Visuelle und räumliche Interferenzen beim Schlußfolgern

The present paper provides evidence for a differential involvement of spatial and visual mental resources in propositional and spatial reasoning. Two experiments consider the load on visuospatial working memory during reasoning. Subjects solve propositional and spatial reasoning tasks either alone or in combination with visual tracking. In the first experiment, subjects resource allocation strategy is manipulated. Independently of the allocation of mental resources to the reasoning tasks or the tracking task, tracking is found to interfere much more with spatial than with propositional reasoning. In the second experiment, propositional reasoning after a comprehension training is disrupted by a simultaneous secondary spatial task, but not by the visual tracking task.     

Propositional reasoning: the differential contribution of "rules" to the difficulty of complex reasoning problems

In Experiment 1, complex propositional reasoning problems were constructed as a combination of several types of logical inferences: modus ponens, modus tollens, disjunctive modus ponens, disjunctive syllogism, and conjunction. Rule theories of propositional reasoning can account for how one combines these inferences, but the difficulty of the problems can be accounted for only if a differential psychological cost is allowed for different basic rules. Experiment 2 ruled out some alternative explanations for these differences that did not refer to the intrinsic difficulty of the basic rules. It was also found that part of the results could be accounted for by the notion of representational cost, as it is used in the mental model theory of propositional reasoning. However, the number of models as a measure of representational cost seems to be too coarsely defined to capture all of the observed effects.     

Propositional reasoning by model.

This article describes a new theory of propositional reasoning, that is, deductions depending on if, or, and, and not. The theory proposes that reasoning is a semantic process based on mental models. It assumes that people are able to maintain models of only a limited number of alternative states of affairs, and they accordingly use models representing as much information as possible in an implicit way. They represent a disjunctive proposition, such as "There is a circle or there is a triangle," by imagining initially 2 alternative possibilities: one in which there is a circle and the other in which there is a triangle. This representation can, if necessary, be fleshed out to yield an explicit representation of an exclusive or an inclusive disjunction. The theory elucidates all the robust phenomena of propositional reasoning. It also makes several novel predictions, which were corroborated by the results of 4 experiments.     

Propositional reasoning and working memory: the role of prior training and pragmatic content

Working memory involvement in propositional reasoning was explored after different kinds of training. The training conditions aimed to reduce the impact of non-analytic heuristics and to enhance analytic inference processes according to mental logic theories, the mental model theory, and the theory of pragmatic reasoning schemata. Following an initial training phase, secondary task interference was investigated using concurrent spatial tapping (Experiment 1), random number generation (Experiment 2), and articulatory suppression (Experiment 3). A training condition practicing the construction and use of mental models via a truth table task increased the disruption of reasoning performance by random number generation and articulatory suppression, whereas the other training conditions did not affect susceptibility to secondary task interference. The results corroborate implications of the mental model theory of reasoning.     

On the relation between representations constructed from text comprehension and transitive inference production

Deductive inference production from texts is a process considered to involve either the construction of an integrated mental model or the step-by-step coordination of propositional representations of the sentences. These alternative hypotheses were tested in 3 experiments using a set inclusion task paradigm in which participants had to recall the premises and to evaluate transitive inferences. Contrary to what is known about linear ordering relations, order of recalls and reaction times provide evidence that the encoding of set inclusion relations does not result in an integrated representation. These results suggest that the mental models theory needs to take account of the nature of the relation to be represented if it is to become a general theory of reasoning.     

Figurative speech: pointing a poisoned arrow at the heart of semantics

I argue that figurative speech, and irony in particular, presents a deep challenge to the orthodox view about sentence content. The standard view is that sentence contents are, at their core, propositional contents: truth-conditional contents. Moreover, the only component of a sentence’s content that embeds in compound sentences, like belief reports or conditionals, is the propositional content. I argue that a careful analysis of irony shows this view cannot be maintained. Irony is a purely pragmatic form of content that embeds in compound sentences. The standard view cannot account for this fact. I sketch out a speech-act theoretic framework that can. But in accepting this alternative framework we are giving up on the whole idea of an autonomous semantics.     

