Learned helplessness: Not dependent upon cognitions, attributions, or other such phenomenal experiences

Subjects shot a light gun at a target with a photorecepter cell in the bull's-eye, with the only information regarding their accuracy being provided by reinforcing tone signals. Half the subjects received reinforcers contingent upon their hits. The others were yoked to the contingent subjects, receiving non-contingent reinforcers in the same patterns. Experiment 1 compared contingent or noncontingent positive or aversive reinforcers in their effect on subsequent anagrams performance. Phenomenal experiences, such as cognitive awareness, attributions, and moods, were assessed. Subjects exhibited a strong helplessness effect independent of their phenomenal experiences. In Experiment 2 the independent variables of contingent/noncontingent reinforcement and awareness of noncontingency were manipulated orthogonally by informing half the subjects that their reinforcement had been noncontingent in the target-shooting. Actual noncontingency produced a strong helplessness effect whereas “awareness of noncontingency” did not.     

“Test-Tube Baby” procedures: Stress and judgements under uncertainty

Patients participating in an in vim fertilisation with embryo transfer (IVF and ET) programme face uncertainty at each stage of the procedure. Research on heuristics and on stress lead to predictions about behaviour in situations of uncertainty. It was predicted that IVF and ET participants would overestimate the likelihood of success, due to publicity the process has received, and would underestimate the likelihood of an earlier, less publicised. stage in the procedure. Both predictions were confirmed in a total of 70 participants (26 women at out-patient clines, 23 of their partners and 21 surgical in-patients). All the men and all but one woman overestimated the likelihood of becoming pregnant and having a baby. and most of the surgical patients underestimated the likelihood of egg recovery. Estimates were not related to patients' confidence about their information, confirming previous evidence about confidence in inaccurate judgements based on heuristics. Data on patients' distress as indicated by mood rating show high anxiety at points of uncertainty and Pailure, as found in other studies of stress. While the couples shared their inaccurate judgements. they did not necessarily share their distress. The results are discussed in terms of patients' decision making. coping strategies and the implications for doctor-patient communication.     

Preliminary support for the use of a hierarchical mapping technique to examine attachment networks

In 2 studies, we investigated the validity and usefulness of a bull's eye hierarchical mapping measure to examine the content and structure of attachment networks. The bull's eye identified network differences between people of different attachment styles and between different ages. Attachment networks varied in the number of members and their hierarchical organization as a function of attachment style. Secure individuals included a higher number of secure relationships in their networks and placed them closer to the core self than their insecure relationships, as well as closer than did dismissing‐avoidant individuals. The bull's eye also allowed for the observation of meaningful interrelations between network members. Study 2 utilized a cross‐sectional design by which we observed network fluidity from mid‐ to late‐adolescence in addition to attachment style differences. One important finding was that late‐adolescents placed their friends closer to the core self than did midadolescents, reflecting increased use of peers as close attachment figures.     

The elusive wishful thinking effect

Abstract

We define a desirability effect as the inflation of the judged probability of desirable events or the diminution of the judged probability of undersirable events. A series of studies of this effect are reported. In the first four experiments, subjects were presented with visual stimuli (a grid matrix in two colours, or a jar containing beads in two colours), and asked to estimate the probability of drawing at random one of the colours), and asked to estimate the probability of drawing at random one of the colours. The estimated probabilities for a defined draw were not higher when the draw entailed a gain than when it entailed a loss. In the fifth and sixth experiments, subjects read short stories each describing two contestants competing for some desirable outcome (e.g. parents fighting for child custody, or firms bidding for a contract). Some judged the probability that A would win, others judged the Desirability that A would win. Story elements that enhanced a contestant's desirability did not cause the favoured contestant to be judged more likely to win. Only when a contestant's desirability was enhanced by promising the subject of payoff contingent on that contestant's victory was there some slight evidence for a desirability effect: contestants were judged more likely to win when the subject expected a monetary prize if they won than when the subject expected a prize if the other contestant won. In the last experiment, subjects estimated the probability of an over-20-point weekly change in the Dow Jones average, and were promised prizes contingent on such a change either occurring, or failing to occur. They were also given a monetary incentive for accuracy. Subjects who desired a small change. We conclude that desirability effects, when they exist, operate by biasing the evidence brought to mind regarding the event in question, but when a given body of evidence is considered, its judged probability is not influenced by desirability considerations.     

