Belief-based and analytic processing in transitive inference depends on premise integration difficulty

Three experiments investigated belief-based versus analytic processing in transitive inference. Belief-based and analytic processing were inferred from conclusion acceptance rates for problems with conclusions that were either valid or invalid and believable or unbelievable. Premise integration difficulty was manipulated by varying premise integration time (Experiment 1), premise presentation order (Experiment 2), and the markedness of the relational terms in the premises (Experiment 3). In all the conditions, reasoning accuracy and rated confidence were lower on conflict problems, where belief-based and analytic processes yielded different responses. Participants relied more on analytic processing and less on belief-based processing in conditions in which premise integration was easier. Fluid intelligence and premise integration ability predicted analytical reasoning on conflict problems after reasoning on the no-conflict problems was controlled for. The findings were related to three dual-process models of belief bias. They provide the first evidence of belief bias in transitive inference.     

信息的充分性和情绪性对推理的影响：时间压力的调节作用

主要探讨推理中信息相关因素对分析系统与启发式系统的影响。通过两个实验考察信息的充分性和情绪性对突发事件情境下推理的影响。实验1任务无时间压力,结果发现：信息充分性对推理的影响显著,表现为信息越充分,被试推理的逻辑指数越高,更多使用了分析系统;且信息充分时,接受积极信息的被试的信念指数显著增高。实验2任务有时间压力,结果发现：信息的情绪性对推理的影响显著,表现为接受积极信息的被试推理的逻辑指数显著大于接受消极信息组,更多使用了分析系统。两个实验结果表明,信息的充分性主要通过分析系统对推理产生影响,而信息的情绪性可通过双系统影响推理过程,即积极信息在推理时间充裕时促进启发式系统,但在有时间压力下促进分析系统。     

Heuristic and analytic processing: age trends and associations with cognitive ability and cognitive styles

Developmental and individual differences in the tendency to favor analytic responses over heuristic responses were examined in children of two different ages (10- and 11-year-olds versus 13-year-olds), and of widely varying cognitive ability. Three tasks were examined that all required analytic processing to override heuristic processing: inductive reasoning, deductive reasoning under conditions of belief bias, and probabilistic reasoning. Significant increases in analytic responding with development were observed on the first two tasks. Cognitive ability was associated with analytic responding on all three tasks. Cognitive style measures such as actively open-minded thinking and need for cognition explained variance in analytic responding on the tasks after variance shared with cognitive ability had been controlled. The implications for dual-process theories of cognition and cognitive development are discussed.     

Matching bias in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a dual-process account from response times and confidence ratings

We examined matching bias in syllogistic reasoning by analysing response times, confidence ratings, and individual differences. Roberts’ (2005) “negations paradigm” was used to generate conflict between the surface features of problems and the logical status of conclusions. The experiment replicated matching bias effects in conclusion evaluation (Stupple & Waterhouse, 2009), revealing increased processing times for matching/logic “conflict problems”. Results paralleled chronometric evidence from the belief bias paradigm indicating that logic/belief conflict problems take longer to process than non-conflict problems (Stupple, Ball, Evans, & Kamal-Smith, 2011). Individuals’ response times for conflict problems also showed patterns of association with the degree of overall normative responding. Acceptance rates, response times, metacognitive confidence judgements, and individual differences all converged in supporting dual-process theory. This is noteworthy because dual-process predictions about heuristic/analytic conflict in syllogistic reasoning generalised from the belief bias paradigm to a situation where matching features of conclusions, rather than beliefs, were set in opposition to logic.     

On the conflict between logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning

Three experiments are reported that investigate the weighting attached to logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning. Substantial belief biases were observed despite controls for possible conversions of the premises. Equally substantial effects of logic were observed despite controls for two possible response biases. A consistent interaction between belief and logic was also recorded; belief bias was more marked on invalid than on valid syllogisms. In all experiments, verbal protocols were recorded and analyzed. These protocols are interpreted in some cases as providing rationalizations for prejudiced decisions and, in other cases, as reflecting a genuine process of premise to conclusion reasoning. In the latter cases, belief bias was minimal but still present. Similarly, even subjects who focus primarily on the conclusion are influenced to an extent by the logic. Thus a conflict between logic and belief is observed throughout, but at several levels of extent.     

Mechanisms of belief-desire reasoning. Inhibition and bias

Biases in reasoning can provide insight into underlying processing mechanisms. We demonstrate a new bias in children's belief-desire reasoning. Children between 4 and 8 years of age were told a story in which a character was mistaken about which of three boxes contained some object. The character wanted to go to one of the boxes, but only if it did not contain the object. In this scenario, the character would be expected to avoid the box where she falsely believed the object to be, but might go to either of the remaining boxes. Though the character was equally likely to go to either box, children were biased to predict that the character would go to the box that contained the object. In a control task, the character had the same desire but did not have a false belief; in this case, children showed no bias, choosing the two correct answers equally often. The observed pattern of bias was predicted by a developmental model of belief-desire reasoning. Competent belief-desire reasoning depends on a process of selection by inhibition in which the best belief content emerges from a set of candidates.     

