories based on perceptual cues, but their ability to form categories based on differential experience is less clear. Here we examined whether infants filter through perceptual differences among faces from different other‐race classes and represent them as a single other‐race class different only from own‐race faces. We used a familiarization/novelty‐preference procedure to investigate category formation for two other‐race face classes (Black vs. Asian) by White 6‐ and 9‐month‐olds. The data indicated that while White 6‐month‐olds categorically represented the distinction between Black and Asian faces, White 9‐month‐olds formed a broad other‐race category inclusive of Black and Asian faces, but exclusive of own‐race White faces. The findings provide evidence that narrowing can occur for mental processes other than discrimination: category formation is also affected. The results suggest that frequency of experience with own‐race versus other‐race classes of faces may propel infants to contrast own‐race faces with other‐race faces, but not different classes of other‐race faces with each other.     

The influence of ingroup/outgroup categorization on same- and other-race face processing: The moderating role of inter- versus intra-racial context

We investigated the impact of ingroup/outgroup categorization on the encoding of same-race and other-race faces presented in inter-racial and intra-racial contexts (Experiments 1 and 2, respectively). White participants performed a same/different matching task on pairs of upright and inverted faces that were either same-race (White) or other-race (Black), and labeled as being from the same university or a different university. In Experiment 1, the same- and other-race faces were intermixed. For other-race faces, participants demonstrated greater configural processing following same- than other-university labeling. Same-race faces showed strong configural coding irrespective of the university labeling. In Experiment 2, faces were blocked by race. Participants demonstrated greater configural processing of same- than other-university faces, but now for both same- and other-race faces. These results demonstrate that other-race face processing is sensitive to non-racial ingroup/outgroup status regardless of racial context, but that the sensitivity of same-race face processing to the same cues depends on the racial context in which targets are encountered.     

Prejudice and perception: the role of automatic and controlled processes in misperceiving a weapon

Two experiments used a priming paradigm to investigate the influence of racial cues on the perceptual identification of weapons. In Experiment 1, participants identified guns faster when primed with Black faces compared with White faces. In Experiment 2, participants were required to respond quickly, causing the racial bias to shift from reaction time to accuracy. Participants misidentified tools as guns more often when primed with a Black face than with a White face. L. L. Jacoby's (1991) process dissociation procedure was applied to demonstrate that racial primes influenced automatic (A) processing, but not controlled (C) processing. The response deadline reduced the C estimate but not the A estimate. The motivation to control prejudice moderated the relationship between explicit prejudice and automatic bias. Implications are discussed on applied and theoretical levels.     

Postencoding cognitive processes in the cross-race effect: Categorization and individuation during face recognition

The cross-race effect (CRE) describes the finding that same-race faces are recognized more accurately than cross-race faces. According to social–cognitive theories of the CRE, processes of categorization and individuation at encoding account for differential recognition of same- and cross-race faces. Recent face memory research has suggested that similar but distinct categorization and individuation processes also occur postencoding, at recognition. Using a divided-attention paradigm, in Experiments 1A and 1B we tested and confirmed the hypothesis that distinct postencoding categorization and individuation processes occur during the recognition of same- and cross-race faces. Specifically, postencoding configural divided-attention tasks impaired recognition accuracy more for same-race than for cross-race faces; on the other hand, for White (but not Black) participants, postencoding featural divided-attention tasks impaired recognition accuracy more for cross-race than for same-race faces. A social categorization paradigm used in Experiments 2A and 2B tested the hypothesis that the postencoding in-group or out-group social orientation to faces affects categorization and individuation processes during the recognition of same-race and cross-race faces. Postencoding out-group orientation to faces resulted in categorization for White but not for Black participants. This was evidenced by White participants’ impaired recognition accuracy for same-race but not for cross-race out-group faces. Postencoding in-group orientation to faces had no effect on recognition accuracy for either same-race or cross-race faces. The results of Experiments 2A and 2B suggest that this social orientation facilitates White but not Black participants’ individuation and categorization processes at recognition. Models of recognition memory for same-race and cross-race faces need to account for processing differences that occur at both encoding and recognition.