Constraints on spatial extrapolation in the mental representation of scenes: View-boundaries vs. object-boundaries

Viewers remember seeing information from outside the boundaries of a scene (boundary extension; BE). To determine if view-boundaries have a special status in scene perception, we sought to determine if object-boundaries would yield the same effect. In Experiment 1 eight “bird's-eye view” photographs containing single object clusters (a smaller object on top of a larger one) were presented. After the presentation, participants reconstructed four scenes by selecting among five different-sized cutouts of each object. BE occurred between the view-boundaries and the object cluster, but not between the smaller object and the larger object's boundaries. There was no consistent effect of the larger object's boundaries. Experiment 2 replicated these results using a drawing task. BE does not occur whenever a border surrounds an object, it occurs when the border signifies the edge of the view. We propose the BE reflects anticipatory representation of scene structure that supports scene comprehension and view integration.     

Team allegiance can lead to both optimistic and pessimistic predictions

Although team allegiance is usually associated with optimistic predictions about team performance, the authors hypothesized that preferences for one’s group can also lead to pessimistic predictions. Upon arrival to the laboratory, groups of four participants were split into teams of two based on bogus criteria. Participants were informed that their teammate would compete against a member of the other team in a trivia game consisting of both easy (e.g., “pop culture”) and hard (e.g., “50’s movies”) categories. They provided likelihood estimates regarding outcomes for each category. As predicted, team allegiance inflated participants’ optimism about their teammate winning the easy categories, but deflated optimism about their teammate winning the hard categories. Path analyses supported the proposed account indicating that preferences for a teammate to win led to an enhanced focus on the teammate’s strengths and weaknesses (and neglect of the strengths and weaknesses of the other competitor).     

Influence of coaching efficacy and coaching competency on athlete‐level moral variables in Botswana youth soccer

This study examined coach‐perceived coaching efficacy and athlete‐perceived coaching competency, perceptions of coaches' endorsement of unfair play, and team norm for aggression on athlete‐level moral variables in Botswana youth soccer. Participants were youth soccer players (n = 506) and their coaches (n = 24). Players completed the coaching competency scale, the Judgments About Moral Behavior in Youth Sports Questionnaire, and the Team Norm Questionnaire. Coaches completed the Coaching Efficacy Scale. Multilevel analysis revealed that team norm for aggression, athletes' perceptions of their coaches' endorsement of aggression/cheating, and Game Strategy Coaching Competency were significant predictors of athletes' likelihood to aggress and perceptions of peer cheating. The findings contribute to previous research demonstrating the influence of the coach on athletes' antisocial behaviors.     

Effects of active information processing on the understanding of risk information

Two experiments investigated effects of active processing of risk information on participants' understanding and judgments. It was hypothesized that more active processing would lead to better understanding and differences in affective judgments (e.g. increased satisfaction and reduced perceived risk to health). In both experiments participants were given a written scenario about their being prescribed a fictitious medication. This medication was said to cause side effects in 2% of people who took it. Before answering a series of written questions, participants in the active conditions of both experiments were asked to carry out a reflective task (portraying the size of risk on a bar chart in Experiment 1 and answering a reflective question in Experiment 2). The results showed that active participants rated the likelihood of experiencing possible side effects significantly lower than passive participants (Experiment 1), and that active participants were significantly more satisfied with the information and judged perceived risk to health from taking the medication significantly lower than passive participants (Experiment 2). In both experiments, active participants were significantly more correct in their probability and frequency estimates. The studies demonstrate that active processing of risk information leads to improved understanding of the information given. This has important implications for risk communication. In the context of health, better understanding should lead to improved decision‐making and health outcomes. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Factors that affect action possibility judgements: Recent experience with the action and the current body state

It has been suggested that action possibility judgements are formed through a covert simulation of the to-be-executed action. We sought to determine whether the motor system (via a common coding mechanism) influences this simulation, by investigating whether action possibility judgements are influenced by experience with the movement task (Experiments 1 and 2) and current body states (Experiment 3). The judgement task in each experiment involved judging whether it was possible for a person's hand to accurately move between two targets at presented speeds. In Experiment 1, participants completed the action judgements before and after executing the movement they were required to judge. Results were that judged movement times after execution were closer to the actual execution time than those prior to execution. The results of Experiment 2 suggest that the effects of execution on judgements were not due to motor activation or perceptual task experience—alternative explanations of the execution-mediated judgement effects. Experiment 3 examined how judged movement times were influenced by participants wearing weights. Results revealed that wearing weights increased judged movement times. These results suggest that the simulation underlying the judgement process is connected to the motor system, and that simulations are dynamically generated, taking into account recent experience and current body state.     

Group norms,intra-group position and children's aggressive intentions

This study aimed to explore the peer group's role in childhood aggression. Participants (N = 356), aged 8.92 to 13.67 years (M = 11.22, SD = .96), were asked to pretend that they had been placed in a team and were then provided with information regarding their team's norms (aggression vs. helping) and their position within the team (prototypical vs. peripheral). Subsequently, participants were asked to rate the likelihood that they would directly or indirectly aggress towards another team. When compared to children in the helping norm condition, those in the aggression norm condition reported a significantly higher likelihood of engaging in direct and indirect aggression. For indirect aggression, prototypical members of aggressive groups also reported being more likely to engage in such behaviour than peripheral members of these groups did. Further, peripheral members of aggressive groups reported a greater likelihood of engaging in indirect aggression than either peripheral or prototypical members of helping groups. The contribution of these results to our understanding of the group mechanisms underlying childhood aggression is discussed.     