Working memory, metacognitive uncertainty, and belief bias in syllogistic reasoning

Studies of syllogistic reasoning have shown that the size of the belief bias effect varies with manipulations of logical validity and problem form. This paper presents a mental models-based account, which explains these findings in terms of variations in the working-memory demands of different problem types. We propose that belief bias may reflect the use of a heuristic that is applied when a threshold of uncertainty in one's processing-attributable to working-memory overload-is exceeded during reasoning. Three experiments are reported, which tested predictions deriving from this account. In Experiment 1, conclusions of neutral believability were presented for evaluation, and a predicted dissociation was observed in confidence ratings for responses to valid and invalid arguments, with participants being more confident in the former. In Experiment 2, an attempt to manipulate working-memory loads indirectly by varying syllogistic figure failed to produce predicted effects upon the size of the belief bias effect. It is argued that the employment of a conclusion evaluation methodology minimized the effect of the figural manipulation in this experiment. In Experiment 3, participants' articulatory and spatial recall capacities were calibrated as a direct test of working-memory involvement in belief bias. Predicted differences in the pattern of belief bias observed between highand lowspatial recall groups supported the view that limited working memory plays a key role in belief bias.     

Cognitive control in belief‐laden reasoning during conclusion processing: An ERP study

Belief bias is the tendency to accept conclusions that are compatible with existing beliefs more frequently than those that contradict beliefs. It is one of the most replicated behavioral findings in the reasoning literature. Recently, neuroimaging studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and event‐related potentials (ERPs) have provided a new perspective and have demonstrated neural correlates of belief bias that have been viewed as supportive of dual‐process theories of belief bias. However, fMRI studies have tended to focus on conclusion processing, while ERPs studies have been concerned with the processing of premises. In the present research, the electrophysiological correlates of cognitive control were studied among 12 subjects using high‐density ERPs. The analysis was focused on the conclusion presentation phase and was limited to normatively sanctioned responses to valid–believable and valid–unbelievable problems. Results showed that when participants gave normatively sanctioned responses to problems where belief and logic conflicted, a more positive ERP deflection was elicited than for normatively sanctioned responses to nonconflict problems. This was observed from ?400 to ?200 ms prior to the correct response being given. The positive component is argued to be analogous to the late positive component (LPC) involved in cognitive control processes. This is consistent with the inhibition of empirically anomalous information when conclusions are unbelievable. These data are important in elucidating the neural correlates of belief bias by providing evidence for electrophysiological correlates of conflict resolution during conclusion processing. Moreover, they are supportive of dual‐process theories of belief bias that propose conflict detection and resolution processes as central to the explanation of belief bias.     

范畴三段论推理中信念偏差效应的实验研究

本研究利用三段论评价任务,分析了已有信念与三段论逻辑状态间的交互影响,探讨了三段论推理判断中信念偏差的存在与作用机制,同时从信念偏差角度对心理模型理论进行了初步验证。结果发现：1．范畴三段论推理的逻辑判断过程中存在信念偏差效应;2．信念偏差效应以逻辑状态与结论可信性交互作用的方式存在;3当逻辑结果与信念相一致时,信念会促进逻辑反应,反之则妨碍逻辑反应;4．信念偏差效应对逻辑有效、结论不可信的单模型三段论问题影响最大,而对逻辑有效、结论不可信的多模型三段论问题相对影响最小。     

逻辑－信念冲突与推理难度对逻辑和信念判断的影响

双加工理论框架下的平行竞争模型和默认干涉模型对推理过程中启发式和分析式加工的启动次序和相互作用的性质提出了不同假设。本研究通过考察被试在信念判断和逻辑判断两种指导语下解决不同难度和不同类型推理问题的正确率和反应时,对两个模型的预测进行了检验。实验结果表明,解决简单问题时,问题类型对信念判断有显著影响,对逻辑判断无显著影响;解决复杂问题时,问题类型对逻辑判断的影响显著大于对信念判断的影响。实验结果支持平行竞争模型的假设,即两类加工在推理过程中同时启动,共同竞争最终的推理反应。     

When logic and belief collide: Individual differences in reasoning times support a selective processing model

When the validity of a deductive conclusion conflicts with its believability people often respond in a belief-biased manner. This study used response times to test the selective processing model, which views belief-bias effects as arising from the interplay between superficial heuristic processes and more rigorous analytic processes. Participants were split into three response groups according to their propensity to endorse logically normative conclusions. The low-logic, high belief-bias group demonstrated rapid responding, consistent with heuristic processing. The medium-logic, moderate belief-bias group showed slower responding, consistent with enhanced analytic processing, albeit selectively biased by conclusion believability. The high-logic, low belief-bias group's relatively unbiased responses came at the cost of increased processing times, especially with invalid-believable conclusions. These findings support selective processing claims that distinct heuristic and analytic processing systems underpin reasoning, and indicate that certain individuals differentially engage one system more than the other. A minor amendment is proposed to the current selective processing model to capture the full range of observed effects.     

