Branching and (In)determinism

Abstract

It might seem, and it has been argued, that if time is linear the threat of determinism is more severe than if time is branching, since in the latter case the future is open in a way it is not in the former one where, so to speak, there exists only one branch—one future. In this paper, I want to resist this claim. I shall first concentrate on what ‘branching’ is or could be, and I shall discuss various versions and interpretations of this view. I shall then (more quickly) turn my attention to what determinism is or could be, and I will distinguish three (well-known) kinds of it—focusing mainly on ‘metaphysical determinism’. I will then ask (and answer) the question whether branching time helps with avoiding determinism or not. As we shall see, it is incorrect to think that under the branching hypothesis the threat of determinism is any smaller.     

Transcendental Arguments and the Problem of Dogmatism

Abstract

Transcendental arguments have been described as undogmatic or non‐dogmatic arguments. This paper examines this contention critically and addresses the question of what is required from an argument for which the characterization is valid. I shall argue that although transcendental arguments do in certain respects meet what one should require from non‐dogmatic arguments, they – or more specifically, what I shall call ‘general transcendental arguments’ – involve an assumption about conceptual unity that constitutes a reason for not attributing to them the status of non‐dogmatic arguments. As a solution to this problem I distinguish general transcendental arguments from what I shall call ‘specific transcendental arguments’ and seek to explain how by limiting the use of transcendental arguments to the latter type it would be possible to avoid dogmatism. This methodological adjustment also opens up a possibility of re‐interpreting transcendental arguments from the past in a novel non‐dogmatic fashion.     

cumulative continuity and injection drug use among women: a test of the downward spiral framework

In this analytic essay. I shall utilize the framework of Individualism and structuralism in an attempt to realize an overview of theory in the sociology of deviance.¹ A major advantage of this framework is that it provides a perspective that sensitizes one to a theory's basic locus of causation and motivation for deviance. This takes us into the question of why some people, but not others, commit deviant acts even though they know those acts will be negatively viewed by others and bring sanctions upon themselves. As I apply this framework to selected major theoretical orientations.² I shall also note limitations of each theory. In addition. I shall Indicate contrasting practical Implications of deviance theory that have far‐ranging ramifications for social life—Interconnections between our changing political orientations and Individualism and structuralism in deviance theory.     

Nietzsche,science, and philosophical nihilism

Abstract

Nietzsche offers us a critique of modern culture as threatened by a nihilistic crisis in values. Philosophy is specifically incorporated into Nietzsche’s critique, resulting in the claim that modern philosophy, as well as modern culture, is nihilistic. But why should contemporary philosophers give this view credence? In this paper, I put forward some reasons to take Nietzsche’s view seriously, focusing on the relationship between science and philosophy. I suggest that modern philosophy still tends to idealise science as an exemplar of objectivity, particularly as this relates to judgement, even despite widespread acknowledgement that science is not value-free. I therefore argue that Nietzsche’s critique is valuable in two respects: first, it calls the notion of a scientific ideal grounding objective, cross-cultural, judgement into question, and second, it facilitates a distinction between this scientific ideal and science itself.     

Nietzsche on the health of the soul

Abstract

Health (particularly of the soul [Seele]) is a central concept in Nietzsche’s work. Yet in the most philosophically sophisticated secondary literature on Nietzsche, there has been fairly little sustained treatment of just what Nietzschean health consists in. In this paper, I aim to provide an account of some of the central marks of this health: resilience, discipline, vitality, a certain positive condition of the will to power, a certain tendency toward integration, and so on. This exposition and discussion will be the main task of the paper. Then in the concluding section of the paper, I consider a line taken in some related secondary literature, which would suggest that health might ultimately be understood in formal or dynamic terms, relating to one’s will to power and/or the unity of one’s drives. I will present the beginnings of an argument against such an account of health. In focusing on the formal and dynamic side exclusively, it cannot get the full story. In particular, it seems to me to miss the substantive dimension that is essential if we are to understand health properly. As I shall suggest, the core concept of Nietzschean health is not fully explicable except by reference to normative terms.     

