Can representational trajectory reveal the nature of an internal model of gravity?

The memory for the vanishing location of a horizontally moving target is usually displaced forward in the direction of motion (representational momentum) and downward in the direction of gravity (representational gravity). Moreover, this downward displacement has been shown to increase with time (representational trajectory). However, the degree to which different kinematic events change the temporal profile of these displacements remains to be determined. The present article attempts to fill this gap. In the first experiment, we replicate the finding that representational momentum for downward-moving targets is bigger than for upward motions, showing, moreover, that it increases rapidly during the first 300 ms, stabilizing afterward. This temporal profile, but not the increased error for descending targets, is shown to be disrupted when eye movements are not allowed. In the second experiment, we show that the downward drift with time emerges even for static targets. Finally, in the third experiment, we report an increased error for upward-moving targets, as compared with downward movements, when the display is compatible with a downward ego-motion by including vection cues. Thus, the errors in the direction of gravity are compatible with the perceived event and do not merely reflect a retinotopic bias. Overall, these results provide further evidence for an internal model of gravity in the visual representational system.     

Does representational momentum reflect a distortion of the length or the endpoint of a trajectory?

Observers viewed a moving target, and after the target vanished, indicated either the initial position or the final position of the target. In Experiment 1, an auditory tone cued observers to indicate either the initial position or the final position; in Experiment 2, different groups of observers indicated the initial position or the final position. Judgments of the initial position were displaced backward in the direction opposite to motion, and judgments of the final position were displaced forward in the direction of motion. The data suggest that the remembered trajectory is longer than the actual trajectory, and the displacement pattern is not consistent with the hypothesis that representational momentum results from a distortion of memory for the location of a trajectory.     

Invisible motion contributes to simultaneous motion contrast

The purpose of the present study was two-fold. First we examined whether visible motion appearance was altered by the spatial interaction between invisible and visible motion. We addressed this issue by means of simultaneous motion contrast, in which a horizontal test grating with a counterphase luminance modulation was seen to have the opposite motion direction to a peripheral inducer grating with unidirectional upward or downward motion. Using a mirror stereoscope, observers viewed the inducer and test gratings with one eye, and continuous flashes of colorful squares forming an annulus shape with the other eye. The continuous flashes rendered the inducer subjectively invisible. The observers’ task was to report whether the test grating moved upward or downward. Consequently, simultaneous motion contrast was observed even when the inducer was invisible (Experiment 1). Second, we examined whether the observers could correctly respond to the direction of invisible motion: It was impossible (Experiment 2).     

Environmental invariants in the representation of motion: Implied dynamics and representational momentum,gravity, friction,and centripetal force

Memory for the final position of a moving target is often shifted or displaced from the true final position of that target. Early studies of this memory shift focused on parallels between the momentum of the target and the momentum of the representation of the target and called this displacementrepresentational momentum, but many factors other than momentum contribute to the memory shift. A consideration of the empirical literature on representational momentum and related types of displacement suggests there are at least four different types of factors influencing the direction and magnitude of such memory shifts: stimulus characteristics (e.g., target direction, target velocity), implied dynamics and environmental invariants (e.g., implied momentum, gravity, friction, centripetal force), memory averaging of target and nontarget context (e.g., biases toward previous target locations or nontarget context), and observers’ expectations (both tacit and conscious) regarding future target motion and target/context interactions. Several theories purporting to account for representational momentum and related types of displacement are also considered.     

Bias to experience approaching motion in a three-dimensional virtual environment

We used two-frame apparent motion in a three-dimensional virtual environment to test whether observers had biases to experience approaching or receding motion in depth. Observers viewed a tunnel of tiles receding in depth, that moved ambiguously either toward or away from them. We found that observers exhibited biases to experience approaching motion. The strengths of the biases were decreased when stimuli pointed away, but size of the display screen had no effect. Tests with diamond-shaped tiles that varied in the degree of pointing asymmetry resulted in a linear trend in which the bias was strongest for stimuli pointing toward the viewer, and weakest for stimuli pointing away. We show that the overall bias to experience approaching motion is consistent with a computational strategy of matching corresponding features between adjacent foreshortened stimuli in consecutive visual frames. We conclude that there are both adaptational and geometric reasons to favor the experience of approaching motion.     

A principal components analysis of dynamic spatial memory biases

Research has shown that spatial memory for moving targets is often biased in the direction of implied momentum and implied gravity, suggesting that representations of the subjective experiences of these physical principles contribute to such biases. The present study examined the association between these spatial memory biases. Observers viewed targets that moved horizontally from left to right before disappearing or viewed briefly shown stationary targets. After a target disappeared, observers indicated the vanishing position of the target. Principal components analysis revealed that biases along the horizontal axis of motion loaded on separate components from biases along the vertical axis orthogonal to motion. The findings support the hypothesis that implied momentum and implied gravity biases have unique influences on spatial memory.     