The Influence of Activation Level on Belief Bias in Relational Reasoning

A novel explanation of belief bias in relational reasoning is presented based on the role of working memory and retrieval in deductive reasoning, and the influence of prior knowledge on this process. It is proposed that belief bias is caused by the believability of a conclusion in working memory which influences its activation level, determining its likelihood of retrieval and therefore its effect on the reasoning process. This theory explores two main influences of belief on the activation levels of these conclusions. First, believable conclusions have higher activation levels and so are more likely to be recalled during the evaluation of reasoning problems than unbelievable conclusions, and therefore, they have a greater influence on the reasoning process. Secondly, prior beliefs about the conclusion have a base level of activation and may be retrieved when logically irrelevant, influencing the evaluation of the problem. The theory of activation and memory is derived from the Atomic Components of Thought‐Rational (ACT‐R) cognitive architecture and so this account is formalized in an ACT‐R cognitive model. Two experiments were conducted to test predictions of this model. Experiment 1 tested strength of belief and Experiment 2 tested the impact of a concurrent working memory load. Both of these manipulations increased the main effect of belief overall and in particular raised belief‐based responding in indeterminately invalid problems. These effects support the idea that the activation level of conclusions formed during reasoning influences belief bias. This theory adds to current explanations of belief bias by providing a detailed specification of the role of working memory and how it is influenced by prior knowledge.     

Causal conjunction fallacies: The roles of causal strength and mental resources

In two experiments we tested the prediction derived from Tversky and Kahneman's (1983) work on the causal conjunction fallacy that the strength of the causal connection between constituent events directly affects the magnitude of the causal conjunction fallacy. We also explored whether any effects of perceived causal strength were due to graded output from heuristic Type 1 reasoning processes or the result of analytic Type 2 reasoning processes. As predicted, Experiment 1 demonstrated that fallacy rates were higher for strongly than for weakly related conjunctions. Weakly related conjunctions in turn attracted higher rates of fallacious responding than did unrelated conjunctions. Experiment 2 showed that a concurrent memory load increased rates of fallacious responding for strongly related but not for weakly related conjunctions. We interpret these results as showing that manipulations of the strength of the perceived causal relationship between the conjuncts result in graded output from heuristic reasoning process and that additional mental resources are required to suppress strong heuristic output.     

Belief–logic conflict resolution in syllogistic reasoning: Inspection-time evidence for a parallel-process model

An experiment is reported examining dual-process models of belief bias in syllogistic reasoning using a problem complexity manipulation and an inspection-time method to monitor processing latencies for premises and conclusions. Endorsement rates indicated increased belief bias on complex problems, a finding that runs counter to the “belief-first” selective scrutiny model, but which is consistent with other theories, including “reasoning-first” and “parallel-process” models. Inspection-time data revealed a number of effects that, again, arbitrated against the selective scrutiny model. The most striking inspection-time result was an interaction between logic and belief on premise-processing times, whereby belief – logic conflict problems promoted increased latencies relative to non-conflict problems. This finding challenges belief-first and reasoning-first models, but is directly predicted by parallel-process models, which assume that the outputs of simultaneous heuristic and analytic processing streams lead to an awareness of belief – logic conflicts than then require time-consuming resolution.     

Response demands and the recruitment of heuristic strategies in syllogistic reasoning

Two experiments investigated whether dealing with a homogeneous subset of syllogisms with time-constrained responses encouraged participants to develop and use heuristics for abstract (Experiment 1) and thematic (Experiment 2) syllogisms. An atmosphere-based heuristic accounted for most responses with both abstract and thematic syllogisms. With thematic syllogisms, a weaker effect of a belief heuristic was also observed, mainly where the correct response was inconsistent with the atmosphere of the premises. Analytic processes appear to have played little role in the time-constrained condition, whereas their involvement increased in a self-paced, unconstrained condition. From a dual-process perspective, the results further specify how task demands affect the recruitment of heuristic and analytic systems of reasoning. Because the syllogisms and experimental procedure were the same as those used in a previous neuroimaging study by Goel, Buchel, Frith, and Dolan (2000), the result also deepen our understanding of the cognitive processes investigated by that study.     

