Human versus machine: a comparison of the accuracy of geographic profiling methods

The current article addresses the continuing debate as to the accuracy of geographic profiling methods in predicting the location of serial crime offenders. In particular, the research addresses whether spatial distribution methods and humans using simple heuristics are as accurate at predicting home locations of offenders as more complex algorithm‐based methods such as RIGEL, DRAGNET, and Crimestat. Using a random sample of solved serial crimes, the research found that predictions by human judges and spatial distribution methods performed equally as well as more complex algorithm‐based methods. In addition to a discussion of findings, implications for police investigations and researchers are included. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Planning abilities and chess: A comparison of chess and non‐chess players on the Tower of London task

Playing chess requires problem‐solving capacities in order to search through the chess problem space in an effective manner. Chess should thus require planning abilities for calculating many moves ahead. Therefore, we asked whether chess players are better problem solvers than non‐chess players in a complex planning task. We compared planning performance between chess (N=25) and non‐chess players (N=25) using a standard psychometric planning task, the Tower of London (ToL) test. We also assessed fluid intelligence (Raven Test), as well as verbal and visuospatial working memory. As expected, chess players showed better planning performance than non‐chess players, an effect most strongly expressed in difficult problems. On the other hand, they showed longer planning and movement execution times, especially for incorrectly solved trials. No differences in fluid intelligence and verbal/visuospatial working memory were found between both groups. These findings indicate that better performance in chess players is associated with disproportionally longer solution times, although it remains to be investigated whether motivational or strategic differences account for this result.     

Perceptual automaticity in expert chess players: Parallel encoding of chess relations

A check detection task in a 5 × 5 section of the chessboard, containing a King and one or two potential checking pieces was employed. The checking status (i.e., the presence or absence of a check) and the number of attackers (one or two) were manipulated. It was found that the reaction time cost for adding a distractor was differentially greater inno trials thanyes trials for novice, but not for expert, chess players. In addition, we contrasted standard check detection trials with trials in which one of two attackers was cued (colored red) and the task was to determine the checking status of the cued attacker while ignoring the other attacker. We documented a Stroop-like interference effect on trials in which a cued nonchecking attacker appeared together with an attacker that was checking (i.e., incongruent). These findings suggest automatic and parallel encoding procedures for chess relations in experts.     

Recall or evaluation of chess positions revisited: the relationship between memory and evaluation in chess skill

We extend work by Holding and Reynolds (1982) on recall and problem solving with quasirandom chess positions. We tested 17 chess players on both quasirandom and structured chess positions. Consistent with the earlier study, initial recall of quasirandom chess positions is unrelated to chess skill level, and quality of the move selected in subsequent problem solving is related to skill level. However, recall following problem solving is related to chess skill level. These results support the view that pattern recognition processes underlie superior performance by skilled chess players, contrary to the conclusions of Holding and Reynolds (1982). Mechanisms such as long-term working memory retrieval structures (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995) or templates (Gobet & Simon, 1996a) could explain the effective encoding of quasirandom positions during problem solving.     

The motivating function of thinking about the future: expectations versus fantasies

Two forms of thinking about the future are distinguished: expectations versus fantasies. Positive expectations (judging a desired future as likely) predicted high effort and successful performance, but the reverse was true for positive fantasies (experiencing one's thoughts and mental images about a desired future positively). Participants were graduates looking for a job (Study 1), students with a crush on a peer of the opposite sex (Study 2), undergraduates anticipating an exam (Study 3), and patients undergoing hip-replacement surgery (Study 4). Effort and performance were measured weeks or months (up to 2 years) after expectations and fantasies had been assessed. Implications for the self-regulation of effort and performance are discussed.     

Recall or evaluation of chess positions as determinants of chess skill

Previous research has found that the ability to recall briefly presented chess positions varies with playing strength, except when random positions are used. The suggestion therefore arises that mastery consists of recognizing configurations that are associated with plausible moves. This approach is tested by comparing the memory scores and move-choice protocols of players in six skill categories, using random chess positions. Contrary to any strong form of recognition-association hypothesis, differences in chess skill are shown to persist although memory differences are abolished. It is further shown that the moves selected are not based on those few pieces that are remembered. Skill-related differences in the accuracy of positional evaluations also occur, but they are less marked than in earlier results. An alternative approach to chess skill seems appropriate, in which memory effects may function at the evaluation phase.     

