Conflict detection,dual processes,and logical intuitions: Some clarifications

Recent studies on conflict detection during thinking suggest that reasoners are sensitive to possible conflict between their heuristic judgement and elementary logical or probabilistic principles. I have argued that this conflict sensitivity calls for the postulation of logical intuitions and has implications for the way we conceive the interaction between System-1 and System-2 in dual process theories. In this paper I clarify potential misconceptions about this work, discuss the link with other approaches, and sketch directions for further research.     

Effects of perspective and belief on analytic reasoning in a scientific reasoning task

The purpose of these studies was to test the hypothesis that changing perspectives from one's own to another's promotes the engagement of analytic processing and, in turn, reduces the impact of beliefs. In two experiments participants evaluated research vignettes containing belief-consistent and belief-inconsistent conclusions, and indicated whether the data supported a correlation between two variables. Consistent with our hypothesis, the tendency to endorse correlations consistent with prior belief was reduced when participants evaluated the data from the researcher's perspective relative to their own. We also administered the Actively Open Minded Thinking (AOT) scale (Stanovich & West, 2007, 2008), which did not predict belief effects on our task. We did however observe that the AOT was reliably associated with different response strategies: high AOT scorers were more inclined to choose ambiguous response options, such as “no conclusion is warranted”, whereas low scorers evinced a preference for more determinate options (e.g., there is no relationship between the two variables). We interpret our findings in the context of dual process theories of reasoning and from a Bayesian perspective.     

Effects of test anxiety,ego stress,and attentional skills training on arithmetic reasoning: An experimental evaluation of a brief counseling strategy

Abstract

Two hundred forty high school students (120 male and 120 female) in India performed a moderately difficult multiple choice Arithmetic Reasoning task after undergoing short-term (40 minutes) cognitive treatment in the form of Attentional Skills Training. A 2 × 2 × 2 (Test Anxiety x Attentional Skills Training x Stress) design with separate analysis for boys and girls indicated these results: with intervention the high anxiety subjects under ego stress conditions, compared to their high-anxious control, low-anxious ego stress, or low-anxious control counterparts, reported the maximum significant improvement in performance on the Arithmetic Reasoning test. The low-anxiety subjects performed consistently well with or without treatment or stress conditions. The findings shed new light on the attentional theory of test anxiety, and it was reasoned that long-term effects of cognitive treatment be studied by using varied performance tasks (difficulty level controlled) on different gender and age groups across cultures.     

Heuristic and analytic processes in propositional reasoning with negatives

The authors report 4 studies on heuristic and analytic processes in conditional reasoning with negations and show that a heuristic negative conclusion bias cannot account for the effects observed on problem-solving latencies derived from eye-movement measures (Experiment 1) and a novel mouse-tracking methodology (Experiment 2). A double negation elimination process can account for both the latency and response-frequency effects of a negation in the clause about which an inference is made. It is further shown that other negation effects cannot be explained by an affirmative premise bias proposed in the literature. Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrate that a novel availability hypothesis provides a viable alternative. It is argued that extant analytic theories need to be extended to incorporate a validating search for counter examples and need to specify how pragmatic and comprehension processes influence such a search.     

When logic and belief collide: Individual differences in reasoning times support a selective processing model

When the validity of a deductive conclusion conflicts with its believability people often respond in a belief-biased manner. This study used response times to test the selective processing model, which views belief-bias effects as arising from the interplay between superficial heuristic processes and more rigorous analytic processes. Participants were split into three response groups according to their propensity to endorse logically normative conclusions. The low-logic, high belief-bias group demonstrated rapid responding, consistent with heuristic processing. The medium-logic, moderate belief-bias group showed slower responding, consistent with enhanced analytic processing, albeit selectively biased by conclusion believability. The high-logic, low belief-bias group's relatively unbiased responses came at the cost of increased processing times, especially with invalid-believable conclusions. These findings support selective processing claims that distinct heuristic and analytic processing systems underpin reasoning, and indicate that certain individuals differentially engage one system more than the other. A minor amendment is proposed to the current selective processing model to capture the full range of observed effects.     