Training propositional reasoning

Two experiments compared the effects of four training conditions on propositional reasoning. A syntactic training demonstrated formal derivations, in an abstract semantic training the standard truth-table definitions of logical connectives were explained, and a domain-specific semantic training provided thematic contexts for the premises of the reasoning task. In a control training, an inductive reasoning task was practised. In line with the account by mental models, both kinds of semantic training were significantly more effective than the control and the syntactic training, whereas there were no significant differences between the control and the syntactic training, nor between the two kinds of semantic training. Experiment 2 replicated this pattern of effects using a different set of syntactic and domain-specific training conditions.     

Mind over grammar: reasoning in aphasia and development

Research on propositional reasoning (involving ‘theory of mind’ understanding) in adult patients with aphasia reveals that reasoning can proceed in the absence of explicit grammatical knowledge. Conversely, evidence from studies with deaf children shows that the presence of such knowledge is not sufficient to account for reasoning. These findings are in keeping with recent research on the development of naming, categorization and imitation, indicating that children's reasoning about objects and actions is guided by inferences about others’ communicative intentions. We discuss the extent to which reasoning is supported by, and tied to, language in the form of conversational awareness and experience rather than grammar.     

The Influence of Linguistic Form on Reasoning: The Case of Matching Bias

A well-established phenomenon in reasoning research is matching bias : a tendency to select information that matches the lexical content of propositional statements, regardless of the logically critical presence of negations. Previous research suggested, however, that the effect might be restricted to reasoning with conditional statements. This paper reports two experiments in which participants were required to construct or identify true and false cases of propositional rules of several kinds, including universal statements, disjunctions, and negated conjunctions. Matching bias was observed across all rule types but largely restricted to problems where participants were required to falsify rather than to verify the rules. A third experiment showed a similar generalization across linguistic forms in the Wason selection task with only if conditionals substituted for universals. The results are discussed with reference to contemporary theories of propositional reasoning.     

Logical knowledge and ordinary reasoning

This paper argues that the prominent accounts of logical knowledge have the consequence that they conflict with ordinary reasoning. On these accounts knowing a logical principle, for instance, is having a disposition to infer according to it. These accounts in particular conflict with so-called ‘reasoned change in view’, where someone does not infer according to a logical principle but revise their views instead. The paper also outlines a propositional account of logical knowledge which does not conflict with ordinary reasoning.     

The wording of conclusions in relational reasoning

Literature on relational reasoning mainly focuses on the performance question. It is typically argued that problem difficulty relies on the number of "mental models" compatible with the problem. However, no study has ever investigated the wording of conclusions that participants formulate. In the present work, we analyze the relational terms that people use in drawing conclusions from spatial relation problems (A is to the left of B, B is to the left C, D is in front of A, E is in front C, What is the relation between D and E?). We observed a general preference for expressing conclusions with 'left' rather than conclusions with 'right'. We also found that three factors had an influence on the wording of the conclusions: the linguistic form of premises, the question type and the presentation format. On the other hand, the number of models and premise order did not affect the wording of conclusions. Our study shows that the type of conclusion produced provides a new key to identifying the mental processes involved in spatial reasoning. Implications for the two main approaches to reasoning processes (i.e. the analogical and the propositional approaches) are discussed.     

Narrative and Propositional Reasoning in an Instructional Context

This study examined the influence of narrative and propositional reasoning in a classroom context. Students viewed 1 of 4 videotaped instructional simulations that varied the controversial issue presented by the teacher and ways of reasoning about it. After viewing a videotape, students rated the expertness, trustworthiness, and attractiveness of the teacher, and the effectiveness of instruction. They rated the teacher as more attractive and the presentation more effective when he used a narrative rather than a propositional approach.     

A computational model for solving problems from the Raven’s Progressive Matrices intelligence test using iconic visual representations

We describe a computational model for solving problems from Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM), a family of standardized intelligence tests. Existing computational models for solving RPM problems generally reason over amodal propositional representations of test inputs. However, there is considerable evidence that humans can also apply imagery-based reasoning strategies to RPM problems, in which processes rooted in perception operate over modal representations of test inputs. In this paper, we present the “affine model,” a computational model that simulates modal reasoning by using iconic visual representations together with affine and set transformations over these representations to solve a given RPM problem. Various configurations of the affine model successfully solve between 33 and 38 of the 60 problems on the Standard Progressive Matrices, which matches levels of performance for typically developing 9- to 11-year-old children. This suggests that, for at least a sizeable subset of RPM problems, it is not always necessary to extract amodal symbols in order to arrive at the correct answer, and iconic visual representations constitute a sufficient form of representation to successfully solve these problems. We intend for the affine model to serve as a complementary computational account to existing propositional models, which together may provide an integrated, dual-process account of human problem solving on the RPM.     