Reference frames and haptic perception of orientation: Body and head tilt effects on the oblique effect

The aim of this study was to examine the effect of body and head tilts on the haptic oblique effect. This effect reflects the more accurate processing of vertical and horizontal orientations, relative to oblique orientations. Body or head tilts lead to a mismatch between egocentric and gravitational axes and indicate whether the haptic oblique effect is defined in an egocentric or a gravitational reference frame. The ability to reproduce principal (vertical and horizontal) and oblique orientations was studied in upright and tilted postures. Moreover, by controlling the deviation of the haptic subjective vertical provoked by postural tilt, the possible role of a subjective gravitational reference frame was tested. Results showed that the haptic reproduction of orientations was strongly affected by both the position of the body (Experiment 1) and the position of the head (Experiment 2). In particular, the classical haptic oblique effect observed in the upright posture disappeared in tilted conditions, mainly because of a decrease in the accuracy of the vertical and horizontal settings. The subjective vertical appeared to be the orientation reproduced the most accurately. These results suggest that the haptic oblique effect is not purely gravitationally or egocentrically defined but, rather, depends on a subjective gravitational reference frame that is tilted in a direction opposite to that of the head in tilted postures (Experiment 3).     

Reference frames and haptic perception of orientation: body and head tilt effects on the oblique effect.

The aim of this study was to examine the effect of body and head tilts on the haptic oblique effect. This effect reflects the more accurate processing of vertical and horizontal orientations, relative to oblique orientations. Body or head tilts lead to a mismatch between egocentric and gravitational axes and indicate whether the haptic oblique effect is defined in an egocentric or a gravitational reference frame. The ability to reproduce principal (vertical and horizontal) and oblique orientations was studied in upright and tilted postures. Moreover, by controlling the deviation of the haptic subjective vertical provoked by postural tilt, the possible role of a subjective gravitational reference frame was tested. Results showed that the haptic reproduction of orientations was strongly affected by both the position of the body (Experiment 1) and the position of the head (Experiment 2). In particular, the classical haptic oblique effect observed in the upright posture disappeared in tilted conditions, mainly because of a decrease in the accuracy of the vertical and horizontal settings. The subjective vertical appeared to be the orientation reproduced the most accurately. These results suggest that the haptic oblique effect is not purely gravitationally or egocentrically defined but, rather, depends on a subjective gravitational reference frame that is tilted in a direction opposite to that of the head in tilted postures (Experiment 3).     

S-R compatibility effects due to context-dependent spatial stimulus coding

Responses are faster with spatial S-R correspondence than with noncorrespondence (spatial compatibility effect), even if stimulus location is irrelevant (Simon effect). In two experiments, we sought to determine whether stimuli located above and below a fixation point are coded as left and right (and thus affect the selection of left and right responses) if the visual context suggests such a coding. So, stimuli appeared on the left or right eye of a face’s image that was tilted by 90° to one side or the other (Experiment 1) or varied between upright and 45° or 90° tilting (Experiment 2). Whether stimulus location was relevant (Experiment 1) or not (Experiment 2), responses were faster with correspondence of (face-based) stimulus location and (egocentrically defined) response location, even if stimulus and response locations varied on physically orthogonal dimensions. This suggests that object-based spatial stimulus codes are formed automatically and thus influence the speed of response selection.     

The pointedness effect on representational momentum

An observer's memory for the final position of a moving object is shifted forward in the direction of that object's motion. It is called representational momentum (RM). This study addressed stimulus-specific effects on RM. In Experiment 1, participants showed larger memory shift for an object moving in its typical direction of motion than when it moved in a nontypical direction of motion. In Experiment 2, participants indicated larger memory shift for a pointed pattern moving in the direction of its point than when it moved in the opposite direction. In Experiment 3, we again examined the influences of knowledge about objects' typical motions and the pointedness of objects, because we did not control the shape (pointedness) of objects in Experiment 1. The results showed that only pointedness affected the magnitude of memory shift and that the effect was smaller than the momentum effect.     

Vestibular stimulation interferes with the dynamics of an internal representation of gravity

The remembered vanishing location of a moving target has been found to be displaced downward in the direction of gravity (representational gravity) and more so with increasing retention intervals, suggesting that the visual spatial updating recruits an internal model of gravity. Despite being consistently linked with gravity, few inquiries have been made about the role of vestibular information in these trends. Previous experiments with static tilting of observers’ bodies suggest that under conflicting cues between the idiotropic vector and vestibular signals, the dynamic drift in memory is reduced to a constant displacement along the body’s main axis. The present experiment aims to replicate and extend these outcomes while keeping the observers’ bodies unchanged in relation to physical gravity by varying the gravito-inertial acceleration using a short-radius centrifuge. Observers were shown, while accelerated to varying degrees, targets moving along several directions and were required to indicate the perceived vanishing location after a variable interval. Increases of the gravito-inertial force (up to 1.4G), orthogonal to the idiotropic vector, did not affect the direction of representational gravity, but significantly disrupted its time course. The role and functioning of an internal model of gravity for spatial perception and orientation are discussed in light of the results.     