Holistic thinking is not the whole story: alternative or adjunct approaches for increasing the accuracy of legal evaluations

There are a number of very helpful, but often underutilized, principles and procedures that can augment decision making in clinical and legal settings. Psychologists often restrict their range of decision-making strategies and options--at the cost of maximizing diagnostic and predictive accuracy--in part as the result of "ontological-epistemological one-worldedness" (O-E O-W). However, no philosophical, logical, or scientific necessity demands strict consistency between views regarding the nature of psychological phenomena and views about how to best assess or learn about those phenomena. Relaxing this unnecessary and largely psychologically-based O-E O-W may promote greater comfort with and utilization of the methods that are discussed in this article for increasing judgmental accuracy.     

Chess knowledge predicts chess memory even after controlling for chess experience: Evidence for the role of high-level processes

The expertise effect in memory for chess positions is one of the most robust effects in cognitive psychology. One explanation of this effect is that chess recall is based on the recognition of familiar patterns and that experts have learned more and larger patterns. Template theory and its instantiation as a computational model are based on this explanation. An alternative explanation is that the expertise effect is due, in part, to stronger players having better and more conceptual knowledge, with this knowledge facilitating memory performance. Our literature review supports the latter view. In our experiment, a sample of 79 chess players were given a test of memory for chess positions, a test of declarative chess knowledge, a test of fluid intelligence, and a questionnaire concerning the amount of time they had played nontournament chess and the amount of time they had studied chess. We determined the numbers of tournament games the players had played from chess databases. Chess knowledge correlated .67 with chess memory and accounted for 16% of the variance after controlling for chess experience. Fluid intelligence accounted for an additional 13% of the variance. These results support the conclusion that both high-level conceptual processing and low-level recognition of familiar patterns play important roles in memory for chess positions.     

Predictors of irrational thinking in regular slot machine gamblers

Previous research has suggested that irrational thinking may play a central role in the maintenance of behavior in slot machine gambling (M. B. Walker, 1992b). The present study is an evaluation of the validity and predictors of irrational thinking in a sample of regular gamblers (N = 20) drawn from the general community. The results were generally consistent with earlier findings; 75% of gambling-related cognitions were found to be irrational. Irrationality was unrelated to the amount of money lost or won during sessions but was positively related to risk taking. The most common irrational cognitions included false beliefs concerning the extent to which outcomes could be controlled or predicted and the attribution of human qualities (personification) to gambling devices. Gender comparisons showed that women were more likely than men to personify the machines. The validity of the speaking-aloud approach and suggestions for future research are discussed.     

Counterfactual thinking and regulatory focus: implications for action versus inaction and sufficiency versus necessity

Counterfactual thinking is associated with regulatory focus in a way that explains previous empirical incongruities, such as whether additive counterfactuals (mutations of inactions) occur more or less frequently than subtractive counterfactuals (mutations of actions). In Experiment 1, regulatory focus moderated this pattern, in that additive counterfactuals were activated by promotion failure, whereas subtractive counterfactuals were activated by prevention failure. In Experiment 2, additive counterfactuals evoked a promotion focus and expressed causal sufficiency, whereas subtractive counterfactuals evoked a prevention focus and expressed causal necessity. In Experiment 3, dejection activated additive counterfactuals, whereas agitation activated subtractive counterfactuals. These findings illuminate the interconnections among counterfactual thinking, motivation, and goals.     

Error in chess: The apperception-restructuring view

Summary Five protocol-analysis experiments with tactical, endgame, and strategic positions were conducted to study cognitive errors in chess players' thinking. It will be argued that chess players' errors can be only partially explained in terms of unspecified working-memory overload, because the working-memory loads caused by the solution paths are usually small. It is therefore necessary to consider apperceptive mechanisms also, as these control information intake.Subjects fail either because they are not able to see the right prototypical problem space at all, or because they fail to close them as a result of missing some crucial task-relevant cue. This makes chess players lose their belief in the idea and restructure, after which the apperceptive information-selection mechanisms make the fording of the solution still more unlikely.     