Effects of the function-specific instruction approach to neurofeedback training on frontal midline theta waves and golf putting performance

A recent meta-analysis has shown inconclusive results on the effectiveness of traditional electroencephalography (EEG) neurofeedback training (NFT) protocols in changing EEG activity and improving sports performance. To enhance the effectiveness of EEG NFT protocols, we explored a new approach to EEG NFT, namely the function-specific instruction (FSI) approach. The basic tenet underpinning effective verbal instruction is to induce mental states as the verbal instructions consider the meaning of the brainwave function in the target region and the EEG power magnitude. This study aimed to test whether a single session of FSI is efficacious in improving frontal midline theta (FMT) activity and putting performance. Method: Thirty-six skilled golfers with a handicap of 14.05 ± 9.43 were recruited. A consecutive sampling method was used to form three groups: an FSI group (n = 12), a traditional instruction (TI) group (n = 12), and a sham control (SC) group (n = 12). In the pre- and post-tests, each participant performed 40 putts from a distance of 3 m, and the number of holed putts was recorded. The participants were asked to perform 50 trials in a single session of NFT. Putting performance improved significantly from before to after NFT in the FSI group. Moreover, the FSI group demonstrated a significant decrease in FMT power, whereas the SC group demonstrated a significant increase in FMT power from before to after NFT. These findings suggest that the FSI approach is more effective in enhancing sustained attention and putting performance in skilled golfers than TI.     

“Meaningful” social inferences: Effects of implicit theories on inferential processes

Perceivers’ shared theories about the social world have long featured prominently in social inference research. Here, we investigate how fundamental differences in such theories influence basic inferential processes. Past work has typically shown that integrating multiple interpretations of behavior during social inference requires cognitive resources. However, three studies that measured or manipulated people’s beliefs about the stable versus dynamic nature of human attributes (i.e., their entity vs. incremental theory, respectively) qualify these past findings. Results revealed that, when interpreting others’ actions, perceivers’ theories selectively facilitate the consideration of interpretations that are especially theory-relevant. While experiencing cognitive load, entity theorists continued to incorporate information about stable dispositions (but not about dynamic social situations) in their social inferences, whereas incremental theorists continued to incorporate information about dynamic social situations (but not about stable traits). Implications of these results for how perceivers find meaning in behavior are discussed.     

Power of the desired self: Influence of induced perceptions of the self on reasoning

This research shows that the motivation to posses a desired characteristic (or to avoid an undesired one) results in self-perceptions that guide people’s use of base rate in the Lawyer–Engineer problem (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). In four studies, participants induced to believe (or recall, Exp. 2) that a rational cognitive style is success-conducive (or an intuitive cognitive style failure-conducive) subsequently viewed themselves as more rational and relied more on base rate in their probability estimates than those induced to believe that a rational cognitive style is failure-conducive (or an intuitive cognitive style success-conducive). These findings show that the desired self had an influence on reasoning in the self-unrelated lawyer–engineer task, since the use of base rates was mediated by changes in participants’ perceptions of their own rationality. These findings therefore show that the desired self, through the working self-concept that it entails, constitutes another factor influencing people’s use of distinct modes of reasoning.     

The impact of anxiety on analogical reasoning

The effect of state anxiety on analogical reasoning was investigated by examining qualitative differences in mapping performance between anxious and non-anxious individuals reasoning about pictorial analogies. The working-memory restriction theory of anxiety, coupled with theories of analogy that link complexity of mapping with working-memory capacity, predicts that high anxiety will impair the ability to find correspondences based on relations between multiple objects relative to correspondences based on overlap of attributes between individual objects. Anxiety was induced in one condition by a stressful speeded subtraction task administered prior to the analogy task. Anxious participants produced fewer relational responses and more attribute responses than did non-anxious participants, both in the absence of explicit instructions to find relational mappings (Experiment 1) and after receiving such instructions (Experiment 2). The findings support the postulated links among anxiety, working memory, and the ability to perform complex analogical mapping.     

Kicking the habit: Effects of nonstereotypic association training and correction processes on hiring decisions

The primary aim of the present research was to examine the effect of training in associating nonstereotypic traits with men and women on hiring decisions. While previous findings demonstrate that training can reduce the uncontrolled activation of stereotypes, the present results show that training by itself may not reduce the more controlled application of stereotypes. Across both no training and training conditions, participants chose male over female candidates for a leadership function. However, extensive nonstereotypic training did reduce sex discrimination when the training phase was disassociated from the choice of candidate task or when the participant's cognitive capacity was limited. These findings provide further evidence for the effectiveness of training in decreasing intergroup biases and for the potential influence of mental correction in moderating the effects of nonstereotypic training.     