Infants' sensitivity to effects of gravity on visible object motion.

A preference method probed infants' perception of object motion on an inclined plane. Infants viewed videotaped events in which a ball rolled downward (or upward) while speeding up (or slowing down). Then infants were tested with events in which the ball moved in the opposite direction with appropriate or inappropriate acceleration. Infants aged 7 months, but not 5 months, looked longer at the test event with inappropriate acceleration, suggesting emerging sensitivity to gravity. A further study tested whether infants appreciate that a stationary object released on an incline moves downward rather than upward; findings again were positive at 7 months and negative at 5 months. A final study provided evidence, nevertheless, that 5-month-old infants discriminate downward from upward motion and relate downward motion in videotaped events to downward motion in live events. Sensitivity to certain effects of gravity appears to develop in infancy.     

Using eye height in different postures to scale the heights of objects

Four experiments examined eye height (EH) scaling of object height across different postures. In Experiment 1, participants viewed rectangular targets while they were standing, seated, and prone. Standing and seated judgments were similar, possibly due to EH scaling. Prone judgments were significantly lower, a result not attributable to the unfamiliarity of that posture (Experiment 2). In Experiment 3, shifts of seated EH produced height overestimations equivalent to those of standing viewers. Experiment 4 examined the visual salience of size information in the seated and prone judgments by holding EH constant and manipulating another source: linear perspective. Participants viewed targets placed on true- and false-perspective (FP) gradients. The FP gradient affected prone judgments but not seated judgments, which presumably relied on EH. It appears that the human visual system weights size information differentially depending on its utility.     

Centripetal force draws the eyes,not memory of the target,toward the center

Many observers believe that a target will continue on a curved trajectory after exiting a spiral tube. Similarly, when observers were asked to localize the final position of a target moving on a circular orbit, displacement of the judged position in the direction of forward motion ("representational momentum") and toward the center of the orbit was observed (cf. T. L. Hubbard, 1996). The present study shows that memory displacement of targets on a circular orbit is affected by eye movements. Forward displacement was larger with ocular pursuit of the target, whereas inward displacement was larger with motionless eyes. The results challenge an account attributing forward and inward displacement to mental analogues of momentum and centripetal force, respectively.     

Recognition of dance-like actions: Memory for static posture or dynamic movement?

Dance-like actions are complex visual stimuli involving multiple changes in body posture across time and space. Visual perception research has demonstrated a difference between the processing of dynamic body movement and the processing of static body posture. Yet, it is unclear whether this processing dissociation continues during the retention of body movement and body form in visual working memory (VWM). When observing a dance-like action, it is likely that static snapshot images of body posture will be retained alongside dynamic images of the complete motion. Therefore, we hypothesized that, as in perception, posture and movement would differ in VWM. Additionally, if body posture and body movement are separable in VWM, as form- and motion-based items, respectively, then differential interference from intervening form and motion tasks should occur during recognition. In two experiments, we examined these hypotheses. In Experiment 1, the recognition of postures and movements was tested in conditions in which the formats of the study and test stimuli matched (movement–study to movement–test, posture–study to posture–test) or mismatched (movement–study to posture–test, posture–study to movement–test). In Experiment 2, the recognition of postures and movements was compared after intervening form and motion tasks. These results indicated that (1) the recognition of body movement based only on posture is possible, but it is significantly poorer than recognition based on the entire movement stimulus, and (2) form-based interference does not impair memory for movements, although motion-based interference does. We concluded that, whereas static posture information is encoded during the observation of dance-like actions, body movement and body posture differ in VWM.     

Anticipating action in complex scenes

In four experiments we explored the accuracy of memory for human action using displays with continuous motion. In Experiment 1, a desktop virtual environment was used to visually simulate ego‐motion in depth, as would be experienced by a passenger in a car. Using a task very similar to that employed in typical studies of representational momentum we probed the accuracy of memory for an instantaneous point in space/time, finding a consistent bias for future locations. In Experiment 2, we used the same virtual environment to introduce a new “interruption” paradigm in which the sensitivity to displacements during a continuous event could be assessed. Thresholds for detecting displacements in ego‐position in the direction of motion were significantly higher than those opposite the direction of motion. In Experiments 3 and 4 we extended previous work that has shown anticipation effects for frozen action photographs or isolated human figures by presenting observers with short video sequences of complex crowd scenes. In both experiments, memory for the stopping position of the video was shifted forward, consistent with representational momentum. Interestingly, when the video sequences were played in reverse, the magnitude of this forward bias was larger. Taken together, the results of all four experiments suggest that even when presented with complex, continuous motion, the visual system may sometimes try to anticipate the outcome of our own and others' actions.     