The Duty to Forgive Repentant Wrongdoers

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to consider the question of whether we have a duty to forgive those who repent and apologize for the wrong they have done. I shall argue that we have a pro tanto duty to forgive repentant wrongdoers, and I shall propose and consider the norm of forgiveness. This norm states that if a wrongdoer repents and apologizes to a victim, then the victim has a duty to forgive the wrongdoer, other things being equal. That someone has a pro tanto duty to forgive a repentant wrongdoer means that he or she ought to forgive unless other considerations outweigh the norm of forgiveness. Furthermore, a distinction is made between what are termed ‘general considerations’ and ‘case‐relative considerations’, and it is argued that only after all the relevant considerations have been examined can it be determined whether there is a duty to forgive, all things considered.     

Gratitude,revenge, and Mitleid: reading Nietzsche’s Daybreak 138

ABSTRACT

This paper analyses Daybreak 138 closely line by line in order to examine whether Nietzsche's conclusion that ‘there is something degrading in suffering and something elevating and productive of superiority in pitying (Mitleiden)’ truly holds. I shall argue that it does not. By way of objection to Nietzsche's conclusion, I am offering a counter example and also examine what, in the context of Daybreak 138, gratitude, revenge, and Mitleid have in common so that they can be used by Nietzsche to pursue together a common goal. I suggest that the feature gratitude, revenge and Mitleid have in common is their usefulness to establish or maintain equality.     

Hope in a Time of Cholera

What are the internal conditions or mental states that may facilitate the moving on with life? How does one explain that some, after undergoing severe trauma, fail to go on with productive and creative lives while others do?In this paper, I shall explore the effect of hope and its central position in mobilizing traumatized individuals so that they can move on with their lives. I shall be focusing on a specific aspect of trauma often neglected in the literature, namely the trauma elicited by the sudden, almost overnight loss of monetary funds accumulated over years of hard work. I will be referring to the psychological impact suffered by Argentineans after severe economic measures taken by the government in late 2001. I shall delve into these solutions and attempt to explore their influence on a contemporary exodus from Argentina.Hope nurtured by despair will be discussed. Is hope a mere palliative, a mental configuration coupling with a furtive affective state? Hope joins the ranks of religion in building a buffer against the silent awareness of inner despair—the most private of madness. I shall try to discuss how hope brings to the fore psyche's devices that are deployed in attempting to deal with our deepest fears.     

Ethical Egoism, Utilitarianism and the fallacy of pragmatic inconsistency

In this paper I shall consider the difficulty for Ethical Egoism, Act Utilitarianism and later what I shall call Cumulative Effect Utilitarianism, that they both commit the fallacy of pragmatic inconsistency. I shall distinguish various forms of the fallacy of pragmatic inconsistency; in particular I shall distinguish between the fallacy of direct and indirect pragmatic inconsistency, and shall argue that though both Ethical Egoism and Act Utilitarianism probably commit both, Cumulative Effect Utilitarianism does not.How art thou out of breath when thou hast breath To say to me that thou art out of breath?William Shakespeare,Romeo and Juliet. But when I tell him he hates flatterers, He says he does, being then most flattered.William Shakespeare,Julius Caesar.     

Against Cognitivism About Supposition

A popular view maintains that supposition is a kind of cognitive mental state, very similar to belief in essential respects. Call this view “cognitivism about supposition”. There are at least three grades of cognitivism, construing supposition as (i) a belief, (ii) belief-like imagination or (iii) a species of belief-like imagination. I shall argue against all three grades of cognitivism and claim that supposition is a sui generis form of imagination essentially dissimilar to belief. Since for good reasons (i) is not supported in the literature, I shall dwell on (ii) and (iii). Without further explanation supposition has been very often merely postulated as being nothing but belief-like imagination—that is, (ii). I shall show that at least two considerations undermine (ii). First, supposition and belief-like imagination are governed by different norms, more precisely the former is freer than the latter and requires minimal or no mental effort. Second, contrary to belief-like imagination, supposition is “cold”, in that it is typically dissociated from emotional reactions. Proponents of (iii) face the pressure of explaining these differences between supposition and belief-like imagination too. I shall argue that they have not sufficiently motivated the claim that supposition is belief-like. In particular they fail to accommodate precisely the dimensions of supposition pertaining to its normativity and emotionality. I shall close with a sketch of a new account of supposition.     

Is open-mindedness truth-conducive?