Alleviating inflation of conditional predictions

Previous studies indicated that conditional predictions—the assessed probability that a certain outcome will occur given a certain condition—tend to be markedly inflated. Five experiments tested the effects of manipulations that were expected to alleviate this inflation by inducing participants to engage in analytic processing. Rewarding participants for accurate predictions proved ineffective. A training procedure in which participants assessed the likelihood of each of several outcomes before assessing the probability of a target outcome was partly effective in reducing overestimation. Most effective was the requirement to work in dyads and to come to an agreement about the assessed likelihood. Working in dyads helped alleviate prediction inflation even after participants made their individual predictions alone, and its debiasing effect also transferred to the estimates that were made individually on a new set of stimuli. The results were discussed in terms of the factors that make prediction inflation resistant to change.     

The influence of linguistic labels on source‐monitoring decisions

Three studies explored the extent to which people use various object features, including linguistic label, shape, and category membership, to make decisions about the source of their memories. To isolate the influence of each feature, we used items that were related in the following four ways: as synonyms, as similar in shape and category membership, as homographs, or as unrelated. Participants read sentences and either saw or imagined a picture of the critical word's referent. Experiment 1 showed that participants committed more source errors for synonyms (e.g., rabbit and bunny) than for objects that were conceptually and perceptually similar (e.g., doughnut and bagel), which produced more errors than unrelated items. However, there was no effect of label, as people did not have more errors for homographs (e.g., baseball bat and flying bat) than unrelated items. In Experiment 2, presenting the critical word at study was not sufficient to lead people to use an item's label to make source decisions. However, Experiment 3 showed more source errors for homographs than unrelated pairs when semantic context was minimised at study, suggesting that people can use linguistic labels to make source decisions when other information is unavailable.     

The self: Your own worst enemy? A test of the self-invoking trigger hypothesis

The self-invoking trigger hypothesis was proposed by Wulf and Lewthwaite [Wulf, G., & Lewthwaite, R. (2010). Effortless motor learning? An external focus of attention enhances movement effectiveness and efficiency. In B. Bruya (Ed.), Effortless attention: A new perspective in attention and action (pp. 75–101). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] as a mechanism underlying the robust effect of attentional focus on motor learning and performance. One component of this hypothesis, relevant beyond the attentional focus effect, suggests that causing individuals to access their self-schema will negatively impact their learning and performance of a motor skill. The purpose of the present two studies was to provide an initial test of the performance and learning aspects of the self-invoking trigger hypothesis by asking participants in one group to think about themselves between trial blocks—presumably activating their self-schema—to compare their performance and learning to that of a control group. In Experiment 1, participants performed 2 blocks of 10 trials on a throwing task. In one condition, participants were asked between blocks to think about their past throwing experience. While a control group maintained their performance across blocks, the self group's performance was degraded on the second block. In Experiment 2, participants were asked to practice a wiffleball hitting task on two separate days. Participants returned on a third day to perform retention and transfer tests without the self-activating manipulation. Results indicated that the self group learned the hitting task less effectively than the control group. The findings reported here provide initial support for the self-invoking trigger hypothesis.     

Monitoring and Control of Learning Own‐Race and Other‐Race Faces

The own‐race bias refers to the finding that individuals are better able to recognize faces of the same race or ethnicity compared with faces of another race or ethnicity. The current study examined whether the own‐race bias was also evident in participants' predictions of memory performance and their self‐regulation of learning. In three experiments, participants studied own‐race and other‐race faces and predicted the likelihood of recognizing each face on a future test. Experiment 1 showed that participants provided similar predictions for own‐race and other‐race faces, despite superior recognition of own‐race faces. Experiments 2 and 3 permitted participants to control their study of faces and revealed better self‐regulation of learning for own‐race relative to other‐race faces. Collectively, these experiments suggest that the own‐race bias may partially reflect a metacognitive deficiency, as participants are less able to effectively self‐regulate learning for other‐race faces. The implications of these findings are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Psychological group memberships as outcomes of resource distributions