Theories of chess skill

Summary The paper reviews the evidence for and against the recognition-association theory and a forward-search (SEEK) theory of chess skill. The recognition-association theory appears to be founded on indirect evidence concerning visual short-term memory, together with supplementary assumptions that may be questioned, and provides no role for verbal processes. There is no direct support for the theory, which omits forward search for reasons that are reexamined. In contrast, the SEEK theory maintains that move choice is based on search and evaluation processes supplemented (or else supplanted) by a knowledge base. These processes are directly evidenced by experimental findings. The objection that search theories cannot account for speed chess is met by a review of the available evidence. It is concluded that chess skill relies on thinking ahead rather than on pattern recognition.     

Individual differences in analytic versus holistic thinking

The authors constructed the Analysis-Holism Scale (AHS) to measure analytic versus holistic thinking tendency. In Study 1, using exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, a 24-item scale was developed. In Study 2, convergent and discriminant validities were tested. In Studies 3 and 4, the known-group difference validity was examined by comparing scores on the AHS of Americans and Koreans (Study 3) and of Korean students of Oriental medicine and Korean students of non-Oriental medicine majors (Study 4). Results of Studies 3 and 4 show that Koreans and Korean students of Oriental medicine scored higher on the AHS than did Americans and Korean students of non-Oriental medicine majors, respectively. Studies 5 and 6 tested predictive validity by examining associations of the AHS with performances on two cognitive tasks (categorization and causal reasoning). Data analysis shows that those with high scores on the AHS displayed the holistic pattern of performances on each task more than did those with low scores.     

Human echolocation: pitch versus loudness information

Blind persons emit sounds to detect objects by echolocation. Both perceived pitch and perceived loudness of the emitted sound change as they fuse with the reflections from nearby objects. Blind persons generally are better than sighted at echolocation, but it is unclear whether this superiority is related to detection of pitch, loudness, or both. We measured the ability of twelve blind and twenty-five sighted listeners to determine which of two sounds, 500 ms noise bursts, that had been recorded in the presence of a reflecting object in a room with reflecting walls using an artificial head. The sound pairs were original recordings differing in both pitch and loudness, or manipulated recordings with either the pitch or the loudness information removed. Observers responded using a 2AFC method with verbal feedback. For both blind and sighted listeners the performance declined more with the pitch information removed than with the loudness information removed. In addition, the blind performed clearly better than the sighted as long as the pitch information was present, but not when it was removed. Taken together, these results show that the ability to detect pitch is a main factor underlying high performance in human echolocation.     

Children and chess expertise: The role of calibration

Summary Three studies of calibration are reported. Calibration refers to the accuracy with which one can predict one's own performance. In the first study child chess players, non-chess playing parents, and statistics students were asked to predict chances of winning chess games against hypothetical opponents. These subjective probabilities were compared to the actual probabilities, based on the Elo rating system. Better players' predictions were better calibrated. Confidence and ratings are negatively correlated, indicating that with lower ratings, players are overconfident. Skilled child players' predictions were better calibrated than any of the adults'. In the second study subjects were asked to estimate chances of winning in conjunctive situations, e. g., winning all the rounds in a tournament. Again, better child players were more accurate in their predictions and more accurate than adults. In the third study, child players were asked to predict their chances of winning in a non-chess domain after hearing a hypothetical win/loss history. Higher-rated players' predictions were again better calibrated, even though the domain was outside their expertise. The motivational and cognitive implications of calibration are discussed.     

Telling a story or telling it straight: the effects of entertaining versus accurate retellings on memory

People retell events for different reasons. Sometimes they try to be accurate, other times entertaining. What characterizes retellings from different perspectives? How does retelling perspective affect later recall of events? In the current research, participants retold a story either three times or not at all. By instruction, retellings were either entertaining or accurate. Compared to accurate retellings, entertaining retellings contained more affect, but fewer sensory references. On a subsequent memory test, participants who retold with an accuracy goal recalled the greatest number of story events, and their recall protocols were the most accurate and detailed, and least exaggerated. However, recognition memory did not differ across groups, suggesting that differences in retrieval structures (necessary for recall but not recognition) were key to understanding later differences in memory. Compared to telling it straight, the creative process of telling a story leads to qualitative and quantitative changes in later recall. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.