A matter of design: No representational momentum without predictability

When observers are asked to localize the final position of a moving target, a forward shift of the judged final position is observed. So far, the forward shift has been attributed to the influence of mental continuation of the final target position (representational momentum). However, studies investigating forward displacement have used highly predictable target motion. The direction of target motion and the final target position were often varied between subjects. Thus, observers may have expected the target to travel in a particular direction or vanish at a particular location before a given trial started. In this study, direction of motion and final position were treated as fixed or random factors. The forward shift and the reversal of the shift with time (memory averaging) were absent when both factors were randomized. Thus, the forward shift with implied motion is restricted to repeatedly observed motion sequences that allow for pre-trial motion prediction.     

Motor action and emotional memory

Can simple motor actions affect how efficiently people retrieve emotional memories, and influence what they choose to remember? In Experiment 1, participants were prompted to retell autobiographical memories with either positive or negative valence, while moving marbles either upward or downward. They retrieved memories faster when the direction of movement was congruent with the valence of the memory (upward for positive, downward for negative memories). Given neutral-valence prompts in Experiment 2, participants retrieved more positive memories when instructed to move marbles up, and more negative memories when instructed to move them down, demonstrating a causal link from motion to emotion. Results suggest that positive and negative life experiences are implicitly associated with schematic representations of upward and downward motion, consistent with theories of metaphorical mental representation. Beyond influencing the efficiency of memory retrieval, the direction of irrelevant, repetitive motor actions can also partly determine the emotional content of the memories people retrieve: moving marbles upward (an ostensibly meaningless action) can cause people to think more positive thoughts.     

Fluency misattribution and visual hindsight bias

We tested a fluency-misattribution theory of visual hindsight bias, and examined how perceptual and conceptual fluency contribute to the bias. In Experiment 1a observers identified celebrity faces that began blurred and then clarified (Forward baseline), or indicated when faces that began clear and then blurred were no longer recognisable (Backward baseline). In surprise memory tests that followed, observers adjusted the degree of blur of each face to match what the faces looked like when identified in the corresponding baseline condition. Hindsight bias was observed in the Forward condition: During the memory test observers adjusted the faces to be more blurry than when originally identified during baseline. These same observers did not show hindsight bias in the Backward condition: Here, they adjusted faces to the exact blur level at which they identified the faces during baseline. Experiment 1b tested a combined condition in which faces were viewed in a Forward progression at baseline but in a Backward progression at test. Hindsight bias was observed in this condition but was significantly less than the bias observed in the Experiment 1a Forward condition. Experiments 1a and 1b provide support for the fluency-misattribution account of visual hindsight bias: When observers are made aware of why fluency has been enhanced (i.e., in the Backward condition) they are better able to discount it, and as a result show reduced or no hindsight bias. In Experiment 2, observers viewed faces in a Forward progression at baseline and then in a Forward upright or inverted progression at test. Hindsight bias occurred in both conditions, but was greater for upright than inverted faces. We conclude that both conceptual and perceptual fluency contribute to visual hindsight bias.     

Fluency misattribution and visual hindsight bias

We tested a fluency-misattribution theory of visual hindsight bias, and examined how perceptual and conceptual fluency contribute to the bias. In Experiment 1a observers identified celebrity faces that began blurred and then clarified (Forward baseline), or indicated when faces that began clear and then blurred were no longer recognisable (Backward baseline). In surprise memory tests that followed, observers adjusted the degree of blur of each face to match what the faces looked like when identified in the corresponding baseline condition. Hindsight bias was observed in the Forward condition: During the memory test observers adjusted the faces to be more blurry than when originally identified during baseline. These same observers did not show hindsight bias in the Backward condition: Here, they adjusted faces to the exact blur level at which they identified the faces during baseline. Experiment 1b tested a combined condition in which faces were viewed in a Forward progression at baseline but in a Backward progression at test. Hindsight bias was observed in this condition but was significantly less than the bias observed in the Experiment 1a Forward condition. Experiments 1a and 1b provide support for the fluency-misattribution account of visual hindsight bias: When observers are made aware of why fluency has been enhanced (i.e., in the Backward condition) they are better able to discount it, and as a result show reduced or no hindsight bias. In Experiment 2, observers viewed faces in a Forward progression at baseline and then in a Forward upright or inverted progression at test. Hindsight bias occurred in both conditions, but was greater for upright than inverted faces. We conclude that both conceptual and perceptual fluency contribute to visual hindsight bias.