Rôle du contrôle exécutif dans le raisonnement par analogie chez l’enfant et le primate non humain

Analogical reasoning (AR) is a cornerstone of human cognition. Two main theories have historically been proposed to account for the ontogeny of AR. They propose that analogical skills are constrained by children's logical skills or limited knowledge of the relations to be considered. We adopt an alternative perspective in this review paper suggesting that AR abilities depend on the efficiency of executive control. We present convergent data collected in children and monkeys highlighting the role of three main executive functions: inhibitory control, cognitive flexibility and working memory updating. The analysis of children's reasoning suggests that the contribution of relational knowledge and executive control to analogical reasoning cannot be considered independently.     

Strategic and automatic components in the processing of linguistic spatial relations

The objective of the present study was to determine the extent to which strategies influence the representational format of a linguistic spatial relation. The propositional model assumes that a sentence describing a spatial relation is always represented as a set of propositions, whereas the strategic model claims that a spatial sentence can be represented either as a set of propositions or as a mental image, depending on the strategy (verbal or visual-spatial) an individual follows. Participants read a sentence (spatial or non-spatial) followed by a picture or sentence, which did or did not exemplify the information of the first sentence. In order to examine the involvement of strategic and automatic components the probability (20% or 80%) of the nature (sentence or picture) of the second stimulus was varied. Participants had slower verification RTs for unexpected stimuli than for expected stimuli, but this cost was significantly larger for an unexpected picture than an unexpected sentence. Furthermore, this asymmetric cost for the unexpected visual-spatial stimulus only occurred with spatial sentences and not with non-spatial sentences. Surprisingly, these data do not support a strictly propositional or a strategic model. Instead, we propose a third option: a dual representational model, in which people automatically represent the spatial sentence propositionally. In addition, depending on the context, a pictorial strategy is employed, which results in a supplementary visual-spatial representation.     

Abstraction and Individual Style in Syllogistic and Heterogeneous Reasoning

Syllogistic reasoning can be modelled with mental models. Heterogeneous reasoning brings together propositional and visual information, and in the Hyperproof logic-teaching system, the visual can act as a model for the propositional. Both mental models notation and Hyperproof’s visual representations allow abstractions of a limited kind. Individual differences in reasoning performance have been found in both domains. We suggest that at least some of the differences can be attributed to students’ differing ability to manipulate abstractions.     

Effects of directionality in deductive reasoning: II. Premise integration and conclusion evaluation

Previous research (Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2000) has shown an inherent directionality between the two terms linked in premises of typical deductive reasoning tasks. With three experiments we investigated the effect of inherent directionality on the time to integrate two premises and for the derivation of a conclusion. We varied figure (i.e., order of terms in the premises) and direction of inference (i.e., order of terms in the conclusion) in deduction tasks from various domains (propositional reasoning, syllogisms, spatial, temporal, and linear order reasoning). Effects of figure on premise reading times varied with the directionality of the relations. Effects of direction of inference reflected the same directionality for a subset of relations. We propose that two factors are jointly responsible for a large part of observed directionality effects in premise integration: the inherent directionality of relational statements and a general advantage for a given-new order of terms in the second premise. Difficulty of deriving a conclusion is affected by the directionality or relations if and only if the relation is semantically asymmetric, so that the directionality must be preserved in the integrated mental model.     

复合命题理解能力的发展

采用命题-图形匹配实验法,探讨了儿童、少年和青年人三个阶段的5种类型复合命题理解能力的发展.结果表明:(1)随着年龄增长,复合命题理解能力迅速提高;(2)对复合命题理解的难易,决定于构建的心理模型的数目.理解能力的发展根据心理模型的类型呈现不同的步调,单模型命题的理解在小学阶段已经很好地获得发展,双模型命题则在初中阶段获得较好的发展,三模型命题发展较迟,直至成年仍需发展.