The influence of retrieval practice on metacognition: The contribution of analytic and non-analytic processes

People may change their memory predictions after retrieval practice using naïve theories of memory and/or by using subjective experience – analytic and non-analytic processes respectively. The current studies disentangled contributions of each process. In one condition, learners studied paired-associates, made a memory prediction, completed a short-run of retrieval practice and made a second prediction. In another condition, judges read about a yoked learners’ retrieval practice performance but did not participate in retrieval practice and therefore, could not use non-analytic processes for the second prediction. In Study 1, learners reduced their predictions following moderately difficult retrieval practice whereas judges increased their predictions. In Study 2, learners made lower adjusted predictions than judges following both easy and difficult retrieval practice. In Study 3, judge-like participants used analytic processes to report adjusted predictions. Overall, the results suggested non-analytic processes play a key role for participants to reduce their predictions after retrieval practice.     

Interference between cues requires a causal scenario: Favorable evidence for causal reasoning models in learning processes

In an interference-between-cues design (IbC), the expression of a learned Cue A–Outcome 1 association has been shown to be impaired if another cue, B, is separately paired with the same outcome in a second learning phase. The present study examined whether IbC could be caused by associative mechanisms independent of causal reasoning processes. This was achieved by testing participants in two different learning situations. In the Causal Scenario condition, participants learned in a diagnostic situation in which a common cause (Outcome 1) caused two disjoint effects, namely Cues A and B. In the Non-Causal Scenario condition, the same IbC design and stimulus conditions were used. However, instructions provided no causal frame to make sense of how cues and outcomes were related. IbC was only found in the Causal Scenario condition. This result is consistent with Causal Reasoning Models of causal learning and raises important difficulties for associative explanations of IbC.     

Independent effects of relevance and arousal on deductive reasoning

Emotional content can have either a deleterious or a beneficial impact on logicality. Using standard deductive-reasoning tasks, we tested the hypothesis that the interplay of two factors – personal relevance and arousal – determines the nature of the effect of emotional content on logicality. Arousal was assessed using measures of skin conductance. Personal relevance was manipulated by asking participants to reason about semantic contents linked to an emotional event that they had experienced or not. Findings showed that (1) personal relevance exerts a positive effect on logicality while arousal exerts a negative effect, and that (2) these effects are independent of each other.     

Implication and reasoning in mental state attribution: Comments on Jane Heal's theory of co-cognition

Simulation theory explains third-person mental state attribution in terms of an attributor's ability to imaginatively mimic other people's mental processes. Jane Heal's version of simulation theory, which she calls a theory of “co-cognition,” maintains that one can know and can predict others’ beliefs primarily by thinking about what their antecedent beliefs imply. I argue that Heal's account of belief attribution elides crucial differences between reasoning and merely discovering relations among propositions.     

Conditional reasoning in context: A developmental dual processes account

The way individuals interpret “if p then q” conditionals varies with content and context, often resulting in a biconditional reading. Surprisingly, truth table tasks reveal the existence of two different types of biconditional interpretations: equivalence, as for promises and threats, and defective biconditional, as for causal conditionals or indicative conditionals involving binary terms. The aim of this study was to determine how the interpretation of indicative conditionals is affected in children, adolescents, and adults, by restricting their context of enunciation to only one possible alternative for both the antecedent and the consequent. Moreover, we wanted to determine what is the exact nature of the biconditional interpretation induced by these restricted contexts. For this purpose, third, sixth, and ninth graders and adults performed a truth-value task on indicative conditionals presented either in restricted on non-restricted contexts. Restricted contexts had no effect on children who have a conjunctive interpretation of the conditional, but elicited a predominant defective biconditional reading in adolescents and adults. These results corroborate the developmental dual process account of conditional reasoning proposed by Gauffroy and Barrouillet (2009).     