We propose that people can and will infer group memberships from resource distributions, and that these distributions have implications for people's understandings of the groups themselves and their own associations with these groups. We derive hypotheses from social identity and self‐categorization theories, and test them in three experiments. In Experiment 1, participants systematically rated specific patterns of group memberships as more likely than others in light of specific resource distributions in a manner consistent with our predictions. In Experiment 2, intragroup distributive fairness led to greater perceived self‐in‐group similarity than intra‐group distributive unfairness, while distributively unfair, in‐group favouritism led to greater perceived self‐in‐group similarity than intergroup fairness. In Experiment 3, social identification dropped following unfair, out‐group favouritism and intragroup unfairness, but not unfair, in‐group favouritism, or intragroup and intergroup fairness. The current data provide support for our hypotheses and clear evidence that resource distributions can be providers of group membership information. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When groups are wrong and deviants are right

How do group members respond when their group wrongfully punishes a group member? In two experiments, participants were presented with an ingroup member who argued for group change on moral (Experiment 1, N = 73) or scientific grounds (Experiment 2, N = 94). Despite being right, the member was treated as deviant by the group. We manipulated whether the group retained its former opinion or adopted the deviant's position, and whether the deviant's punishment was ongoing or whether the deviant was reinstated. We tested opposing predictions about how these group actions would affect group members' negativity towards the deviant. Both studies showed that negativity towards the deviant was highest when the group opinion was unchanged and the deviant was not reinstated. Further, opinion change or reintegration defused negativity towards the deviant. Implications of groups rejecting or embracing change, and their effects on the evaluation of wrongfully accused deviants are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Team capability beliefs over time: Distinguishing between team potency,team outcome efficacy,and team process efficacy

Teams that have positive beliefs about their capability tend to perform more effectively. However, relatively little is known about the nature and change of different types of team capability beliefs. Team potency and team efficacy are two approaches to understanding team capability beliefs, but few studies have considered these beliefs simultaneously. We investigate their distinctiveness and relative predictive power. Additionally, we propose two types of team efficacy: team outcome efficacy and team process efficacy. In two longitudinal samples of executive MBA study teams (sample 1, N=213 individuals in 41 teams; sample 2, N=360 individuals in 89 teams), we showed that team potency, team outcome efficacy, and team process efficacy are factorially distinct and measure invariant at four time points over 7 months (except for high levels of team outcome efficacy for which factorial invariance emerged). We also show differential predictive validity. Team outcome efficacy was the strongest predictor of objective team performance, whereas team process efficacy was the best predictor of citizenship behaviours. Team potency predicted both outcomes, albeit more weakly. Collectively, the findings show the value of a more fine‐grained approach to teams' capability beliefs, including a new validated measure of team process efficacy.     

Being responsible versus acting responsibly: Effects of agency and risk taking on responsibility judgments

In three experimental studies, with managers and students as participants, we explore in this paper the relation between two kinds of responsibility judgments, called Responsibility 1 (R1) and Responsibility 2 (R2). Decision makers can be viewed as being more or less responsible for their choice and its consequences (R1). Their actions can also be evaluated, from a normative point of view, as instances of more or less responsible behavior (R2). Experiment 1 showed that managers who depart from the default or “normal” course of action, by choosing a new (versus familiar) alternative, changing (versus sticking to) an initial decision, or going against (versus following) the advice of a management team, are rated as more responsible (R1) for the outcomes of their decision. At the same time, they are perceived to act in a less responsible way (R2). Experiment 2 compared decision makers choosing between more or less risky options. High risk takers were held more responsible (R1) for their choice and for its consequences, but were again viewed as behaving in a less responsible way (R2) than low risk takers. In Experiment 3, participants judged decision makers who followed or opposed others' advice by choosing either a high or a low risk option. Opposing others' advice led to higher R1 and lower R2 scores, especially when choosing the high risk option, moderated by outcome (successful decisions appearing more responsible than those that went wrong). Thus R1 and R2 judgments should be distinguished as having different and sometimes even opposite determinants.     

Conflict and metacognitive control: the mismatch-monitoring hypothesis of how others' knowledge states affect recall

Information about others' success in remembering is frequently available. For example, students taking an exam may assess its difficulty by monitoring when others turn in their exams. In two experiments, we investigated how rememberers use this information to guide recall. Participants studied paired associates, some semantically related (and thus easier to retrieve) and some unrelated (and thus harder). During a subsequent cued recall test, participants viewed fictive information about an opponent's accuracy on each item. In Experiment 1, participants responded to each cue once before seeing the opponent's performance and once afterwards. Participants reconsidered their responses least often when the opponent's accuracy matched the item difficulty (easy items the opponent recalled, hard items the opponent forgot) and most often when the opponent's accuracy and the item difficulty mismatched. When participants responded only after seeing the opponent's performance (Experiment 2), the same mismatch conditions that led to reconsideration even produced superior recall. These results suggest that rememberers monitor whether others' knowledge states accord or conflict with their own experience, and that this information shifts how they interrogate their memory and what they recall.