What makes an intellectual virtue a virtue? A straightforward and influential answer to this question has been given by virtue-reliabilists: a trait is a virtue only insofar as it is truth-conducive. In this paper I shall contend that recent arguments advanced by Jack Kwong in defence of the reliabilist view are good as far as they go, in that they advance the debate by usefully clarifying ways in how best to understand the nature of open-mindedness. But I shall argue that these considerations do not establish the desired conclusions that open-mindedness is truth-conducive. To establish these much stronger conclusions we would need an adequate reply to what I shall call Montmarquet’s objection. I argue that Linda Zagzebski’s reply to Montmarquet’s objection, to which Kwong defers, is inadequate. I conclude that it is contingent if open-mindedness is truth-conducive, and if a necessary tie to truth is what makes an intellectual virtue a virtue, then the status of open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue is jeopardised. We either need an adequate reliabilist response to Montmarquet’s objection, or else seek alternative accounts of what it is that makes a virtue a virtue. I conclude by briefly outlining some alternatives.

     

Critical reflections on second-generation mindfulness-based interventions

ObjectivesThe purpose of this paper is to provide a critical introduction on Second-Generation Mindfulness-Based Interventions (SG-MBIs) to sport and performance psychology scholars and practitioners.MethodThis essay is written as a commentary on Roychowdhury et al.’s, (2021, this issue) article in this issue. Specifically, I apply theoretical insights from Roychowdhury et al., (2021, this issue) to the practical model of SG-MBIs.ResultsI find that SG-MBIs attempt to respond to ethical concerns with the ways that mindfulness has been commodified, secularized, and universalized through appeals to cultural authenticity.DiscussionWhile acknowledging the cultural contexts from which practices like mindfulness have been taken is important, appeals to cultural authenticity often reproduce fixed and essentializing constructions of culture and are easily coopted by neoliberal multiculturalism.ConclusionAs sport and performance psychology professionals reflect on the next generation of mindfulness-based interventions, it will be important to attend to the contextual flexibility of neoliberalism to universalize and essentialize.     

The Causal Efficiency of the Passage of Time

Does mere passage of time have causal powers? Are properties like ??being n days past?? causally efficient? A pervasive intuition among metaphysicians seems to be that they don??t. Events and/or objects change, and they cause or are caused by other events and/or objects; but one does not see how just the mere passage of time could cause any difference in the world. In this paper, I shall discuss a case where it seems that mere passage of time does have causal powers: Sydney Shoemaker??s (1969) possible world where temporal vacua (allegedly) take place. I shall argue that Shoemaker??s thought-experiment doesn??t really aim at teaching us that there can be time without change, but rather that if such a scenario is plausible at all (as I think it is) it provides us with good reasons to think that mere passage of time can be directly causally efficient.     

The Politics of Naming and the Development of Morality

Abstract

Feminists have challenged traditional uses of naming and have reclaimed naming as a tool of empowerment rather than of oppression. Yet feminist naming often reverts into the paradigm of dominant culture, leading to further domination and social control through the creation of norms, rules, and moral absolutes. By focusing specifically on lesbian-feminism and deconstructing the lesbian-feminist “rules” of sexuality and physical appearance, this article explores the dualistic nature of feminist naming and morality and how they inadvertently mimic the moral paradigm of dominant culture. This article closes with a discussion of alternative models of feminist naming and moral frameworks.     

Perspectival representation and fallacies in metaethics

Abstract

The prevailing theoretical framework for theorising about representation construes all representation as involving objective representational contents. This classic framework has tended to drive philosophers either to claim that evaluative judgements are representations and therefore objective, or else to claim that evaluative judgements are not really representations, because they are not objective. However, a more general, already well-explored framework is available, which will allow theorists to treat evaluative judgements as full-fledged representations (thus doing justice to their representational aspects) while leaving open whether they are objective. Such a more general conception of representational content is exemplified, e.g. by Lewis’s ‘centred contents’ and Gibbard’s framework of ‘contents of judgement’, thus it is not new. I shall start in §1 by introducing the more general framework of perspectival contents and then illustrate in §2 how awareness of it can help expose the fallaciousness of certain widely used forms of argumentation in metaethics.     

Anti-Normativism Evaluated

Abstract

I argue that recent attempts to show that meaning and content are not normative fail. The two most important arguments anti-normativists have presented are what I call the ‘argument from constitution’ and the ‘argument from guidance’. Both of these arguments suffer from the same basic problem: they overlook the possibility of focusing on assessability by norms, rather than compliance with norms or guidance by norms. Moreover, I argue that the anti-normativists arguments fail even if we ignore this basic problem. Thus, we have not been given good reasons to think that normativism is false.