Response demands and the recruitment of heuristic strategies in syllogistic reasoning

Two experiments investigated whether dealing with a homogeneous subset of syllogisms with time-constrained responses encouraged participants to develop and use heuristics for abstract (Experiment 1) and thematic (Experiment 2) syllogisms. An atmosphere-based heuristic accounted for most responses with both abstract and thematic syllogisms. With thematic syllogisms, a weaker effect of a belief heuristic was also observed, mainly where the correct response was inconsistent with the atmosphere of the premises. Analytic processes appear to have played little role in the time-constrained condition, whereas their involvement increased in a self-paced, unconstrained condition. From a dual-process perspective, the results further specify how task demands affect the recruitment of heuristic and analytic systems of reasoning. Because the syllogisms and experimental procedure were the same as those used in a previous neuroimaging study by Goel, Buchel, Frith, and Dolan (2000), the result also deepen our understanding of the cognitive processes investigated by that study.     

Heuristic and analytic processes in propositional reasoning with negatives

The authors report 4 studies on heuristic and analytic processes in conditional reasoning with negations and show that a heuristic negative conclusion bias cannot account for the effects observed on problem-solving latencies derived from eye-movement measures (Experiment 1) and a novel mouse-tracking methodology (Experiment 2). A double negation elimination process can account for both the latency and response-frequency effects of a negation in the clause about which an inference is made. It is further shown that other negation effects cannot be explained by an affirmative premise bias proposed in the literature. Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrate that a novel availability hypothesis provides a viable alternative. It is argued that extant analytic theories need to be extended to incorporate a validating search for counter examples and need to specify how pragmatic and comprehension processes influence such a search.     

Jumping to conclusions, a lack of belief flexibility and delusional conviction in psychosis: a longitudinal investigation of the structure, frequency, and relatedness of reasoning biases

Two reasoning biases, jumping to conclusions (JTC) and belief inflexibility, have been found to be associated with delusions. We examined these biases and their relationship with delusional conviction in a longitudinal cohort of people with schizophrenia-spectrum psychosis. We hypothesized that JTC, lack of belief flexibility, and delusional conviction would form distinct factors, and that JTC and lack of belief flexibility would predict less change in delusional conviction over time. Two hundred seventy-three patients with delusions were assessed over twelve months of a treatment trial (Garety et al., 2008). Forty-one percent of the sample had 100% conviction in their delusions, 50% showed a JTC bias, and 50%-75% showed a lack of belief flexibility. Delusional conviction, JTC, and belief flexibility formed distinct factors although conviction was negatively correlated with belief flexibility. Conviction declined slightly over the year in this established psychosis group, whereas the reasoning biases were stable. There was little evidence that reasoning predicted the slight decline in conviction. The degree to which people believe their delusions, their ability to think that they may be mistaken and to consider alternative explanations, and their hastiness in decision making are three distinct processes although belief flexibility and conviction are related. In this established psychosis sample, reasoning biases changed little in response to medication or psychological therapy. Required now is examination of these processes in psychosis groups where there is greater change in delusion conviction, as well as tests of the effects on delusions when these reasoning biases are specifically targeted.     

关系推理中信念偏差效应的研究

采用结论评估范式,考察时向和空间关系推理中信念偏差效应的表现形式,以及心理模型理论对关系推理中信念偏差效应的解释力。研究结果表明,关系推理中信念偏差效应的表现形式与三段论有所不同,不论是时间推理还是空间推理中都存在信念主效应,但没有发现信念与逻辑的交互作用;心理模型理论不能对关系推理中信念偏差效应作出合理解释。     

Individual differences in working memory capacity and resistance to belief bias in syllogistic reasoning

In two experiments, we investigated the possibility that individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) would provide resistance to belief bias in syllogistic reasoning. In Experiment 1 (N?=?157), participants showed a belief bias effect in that they had longer response times and decreased accuracy on syllogisms with conflict between the validity and believability of the conclusion than on syllogisms with no such conflict. However, this effect did not differ as a function of individual differences in WMC. Experiment 2 (N?=?122) replicated this effect with the addition of decontextualized (i.e., nonsense) syllogisms as a different means of measuring the magnitude of the belief bias effect. Although individual differences in WMC and fluid intelligence were related to better reasoning overall, the magnitude of the belief bias effect was not smaller for participants with greater WMC. The present study offers two novel findings: (a) The belief bias effect is independent of individual differences in WMC and fluid intelligence, and (b) resolving conflict in verbal reasoning is not a type of conflict resolution that correlates with individual differences in WMC, further establishing boundary conditions for the role of WMC in human cognitive processes.