Dual-memory processes in crack cocaine dependents: The effects of childhood neglect on recall

Exposure to adversities during sensitive periods of neurodevelopment is associated with the subsequent development of substance dependence and exerts harmful, long-lasting effects upon memory functioning. In this study, we investigated the relationship between childhood neglect (CN) and memory using a dual-process model that quantifies recollective and non-recollective retrieval processes in crack cocaine dependents. Eighty-four female crack cocaine–dependent inpatients who did (N = 32) or did not (N = 52) report a history of CN received multiple opportunities to study and recall a short list composed of familiar and concrete words and then received a delayed-recall test. Crack cocaine dependents with a history of CN showed worse performance on free-recall tests than did dependents without a history of CN; this finding was associated with declines in recollective retrieval (direct access) rather than non-recollective retrieval. In addition, we found no evidence of group differences in forgetting rates between immediate- and delayed-recall tests. The results support developmental models of traumatology and suggest that neglect of crack cocaine dependents in early life disrupts the adult memory processes that support the retrieval of detailed representations of events from the past.     

Improved matrix reasoning is limited to training on tasks with a visuospatial component

Recent studies (e.g.,  and ) have provided evidence that scores on tests of fluid intelligence can be improved by having participants complete a four week training program using the dual n-back task. The dual n-back task is a working memory task that presents auditory and visual stimuli simultaneously. The primary goal of our study was to determine whether a visuospatial component is required in the training program for participants to experience gains in tests of fluid intelligence. We had participants complete variations of the dual n-back task or a short-term memory task as training. Participants were assessed with four tests of fluid intelligence and four cognitive tests. We were successful in corroborating Jaeggi et al.'s results, however, improvements in scores were observed on only two out of four tests of fluid intelligence for participants who completed the dual n-back task, the visual n-back task, or a short-term memory task training program. Our results raise the issue of whether the tests measure the construct of fluid intelligence exclusively, or whether they may be sensitive to other factors. The findings are discussed in terms of implications for conceptualizing and assessing fluid intelligence.     

Young children's reasoning about the order of past events

Four studies are reported that employed an object location task to assess temporal-causal reasoning. In Experiments 1-3, successfully locating the object required a retrospective consideration of the order in which two events had occurred. In Experiment 1, 5- but not 4-year-olds were successful; 4-year-olds also failed to perform at above-chance levels in modified versions of the task in Experiments 2 and 3. However, in Experiment 4, 3-year-olds were successful when they were able to see the object being placed first in one location and then in the other, rather than having to consider retrospectively the sequence in which two events had happened. The results suggest that reasoning about the causal significance of the temporal order of events may not be fully developed before 5 years.     

Dual processes of emotion and reason in judgments about moral dilemmas

We report the results of two experiments that show that participants rely on both emotion and reason in moral judgments. Experiment 1 showed that when participants were primed to communicate feelings, they provided emotive justifications not only for personal dilemmas, e.g., pushing a man from a bridge that will result in his death but save the lives of five others, but also for impersonal dilemmas, e.g., hitting a switch on a runaway train that will result in the death of one man but save the lives of five others; when they were primed to communicate thoughts, they provided non-emotive justifications for both personal and impersonal dilemmas. Experiment 2 showed that participants read about a protagonist's emotions more quickly when the protagonist was faced with a personal dilemma than an impersonal one, but they read about the protagonist's decision to act or not act equally quickly for personal and impersonal dilemmas.     

Multiple layers of information processing in deductive reasoning: combining dual strategy and dual-source approaches to reasoning

The idea that inferential performance cannot be analyzed within a single model has been suggested within two theoretical contexts. The dual strategy model suggests that people reason using different approaches to processing statistical information. The dual-source model suggests that people reason probabilistically using both statistical information and some intuition about logical form. Each model suggests that people have different approaches to processing information while making inferences. The following studies examined whether these different forms of information processing were equally present during reasoning. Participants were given a series of problems designed to distinguish counterexample from statistical reasoners. They were then given a series of MP or AC inferences for which identical statistical information was provided. Results show that MP inferences were considered to be deductively valid more often than equivalent AC inferences. The effect of logical form was independent of reasoning strategy, and of relatively equivalent size for both counterexample and statistical reasoners. The second study examined explicitly probabilistic inferences, and showed smaller effects of logical form and of reasoning strategy, although with a complex set of interactions. These results show that understanding the way that people use information when making inferences requires a multidimensional approach.