Deciding between accounts of the selection task: A reply to Oaksford (2002)

In this paper we report on our attempts to fit the optimal data selection (ODS) model (Oaksford & Chater, 1994; Oaksford, Chater, & Larkin, 2000) to the selection task data reported in Feeney and Handley (2000) and Handley, Feeney, and Harper (2002). Although Oaksford (2002b) reports good fits to the data described in Feeney and Handley (2000), the model does not adequately capture the data described in Handley et al. (2002). Furthermore, across all six of the experiments modelled here, the ODS model does not predict participants' behaviour at the level of selection rates for individual cards. Finally, when people's probability estimates are used in the modelling exercise, the model adequately captures only 1 out of 18 conditions described in Handley et al. We discuss the implications of these results for models of the selection task and claim that they support deductive, rather than probabilistic, accounts of the task.     

Theories of reasoning and the representational level: A reply to Oaksford

Oaksford (2001) considers that the findings of Espino, Santamaría, and García Madruga (2000a) could be explained by the Probability Heuristics Model (PHM) proposed by Chater and Oaksford (1999). He specifically voices three objections, the two main ones being based on the fact that PHM is not a theory about syllogism representation. If this is the case, we consider that PHM cannot explain our data, because most of them were registered before the participants evaluated the conclusion. We argue that only a theory at the representational level can property explain these data.     

Cultural psychology, A new look: reply to Bond (2002), Fiske (2002), Kitayama (2002), and Miller (2002)

M. H. Bond (2002), A. P. Fiske (2002), S. Kitayama (2002), and J. G. Miller (2002) joined D. Oyserman, H. M. Coon, and M. Kemmelmeier (2002) in highlighting limitations of the individualism-collectivism model of culture. Concern is warranted; nevertheless, individualism-collectivism helps structure discourse on the influence of culture on the mind. To avoid level-of-analysis entanglements, Oyserman et al. propose an integrative model that includes distal, proximal, and situated cultural features of societies and internalized models of these features, highlights the importance of subjective construal, and uses evolutionary perspectives to clarify the basic problems cultures address. Framed this way, it is clear that, depending on situational requirements, both individualism- and collectivism-focused strategies are adaptive; thus, it is likely that human minds have adapted to think both ways.     

Negative priming and stimulus repetition: A reply to Neill and Joordens (2002)

Negative priming is reliably obtained with repeated items, but not with novel items. Here, we review why these stimulus repetition effects raise problems for memorybased theories of negative priming. Furthermore, we provide empirical evidence casting doubt on Neill and Joordens’s (2002) claim that perceptual facilitation masks the effects of episodic retrieval with novel items. Finally, we discuss several theoretical and methodological issues raised in the reply by Neill and Joordens. We conclude that a more straightforward interpretation of these stimulus repetition effects is one based on activation-sensitive inhibition.     

Reaching a Decision: A Reply to Oaksford

In his commentary, Oaksford makes two main claims: (1) that the externalisation method used by Green, Over, and Pyne (1997) enforces the correlation observed between probability estimates and selection, and (2) that these estimates support the prediction of a downward revision of P(p) when P(p) > P(q). In this reply, we rebut claim 1 by describing the instructions more comprehensively, and claim 2 by reiterating the importance of making certain theoretical distinctions which Oaksford does not make. Our interest is the psychological process of reaching decision: externalisation methods provide a means of exploring this process and of assessing the value of Bayesian approaches.     

Logical reasoning and probabilities: A comprehensive test of Oaksford and Chater (2001)

We report two experiments testing a central prediction of the probabilistic account of reasoning provided by Oaksford and Chater (2001): Acceptance of standard conditional inferences, card choices in the Wason selection task, and quantifiers chosen for conclusions from syllogisms should vary as a function of the frequency of the concepts involved. Frequency was manipulated by a probability-learning phase preceding the reasoning tasks to simulate natural sampling. The effects predicted by Oaksford and Chater (2001) were not obtained with any of the three paradigms.     

Autonomic and eyeblink conditioning are closely related to contingency awareness: reply to Wiens and Ohman (2002) and Manns et al. (2002)

S. Wiens and A. Ohman (2002) disputed the conclusion that Pavlovian conditioning is strongly related to contingency awareness (P. F. Lovibond & D. R. Shanks, 2002) on the basis that an inappropriate definition of awareness was used. J. R. Manns, R. E. Clark, and L. R. Squire (2002) contended that delay eyeblink conditioning is independent of awareness. The authors of the present article consider these arguments, highlight several problems in the new studies described by the commentators, and conclude that there is still little evidence for unconscious conditioning in either subliminal autonomic conditioning or eyeblink conditioning. The most parsimonious account of existing data is that a single learning process gives rise to both awareness and conditioned responding. Further progress in evaluating the possibility of unconscious conditioning would be facilitated by the development of more completely specified and testable dual-process models.     

Wethinks the author doth protest too much: a reply to Esterson (2002)

A Esterson (2002) responded to the authors' analysis of recent reformulations of Freud's seduction theory and alleged sexual abuse discoveries. Esterson gave several additional examples of the same type of problematic writing the authors discussed in their original article. His commentary is largely a repetition of several already-published arguments, and his numerous criticisms of the article are, in the authors' opinion, without merit. The authors address confusion over inferring abuse from symptoms, treatment of symptoms versus resolution of cases, and fathers as perpetrators of abuse. It is clear that, as long as the topic of child sexual abuse elicits heated debate, so will Freud's seduction theory, but there may be times when one needs to step back to allow a debate to move forward.     

The utility of the PND statistic: A reply to Allison and Gorman

Quantitative synthesis (“meta-analysis”) of single-subject research has rarely been conducted, partly because of a lack of agreement on how study outcomes are to be quantified. This article provides a response to Allison and German (Behaviour Research and Therapy, 31, 621–631, 1993), who listed some problematic characteristics of use of the PND (percent of non-overlapping data) statistic for computing single-subject study outcomes, and recommended a regression-based solution to computation of effect sizes from single-subject research reports. Although Allison and Gorman are generally accurate in pointing out some limitations of the use of the PND statistic, they have been less thorough in identifying its relative strengths. Among these strengths is the fact that the PND statistic and its variations (a) have been shown to be strongly related to qualitative, “expert” ratings, (b) have been successfully employed in at least seven separate integrative reviews, and (c) have produced results which are complementary to more qualitative reviews of the same literature. In contrast, Allison and Gorman did not report results of applications of their procedure and, although their procedure has apparent theoretical support, it may be less useful in synthesizing existing single-subject literature.     

Jealousy reconsidered: A reply to DeSteno (2010)

In a recent commentary, DeSteno (2010) critiqued the work of Levy and Kelley (2010) which investigated the relationship of attachment style to the sex difference in jealousy. This commentary addresses the concerns raised by DeSteno; I briefly review some of the literature that was not addressed by DeSteno's commentary and discuss directions that future research may take.     

Advance specification and programming interactions: A reply to Rosenbaum,Barnes, and Slotta (1988)

Summary Choice reaction time often depends on the relation between the responses from which subjects have to choose. Rosenbaum, Barnes, and Slotta (1988) criticized the interpretation of a particular set of such effects which can be observed when subjects have to choose between left-hand and right-hand responses that have same or different spatio-temporal patterns. This set of effects had been interpreted in terms of a programming interactions (PI) hypothesis rather than in terms of the more popular advance specification (AS) hypothesis which is the foundation of a major portion of motor-programming research. It is made clear that the controversy is not about whether the one or the other hypothesis is correct in general, but about whether there are exceptions which cannot be interpreted in terms of the AS hypothesis. Further it is argued that the particular set of effects represents such an exception. It is shown that Rosenbaum et al. claim that the data are consistent with the AS hypothesis and inconsistent with the PI hypothesis is untenable.Supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (grant He 1187/3-1)